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This thesis aims to investigate how Thai TV dramas with a Northern Thai 
focus demonstrate and are used to construct the Thai nation and national identities. 
As a researcher, I am interested in how hegemonic narratives are used and depicted 
in selected television dramas and how the dominant power creates and distorts the 
pictures of subaltern/less powerful regional cultures. My major argument is based on 
the hypothesis that the Thai nation is not only constructed from ‘Thainess’ but also 
from the combinations of many ethnicities, cultures, and identities of many groups of 
people. 
Many scholars in the field of Thai Studies have shown that many Western 
elements are hybridised with Thai identities. This thesis goes further in investigating 
the Thai nation by focusing on Northern Thai culture as an example of subordinate 
culture and identity which are not hybridised but combined with and into Thai nation-
building. The key term, ‘combi-nation’, means the unequal, selective way that 
constructions of the Thai nation often adopt some specific cultures and identities to 
form the idea of a ‘modern nation.’ This combi-nation depends on their hierarchical 
relationships with Thai nation. While Thais choose to hybridise with the West by 
selecting what is good for their nation, that hybridisation is barred from northern 
identities as Thais regard the North as inferior and subordinate.   
This research uses qualitative analysis via close readings of key points and 
moments in four selected dramas. Chapter three is ‘history and nation’ in which I aim 
to show how Royalist Nationalist Historiography dominates presentation in these 
dramas, how the state exploits history to construct the Thai nation, and how history 
creates different combinations to form the Thai nation. This is done by examining 
three combinations - with the West, with other ethnicities, and with the Others within. 
Chapter four is concerned with ‘body and nation’, in which I investigate how Thai 
national identities are created by different combinations by looking specifically at 
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Note on translation and transliteration system 
 
In this thesis, I have adopted a transliteration style from the Royal Institute 
System. The Royal Institute System itself has gone through several changes since 
1939 and the current one was revised in 1999. The system however does not 
indicate long and short vowels, as well as tones. All names and Thai words are 
romanised following this system unless they are proper names that have been spelt 
differently and become widely used by the public, such as royal titles or names of 
well-known people. Some key terms that are used as main concepts are in italics to 
highlight that they are Thai terms, such as kathoey and siwilai. Other Thai words in 
the thesis will also be italicised and then followed by Thai script for the first time they 
are mentioned.  
 While it is common for international standards to refer to people by their 
surnames, in this thesis I follow the Thai way by referring to them by their given 
names. The first time their names are mentioned will be in full, meaning given name 
and surname. In the bibliography Thai names are presented in alphabetical order 
based on their given names. For some Thai scholars and people whose 
transliterated romanised names are not well-known, I have followed the Royal 
Institute System. However, some well-known scholars have a specific way of spelling 
their names that differs from the said system. In that case, I stay allegiant to how it 
has been spelt so that it will be consistent with other textbooks in the field.  
 Titles of TV dramas and films are romanised and italicised, followed by the 
year of broadcasting (mentioned first time only) and without translation to avoid 
confusion, because many dramas do not have official English names and they have 
several versions of translation. For tables and figures, credits and references are 
given in captions. Only in the case that they are originally Thai, and that I have 
translated into English, the caption will say ‘my translation.’   
 This thesis contains dialogue from TV dramas. Unless stated that they are in 
English, all conversations are my translation, from the original Thai versions. This 








Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 General Thai views on the Thai nation   
 In 2020, there were several social movements and protests within Thailand 
that showed resistance and dissatisfaction towards the military government. One 
protest in August was led by students and more than 10,000 protestors rallied at the 
Democracy Monument roundabout in Bangkok. The protestors had three demands: 
the dissolution of the House, the commencement of writing a new constitution, and 
an end to harassment of government critics (Bangkokpost, 2020a). The protests 
called not only for political reform but also monarchical reform, to moderate royal use 
of public funds, and to stay out of politics and without exercising control over 
important army units. The student protestors have since been accused of ‘crossing 
the line’ and powerful army commander, General Apirat Kongsompong, commented 
that the protesters were afflicted by ‘chung chart’ or ‘hatred of the nation’, a term 
used in the past to rally ultra-nationalist Thais against perceived enemies, and a 
disease, General Apirat told soldiers, that was far worse than Covid-19 (BBC, 2020).   
 Such phenomena raise some important questions in the minds of many Thais: 
‘what exactly is a nation’? Why is criticizing the government or the monarchy equal to 
criticizing or even hating the nation? Why do the military government and the 
monarchy so strongly monopolise the definition of nation? This thesis originated from 
the idea that Thai nation-building is everywhere, and that it is even more obvious in 
places that are frequently overlooked, such as in entertainment media. This thesis 
will, thus, investigate nation-building and the construction of national identities in TV 
drama, and it is one of Thailand’s most influential entertainment media.  I therefore 
investigate how the Thai nation and national identities are constructed in Thai TV 
dramas. I do so by looking specially at the relationship TV drama has with the 
regional identities of Northern Thailand, and as a subordinate culture. The Thai 
nation has frequently been a major topic and theme in mass media and textbooks, 
but as what, and how do these media present the Thai nation?   
In one Thai elementary school textbook, one learns that the concept of the 
Thai nation arose from the Sukhothai and Ayutthaya kingdoms1, continuing through 
 
1 In Thai school textbooks, there are three main periods of Thai history starting with 
Sukhothai (1257-1350), moving to Ayutthaya (1350-1767), and Bangkok (1768 to present). 
The rise and fall of these ancient kingdoms as shown in Thai historiography is a simplified 
linear presentation of Thai history, in that one kingdom falls, and another begins. This kind of 




to the current Bangkok period. In this textbook, one also learns that Thailand is the 
only country that has never been colonised and has stood firmly as a nation with a 
long history of over 800 years. Students are taught to be proud of their nation in 
comparison to other countries, which were colonised or newly founded (OBEC, 
2012:248-249). The Thai nation is a topic frequently found in mass media and 
television is a genre that repeatedly presents the Thai nation and Thainess. For 
example, the national anthem and its music video are decreed to broadcast twice a 
day at 8am and 6pm on every TV channel. For entertainment programmes, the Thai 
nation has become a popular theme. In 2019-2020, one of the country’s famous 
singing shows, The Mask Singer Thailand, featured nationalist themes of ‘Lai Thai’ 
(Thai painting) and ‘Luk Thai’ (Thai children). These forms highlighted Thai national 
and regional identities. In these two seasons of the show singers were dressed in 
special costumes and masks. These were designed to represent national and 
regional cultures and traditions such as festivals, food, myths, music, dance, and 
animals. The TV hosts and judges all dressed in traditional Thai costumes. Even the 
songs and performances were carefully selected and designed to showcase Thai 
nationalism and cultural identities. By watching this show, audiences were reminded 
of the ‘Thai nation’, inclusive of national and regional identities. Throughout the 
shows, a brief history of each ‘Thai identity’ was introduced to the audience, urging 
them to feel proud. 
The idea of ‘Thai nation’ is even more apparent in Thai TV dramas. The 
country’s most famous historical drama in 2018, Bupphesanniwat, is an outstanding 
example to demonstrate how much the theme of the Thai nation can generate 
national hype. (I will elaborate on this drama and topic in Chapter 2, in a section on 
historical drama). Because of this drama, the topic of Thai history during the 
Ayutthaya period has become of major public interest, as well as boosting the 
popularity of Thai traditional costume. This was simultaneously promoted by the 
government just as the drama aired. The drama’s success was confirmed when 
actors and producers were summoned to meet the Thai Prime Minister and 
members of parliament after they were impressed by the drama’s promotion of Thai 
culture and history. The major themes and messages in Bupphesanniwat are not 
different from existing well-known Thai historical TV dramas, which focus on the 
prosperity of Thailand in the past2. These depict pre-modern kingdoms such as 
Ayutthaya and the early Bangkok period. Nation in these dramas is portrayed 
through the representations of a prosperous history of a country that has never been 
 
2 For example, themes revolving around king and monarchy, ruling elites, war heroes, or a 




colonised. These representations are accompanied by anti-Western themes. Under 
this narrative of the nation, Siam/Thailand3 is shown to have always been an 
independent, prosperous country with a long history, enriched by its national and 
regional identities that, somehow, all nicely combine as one. It is this version of 
nation that has been constantly reproduced and served up to Thai audiences. 
However, Siam/Thailand’s independence and its relationship with regional states 
have also been under debate amongst many scholars in the Thai Studies field.  
1.2 Thai Studies view on the Thai nation 
Conventional histories of the Thai nation as exemplified above emphasise a 
‘Siam-was-never-colonised’ discourse, and a status as an independent country. (I 
will explore this later according to Thongchai Winichakul and other scholars in 
Chapter 3.1). However, several scholars in Thai Studies argue that the Thai nation 
cannot be understood on the premise of a ‘never-colonised’ discourse. They have 
debated Thailand’s independent status and that its history should rather be 
considered as a ‘semicolonial’ one, or ‘crypto-colonial.’ While Siam was a 
‘semicolonial’ state, under Western imperialism, it exercised its power through 
internal colonisation of other smaller states, such as those in the northern region. 
This has built hybrid characteristics of Thailand as a nation, which is both semi-
colonial and self-colonising. 
 Nidhi Eoseewong, a well-known Thai scholar and historian, calls conventional 
Thai history the ‘Prince Damrong school of history’ because it follows a style written 
by Prince Damrong, the half-brother of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). According 
to Nidhi, this kind of history was the writing of chronicles focused on kings and their 
activities. The historians of this school dominated the approaches to Thai history by 
focusing on events as the outcome of the actions of great figures, while paying no 
attention to society, economy, or culture (Baker, 2005:362-363, 367). The problem of 
this school is its sacredness, which prevents criticism or alternative interpretation of 
history.  
Likewise, Barend Jan Terwiel reviews the writing of the Thai past by placing 
attention on Royal Autographs. This writing, Terwiel proffers, is burdened by a 
process of rewriting the past, and avoiding disagreeable events – in favour of an 
account that renders a more positive impression (Terwiel,2011: 318). Historians 
covering the Bangkok period from 1782 face the same problem that ‘the plot of most 
 
3 Thailand was previously known as Siam (Prathet Sayam). In this thesis, Siam refers to pre-
modern Thailand before 1939, when the first State Convention during Phibun’s regime 




Thai history’ is chauvinistic. If any historian argues the fact, the debates will quickly 
tend to degenerate into accusation of ill-will towards the nation, being against 
authority, being Communist, or generally being held up for undermining proper law 
and order (Terwiel, 2011: 321-322). These views suggest that the writing of Thai 
history has been dominated by the power of the ruling class and they were the 
initiators of Thai nationalism.  
According to Benedict Anderson, Thai scholars often rely on the axioms that 
their nation is unique and fortunate because of the non-colonisation that made Siam 
an independent nation or the belief in the Chakri dynasty’s historical role as 
‘modernising’ and ‘national.’ Nevertheless, Anderson contends that Siam was 
unfortunate, not because it was colonised but for being indirectly colonised. He calls 
into question the accepted view of the modern Thai monarchy and the relationship 
between the modern Siamese nation (Anderson, 1978:198-200). Therefore, 
Anderson studies the modernisation of the Thai armed forces, roles of the monarchs, 
Royalism and economic relationship with the imperial West that somewhat 
resembled that of a colony. All of these suggest Siam’s status as semi-colonial. 
However, what created the idea of nationhood and nationalism in Thailand was the 
‘myopic interpretation of the rationalisation and centralisation policies of Rama IV, 
Rama V, and Rama VI, which reads the internal consolidation of the dynastic state 
as identical with the development of the nation’ (Anderson, 1978:210). On the 
contrary, he argues that ‘because the construction of the centralising ‘colonial’-style 
late 19th-century state was affected by the monarchy, the growth of an authentic 
popular Siamese nationalism was stunted’ (Anderson, 1978:211).  
Anderson refers to nationalism in Thailand as ‘official nationalism’, in which 
national consciousness is dominated by a dominant power from central Bangkok 
using a top-down process. Narrative does not originate from the nation's people but 
rather is introduced by the monarchs and elites. The monarchs founded many state-
controlled organisations to promote their version of nationalism. King Chulalongkorn 
modernised the country by taking a model of nationalism not from European 
countries but the colonies, such as the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and the 
Raj, which means ‘rationalising and centralising royal government, eliminative 
traditional semi-autonomous tributary statelets, and promoting economic 
development somewhat along colonial lines’ (Anderson, 2016: 99-101). 
Thongchai Winichakul has a similar view that Thai history has focused heavily 
on the roles of the monarchs or what he calls ‘Royalist nationalism’, or a nationalism 
defined by loyalty to the monarchy and where ‘being Thai’ means being royalist 




history is based on the ‘Siam-was-never-colonised’ narrative. This narrative was 
created based on the assumption that Siam has always been an integrated nation, 
which included other smaller states. His argument on the construction of Siam’s geo-
body points out that Siamese elites constructed the Thai nation from two stories, 
following the 1893 Paknam crisis. (The conflict between Siam and France regarding 
boundary at the east side of Mekong River. I will discuss this incident in chapter 3.1). 
These stories, or narratives, are the loss of territories and reform. These narratives 
present Siam as an integrated nation-state, set against Western power, and as Siam 
pressed its status over other independent states based on expansionist desires to 
magnify the anticolonial pretension (Thongchai, 1994:146-148). Within this view, 
Siam justified its internal colonisation of smaller independent states such as the 
North, or Lanna Kingdom. The main idea of this kind of nationalism is that all kings 
are presented as national heroes and other states as being saved and united by 
Siam to form a single, independent nation.  
 Royalist nationalism has become a powerful ideology in Thailand, even after 
the 1932 revolution to overthrow the absolute monarchy. Though the emphasis of 
the military government during the 1940s shifted to racial nationalism, it did not 
eliminate Royalist nationalism which has also become blurred with chauvinism. The 
external threat changed from Western imperialism, to Communism, and then to 
Western capitalism, consumerism and the negative impacts of Western culture. 
Thongchai states that though the varying ‘Others’ of Thai nationalism have changed 
over time, the monarchy, the Thai race, and the people are the main bases for Thai 
nationalism (Thongchai, 2008:585). The sacred aura of the monarchy was intensified 
after the 1960s. Jack Fong refers to the role of the monarch as a ‘sacred nationalism’ 
rooted to Thai primordial society and the reproduced cultural essence for legitimating 
its authority (Fong, 2009:676).  
  Apart from historical writing that emphasises the role of the monarch, Siam’s 
independent status during Western imperialism is also questionable. Peter Jackson 
points out it should be termed as ‘semi-colonialism.’ While Siam might remain 
politically independent, economically and culturally it followed patterns very similar to 
those of colonised Southeast Asian societies (Jackson, 2010:38). There are many 
other similar terms that could also be used to describe the Siamese scenario at that 
time, such as ‘indirect rule’, ‘informal empire’, ‘cultural imperialism’, internal 
colonialism, auto-colonialism, and crypto-colonialism (Jackson, 2010:41). For 
Jackson, the semi-colonisation of Siam is reflected in themes of duality and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, Siam had shown semi-colonial forms of power as the 
local elites were subordinate to Western power. On the other hand, Siam’s absolute 




the internal tyranny that the absolute monarchy and its successors exercised over 
the local population in order to secure their own political autonomy in the 
international arena (Jackson, 2010:51-53).  
  Other scholars also find that definition of the Thai nation and nationalism is 
problematic. Michael Herzfeld states that Siam was not independent but should be 
described as a ‘crypto-colonial’ nation. Crypto-colonialism is the condition in which 
the very claim of independence marks a symbolic as well as material dependence on 
intrusive colonial power; 
the curious alchemy whereby certain countries, buffer zones between the 
colonised lands and those as yet untamed, were compelled to acquire 
their political independence at the expense of massive economic 
dependence, this relationship being articulated in the iconic guise of 
aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models. Such 
countries were and are living paradoxes: they are nominally independent, 
but that independence comes at the price of a sometimes humiliating form 
of effective dependence (Herzfeld (2002), cited in Herzfeld, 2010:173-74). 
 In Herzfeld’s view, Siam was forced not only to cede territory but also to 
reform its administrative institutions like other countries that fell under Western 
colonialism. The only difference was that Siam tried to present that Western 
authoritarianism, culture, technology and values, models of public order and 
conceptual discipline were local products (Herzfeld, 2010:175-76). Thais have long 
been, and still are, strategic and selective in their adoption and use of Western forms 
as expressed through Thai urban architecture, hygiene, personal clothing, table 
manners, and also the production of stereotypically Thai cultural forms such as 
Buddhism and feudalism to claim political attitudes for local creativity (Herzfeld, 
2010:178,180-182).  
 Due to its ambiguous status during Western imperialism, Rachel Harrison has 
shown how Siam/Thailand gained a lot of Western influence, akin to other colonised 
countries. By looking at Thai films as a cinematic display of hybridised Thai identity, 
Harrison finds that these films reveal underlying anxieties about the resilience of Thai 
cultural integrity in a rapidly globalising world (Harrison, 2010b:96). Thai films use 
anti-Western themes to build national pride by depicting the nationalist theme of 
‘never-been-colonised’, the narratives of which surround the country’s avoidance of a 
fully-fledged colonial past by the wisdom of Siamese kings (Harrison, 2010b:113).    
 According to these scholars, this attitude lies in contrast to the conventional 
view of Siam/Thailand as an independent state, or what can be described as the 
‘never-colonised’ nation. Rather, this construct of the Thai nation is a hybrid 




the internal coloniser when viewed by the inward gaze of local people. While these 
scholars mainly focus on the characteristics of the Thai nation in its relationship with 
the West or from the central Thai perspective, this thesis aims to look at Thai nation-
building from the internal perspective that local identities are exploited to construct 
national identity and this reflects the imperialist status of Siam/Thailand.   
1.3 Thailand and its imperialist thinking  
When the Siamese ruling class wanted to oppose Western imperialism, 
Bangkok elites acted in the name of Siam by uniting all local populations and 
identities to form a united, modern Thai nation. However, it is questionable how well 
local identities are accepted domestically regarding the nation-building in which 
these Bangkok elites or central Thailand has always been the dominant power over 
local, subordinated peoples. These subordinate identities are treated as inferior, yet 
they are essential for the construction of the nation. The manipulation of local 
identities within Thai nation-building processes has shown Thai imperialist thinking4, 
which is also a product of Western colonialism. This imperialist thinking in Thailand is 
still recurrent and is reproduced in the contemporary Thai media, even though actual 
Western colonisation has ended.  
In order to illustrate this recurrent imperialist thinking, I would like to take 
examples from new racism in Britain. Stuart Hall studied British law and mugging as 
social phenomenon. Hall found that racism dominated attitudes and the thoughts of 
British people in the 1970s, even though imperialism had ended. Race, crime and 
youth were the articulators of social crisis and that crisis functioned as a mechanism 
for the construction of an authoritarian consensus (Hall et.al, 1978: viii). As British 
society was in a moral panic about the rising rate of violent crime, they found a link 
between the crime rate and environment that determined crime and the background 
of the criminal. In other words, there was a transparent association between crime, 
race, poverty and housing (Hall et.al, 1978:115, 119).  
Following Hall’s work, a book entitled The Empire Strikes Back: Race and 
Racism in 70s Britain further shows that race has become the means through which 
hegemonic relations are secured in a period of structural crisis management 
(Solomos et.al, 1982:11). Black people in Britain have been constructed as a 
national problem, or enemy within. This is neo-conservative racist theory which 
believes in the common-sense that ‘enemies within’ are undermining the structures 
of British society and racial problems are a result of illegal immigrants and that the 
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black community is a home-grown problem, who are in Britain, but not of Britain 
(Solomos et.at, 1982:21,29-30). Sectors of British society have believed that ‘normal’ 
family will generate correct ‘moral social compulsions’ and ‘inner controls’, while 
‘criminal’ or ‘immoral’ behaviour are the outcome of an inadequate upbringing, or 
even in some cases the result of an abnormal, black, family life (Lawrence, 1982:50-
51). Therefore, problems in British society were regarded as being imported by 
immigrant, alien communities, with alien cultures (Lawrence, 1982:81).  
While these scholars studied British law and social crisis since the 1970s, 
more than 30 years have passed and racism in Britain is yet to go away. The 
construction of an authoritarian state in Britain is fundamentally intertwined with the 
elaboration of popular racism and long-standing common-sense views of immigration 
as a problem and of black and minority ethnic groups (BME) as alien to British 
nationhood and citizenship. Racial crisis remains salient across a range of arenas – 
education, labour markets, housing, crime and policing (Alexander, 2014:1785-86). 
Even though Britain today is a multicultural society, people are living parallel lives. 
West Indians or Asians do not become ‘Englishmen’ despite being born in Britain.  
British society is a community of communities (Alexander, 2014:1789). 
Just like the new racism that is still persistent in Britain, imperialist thinking in 
Thailand has dominated the ideologies and social values of the dominant power in 
central Thailand towards local populations. This thesis will focus on the depiction of 
Northern people and Northern Thai identity as a case study of a subordinate region. 
Northern people and cultural identities may not be regarded as threats or causes of 
social crisis as black people in Britain are. However, they are treated as peripheral, 
alienated and inferior to the dominant central Thai identity in Bangkok. The 
suppression of the North has been evident in mass media especially TV dramas. 
The recurrent imperialist thinking is often shown via narratives and themes relating to 
Western colonialism, the country’s reform and centralisation of power, demarcation 
of territories and the expansion of Thai empire. Following these narratives, Siam 
plays the role of a saviour who protects the north from external threats. I further 
investigate these themes in Chapter 3.1 and 3.2 in which the North, as an 
independent state, seeks help by uniting with Siam to find peace and sanctuary. 
Seen with imperialist eyes, the dominant power in Bangkok regards itself as more 
civilised so the north is therefore deemed savage and backward. This theme is 
discussed in Chapter 3.3 as the North, represented by landscape, villager and hill 
tribe peoples, are shown as stereotypes of a helpless, uncivilised Other, waiting for 
Central Thai power to educate and civilise them. The imperialist eye has frozen the 




Based on imperialist thinking that often sexualises a relationship with the 
colonies, Siam has effeminised the North, and this is reproduced in Thai TV dramas. 
This is portrayed through the stereotypical romance between Central Thai men and 
Northern Thai women. I will elaborate this issue in Chapter 4.1. Western gender 
binary is also a product of imperialism that has altered pre-modern concepts of 
gender in the country and positions the coloniser with masculinity and adulthood, 
and the colonised with femininity and childhood. Following this gender binary, other 
genders are invisible in this imperialist relationship. The third gender, which is an 
intermediate gender between male and female, and one of the compulsory elements 
in Thai TV dramas, is almost invisible in TV dramas with a Northern Thai focus. 
Chapter 4.1 explores this gender stereotype and the sexualisation of the North. 
Lastly, Siam/Thailand is often situated as superior to local populations. One way of 
doing so is by the occupying of hybridised beauty, as modern Thai identity gains 
more power over subordinate Others. This modern concept of beauty is a product of 
imperialism that Siam/Thailand has gained from being an indirect colony. While 
modernised identity is presented, the North is suppressed and compressed into a 
pre-modern identity and concept of beauty. Chapter 4.2 will explore the hybridised 
beauty mechanism that Siam/Thailand has used to exercise power, constantly 
creating reminders of Thainess while suppressing the North to enhance their own 
status.  
What this thesis aims to show is that imperialist thinking is still persistent in 
Thailand and it is reproduced continuously in contemporary television dramas, even 
though actual colonisation has ended. This kind of imperialist thinking is found in the 
nation-building process and construction of national identities. The North as 
subordinate culture has been exploited by Siam/Thailand in different aspects to 
create its power.  
1.4 Combi-nation   
Thinking the history of Thailand through the lens of internal empire building 
brings forth the concept of ‘Combi-nation.’ My major argument is that Thai nation-
building and national identities are both hybridised, as a product of semi-colonialism, 
and also constructed from many combinations as a result of internal colonisation. 
Many different elements are taken, merged, and mixed during this process, to 
become modern Thai identities. This process of combination is ongoing, and it is 
expressed through the political conflicts in the country.  
Political unrest in Thailand in 2020 urged more and more people to question 




country in many aspects, including the political and monarchical, implies an apex of 
dissatisfaction towards the government and status quo. Among many topics, one 
problem raised by the protesters is social structure and inequality, which they argue 
to be the effect of the centralisation of power. Bangkok is the centre of almost 
everything ranging from administration, military, education, transportation and 
healthcare while other provinces are less developed. Thus, parts of the demands 
also mentioned the decentralisation or distribution of administrative power and tax 
revenue to other parts of the country.  
This reminds us of Thailand’s political conflict between the Yellow and Red 
Shirts since 2006, which was a clash between the middle and upper classes who are 
mostly Royalists, supporting the old establishment, with the lower middle-class 
people who supported the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was 
regarded as ‘the arch enemy of the old establishment’ (Row, 2020). These conflicts 
were based on discourses such as phrai (ไพร ่commoners) and ammat (อาํมาตย ์
privileged class), the educated middle-class in urban Bangkok and the uneducated 
lower-classes in the rural areas, and so on. All these divides are suggestive of how 
hierarchical power is and how it is unequally distributed in the country.  
The political divide in 2006 was also based on an urban-rural split, a regional 
division between the poor North and Northeast and centrally located Bangkok where 
money and power is located. The crisis in Thai politics was exacerbated by regional 
imbalances and uneven development (Schmidt, 2011:323-324). In 2014, the tension 
escalated after a demand of separatism by the Red Shirts. Though they later denied 
this and claimed that it was a misunderstanding, they admitted that the people in the 
North and Northeast had painful feeling towards the political injustice since the 2006 
coup (Bangkokpost, 2014). According to Duncan McCargo, the government’s 
‘reconciliation’ in responding to political conflicts does not work because 
reconciliation is a royalist construct, based on the premise that all Thais are bound 
together by a shared sense of identity predicated on the pillars of ‘nation, religion, 
and king.’ This evidence of political division shows unequal distributions of power 
and the political landscape that has long been suppressed by the Bangkok elite and 
is now challenged (McCargo, 2010:6,11).  
Similar to the conflicts fuelling Thailand’s political crisis, this thesis is based on 
the idea that the roots of problems start from the construction of the ‘Thai nation.’ 
Thai nation-building prioritises the dominant power in Bangkok and Central Thai 
culture. Bangkok as a capital city acts as a hegemony of Thainess and nationhood. 
Central Thai culture has marginalised and exploited other regional cultures and 




concept of the Thai nation is complex, containing different layers comprised of many 
other sub-altern identities that are essential to it, though not equally treated. In order 
to understand the complexity in Thailand, I have drawn on the following theories.    
The first concept used to help explain this situation in Thailand is Homi 
Bhabha’s hybridisation. According to Bhabha, the new form of culture that emerged 
as a product of colonisation is ‘hybridisation.’ Bhabha’s concept points out that the 
process of cultural assimilation is not one-way. In contrast to Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1979) which focused on the binaries between East and West or 
colonised and coloniser, Bhabha contended that colonial power did not only 
dominate, command authorities of the colonialist or repress the colonised. Bhabha 
argues that it also produced 'hybridisation' – a new space which is neither the 
colonised or the coloniser, rather, something 'in-between.’ 
The concept of hybridisation is concerned with two key terms – ambivalence 
and mimicry. Mimicry is a strategy used by a colonial power to transform the colonial 
subject into a 'partial presence' (Bhabha, 1994:86). To dominate one culture, the 
coloniser wants to turn a colonial subject to be something similar to themselves. 
However, this similarity must not be identical since it is 'the desire for a reformed, 
recognisable Other, as a subject of differences that is almost the same but not quite' 
(Bhabha, 1994:86). In other words, to control the boundaries of that mimicry, it needs 
an ambivalence which is produced by remaining slippage, excess, and difference. 
Therefore, a non-equivalence needs to remain; a split between superior and inferior 
to explain why one group can dominate another (Huddart, 2006:59). 
Bhabha argues that in the process of mimicry, the colonised and coloniser 
had produced something 'in-between' or a space that initiated new signs of identity. It 
is a space where the social articulation of difference is complex in an ongoing 
negotiation, and this permitted cultural hybridity to occur (Bhabha, 1994:1-2). 
Hybridity is not a mixing of two different cultures. However, it is the way that the 
rejected and denied culture has turned back to a dominant discourse and weakened 
the authority of the colonist. In Bhabha's terms, hybridity is ‘a problematic of colonial 
representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist 
disavowal.’ So, the other 'denied' knowledge enter upon the dominant discourse and 
estrange the basis of its authority – its rules of recognition (Bhabha, 1994:114). 
Hybridisation breaks down the authority constructed by the coloniser because 
colonial authority requires an identity asserted through the repetition of 
discriminatory effects, through the construction of a differentiated identity (Childs and 
Williams, 1997:134). Thus, hybridity intervenes in this exercise of authority. It is the 




discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of 
colonial power and turns the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power 
(Bhabha, 1994:112, 114).   
There are several scholars who have argued on the ambiguity or hybridity of 
the Thai nation. For example, The Ambiguous Allure of the West: Traces of the 
Colonial in Thailand comprises articles by scholars who argue how Thailand has 
hybridised with the West. Scholars who contributed to this volume, such as Harrison, 
Pattana, and Thongchai, have presented different aspects of Western influences in 
Thai society. In terms of Siam’s relationship with its internal colonies, Jackson 
investigates its hybridity by using Bhabha's hybridisation to explain the unique 
characteristic of Thailand as being semi-colonial. He uses Bhabha's and Garcia 
Canclini’s concepts to show Siam/Thailand's two dimensions of semi-colonial 
relations to the West – one in which the ruling elites are autonomous of the West and 
another in which both these elites and general population are in a subordinate, 
colony-like relation. In the local, Jackson uses Canclini’s account of Hispanic 
hegemony in Latin America to show that hybridity in Siam bolsters elite power over 
the population. In the international level where Siam is in subordinate, colony-like 
dimension, he uses Bhabha’s approach to explain that hybridity is both a form of 
resistance to or evasion of Western domination (Jackson, 2008:161).  
While Thailand’s semicolonial relationship to the West can be defined using 
the notion of hybridisation, its status as a self-colonising or internal coloniser to 
smaller states such as Lanna needs another concept to understand this doubleness. 
I have drawn on the case of Russia, which also has that kind of ambiguity. Russia 
has special characteristics that made it different from other imperialists, or that is its 
being ‘European but not Western’ identity. Three significant reasons caused 
'Russia's contradictory status.’ These are sequence, duration, and contiguity. First, 
the sequence of the Russian nation-state is unlike those in western countries. While 
other empires fell when their former metropoles were gradually being transformed 
into nations and nation-states, the Tsarist and Soviet empire fell apart before a 
modern Russian nation and a Russian nation-state had emerged (Condee, 2009:21).  
The next feature is the duration of the imperial structure, which was far longer 
than the Western cohort. The last reason is contiguity. Unlike the British Empire, 
Russian empire did not easily divide geographically or culturally, and its territorial 
markers were hybrid with blurring ethnic identifications. These caused cultural 
hybridity, ambiguity and contested boundaries. Besides, the distinctions between 




2009:22-24). Because of these characteristics, Nancy Condee argues that the 
formation of the Russian nation does not fit with Western definitions of a nation.  
There are different definitions of a nation according to Western scholars. For 
example, scholar of ethnosymbolism Anthony Smith defines a nation as ‘a named 
human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members’ (Smith, 1991:14). Scholars of modernism like Gellner, 
Anderson, and Hobsbawm term it differently. For Gellner, nation resulted from 
modernity and industrialisation whereby universal literacy, mobility, individualism, 
political centralisation, and the need for educational infrastructure were required for 
the economic growth of industrial society (Gellner, 2006:106). For Anderson, nation 
emerged when religious community and dynastic realm declined in power. The 
coming of print capitalism created new ‘homogeneous, empty time’, in which 
simultaneity is marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar 
(Anderson, 2016:16-24). Hobsbawm states that nation is an invention and product of 
social engineering, created from above or top-down processes. For him, nationalism 
comes before nation, not the other way around. Nationalism sometimes takes pre-
existing cultures and turns them into nation while sometimes inventing them. Nations 
need certain political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions to 
emerge (Hobsbawm, 1991:9-11).   
According to these definitions, Russia has shown some overlapping features. 
On the one hand, it is a strong centralised state and imperial identity. On the other 
hand, ethnic and linguistic categories are not identical to territorial boundaries, to 
each other, and to the nation as constructivist theorists have elaborated that 
concept. So, these characteristics have created two Russias (Condee, 2009:12). 
These two Russias are imperial and demotic identities. For the imperial identity, the 
elites forged to command the mechanism of the state through civil bureaucracy, 
economic patronage and other means. At the same time, there was a demotic 
identity which has little to do with Western education, language, culture, and travel 
but relies on the notion of ‘Holy Rus’, which denotes the idea of land with a sacred 
ruler (Condee, 2009:17-18). The difference between metropolitan elites and the 
demotic periphery imbues Russia with an exceptional status with its nationhood in 
internal differentiation under the larger imperial rubric. In Condee’s words, ‘Russia 
has occupied a space between empire and ethnicity, space where nation does not 
cohere’ (Condee, 2009:17). 
Considering the idea of ‘two Russias’, I want to investigate what structure 




to form its nation, in the case of Thailand however I want to propose that there is a 
process of ‘Combi-nation.’ Thailand formed a modern nation from its relationship with 
the imperialists and followed the imperial structure. Still, it cannot fit with either the 
definitions by the ethnosymbolism or the modernism alone. Based on these two 
theoretical concepts, Bhabha’s hybridisation emphasises the ‘in-between’ where the 
hybridised culture breaks down the authority constructed by the coloniser. At the 
same time, Condee’s ‘two Russias’ focused on the ambiguity and doubleness in 
becoming a modern nation. In the case of Thailand, it is not only a doubleness of 
Siam's identity or hybridisation between cultures of colonised and coloniser – Siam 
VS. West, or Lanna Kingdom VS. Siam. Instead, it is a selective combination of both 
the West and ethnic cultures to formulate the Thai nation.  
This ‘Combi-nation’ is rooted in the uneven distribution of power among 
elements of the superior and inferior, a colony within a semi-colony, a colonised who 
is also a coloniser, and subordinate people as double-colonised object. Modern Thai 
identities are hybridised with Western imperialist’s culture to empower Thailand as a 
modernised, civilised nation. This is expressed through bureaucratic system, 
education, technology and innovations, eating habits, architecture, and bodily 
practices. At the same time, the central power in Bangkok dominates other parts of 
the country and standardised its own culture, language, ideologies and so on, they 
have also exploited and adopted some features of suppressed cultures and people 
to form the Thai nation and national identities. Ethnic groups and cultures like Lanna 
were exploited to stabilise the united Thai nation.  
The process of ‘Combi-nation’ in Thailand is not identical to, but consists of, 
hybridisation because different elements are not necessarily hybridised. Elements 
are either combined or hybridised depending on a hierarchical relationship or how 
the project of the Thai nation uses it. During the combination process, the Thai 
nation making adds new signification to each element. Each part remains meaningful 
in itself, but once it is combined, its meaning has been changed to something else. 
For example, the West is hybridised to becoming modern Thai identities. The West 
has its meaning in the western world. Once the West is associated with the Thai 
nation, its meanings changes and becomes complex, regarded either as external 
threat and destroyer or as models of civilisation that the Thai nation desires. In 
contrast to the West, the North is combined but never hybridised. Northern Thailand 
has meaning in itself, but once combined with the Thai nation, its status changes 
according to a relationship it has with Siam/Thailand, the centre. It was termed as a 
‘territorial state’, and then ‘provinces’ with inferior status so that Thailand can 
construct its identity. Ethnic cultures and identities of the North are exploited to 




ethnic cultures are not hybridised with Central Thai culture. They are combined, 
assimilated, but at the same time kept apart because of social hierarchies and racial 
differences.  
Accordingly, this is a selective way of using ‘combination’, between different 
cultures and identities that depend on where Siam/Thailand positions itself by 
relationship to others. In this thesis, I want to call this selective way of hybridisation 
and combination, ‘Combi-nation’. This concept explains a Siamese way of using 
such combination to construct a nation. One is the Thai nation structured from the 
imperialist perspectives, which is united, homogenous, static and stable. It is the 
Thai nation that has been modernised and Westernised, so it survived Western 
colonisation. It is the Thai nation with bureaucracy, sovereignty and independence. 
Another is the Thai nation that is grounded on traditional perceptions of hierarchies 
and racial differences. This Thailand is in an ambiguity and ongoing tension between 
centre and periphery, central Thai and other subordinate regions, elite and 
commoners, official and non-official caused by assimilation during the formation of a 
nation as exemplified with the political crisis above. These two identities of Thailand 
were caused through the complex relationship of Siam/Thailand acting as an internal 
imperialist among other states.  
The relationship between Siam/Thailand and the West and its internal 
colonies have been discussed by scholars in the field. However, all of them were 
done from a central Thai perspective of Thai history. I wish to further investigate, 
branching out from the above-mentioned scholars in the Thai studies field. This 
thesis aims to inverstigate further on a non-centric perspective that focuses on 
regional, subordinate culture and the construction of the Thai nation and national 
identities. It will develop from these scholars by looking at the representations of the 
North in the narrative of the nation as shown in TV dramas. This is different from 
studying historical records because it is the representation of history, not the history 
itself. (I will explain this in the following section in this chapter). Finally, this thesis 
demonstrates a new way to understand that the construction of a modern Thai nation 
is a complex process. While these scholars have shown Thailand’s hybridity, it does 
not simply mean that every identity of the Thai nation is hybridised. On the other 
hand, the hybridisation and assimilation processes are selective, and variant based 
on the dimension of relationships.    
1.5 History, nation and narration    
 My thesis is based on the idea that history and nation are related to 




history as recorded in those textbooks or adapted into movies? How important is 
historical narrative to a nation? Can a nation be constructed without referring to its 
past or history? Every narrative was written or told for some specific purpose, and 
this thesis wants to investigate Thai television drama in providing narratives of Thai 
nation.    
In Thailand, TV drama is one of the most influential forms of media. Popular 
TV dramas can have a high impact on the whole population. While these TV dramas 
are produced mainly for entertainment, it is undeniable that they are laden with Thai 
values, beliefs, ideologies, and hegemony. One of the key messages propelled 
through Thai television drama is that of Thai nationalism, rooted in Thai Royalist 
Nationalist Historiography (hereafter RNH). The RNH is the writing of history which is 
built on the concept Thongchai calls ‘Royalist nationalism’ and Nidhi’s ‘Prince 
Damrong School of history’ that I have mentioned earlier (more detail in Chapter 
3.1). Therefore, I want to use three concepts which are nation, narration, and 
historical writing borrowed from Benedict Anderson, Homi Bhabha, and Linda 
Hutcheon, respectively. These will explain and help us understand how history and 
narratives in Thai television dramas are related and used to build the Thai nation and 
some specific national identities.  
The first question to ask then, is how a nation is related to narration. 
Anderson's concept of a nation as an 'imagined community' explains that a national 
consciousness starts from two forms of imagining, which are the novel and the 
newspaper. This imagination is possible through the emerging of 'homogenous, 
empty time', a concept which replaces mediaeval conception of time, marked by 
temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar (Anderson, 2016:22-24-
25). Reading novels creates a sense of nationhood because it gives a picture of 
people doing different activities at the same time. For omniscient readers, these 
people are living in the same clocked, calendrical time and ‘the idea of sociological 
organism moving calendrically is analogue of the idea of the nation, which is 
conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history’ (Anderson, 
2016:26). 
Similarly, reading a newspaper gives experiences of ‘doubleness of reading' 
because stories on a front-page happened simultaneously and independently, 
without actors being aware of each other. Still, their linkage is imagined because of 
the calendrical coincidence (Anderson, 2016:32-33). The emergence of two forms of 
imagination holds a lot of credit to the rise of print language and print-capitalism, as 
well as the decline of a religious community and sacred language. Print language, or 




consciousness while print-capitalism created mass consumption and imagined world 
among readers (Anderson, 2016:34-35, 44). In other words, it is a convergence of 
capitalism and print technology which created a new form of imagined community, 
which set the stage for the modern nation (Anderson, 2016:46).  
According to this concept, national consciousness is constructed by forms of 
narration which create a sense of unity from reading, and that then connects people 
even though they do not know, meet or are aware of one another. Thus, a nation is 
then associated with perception rather than reality, as long as people feel they are 
united. As in Anderson's words, ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 2016:6). Same as 
newspaper and novel, television drama also creates an imagined community through 
narrations because it is a modern genre of mass media that aims to reach a wide 
group of audiences nationwide at the same time. Audiences who watch a television 
programmes are aware of million of others who could have also watched the same 
programme. Besides, the watching of TV forms a perception that people on screen 
are also members of the same nation. In other words, the Thai nation is forged from 
narration, through narratives, but these are narrated or dominated by those who are 
in power.  
Anderson’s concept focuses on the process of imagining, done through the 
reading of 'newspaper-as-fiction.’ It does not touch upon the production of narratives 
but rather emphasises how people perceive the feeling of a nation after reading or 
watching it. Anderson regards a nation's people as a group with their own self-
originated perception free from power or domination. Can Anderson’s concept of 
imagined community describe the imagining of the Thai nation? The answer is yes, 
but we also have to consider whose narratives are told. Therefore, I want to bring in 
a concept from another thinker to expand an idea on a nation’s narrations.  
Homi Bhabha contends that Anderson's discussion focuses on the process of 
signification rather than the progress of narratives. For Bhabha, Anderson's concept 
of the 'meanwhile'– a form of temporality that produces 'imagined community' which 
works like a plot of a realist novel – puts more emphasis on the 'suddenness' of the 
arbitrary sign (Bhabha, 1994:158-159). According to Bhabha, nations are forms of 
narration, and it is created on the double narrative movement. He proposes an idea 
of 'doubleness' in writing, which questions the concept of 'many as one’ that treats 
gender, class or race as social totalities of unitary collective experience (Bhabha, 
1994:142). To understand ‘doubleness', Babha took Freud's concept of 'uncanny' to 




cultural belief as a result of some psychic ambivalence or intellectual uncertainty. 
Therefore, a double narration is a process of ‘the doubling, dividing and 
interchanging of the self’ (Bhabha, 1994:140-144).  A national narration is neither 
derived from dominant power or a nation’s people alone. It is in between. 
While Anderson stresses the consuming of printed text like novels or 
newspapers, Bhabha further points out that a nation’s people are not simply parts of 
historical events or a patriotic body politic, but they must be thought of in double-
time. On the one hand, the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist 
pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or 
constituted historical origin in the past. On the other hand, the people are also the 
‘subjects’ of a process of signification. They must erase any prior presence of the 
nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of the people as 
contemporaneity. In other words, the production of the nation as narration is in ‘a 
split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the 
repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative’ (Bhabha, 1994:145). The 
pedagogical found its narrative authority in a tradition of the people, encapsulated in 
historical moments while the performative found its narrative between people as 
'image' and its signification as a differentiating sign of self. So, a problem is not the 
'selfhood' of a nation as opposed to the otherness, but a nation split within itself. This 
turns to be a liminal space in which no political ideologies could claim authority for 
themselves (Bhabha, 1994:148). 
Following Anderson’s view, we assume that a nation is formed by imagining. It 
is only a question of whose narratives that are used for imagination. Then we have 
Bhabha’s concept of double narrative movement which opens more spaces for 
people to be both object and subject of narrations. According to this, it is presumed 
that narratives can be produced between the authoritative power and the nation's 
people. Most Thai TV dramas have turned out to be both pedagogical and 
performative. These TV dramas show signs of being pedagogical as they make use 
of historical moments from traditional sources like textbooks or conventional history. 
At the same time, they are performative as being contemporary adaptation by the 
people. Their signification of self and the nation is very much influenced by the 
pedagogical. So, nation narrations in Thailand lie in the ambivalence between being 
the state's apparatus or propaganda, and being people's process of representing 
themselves as 'subjects' of historical narratives. 
Apart from the question of whose narrations get told or whether they are from 
dominant power or people, another thing to consider is what kind of stories are 




moments to build up their narratives, and many times history and fiction are blurred. 
Audiences find it difficult to distinguish between fiction and historical facts. However, 
it does not matter at all whether it is fiction or fact. Linda Hutcheon argues that both 
history and fiction are discourses that constitute systems of signification by which we 
make sense of the past. When looking at history, the meaning is not in the events, 
but in the systems which make those past ‘events’ into present historical ‘facts.’ In 
Hutcheon’s terms, there can be no single concept of ‘genuine historicity’ because the 
writing of history and fiction is always filled with contamination (Hutcheon, 1988:89-
92).  
As a postmodern thinker, she is interested in how we can know the past today 
and what can we know of it. Hutcheon calls it 'historiographic metafiction’ (Hutcheon, 
1988:92). 'Historiographic metafiction' refutes the natural or common-sense methods 
of distinguishing between historical fact and fiction. It refuses the view that the only 
history has a truth claim, both by questioning the ground of that claim in 
historiography and by asserting that both history and fiction are discourses, human 
constructs, signifying systems (Hutcheon, 1988:93). To put it simply, neither truth nor 
falsity are the right terms to discuss fiction. There are only ‘truths in the plural, and 
never one Truth; and there is rarely falseness per se, just others’ truths’ (Hutcheon, 
1988:109). Accordingly, the critical question is not whether history or fiction is real or 
not, but what does it mean to a nation's people. It is a shift from validation to 
signification and to the way those discourses make sense of the past. Besides, what 
is also essential is a selection of past events. While events occurred in the real 
empirical past, only some events are constituted as historical facts. This selection 
means that we only know those past events through their discursive inscription and 
their traces in the present (Hutcheon, 1988:97). 
When combining these three concepts, the framework of this thesis hinges on 
the idea that a nation is formed by imagining through narrations. These narrations 
are in the doubleness of being both pedagogical and performative. In Thai TV 
drama, the nation's people are performed as 'subjects' of a nation. Yet, it is a genre 
that is much dominated by historical moments, hegemonic and ideological power as 
state apparatus. Moreover, history and fiction are discourses that are exploited to 
produce these narratives, so that none of them should be considered as facts or 
truths. What this thesis emphasises is not the past events themselves but that it is 
the representation of the past that does matter. Thai TV dramas are selected as a 
text for this thesis because they clearly illustrate how a nation is narrated and 
broadcast to Thai people both nationwide and worldwide to build a sense of 
nationhood. The next chapter ‘Pre-chapter’ will provide background of Thai TV 




Chapter 2  
Thai TV context and research methodology   
 This chapter provides a landscape of Thai TV drama, looking at a television 
pattern - historical background, screening, schedule, state control, and consumption 
of TV drama - through to the structures and key elements of Thai TV dramas. It then 
discusses the genre of historical drama because all four selected dramas in this 
thesis are historical dramas. This genre has long been popular for Thai audiences. 
These historical TV dramas take place within a specific spectrum or use a specific 
repertoire, ordinarily laden with RNH, that is, they exhibit a mode of hyper-royalism. 
This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of these Thai TV dramas – why 
particular themes are recurrent, which topics are taboo, what the role of the Thai 
state is in the industry, and how TV dramas are viewed or have impact upon the 
audience. The last section focusses on the central research question and 
methodology. I have provided empirical data from fieldwork in Thailand also. This 
data provides background to the dramas I analyse and demonstrates they were 
created based on existing ideologies and frameworks in Thailand; the RNH and 
stereotypical images of the north from the central Thai perspective.  
2.1 Television today – watching and studying  
According to Toby Miller, television has given rise to three major topics. These 
are technology, ownership and control or its political economy; textuality or its 
content; and audiences or TV’s public. Each topic is divided into different theories 
and methods. For example, technology lies between two disciplines; one that 
believes in limited regulation of the state, and the other controlling socio-political 
agenda. The study of text could be hermeneutics and content analysis, while 
audience studies vary from the relation between social conduct and TV or the 
spectators own interpretations. Miller divided these approaches into TV studies 1.0 
and 2.0 (Miller, 2009:23-25). While TV studies 1.0 focused on the political economy 
of TV, roles of mass media, top-down, leftist functionalism and its audiences as 
‘passive consumers’, TV studies 2.0 placed stress on the audiences as powerful 
agents that could make their own meanings. However, Miller terms more recent 
studies as TV studies 3.0, a hybrid concept composed of political economy and 
cultural studies. Under this approach, we see media not as things that ‘fall out of the 
sky’ but as produced with meanings, and thus requiring comprehensive 
interdisciplinarity to acknowledge the specificity of television as a cultural, economic, 




studies can contribute to wider understanding not only in terms of media function, but 
social, cultural and historical contexts that surround a production.   
Studies on the impact of television before the 1980s were based on the 
conventional viewing atmosphere and the idea that television content was limited 
within a particular area. Traditionally, television had been closely bound to a national 
territory and tied up with national projects and in engineering a national identity. 
However, the rise of transnational television has changed viewing behaviour as 
hundreds of cross-border TV channels occupy transponder space on 
communications satellites (Chalaby, 2005:1). Ramon Lobato states that the history 
of broadcast television is closely tied to the history of the nation-state. Television 
systems in almost every country have reinforced national boundaries. The 
nationwide distribution of television has shaped advertising markets, propagated 
official language policies, and established common frames of national discourse. 
However, the internet has offered ‘transnational television', enabling distribution 
across one or more national borders (Lobato, 2019:50-51). Through the internet, 
audiences in many parts of the world can view content from overseas through many 
channels, using browsers, apps, and set-top boxes. 
Does this mean the end of television as we have known it? The answer is of 
course not. The flux of internet distribution and online channels do not reduce the 
power of television. It is just the form of viewing that has changed, while the function 
remains the same. Toby Miller argues that a lot of internet media is basically 
television because ‘television institutions are still central to digital media markets’ 
(cited in Lobato,2019:27). Many internet-distributed or online-streaming platforms 
such as YouTube or Netflix, do not bring the internet to television, but rather take 
television contents to other online screens. As Michael Wolff points out, television 
tamed and absorbed digital media. ‘It is not Netflix bringing digital to television, but, 
quite obviously, Netflix bringing television programming and values and behaviour – 
like passive watching – to heretofore interactive and computing-related screens’ 
(Wolff, 2017:91).  
The power of television flow and sequence, the interval between programmes 
and users’ experiences are not much affected by the changing of viewing behaviour. 
William Uricchio found that the changing of audience reception and viewing 
environment – from the living console to the use of remote control and smart TV – 
are only the shifting of an agency. It does not turn down the flow of television 
(Uriccio, 2004). This is the same in Thailand in which the changing of platforms 
does, in fact, enhance the power of television. People watch more television than 




this thesis, I could watch Thai TV dramas that were selected for this thesis almost at 
the same time as those who live in Thailand, even though I was in the UK. Even 
dramas from last season were hard to find many years ago became available via 
many online video-sharing platforms. Thus, the internet has intensified and 
broadened the watching of television more than ever before.  
 This recent trend towards television studies has implied that technology, 
channel, or platform may be changing but television is still a powerful source where 
social values, ideologies, beliefs, perception, imagination and so on are reproduced 
and combined with global content that supports a national discourse. It is assumable 
that the concept of nationhood can be constructed regardless of how television is 
consumed. Nation-building is not restricted to a national border, but embedded in 
dramatic content, which is the result of a restricted atmosphere controlled by the 
state. In order to understand the situation in Thailand, it is essential to know the 
starting point of television in Thailand and how Thai television content is framed and 
controlled.   
2.2 Background of Thai television  
2.2.1 The Birth of Thai TV 
Television broadcasting in Thailand began in the early 1950s. Though it was 
established by a government as a private enterprise, the board of Thai TV consisted 
of army chiefs and government bureaucrat. Thus, it was a private organisation 
owned, operated and subsidised by the government and the bureaucracy (Thanet, 
1996). Thailand’s first television channel or Thai Thorathat Company Limited was 
founded in 1953 by Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram (MCOT, 2017; Sinit, 
1992:111). The first intention was to use it for political and cultural propaganda to 
fight against the press, and also the expansion of communism. Alongside this was a 
desire to contend with the economic expansion of the West (Thitinan, 2007:31). In 
1957, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief at 
that time, founded the Royal Thai Army Radio and Television Channel 7. Later, in 
1974, it became Channel 5. The main three purposes of this channel were to train 
army officers to be knowledgeable of radio and television technology; to provide 
knowledge and entertainment for army officers and the public; and to build a good 
understanding between the army's affairs and the public (Royal Thai Army Radio 
and Television Station, n.d.). Even though these two first channels were initiated for 
political purposes, their programmes were mainly entertainment based, including 




 After Sarit died in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn succeeded as 
Prime Minister (1963-1973). In this government, Field Marshal Praphas 
Charusathien5 approved the establishment of a new television channel privately 
operated by Bangkok Broadcasting Television Co., Ltd. However, the shareholders 
of the company were members of the Charusathien family. This channel is well-
known today as The Royal Thai Army Television Channel 7 or Channel 7 (Daunpen, 
1996). After that, Thanom launched a fourth television channel in 1970. This was 
privately operated by Bangkok Entertainment Co., Ltd (BEC) under a concession 
contract with Thai Thorathat Company Limited (Thai Digital Television, 2014). It is 
best known as Thailand Colour Television Channel 3, or Channel 3, and was 
Thailand’s first commercial television station. Apart from these first four channels, at 
the end of the 1980s, the first public service television network was founded. The 
National Broadcasting Services of Thailand (NBT) is a state-run channel, operated 
by the Public Relations Department (PRD). NBT, or Channel 11, was designed to 
broadcast educational programmes and public service announcements (Thitinan, 
2007:32).   
 The last free-TV channel, ITV, was founded after the ‘Bloody May’ political 
crisis in 1992, which raised public awareness regarding the government’s 
interventions in the media. The ITV Station was established in 1995 under a 30-year 
concession with the Office of the Prime Minister. Due to the concession contract that 
required the channel to broadcast news programmes up to 70% of the total airtime, 
the channel went into financial crisis and then bankruptcy. It was renamed by a new 
government as TITV. In 2007, after the launching of the Thailand Public 
Broadcasting Service Act B.E.2551(2008), TITV was renamed again, as the Thai 
Public Broadcasting Service (Thai PBS). The Thailand Public Broadcasting Service 
Act provides Thai PBS with legal protection against political and commercial 
intervention (Somkiat 2008:4). Television channels in Thailand, in the early stages of 
broadcasting, were divided into two groups; those that were state-owned and run, 
and those that were state-owned but privately run (Somkiat, 2008:3). These six 
channels - Channel 3, Channel 5, Channel 7, Channel 9, Channel 11 (NBT), and 
Thai PBS, were free-to-air analogue terrestrial television stations. They provided 
programmes to audiences free of charge making their profits from advertising.  
The liberalisation of Thailand’s broadcasting and telecommunication 
industries was initiated through the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 
 





25406 (1997) and two independent regulatory agencies were founded to complete 
the task. In 2010, two agencies were combined as one to be The National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission (NBTC)7 in accordance with the 
Act on Organisation to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting 
and Telecommunications Services BE. 25538 under the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand, B.E. 25509 (2007). NBTC’s duty is to supervise broadcasting and 
telecommunication industries by promoting free and fair competition, and regulating 
the spectrum usages for the utmost benefit of the public interest and the country 
(Nathnipa, 2014:98; The Fundamental Acts Relating to Telecommunications and 
Broadcasting Services, 2015; Regulations on Radio and Television Broadcasting, 
199210). Since 2014, broadcasting technology in Thailand has been entering the 
process of digitalisation. NBTC awarded 24 commercial digital TV licences via 
auction on December 2013, including the existing six main channels, and the15-year 
licences became valid from April 25, 2014 (The Nation Thailand, 2019). Most new 
channels are privately run by newspapers and media industry such as music and film 
companies. However, in 2019, operators of seven digital TV channels returned their 
licenses to the broadcast regulator, bringing the number of digital TV channels still 
operating in Thailand down from 22 to just 15 (2 channels had returned licenses 
before this) (Thai PBS World, 2019). 
2.2.2 Screening, schedule, state control  
State regulations on radio and television are divided into four phases. The first 
phase was 1955-1975 which state monopolised all channels for broadcasting 
political propaganda. The second phase was between 1975-1992. The Radio and 
Television Broadcasting Management Commission11 was founded to censor and 
strictly control content to respond to the national trinity (nation, religion, monarchy) 
as well as regulating content criticising Thai politics or supporting communism. The 
third phase was 1992-1997. The Bloody May raised more awareness on media 
freedom and state intervention. Thus, the old state censorship was cancelled and 
replaced with The National Broadcasting Commission12 (NBC) to supervise rather 
than censor placing self-censorship as each channel’s own concern. The last phase 
was from 1997 to the present. All channels still had to comply with rules and 
 
6 รฐัธรรมนูญแหง่ราชอาณาจกัรไทย พทุธศกัราช 2540 
7 คณะกรรมการกจิการกระจายเสยีง กจิการโทรทศัน์ และกจิการโทรคมนาคมแหง่ชาต ิ(กสทช.)  
8 พระราชบญัญตัอิงคก์รจดัสรรคลืFนความถีFและกาํกบัการประกอบกจิการกระจายเสยีง วทิยโุทรทศัน์ และกจิการโทรคมนาคม พ.ศ. 2553 
9 รฐัธรรมนูญแหง่ราชอาณาจกัรไทย พทุธศกัราช 2550 
10 ระเบยีบวา่ดว้ยวทิยกุระจายเสยีงและวทิยโุทรทศัน์ พ.ศ.2535  
11 Unofficial translation for คณะกรรมการบริหารวิทยกุระจายเสียงและวิทยโุทรทศัน์ (กบว.) 




regulations according to the Operation of the Sound Broadcasting Service and the 
Television Broadcasting Act B.E. 255113. Some parts of the Act are ambiguous and 
open to interpretation and intervention by the station owners and state officers 
(Pirongrong and Sasithorn, 2003:v-vii; Nathnipa, 2014:97-98).  
In 2013, NBTC announced in the government gazette (B.E. 2556, no. 130, 
section 27 and 147) criteria regarding TV content, a rating system, and schedule. 
NBTC classifies different types of programmes according to content and their age 
appropriateness. Criteria and evaluation are based on three main aspects – the 
presentation of violence, sexual content, and inappropriate language (Royal Gazette, 
2013a:1-2). This divides Thai programmes into six categories and each category has 
definite airtime and description. For example, programmes that are classified type 
PG13 are not allowed to air before 8.30pm; programmes classified type PG18 are 
not allowed to air before 10pm; and programmes classified as ‘Adults’ are not 
allowed to air before midnight (Figure 1). All permit holders from every TV station 
must submit their schedules to NBTC every year and at least 15 days in advance 
before broadcasting (Royal Gazette, 2013b:24-26).  
All channels must follow and practice self-censorship by avoiding violence, 
sexual content, and inappropriate language. However, many forms of violence can 
still be seen in TV dramas. Rape has become a common form of violence in Thai TV 
dramas and may be portrayed as a so-called act of love, or as a punishment. When 
a male protagonist rapes a female protagonist, it will be suggestive of some kind of 
misunderstanding, and the characters often fall in love by the end. On the contrary, if 
a female antagonist is raped, usually by a male antagonist, it is an act of revenge or 
punishment that she is seen to have deserved (Townsend, 2016:581, 583-585). Thai 
TV dramas often romanticise rape and violence as parts of a normal relationship. 
The violence of rape is sometimes reduced by using the word ‘bplum’ (ปลํ.า) instead 
of ‘khom kheun’ (ขม่ขนื). While ‘khom kheun’ is used to describe a criminal act, 
‘bplum’ in Thai TV dramas is a forceful act that ends with romantic relationship 
(Under the Ropes, 2016). Rape has been more acceptable in Thai literature and TV 
dramas because ‘a good woman’ cannot initiate sexual contact. So, if a woman 
cannot willingly engage in sexual interaction with a man without losing her ‘good girl’ 
status, sexual violence becomes an alternative. Otherwise, she would be labelled as 
a 'whore' for being sexually confident. Therefore, the TV producers use rape to justify 
the inclusion of sexual intercourse (Townsend, 2016:587; Nanthayapirom, 2017).  
 




However, more and more, younger audiences find this kind of plot unbearable 
as it encourages rape culture. In July 2020, one famous Thai TV drama Sawanbiang 
was rerun on a prime-time slot. The story is about an abusive man who kidnaps and 
rapes a woman. The drama has been widely discussed on social media such as 
Twitter urging the channel to stop this show, but the attempt was not successful. At 
least this phenomenon suggests that audiences have more awareness and social 
sensitivity to rape, albeit that the TV stations seem not to. Apart from rape, other 
violent scenes such as people killing each other or female characters slapping each 
other are also common in Thai dramas even though they are rated for ‘general 
audience.’ According to the NBTC announcement, every programme aired during the 
prime-time slot (6-10 pm) must be suitable for ‘general audiences’ (Royal Gazette, 
2013b:24). However, most of the programmes in this slot are TV dramas and these 
violent scenes are common. So, the warning subtitles act to defend their presence in 
the shows. 
 
Figure 1 Six categories of TV rating and classification (Royal Gazette, 2013b, 
my translation)  
 Apart from the schedule of general programmes, there are also restrictions on 
the broadcasting of national programmes. The national anthem must be played twice 




(Royal Gazette, 2013a:25). Royal news lasts about half an hour and shows the 
activities of the Royal Family and sometimes of high government officials. Besides, 
every Thai station is a member of The Television Pool of Thailand (TPT or 
T.V.Pool14), which means they are obliged to live broadcast all the government’s 
programmes and special events nationwide such as royal ceremonies, military or 
government activities, sports events, and so on. In October 2016 after the death of 
King Bhumibol, the prime minister declared a year of mourning and urged all Thais to 
wear only black and white. Television and radio were to refrain from broadcasting 
entertainment for a month and could only air in monochrome or muted colours. On 
October 14 when King Bhumibol’s body was moved in a procession to the Grand 
Palace in Bangkok for royal funeral rites, all television channels live broadcast the 
historic procession, which lasted for one and a half hours (Jitlada, 2017:5-6). Below 
are the rules and regulations issued by the NBTC for television stations to follow:  
 
All media operators must ‘take into account ‘appropriate’ broadcasting to 
show appreciation towards the King’s compassion and take part in 
mourning his death’, and that an intense atmosphere of mourning must be 
sustained for 30 days. All information regarding the king’s death must 
strictly follow the palace’s rules; must be approved before airing; and must 
not include ‘interpretation, analysis, and criticism of such information.’ All 
television and radio channels must refrain from showing ‘any element of 
entertainment, dancing, joy, violence, impoliteness, or overly expressed 
emotion for 30 days.’ Media presenters and guests must dress in plain 
‘black and white–preferably black, and appear composed.’ 
(Jitlada, 2017:49) 
After the mourning period, commemorations of Bhumibol were still ubiquitous 
in books, exhibitions, media coverage, and television programming throughout the 
first 10 months of 2017 (McCargo,2018:181). All TV stations were obliged to 
broadcast the king’s funeral from October 25-29, 2017 and all programmes during 
the funeral ceremony were required to drop 40% of their colour tones to be less vivid 
or close to grey scale during 1-27 October 2017. Similar to this mourning period, 
NBTC and T.V.Pool announced detailed rules and regulations for every station to 
follow during the restricted time of the daily royal funeral ceremony. This included the 
controlling of other programmes’ content, emotion and clothing that would be on air 
in that period (Posttoday, 2017; Brand Buffet, 2017).  
 
14 Since 1968, Channel 9, Channel 5, and Channel 7 had formed a special unit responsible 
for broadcasting national special programmes. Channel 3 joined in 1970 followed by 




Raknakkara, one of the TV dramas selected for this thesis is a good example. 
It showed how Thai TV programming was controlled by the state. The drama aired 
on a prime-time slot around one month before the royal cremation. A few weeks prior 
to the ceremony, entertainment programmes were retained from schedules. TV 
stations withdrew television dramas as well as many variety-shows and replaced 
them with documentaries about the late king. Raknakkara was the only prime-time 
drama at that time that had not yet finished by the restricted period. Therefore, 
Channel 3 station decided to air the last five episodes on five consecutive days from 
29 September to 3 October, which was not its normal time slot, so that the drama 
would finish before the cremation ceremony.15 The last five episodes had to also 
drop the colour to a softer tone almost similar to grayscale, as for the mourning 
period.  
Likewise, in April and May 2019 during the period prior and after the 
coronation of King Vajiralongkorn, NBTC announced guidelines on broadcasting 
which included the content on TV, website, advertisement, online video, and so on. A 
coronation emblem had to be displayed on the top left corner of the screen (Figure 2) 
(Thai Webmaster Association, 2019). Apart from this, TV newscasters and 
moderators were also encouraged to wear yellow, which is the colour of the 
monarchy (Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 2 Coronation emblem was put on the top left of the screen months 
before and after the coronation period (Krongkram, 2019) 
 
15 Most prime-time dramas in Thailand air in three main slots; Monday-Tuesday, 





Figure 3 TV moderators of a cooking show wear yellow before and after the 
coronation period (Masterchef Thailand season 3, ep 15) 
 Because of these strict rules and guidelines, most Thai TV programmes avoid 
controversy and follow the restrictions for their own benefit. Thanet Aphornsuvan 
stated that even though television has expanded, into many channels, one thing 
remains the same – ‘they are owned and strictly controlled by the government and 
the responsible bureaucracies… contents of the TV programmes are mainly 
entertainment and government news without comment and feedback from the 
audience’ (Thanet, 1996). This statement is accurate up until the present day.  
2.2.3 Consumption of Thai TV dramas 
Thai TV schedules are abundant with entertainment programmes and almost 
every channel has TV dramas in their schedules. Among the top ten highest-rating 
channels in January 2020 (Figure 4), four are news channels (Amarin TV, Thairath 
TV, Nation, MCOT HD), one channel is for game shows and variety shows 
(Workpoint), one channel for foreign movies and series (Mono 29), and the last four 
are channels that broadcasts TV dramas, news and variety shows (3HD, 7HD, 
One31 and Channel 8). I have listed TV dramas on air in a weekly schedule of these 
four channels and found that there are 23 different dramas to watch in one week, 
throughout the day (Figure 5). It is interesting to note that all these four channels 
broadcast dramas almost at the same time especially in the prime-time slot, which is 






Figure 4 Top ten channels with highest ratings in January 2020 (Thai 
Broadcast Journalists Association, 2020) 
 




 Thai people watch television as a part of family activities. It is an act of 
watching without an intention to watch a particular programme. According to 
Raymond Williams, people ‘watch television’, not particular programmes because of 
the ‘planned flow’ which is ‘the characteristic of broadcasting, simultaneously as a 
technology and as a cultural form.’ The sequence of shows created normal 
experience and people ‘find television very difficult to switch off, even when we have 
switched on for a particular ‘programme’, we find ourselves watching the one after it’ 
because flow is organised without definite intervals (Williams, 1990:86,94). For Thai 
audiences, television flow goes along with their daily activities. Somsuk Hinwiman 
argues that Thai people watch TV dramas while doing other activities, and without 
paying attention to particular programme because of the flow or someone in a family 
wants to watch it (Somsuk, 2015:47, 57-58). Thai viewing habits are rooted to the 
way audiences watch traditional Thai performance — likay.16 While watching likay 
performance, audiences have many other activities that occur at the same time. 
There are food stalls and kiosks nearby where people could buy food to enjoy during 
the show. Kids are running around, in front of, or even to the back of a stage. Likay 
actors can also interact with the audience. It is a ‘carnival-like' atmosphere which is 
in contrast with the viewing of western film (Juree, 2003:164). With this viewing 
culture as a background, Thais are accustomed to viewing behaviour that does not 
need much concentration.   
  Thais have this viewing habit because, for TV dramas, a storyline is not 
important. Thais watch television drama for ‘emotion' rather than ‘content.' Dramas 
are often adaptations of popular novels that most Thais are already familiar with. So, 
audiences are excited to comment on the performances of actors rather than 
focusing on the story (Somsuk, 2015:98). Besides, Thai viewing habits do not rely on 
a single medium. Thai audiences enjoy TV drama with many other kinds of media 
before or almost at the same time of watching a drama. Besides original text or 
novels, newspapers and magazines are supplementary for conventional audiences. 
Newspapers usually provide full pages of TV drama synopsis, from chapter to 
chapter in advance of the programme. Magazines with detailed synopsis and photos 
are available in most bookstores and street restaurants. They help to complete the 
drama watching because viewers use the synopsis as a guide to catch up with the 
part they may have missed (Somsuk, 2015:29).  
 
16 A performance usually shown in a temple fair. Its style and characteristics have been 
influential in the content and style of Thai films e.g. the role of monarchy (hero, heroin, 




Nowadays, Thai people do not rely on broadcasting schedules. The internet 
has created ‘on-demand’ watching which gives viewers a chance to watch any 
programmes they missed (Akkarong, 2016:10). Drama watching is accompanied by 
new tools such as browsers and social network apps. Drama synopsis moves from a 
newspaper and magazine to website. A conventional community between drama 
viewers like family, neighbours or friends are substituted with social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or web forums. Research has found that in 2018, Thai 
people spend an average of 10.05 hours per day on social media. So, many 
channels have started to use social networks in addition to TV broadcasting 
(Pornchai and Aswin, 2020:3). This number is very high compared to statistics found 
in other countries. For example, in the U.S. internet users spent an average of 2.22 
hours per day on social networking in 2019 (Metev, 2020), while in the UK the 
average daily use of social media in 2019 was 102 minutes or 1.7 hours (Statista, 
2020). This number implies that the internet has significantly changed their viewing 
behaviour. Therefore, the watching behaviour of a typical drama viewer is never one-
dimensional. Thai viewers watch TV dramas for entertainment, and at the same time, 
the watching itself is entertaining as it creates communities between viewers. Tools 
and equipment may be improved, yet Thai viewing behaviour hardly changes. 
Watching TV has created a community and entertaining activity between viewers, 
either in actual or virtual experiences.  
2.3 Historical background of Thai TV dramas and typical patterns 
Thai TV dramas began airing in 1955. The first being to is Phongphang, 
written by King Vajiravudh,17 though it copied a form of Western dialogue play. The 
first TV drama that was written specially for television was Suriyanee Mai Yom 
Taeng-ngarn in 1959 (Chitralada, 1995:5-6). Recording and videocassette were 
introduced to the country in 1961 but they were not widely used. In 1976, more TV 
dramas started to switch from live broadcasting to video tape. This was regarded as 
the revolution of the industry because production quality and actors’ performances 
had improved e.g. realistic setting, modern technique of cutting and editing, and 
actors remembering their own dialogue (Arunee, 1993:4-5; Naraphorn, 2009:140).   
 TV drama is called ‘lakhon’ (ละคร) in Thai, which is a term referring to the 
performing arts18. When Thai traditional performing arts are developed into TV 
drama, they are called ‘lakhon TV.' Sometimes, television drama is called ‘lakhon 
 
17 King Rama VI of Chakri Dynasty (reign 1910-1925). 
18 Such as lakhon nai (dance-drama shown within inner court, performed by female 
dancers), lakhon nok (dance-drama shown outside royal court, performed by male dancers), 




namnao', literally meaning ‘stinking, polluted water’ because of its recurring theme, 
emotional plots and low-quality production that remain the same as still, putrid water. 
According to Van Fleet, Namnao is a term originated during the 1970s to describe 
the corruption of the political establishment and ‘evokes the look and smell of 
stagnant water and rotting garbage, conjuring up images of modern Thailand’s 
polluted cannels and waterways’ (cited in Farmer, 2015:81).  
 The plot and theme of lakhon namnao can be compared with Western 
melodrama. According to James L. Smith, the typical theme of melodrama:  
relies heavily on well-worn devices such as long-lost children, lying letters, 
tell-tale scars, secret marriages, murders frustrated and plot overheard… 
have handsome and courageous hero, a comic servant who befirends 
innocence in distress and a mysterious stranger, later revealed as the 
heroine’s long-lost father … a dramatic piece characterised by sensational 
incident and violent appeals to the emotions, but with a happy ending 
(Smith, 1973:3-5).  
Melodrama has been regarded as ‘low-class’ entertainment. In England 
during the industrial revolution it was an entertainment form mass-produced to 
satisfy workers. Its story caused little controversy after offering simplified views of 
life, particularly of morality (Basuki, 2003:4). When compared to a tragedy, that is 
often highly regarded, melodrama provides single and simple emotion. Smith argues 
that emotions in this context are savoured singly, in isolation, divorced from anything 
which might qualify, contradict or otherwise diminish the prevailing monopathic tone 
as he says ‘In melodrama we win or lose; in tragedy we lose in winning or win in the 
losing’ (Smith, 1973:10). However, William Sharp states that they are just different; 
neither one is better than the other. The only problem is that people tend to use the 
term tragedy for a good serious play and melodrama for a bad one (cited in Basuki, 
2003:8).  
Like melodrama, Thai TV drama is often regarded as a low-quality 
entertainment having very little academic or aesthetic value. Though it is popular and 
provides entertainment to audiences, Thai TV dramas are mostly love stories that 
rarely attempt to problematise or criticise Thai society. Most deal with personal and 
domestic spheres rather than any controversial politicised issue. Besides, the 
production quality is often poor due to small budgets and timelines. According to 
Brett Farmer, lakhon ‘are routinely disregarded as worthless trash, something of 
insignificance with no intrinsic value or merit, yet on the other, are ascribed a quite 
intense potency as objects of social pollution that need to be expelled or 
quarantined.’ Many of them have attracted attention from powerful state agencies 
that take action whenever they feel the lakhon is breaking moral taboos and/or 




dramas Dok Som Si Thong and Raeng Ngao were criticised by the Ministry of 
Culture, the Senate Committee and the NBTC because the main female characters 
present images of bad girls. A character in Dok Som Si Thong has ‘sexual 
aggressiveness, violent language and behaviour, and … showing in gratitude to her 
mother’ while a character in Raeng Ngao sets a bad example for the nation’s youth 
and through destroying the image of Thai femininity because she uses violence, 
verbally and physically. Their main female protagonists are ‘patterned on the 
conventional mia noi (เมยีน้อย) or ‘minor wife/mistress’ figure with the low-birth status, 
towering ambition and super-crass personality.’ These characters are considered a 
threat to public decency setting a bad example for the nation’s youth (Farmer, 
2015:80-83).  
Though stories are similar, the broadcasting patterns are different from the 
West. American or British soap opera runs over a long period for years or decades. 
As Hobson defines, soap opera is ‘a radio or television drama in serial form… 
transmitted more than three times a week for fifty-two weeks a year’ (Hobson, 
2003:1). American soap operas have self-contained episodes, with a narrative 
openness that gives the drama series the capacity to endure through seasons, while 
British soap operas are serialized and open-ended. Some British dramas have 
regularity, continuity, longevity in broadcast schedule and audience loyalty such as 
Coronation Street, which has aired since the 1950s (Dunleavy, 2009:20-21). Latin 
American telenovelas, though they have definitive endings, normally have up to 180-
200 episodes depending on their popularity (La Pastina et.al, 2003). Thai dramas, on 
the other hand, are much shorter and run for a finite period of no more than a couple 
of months with one or two hour episodes aired in batched instalments over several 
nights each week (Farmer, 2015:80). 
TV drama in Thailand can be categorised based on many criteria, i.e. mood 
and tone. According to Ongart Singlamphong, Thai television drama can be divided 
into eight main categories which are historical, dramatic, comedy, crime/detective, 
horror/mysterious, adventurous, fantasy, and folktale (Ongart, 2014:97-98). 
However, it needs to be pointed out that they often overlap, and may move between 
categories which mean one drama can fit into more than one category. For example, 
a historical drama can be both dramatic and comedic, such as Bupphesanniwat. In 
this drama, there is an attempt to make a historical drama with historical figures, but 
also there are many non-essential scenes, sometimes irrelevant to the core plot, to 
make it a romance with strong elements of comedy. For example, the drama shows 
the main female character (who is a contemporary woman time-travelling to the 
Ayutthaya period) speaking some modern Thai slang, doing yoga, parodying a 




character therefore appears as a strange, unique woman, and her differences from 
other people create comical elements for the drama.  
Apart from tone, we may also categorise Thai TV drama into groups with 
similar plots. According to Georges Polti (1921), there are only thirty-six dramatic 
situations in every story or performance. Thai TV dramas commonly have much less 
than that. Juree Vichit-vadakan has listed seven main themes see in Thai movies, 
which could be applied to the case of Thai TV dramas also. These themes have 
remained constant even though setting or presentation of story may vary (Juree, 
2003:159-160). They are: 
1. The struggle between opposing forces of good and evil 
2. The conflict between persons of unequal socio-economic status  
3. Human weakness, misunderstandings, fate, and so on. 
4. Conflict and rivalry among kinsmen 
5. Marital strife 
6. Sex as a subject of fascination 
7. Life histories of protagonists 
These seven themes can overlap, and one drama can have subtle mixing of 
more than one theme. Still, they share some typical plots and storylines except some 
minor, additional details. As Sirinya Wattanasukchai (2009) argues, Thai TV dramas 
are characterised by a very high degree of formula with stock plots, character types, 
scenarios, settings and even actors in a repetitive, conventional manner. If a story 
was successful in terms of economic popularity it could be remade as a lakhon every 
few years, updated with a new cast and sensibility, but remaining similar to 
preceding versions (cited in Farmer, 2015:80-81). This repetition of theme Amporn 
Jirattikorn calls ‘modern fable drama’ because of its characteristic similar to a fable 
developed from romance novels where secret relationships, extra-marital affairs, and 
genuine love form a basis for dramatic plots (Amporn, 2008:45).  
Thai TV dramas, to a large extent, are of the same storyline and pattern 
because they are in form, strongly influenced by the same framework.  This 
framework will be discussed later. Nevertheless, there are few exceptions such as 
Soi Pratthana 2500, which was an adaptation from the American play A Streetcar 
Named Desire. This drama showed high-quality production, complicated plot and 
realistic characters that are hardly found in other dramas. More recent examples are 
Luedkhon Khonjang and Kahonmahoratuek. These have outstanding narratives, 




dramas were praised by critics and social media for having original plots, high-quality 
production, and complexity of characters, they were not highly successful in terms of 
audience rating. Luedkhon Khonjang got an average rating of only 1.345 while 
Bupphesanniwat, a romantic-comedy historical drama, got average rating of 13.219 
(Brandbuffet, 2019; Positioning, 2018). These numbers imply that new style dramas 
of subtle plot may not be widely accepted in the country and most TV dramas are 
still, to the large extent, following the same old patterns. 
One key feature of Thai drama is a happy ending. It is expected for a Thai 
drama to end with the villains punished or forgiven, and two heroes (male and 
female) living happily ever after. Thai people strongly believe in the popular Buddhist 
concept of karma; that those who do good receive good things in reward and those 
who do bad, receive bad things in return. When a character is good, he or she must 
be rewarded, and when a character is bad, he or she must be punished. With this 
kind of story, Thai dramas convey cultural and moral messages (Kultida,1993:85-88; 
Juree, 2003:158, 161; Amporn, 2008:45). Moreover, Thai TV dramas aim for 
preaching moral lessons as well as modelling social rules and standards to keep 
everything in its place. Juree argues that the ending of Thai movies reminds 
audiences that things will turn back to a normal state. Even though some movies 
begin with a wide range of situations and behaviours that are unacceptable, in the 
end, those behaviours change to yield to social conformity and expectation (Juree, 
2003:162). 
2.4 Structure and key elements in Thai TV dramas 
Most Thai television dramas have a fixed binary of characters – either good or 
evil. A large number of Thai TV dramas and films are influenced by khon (โขน), a 
masked dance-drama with the Ramakian20 being the most frequently performed. The 
central theme of the Ramakian is indeed the triumph of good over evil. The story 
revolves around the ruling monarch and elite society (Patsorn, 2004:46-48). The 
most important obligatory roles in every drama are the two main heroes – male and 
female, or ‘phra-ek’ (พระเอก) and ‘nang-ek’ (นางเอก) respectively in Thai. These 
heroes are different from the main or leading characters in western drama because 
they also represent goodness and people who would do no wrong intentionally. The 
hero or ‘phra-ek’ must be ‘brave, gallant, and impartial.' The heroine or ‘nang-ek’ 
 
19 According to a document by Public Relations Department (PRD), rating is a number of 
audiences, calculated by AGB Nielsen (Thailand). Numbers are calculated from case studies 
(face to face observation or through a device called people meter) and using statistic 
methods. Rating 1 means approximately 670,000 audiences per one minute (Samer, n.d.).  




must be ‘innocent, gentle, prim, well-behaved, forgiving, and, most of all, a virgin’ 
(Kultida, 1993:83-83). The word ‘phra’ is also related to Buddhism as it is the word 
used to refer to a Buddhist monk and/or Buddha image21. ‘Phra’ is also related to 
highly respected objects and people. The royal family hierarchy starts with ‘phra’ as 
a prefix of their ranks. Therefore, the word ‘phra’ is used for something sacred and 
highly worshipped in Thai society, while the word ‘nang’ stands for a female role that 
accompanies the ‘phra.’ Thus, we see a hierarchy of gender here, too.  
 A rounded character is often found in Western drama while most characters in 
Thai dramas are simple and stereotypical. Recently, however, in contrast to previous 
generations of dramas, there is an increasing complexity where characters develop 
or evolve over the course of the story. Occasionally, characters have complex 
characteristics that are not easily distinguishable. For example, the role of the 
mother in Bupphesanniwat (2018) appears like evil, dictators while actually she is 
kind-hearted. Even the ‘nang-ek’ starts to change. Kultida, cited above, notes that 
the ‘nang-ek’ has to be a virgin. In Townsend’s words, the women’s virginity 
ultimately determines the man’s perspective of her (Townsend, 2016:590). The 
virginity of the female leading role is challenged in Krongkam (2019). The ‘nang-ek’ 
is a prostitute who works in a bar for the American GIs. She has had a sexual affair 
with her brother-in-law and a child before moving to a new town to start a new life 
with a new husband. Despite her blemished background, she is a hard-working, loyal 
wife. Another example of the mother role can be found in Lah (2017), which is a 
remake of the 1994 drama of the same name. Here, the mother role shows 
complexity regarding good or bad behaviour because she becomes a murderer to 
take revenge on all the men who have gang-raped her, and her daughter. So, it is 
true to some extent that characters in Thai dramas are static. Recently these dramas 
have shown more signs of character dynamism, though they are in small number. 
The majority of characters are easily distinguishable and are constructed in line with 
a binary of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad.’  
In Thai TV drama, supporting characters often have hilarious personalities. 
They are known as clowns or ‘tua talok' (ตวัตลก) which literally means a funny, 
hilarious person. These characters function as the voices of the audience, and also 
prevent audiences from feeling too sad or too bored (Kultida 1993:92). According to 
Nidhi, the clown in Thai movies can be compared to a god in a Javanese play, who 
 
21 In Thailand where the dominant religion is Theravada Buddhism, most of Buddhist monks 
are male (Bhikkhu) and they are commonly referred to by lay people as ‘Phra’ while female 
monastic (Bhikkuni) in Theravada Buddhism is very rare. Buddhist laywomen in Thailand are 




communicates with the audience or criticises other characters' actions and 
behaviours. This concept is taken from Javanese dance-dramas, in which the clown 
is god’s avatar22. Clowns in Thai movies violate the rules of Western movies which 
aim to present realistic settings completely separated from the real world. A clown in 
Thai movies keeps reminding audiences of the imagined setting by communicating 
with them directly, criticising or making fun of the actions of others. She or he 
reminds audiences of another reality, beyond the make-believe word of the stage or 
screen (Nidhi, 2014:74-75). 
 In Western literature and mythology such as picaresque tales, carnivals and 
revels, and magic rites, there is a character broadly known as ‘the trickster.’ 
Medieval customs demonstrate the role of the trickster as those comic types who 
entertained the prudish public with ribaldries (Jung, 2010:140). A trickster is not a 
normal human being. Its main role is to entertain as well as challenge the norm in a 
story. According to Jung Carl Gustav, a trickster is ‘a forerunner of the saviour, and 
God, man, and animal all at once. He is both subhuman and superhuman.’ A 
trickster could be either stupider than animals or have a ‘divine-animal’ nature, which 
is superior to man because of his superhuman qualities (Jung, 2010: 143-44). In 
many cultures, tricksters challenge the status quo and disrupt perceived boundaries. 
The trickster's role is both survivor and transformer, creating order from chaos, as 
well as challenging culture from both within and without, strengthening and renewing 
it with outrageous laughter (Smith, 1997). However, the ‘tua talok,' in Thai dramas 
are not for trick playing or troublemaking. They do not challenge any status quo or 
norm but are supporters there to enhance the superior aura of the main characters. 
Normally, supporting characters are reserved for lower-class people such as 
servants, or marginalised groups like transgender people, minority and hill tribe 
clans, or people from ‘the upcountry.’ These fixed characters – hero and heroine, 
villains, and clowns have become the basis for the majority of Thai television 
dramas.  
2.5 Historical drama: How Thailand narrates its nation 
Though there are several kinds, historical drama is a popular genre that has 
been produced regularly in the TV industry. I examined prime-time television dramas 
between 2017-2018, from the two main Thai channels (Channel 3 and Channel 7) 
which have broadcast television dramas regularly since the beginning of the 
television industry in Thailand. The result shows that out of the total number of 99 






25 are remade versions of existing historical dramas or films. However, not all 
historical dramas are focussed on history. Some are only set in a historical setting. 
The term historical drama in Thailand is often loosely used, to refer to any drama 
that has its plot and setting in the past. Before this thesis analyses any further, it is 
important to define what ‘historical drama’ means exactly in the Thai television 
industry and what the most popular themes are for this genre.  
2.5.1 Definitions of Thai historical dramas 
 Generally speaking, ‘historical drama’ narrates and presents stories which are 
inspired by or based on historical events. Historical narratives of important events 
such as wars or a story relating to a historical figure such as a monarch are used to 
generate impact. Rodríguez Cadena (2004) defined historical films as:  
primarily characterised by the representation of a specific period of 
collective history and its main heroes in plots that depict wars, conspiracy, 
heroic feats, the public deeds of the heroes and national unification. As a 
complement to that essential historical component, non-historical 
characters enact interconnected subplots of passion, love, jealousy, 
betrayal, and intrigue (Rodríguez Cadena, 2004:49).  
Steven Fielding studies interwar cinema and defines it as ‘wholly fictional, with 
the past merely supplying glamourous costumes and colourful contexts’ as well as 
tackling the biographies of real figures in which he calls ‘historiophoty’ or the biopics 
of political figures (Fielding, 2013:494). According to these definitions, a historical 
drama is a re-working of historical events, with additional components, and thus a 
construction of the past.    
 In Thailand, historical drama is varied according to themes, plots, 
presentations, or even production quality. There are many definitions and similar 
terminologies. Sometimes, the definition is blurred and overlaps. Gandamas and 
Supatcharajit use the term ‘retro drama’23 which means any drama that is modelling 
an atmosphere of the late Ayutthaya and Bangkok period24 in which the author 
imagines or picks up some parts of events in history to form a plot. Retro dramas are 
stories about a specific period in the past and evidence, therefore, how 
contemporary writers view the past (Gandamas and Supatcharajit, 2014:61). Or, as 
Seri Wongmontha translated from Thai to English: ‘movies and TV series that are 
 
23 ละครยอ้นยคุ (literally means drama that goes back in time) 
24 One important event during this period was the sacking of Ayutthaya in 1767 by the 
Burmese army and the founding of new Thonburi kingdom (1767-1782). This was regarded 





based on true stories in history’25. Seri states that drama producers should have 
some liberty to use ‘literary truth’ or be able to add some extra detail to make such 
drama more entertaining (Seri, 2018:2). Dinar Boontharm defines historical drama as 
‘a drama that presents some important parts of events in history.' He suggests the 
main purpose of any historical drama/film is to entertain, not to teach history. 
Therefore, this is entertainment first and foremost, while its content is based on 
citable historical information (CURadio, 2018).  
According to these scholars, history and fiction are separated and it is 
acceptable for drama makers to use their own interpretation of history to make 
shows entertaining. However, this statement may apply to only dramas or films that 
deal with historical events in general. Once the role of a monarch is included in a 
drama or film, especially concerning the Chakri dynasty, the possibility to change or 
add extra detail to the conventional ‘historical facts’ would immediately be 
problematic. In Thai TV dramas and films, there is no one playing a King of the 
Chakri dynasty as a central role. Sometimes the King is mentioned or shown by his 
back or shadow. He may sit in a throne far away but it is impossible to see his face. 
It may be possible to have actors perform roles of kings in the Ayutthaya period, 
such as King Narai in Bupphasanniwat or King Naresuan in the film Naresuan, but 
not for kings in the current dynasty26. The case of the film Anna and the King is a 
good example, which I will discuss later in this chapter and in relation to hyper-
royalism. When a monarch is depicted on screen, there is no room for other 
interpretations or entertainment. 
 In the Thai entertainment industry, there are two similar terms which are 
suggestive of different degrees of seriousness in relation to presentations of history. 
The first is lakorn ing prawattisat’ (ละครองิประวตัศิาสตร)์ or ‘historical drama.’ This kind 
of drama has a historical narrative based on the life of national heroes or key events 
in historical records. Usually, it comes with nationalistic thematic such as wars, war 
heroes, national enemies like the Burmese, or the West. This kind of epic drama 
usually involves famous actors, using high budget on lavish settings and production, 
and usually have a serious dramatic tone. Another term is ‘lakorn yon yuk’ (ละครยอ้น
ยคุ) or ‘period drama.’ This is similar to a Western definition of ‘costume drama.’ Most 
of these take the form of melodrama, romance, or comedy, with stories set in the 
past. This ’period drama’ tells less seriously of a specific historical theme or event 
 
25 ภาพยนตรแ์ละละครโทรทศัน์องิประวตัศิาสตร ์ 
26 Both are kings of the Ayutthaya period. Narai is a well-known because his reign was 
regarded as the prosperous time of the Ayutthaya kingdom and he was open to Westerners. 





and entails less historical background as a result. Often Thai TV dramas are blurred 
between these two categories. They may use historical figures and events in the 
story as a background, with high-quality production and costumes that are presented 
as ‘historically accurate’ yet the core plot revolves around a love story. 
Bupphesanniwat is a good example to show how the two terms ‘historical drama’ 
and ‘period drama’ can overlap.  
However, what is more important than definitions or historical accuracy is the 
question of ‘what kind of history is being told’ in these dramas. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Hutcheon argues that both history and fiction are discourses. Therefore, 
the meaning is not in the events, but in the systems, which make past events into 
present historical facts. So, it is not a question of true or false, but what does it mean 
to a nation's people (Hutcheon, 1988). For Thai TV dramas, it is essential to note 
that only limited narrations of history are reproduced.  
2.5.2 Popular themes and plots in Thai historical dramas  
 Historical dramas portray a picture of Thailand in the past. Such depictions 
are essential for modern society because it reminds people who they are and where 
they came from, of their identity and sense of belonging. For example, Baker and 
Pasuk argue that ‘historical dramas create a nostalgic past for the new city that has 
only recently sprung into existence’ (cited in Amporn, 2008:45). Some Thai scholars 
note that historical dramas act as a medium for modern-day audiences in getting 
themback to their Thai roots. These historical narratives create an understanding of 
Thai cultural heritage and history for modern-day audiences (Phornphat and 
Patchanee, 2018:44). Others view these dramas as a tool to fight against global or 
international culture and modern technology that is negatively affecting the country. 
People of all generations thus have a chance to admire Thai cultural heritage and its 
roots through the modelling of Thai lives (Gandamas and Supatcharachit, 2014:59).  
 Historical dramas can be nationalistic in their themes and plots. Most Thai 
historical dramas revolve around the king and monarchy, ruling elites, war heroes, or 
a nation’s unity. These similar stories are generally set in some specific period, when 
important events occurred; for example wars between Siam and Burma in the middle 
of the sixteenth century, the sacking of Ayutthaya in 1569 and 1767, Ayutthaya’s 
regaining of independence from the Burmese in 1593, the prosperity of the Bangkok 
period after being free from the Burmese (late eighteenth century – first half of 
nineteenth century), the coming of Western power since the seventeenth century 
and the coming of Western imperialism in the late nineteenth century, or even the 




 I have listed examples of well-known TV dramas that clearly set their stories 
in specific periods of the past. There are a number of dramas that use stories taking 
place somewhere in the past without stating specifically when, and they are not 
included here. This list comprises both ‘historical drama’ and ‘period drama’ 
according to the definitions above, because many of them overlap and the tone or 
degree of historical accuracy is not the point of discussion in this thesis. Therefore, I 
would rather call both categories ‘historical drama.’ However, it is impossible for this 
thesis to make a complete list of every drama aired in Thailand due to the limited 
time provided. We should treat this data as examples to show what kind of history is 
favoured in this country. These dramas can be divided into five periods starting from 
the Ayutthaya era up to WWII. Table 1 below shows examples of historical dramas 
based on popular historical events which I have grouped into these different periods.  
 
Table 1 List of Thai historical dramas and years of production, grouped into 
different periods according to their plots and themes  
This list shows the periods that have frequently appeared in Thai historical 




categories. During Ayutthaya period (14th-18th century), Siam had struggled with 
many conflicts and enemies, both inside and outside the kingdom such as with the 
Burmese. For Thai students, the Ayutthaya period reminds them of two major wars 
with the Burmese in which Siam struggled to maintain its independence; one fought 
by King Naresuan in 1593, and the other by King Taksin in 1767. These conflicts are 
also regarded as moments of resurgence for the kingdom. Dramas in this group are 
usually about ordinary people or soldiers who fight bravely and sacrifice their lives for 
the nation. Characters are sometimes contemporary people who travel back to the 
past to learn how their ancestors sacrificed themselves for their nation. These 
themes are evident in dramas like Atita, Bupphesanniwat, Niratsongphop. For 
example, Atita tells a story about a man who time-travels to Bangrajan village and 
helps the villagers to fight against the Burmese to protect Ayutthaya kingdom. The 
rest of these samples portray lives of patriotic soldiers. Sailohit and Fa Mai are about 
soldiers who fight for Ayutthaya before its fall in 1767.  
The early Bangkok period, on the contrary, had less conflicts or problems so 
there are fewer dramas. These dramas instead focus on the prosperity of life in a 
newly established kingdom rather than bloodshed and wars, enemies and 
colonisation. Yattika tells a continuing story after Sailohit, a drama written by the 
same author. In Sailohit the Ayutthaya kingdom falls. In Yattika, we see descendants 
of a family in Sailohit starting their new lives in a new kingdom. Similarly, 
Rattanakosin shows a peaceful life of one Chinese family who moves to Bangkok 
and gradually become Thai. There are few examples in this group partly because 
during this time there was not much conflict from external threats thus providing less 
material for dramatic content.  
In Chulalongkorn's reign (19th century), again Siam had to fight, with Western 
imperialism. There was also the abolition of slavery, modernisation, and in-country 
reform. Dramas in this group focus on the roles of the monarch (Chulalongkorn) in 
modernising the country. For examples, Luk That centres its theme on social class 
and the life of a slave who wants to be free. Thongek Moryathachalong talks about 
Thai herbal medicine, pandemic and the coming of Western medication. Plaijawak 
features life in the inner palace and introduction of food, both traditional and those 
inspired by Western dishes after the king’s journey to Europe. Thawiphop brings in 
the 1893 Siam-Franco conflict and then praising the king for safeguarding the 
country from Western imperialism. All these events underpin the origins of RNH that 
Thais use to understand and explain their past, and also form a sense of nationhood. 




There are not many dramas taking place during Vajiravudh’s reign up until 
1932 (before the coup) because it is a short period and has less conflict according to 
conventional Thai history. However, Petklangfai is one example that illustrates social 
and political conflict. It portrays the decline of an aristocrat’s life, some criticism 
against Vajiravudh’s Wild Tiger Corps27 and features the Palace Revolt of 1912 that 
tried to topple the absolute monarchy but unsuccessfully. However, the drama ends 
up presenting harmonious life under the king’s benevolence. Raklaekphob also 
features prosperity in this reign by placing emphasis on the Government Savings 
Bank (GSB), which was founded by Vajiravudh. This drama is sponsored by the 
GSB to commemorate its 100th anniversary.  
The post-coup period is more popular for drama makers because it was the 
time when there were massive changes in Thai society, e.g., the overthrow of the 
absolute monarchy, the Westernisation of the country by the military government, 
and the second world war. Usually, dramas based on this period depict changes in 
the life of Thai people, how Thai people felt and survived after the overthrown of the 
absolute monarchy, and how the ruling class or elites coped with these changes. For 
example, Si Phaendin (often known in English as Four Reigns) is a detailed portrayal 
of royal life and the women in the inner palace. The lead female role lives her life 
throughout four reigns (Rama V-VIII) and we see her attitudes as a royalist towards 
social change, such as the overthrow of absolute monarchy in which her son, who is 
one of the instigators, is presented as an aggressive man. Some dramas mention, 
though not often, about wars, independence of the nation, and enemies of the state. 
Khukam is an obvious example that uses political context during WWII as a 
backdrop for the story. Though it depicts Japan as an enemy, it also romanticises the 
relationship between the Thai and Japanese military. However, it ends with the death 
of a Japanese man and Thailand saved by the Free Thai movement. Explicitly or not, 
each of these dramas are nationalistic in terms of how they support and strengthen 
the Thai RNH.  
However, there are little to no dramas about contemporary Thai history, 
especially after the 1970s and let alone dramas about the current or more recent 
monarchs. According to Jory, it is the monarchy’s overwhelming political and cultural 
presence that makes some topics too taboo to discuss in public (Jory, 2003). Two 
important events in the 1970s are the Thai popular uprising in 1973 to overthrow the 
unpopular regime of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, and the Thammasat 
University Massacre in 1976 involving students who were against the return of 
 
27 A paramilitary unit under the patronage of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI), founded by the king 




Thanom. The Thammasat Massacre ended with violent attack by the numbers of 
Village Scouts, Red Gaurs, assisted by police and army units that killed and 
wounded a large number of unarmed protesters (Terwiel:2011, 279-281). The 
political uprisings in the 1970s have been deleted and forgotten in Thai conventional 
textbooks because of the problematic issues relating to the government and the 
monarchy. Nevertheless, student protests in October 2020 have brought this topic 
back into the public arena, as well as raising more awareness and interest in 
contemporary Thai history that is not taught in school. I will explore this sensitivity in 
Thailand again in the section on hyper-royalism.  
It can be concluded that Thai historical dramas are obsessed with the past; 
that which happened somewhere ‘a long time ago’ while more recent history remains 
untouchable. The question arises as to  why drama makers are fixed to creating 
material about those periods, and why nationalistic themes in historical dramas are 
so important for Thai society. In order to understand this trend, I investigate it in this 
thesis in relation to Thai historical films.  
Nationalistic themes are popular in Thai films. In part this arose out of the 
1997 economic crisis as an effective apparatus used to restore the country. The Tom 
Yum Kung Crisis, or 1997 Asian Financial crisis, led to Thailand facing widespread 
bankruptcy among companies and financial institutions. The Thai baht was floated 
on international currency markets, spurring the Thai government to secure a rescue 
package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Callahan, 2003:495-96). After 
1997, more films with nationalistic themes were produced as a reaction against 
global forces. There was a general feeling that the country was being colonised by 
the West and the IMF. For Thais, the collapse of the economy smacked of western 
imperialism and drove a felt need to build up nationalist feeling again as part of a 
national sense of recovery. 
This phenomenon is known as ‘new nationalism’ (or neo-nationalism). As a 
reaction to the 1997 crisis Thai public intellectuals created a new set of Others; these 
were liberals and the West. In responding to the 1997 economic crisis, Thai 
nationalism turned inwards by stressing self-sufficiency and communitarianism 
(Lewis, 2003:69). Accordingly, Thai neo-nationalists proposed the idea of economic 
and cultural self-sufficiency that romanticized the Buddhist village community, and as 
part of its rejection of urbanism, consumerism and industrialism (Callahan, 2003:496-
97). These themes were the hallmarks of the old nationalist movements of the early 
twentieth century. Now the colonial powers have gone, the neo-nationalists have 




national right to self-determination, but national pride and the integrity of national 
territories (Vu, 2013:266).  
 Thus, the 1997 crisis provoked a revival of interest in national culture as a 
reaction against everything modern and global. Thai investors then turned their 
interests to producing more historical films. Nang Nak (1999)28 was credited as the 
beginning of the Thai film revival after the 1997 crisis, which featured ‘the nostalgic 
sensibility that Thais are yearning for, and serves as a social function in recognising 
and resolving the anxiety of Thai views, who are experiencing the loss of their history 
and culture, and the infiltration of cultural forces from elsewhere’ (May Adadol, 
2007:187). Bangrajan (2000), also reflected the anxieties of Thais in the IMF era. Its 
plot has anti-Western, anti-imperialist sentiments and the movie’s closing narration 
mentions the independence of the kingdom, regained after this war with the 
Burmese, and lauding Siam for having never become a colony of any other nation 
since (Harrison, 2010b:111). Later, films were filled with a nostalgic, and nationalistic 
atmosphere, towards the threat of the West. Suriyothai (2001)29 resonated with the 
new discourse on Thai national identity and a restatement of Thai elite nationalism 
(Lewis, 2003:71-76). Thawiphop (2004)30 reiterates a nationalist master narrative 
that Siam survived colonisation because of wise diplomacy and characteristic of 
compromise. According to Harrison, it persuades audiences to engage with a 
method of compromise, and as a trait of national identity that could be used to push 
back against the influence of theWest in the IMF era (Harrison, 2010b:114).  
 These samples explicitly illustrate how historical films were essential in the 
time of economic crisis. They were used as an apparatus to restore the country’s 
prestige and remind people of their glorious past. Phiphat Krajaejan studied the 
relationship between the Thai political crisis/problems with the number of historical 
dramas and films. He found that every time a country was in political crisis, more and 
more historical films/dramas were produced (Figure 6). Those films and dramas 
portray nationalistic themes emphasising the sacrifice of Thais for the nation and the 
monarchy as well as the yearning for a bygone time before the 1932 coup, when 
Thailand was in an absolute monarchy. In a period of hardship, these films provoke 
the idea of a need for unity within the nation as well as strengthening the aura of the 
 
28 A ghost story set in a historical setting during the time of Rama IV (1851-1868). The film 
provides a nostalgic picture of Thai rural society in the past.  
29 A film that is believed to portray the life of Queen Suriyothai from the Ayutthaya period. 
She is regarded as a heroine of the nation who saved her husband’s life from the Burmese 
army, and saved the Ayutthaya kingdom.  
30 A story about a woman who time-travels to Siam during the fifth reign (1868-1910) and 




monarchy (Phiphat, 2018). It is obvious that historical films and dramas are essential 
in this regard, especially for a society in political crises.  
 
 
Figure 6 Numbers of historical dramas and films in relation to Thailand’s 
political crises (Phiphat, 2018, my translation).    
 In contemporary Thai society nowadays, though there is no external threat or 
major crisis, political conflict has remained since the 2014 coup and the yearning for 
historical drama has not gone away. The creation of historical TV dramas is 
motivated by similar factors and inspirations, as historical films are. The only 
difference is that they are recurrent more frequently in Thai TV schedules, and this 
trend lasts for a longer time. One obvious example is Bupphesanniwat (2018), which 
has garnered huge national interest. 
 Bupphesanniwat is about a woman from contemporary Bangkok who travels 
back in time to possess the body of another woman who lives in the Ayutthaya 
period in the late seventeenth century. The drama made a highest ever-recorded 
rating for Channel 3, a statistic few dramas achieve31. It sparked public interest in 
archaeology and early modern Thai history. Many Thais have been dressing up in 
‘traditional’ dress, and travelling to historic sites in which the series is set (the old 
 
31 Episode 11 made a record at 22.6 for Bangkok and its metropolitan area, and 17.4 for 
nationwide rating (Posttoday, 2018b). According to PRD, rating 1 means 670,000 audiences 
per minute (Samer, n.d.). So, rating 22.6 would make up to 15,142,000 audiences watching 




Siamese capital of Ayutthaya and Lopburi) (Jory, 2018: 441). The drama aired during 
the same period as Bangkok’s vintage festival in which participants dressed in 
traditional Thai outfits and enjoyed nostalgic vibes around the Royal Plaza on the 
grounds of the Dusit Palace and Sanam Suea Pa in Bangkok32. This pushed the 
trend of traditional Thai dress to continue some months after the drama concluded. 
 According to Jory (2018), the success and popularity of Bupphesanniwat 
reflects a felt loss of identity among contemporary Thai audiences. For the state, this 
drama celebrates Thainess and shows what Thailand is about. Therefore, it was 
used as a cultural tool by the government to promote Thainess. The actors and 
producers were summoned to meet the Prime Minister and other cabinet members 
(Figure 7). The drama was praised by the PM and ministers because it promoted the 
three national pillars: nation, Buddhism, and the monarchy. The government planned 
to offer more funding to support any historical dramas with cultural and nationalistic 
themes33. This emphasis on Thainess by the state, according to Jory, was the way 
the military regime has tried to latch onto the show’s popularity. At the same time, 
this drama can be read as a commentary on how the Bangkok middle class views 
the absolutist society of Ayutthaya which can be compared to the situation in 
Thailand that has been under political crisis and military coup for 12 years (Jory, 
2018:442). According to Irene Stengs, this drama has a significant education 
dimension. First, it educates audiences about the etiquette and tasks of women. 
Then it narrates the story of the greatness of the Ayutthaya Kingdom and it teaches 
viewers about King Narai’s reign34, which offers an opportunity to demonstrate the 
accuracy of the twenty-first-century Thai history curriculum (Stengs, 2020:263). 
These features strongly restate aspects of Thai national identity to the show’s 
audiences. (I will further discuss the recreation of the past as the modernisation of 
the past in Chapter 4.2.)   
 
 
32 ‘Un Ai Rak Khlai Khwam Nao,’ or ‘Love and Warmth at Winter’s End’ held from 8 February 
– 11 March 2018 and 9 December 2018 - 19 January 2019 (TATnews, 2018).  
33 The Ministry of Culture offered funds to support TV dramas that promote Thai history, Thai 
food, Thai textiles, and Thai artisans (Ch3 Thailand, 2018; Posttoday, 2018a).  
34 The 27th monarch of the Ayutthaya Kingdom who was one of the most beloved kings. 
Narai’s reign (1656-1688) was prosperous because many foreign visitors were welcomed, 





Figure 7 Bupphesanniwat actors meet Thai PM and the cabinet at Government 
House (Posttoday, 2018a) 
This section illustrates the popularity and situation of historical dramas and 
how they are similar in terms of themes and plots. We can clearly see that historical 
dramas/films are a part of the new nationalist movement responding to economic 
crisis as well as political instability. Still, there are many questions as to why the 
depiction of Thai history or past is analogous with nationalism in most cases and 
what kind of power dominates these narratives. Certainly, there is a climate of 
restriction in the country, and sensitive issues that need to be considered when 
making historical dramas. The next section further explores these issues. 
2.6 Hyper-royalism and sensitive topics in Thai TV dramas 
The first and most important framework that founds the restrictive atmosphere 
in Thailand is the country’s special kind of royalist nationalism. This framework, 
which is referred to in Thongchai's term as ‘hyper-royalism,' has become very strong 
in the country and as part of a mission initiated by the military government and the 
monarchy’s network, to revive the monarch's power as far back as the 1960s.  
  In Thongchai’s terms, ‘Hyper-royalism’ is ‘intense, excessive royalism 
because it has occupied the space and time of public life.’ Hyper-royalism is defined 
by the following characteristics. First, the monarchy (images, rituals, sayings, 
worship, and so on.) has been omnipresent. Next, the exaggeration of the royals is a 
norm. The king and his family are portrayed as ‘the best at everything.’ There are 
invented requirements and taboos too. Failure to show loyalty results in severe 
punishment and social sanctions (Thongchai, 2016a:7-11). For example, standing to 
show respect to the royal anthem in a cinema can be problematic. In 2007, two men 
were charged for not doing so. This issue became public interest again in 2019 when 




Instagram. SF Cinema, one of the major cinema companies in Thailand, responded 
that ‘there is no enforcement to stand’ while Major Group, another company, said 
‘any customers who wish not to stand please wait outside until the anthem ends’ 
(BBC, 2019). Even though it is not restricted by law, the action of standing is 
required in public space and any people who resist risk being condemned or charged 
with one of the most severe laws in the country, Article 112 - Lèse majesté.  
This is the most important feature of hyper-royalism. The ‘112 Lèse majesté 
law’ prevents people from criticising the monarchy or even the 112 law itself. 
According to this law, ‘whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the 
Heir-apparent or the Regent’ will be punished severely by imprisonment for three to 
fifteen years. The problem is the way this law has been interpreted as it includes 
previous kings and even the royal pets. Any violation is therefore considered as a 
threat to national security, and anybody can report another body's violation to the 
authorities (Thongchai, 2016a:11). For example, a Thai well-known social critic Sulak 
Sivaraksa was charged with lèse majesté after he gave a speech about the revision 
of Thai history at Thammasat University in 2014. Sulak was accused of 
deconstructing King Naresuan's famous battle waged on elephants against a 
Burmese prince in 1593. This was the very first time that the 112 law was interpreted 
to cover the previous monarchs (BBC, 2017; Atiya, 2020).  
 As an idea, hyper-royalism was introduced during the late 1950s and early 
1960s. The Sarit35 government was responsible for reviving the roles of the monarch 
after the coup in 1957, to purge Phibun, the former Prime Minister from power. As 
the role of the monarchy weakened during Phibun’s regime, Sarit aimed to create re-
Thai-ification and he sent a message to King Bhumibol that the revolutionary council 
would never allow the institution of the monarchy to be altered. Thus, his government 
was supported by the royalists and the monarchical network36, that allowed the 
military in taking a leading role in running the Thai state (Fong, 2009:686-87). This 
revival of the monarchs was done by organising royal visits to the countryside and 
overseas, as well as initiating royal public holidays and national days. This included 
the construction of royal monuments and universities and institutions named after 
Thai kings. Even the custom of prostration in the presence of the king was revived in 
this era (Jory, 2001:211).  
 
35 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Prime Minister of Thailand from 1959-1963 
36 A term coined by Duncan McCargo to explain how King Bhumibol stayed in power. The 
monarchical network relied on political groups led by ‘good men’ such as royalist proxies, 
Prem Tinsulanonda – the former prime minister and privy council – and other with the 




 Hyper-royalism has created an intense discourse that there is no space for 
other kinds of presentation regarding the monarchy except the one coated with a 
sacred aura. It is very rare to see the role-playing of the monarchs in dramas or 
films. Presenting the monarchs in disgrace can be considered violating the Lèse 
majesté law. The case of the movie Anna and the King (1999) was a good example. 
The movie was adapted from a book written by U.S. novelist Margaret Landon which 
was based on the autobiography of Anna Leonowens, a teacher in the Siamese 
court during the reign of King Mongkut. In 1998, the Thai Film Board rejected the 
request by Twentieth Century Fox to film Anna and the King, arguing that it showed 
inappropriate presentations of the king and Siamese people. The script portrayed 
King Mongkut as a ‘brutal buffoon’ and conveyed disrespect to the monarchy and 
defamation of Thailand (Jory, 2001:204; Van Esterik, 2006:301).  
Not only was the application of filming in Thailand rejected, but also the film’s 
showing. Information provided by Thai embassies on the banning of Anna and the 
King was that it portrayed Mongkut37 and Chulalongkorn as despotic, arrogant, 
barbaric rulers whose acts of modernisation were inspired by Anna (Van Esterik, 
2006:303). According to Pattamawadee Jaruworn, a member of the Thai Film Board, 
the film was banned because ‘it disparaged royal aura of power, and explicitly 
distorted Thai history. Besides, Leonowens’ novel is unreliable, and the film producer 
had excessively emphasised characterisation and narrative. If the film to be 
screened in the country, it would have likely caused more harm than profit’ (Amphorn 
and Chonratda, 2000). There are more reasons from the Film Board’s criticism such 
as ‘it contained certain dialogues which humiliated Siam and Buddhism; there was a 
line in which a character said Siam was uncivilised; there were suggestions of a 
romantic attachment between Anna and the King; there was inappropriate 
characterisation of the King and the King’s son, Chulalongkorn, and there was a 
scene in which an assassination attempt is made on the King’ (Jory, 2001:204).   
 Because of this strong restriction, characters who play the role of the 
monarch are not expected in most Thai historical dramas. It may be possible to have 
actors perform roles of kings of previous dynasties. For example, in Bupphesanniwat 
(2018), there are actors who perform roles of kings in the Ayutthaya period, such as 
 
37 Rama IV (1851-1868) was highly revered for his competency and interest in Western 
knowledge and innovation. For example, he was a master in astronomy and mathematics. 
He studied from English textbooks and hired an English woman, Anna Leonowens, to be a 




Narai38, Phra Phetracha39, and Luang Sorasak40. However, the depictions of the 
Chakri dynasty, or to be specific, Thailand's most beloved kings such as 
Chulalongkorn and Bhumibol, is impossible. Although Chulalongkorn has been 
highly revered by Thai historiography and celebrated as the one who saved the 
nation from western colonisation by the country’s reform and modernisation, he is 
invisible in Thai historical dramas. The king is omnipresent in many forms but not in 
person. His name is mentioned and revered, yet he never appeared because it 
would be risky for the TV producers. For example, in a final episode of the drama 
‘Thongek Moryathachalong,' King Chulalongkorn is mentioned as the moderniser 
who started public health in the country. Despite the fact that throughout the whole 
drama, the king was never mentioned and the story itself was a romantic comedy, 
the final episode had brought in the invisible monarch by having many characters sit 
on the floor and make a gesture of ‘wai’ above their heads to show immense 
gratitude to the king (Figure 8). In this case, the monarch is present, but not visible, 
and has been a common practice for many Thai television dramas. 
 
 
Figure 8 Thongek Moryathachalong, ep 14 
 Other sensitive topics regarding the monarchy are also taboo, even if they 
can be interpreted as subtly inferred. According to Jory (2003), sensitive historical 
events include the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932; the suspicious death 
of Rama VIII who was found dead in his bed in the Grand Palace; and the massacre 
of students, who protested the military dictator, by the security forces and village 
 
38 The 27th monarch of the Ayutthaya Kingdom. 
39 Ayutthaya king, who staged a coup in the reign of King Narai and founded the Ban Phlu 
Luang dynasty. 




militias at Thammasat University in 1976. The Thammasat massacre in 1976 has 
been removed from the conventional Thai education system as an unthinkable topic. 
According to Thongchai, there are many factors contributing to the silencing of this 
event. The most important factor is because ‘the monarchy and the Buddhist sangha 
had been involved in the conspiracy that led to the killing.’ Other factors include the 
narrative that the protesters, believed to be communists, were threats to the ‘nation, 
religion, and monarchy’, and the massacre or state crime is against the saga of the 
unity of Thai people under the benevolent monarchs (Thongchai, 2001:3-4). 
Therefore, among many examples of historical dramas provided earlier in this 
section, very few mention these topics, and none openly criticise or discuss them in 
detail.  
However, criticism of the country is evident in other new media such as 
YouTube. In 2018, an anti-military rap song ‘Prathet Ku Mee’ (What My Country’s 
Got) by a group called RAD (Rap Against Dictatorship) has become an 
unprecedented phenomenon in Thailand. The song’s lyrics directly challenge the 
military government and confront corruption, nepotism, the lack of accountability and 
transparency, poor healthcare, suppression of freedom of speech, and so on (The 
Guardian, 2018). The video also displays subjects considered a taboo in Thai 
society. It replicates the historic scene, based on an iconic image from the 1976 
massacre at Thammasat University, where a corpse hanging from a tree is 
continuously beaten as a crowd cheers (Figure 9). This corpse was supposed to 
represent two activists who had been hanged while putting up protest posters. The 
act of hanging was shown in a theatrical skit by students and it was accused by the 
military of staging a satire of the hanging of the Crown Prince in effigy (Thongchai, 
2001:3). This is one of the events that the Thai state does not want to be 
remembered or allowed to be discussed or shown freely in public. The Prime 
Minister Prayut responded to this video by complaining that ‘anyone who shows 
appreciation for the song must accept responsibility for what happens to the country 
in the future’ (Beech, 2019).  
Consequently, the government launched an official rap ‘Thailand 4.0’ in retort. 
Most Thais found its lyrics and melody lame and out-of-date (Bangkokpost, 2018). 
The government’s song consists of sampling melodic themes from the national 
anthem and using hallmark lyrics such as ‘Make today and tomorrow better by 
agreeing with another’ and ‘Thai people are so smart. We just need to set collective 
goals to be stronger.’ The government tried to fight against political resistance with 








Figure 9 captured from the music video of an anti-military rap song ‘Prathet Ku 
Mee’ 
In 2020, the resistance to this taboo was elevated by continuous student 
protests. The protesters call themselves ‘Khana Ratsadon 2563’ (The People’s Party 
2020) after the instigators of the 1932 Siamese Revolution, which ended absolute 
monarchy. In September 2020, protesters placed a plaque near the royal palace so 
as to demand democracy as well as imitating the original plaque placed by the 
People’s Party in 1932, which incidentally went missing in recent years and was 
replaced by a royalist plaque. The key event started again in October 14 as a 
student-led rally gathered at Democracy Monument and walked to Government 
House. The protest was set on that day to commemorate the 47th anniversary of the 
Thai popular uprising in 1973, which toppled the dictatorship of ‘Sarit-Thanom-
Praphas41’ (Thai PBS World, 2020; Paddock and Linder, 2020). Not only did the 
protests re-illuminate these unspeakable topics, the protesters’ demands also 
reached the unreachable, to the point of reforming the monarchy. This is 
unprecedented thinking in Thai society. The 10-point manifesto for monarchical 
reform includes ‘curbing the monarchy’s authority, mentioning a desire for the king to 
be truly above politics, reducing the national budget allocated to the king, disbanding 
royal offices, including the historically powerful privy council, and ending public 
relations that excessively glorify the monarchy’ (Row, 2020). 
The government responded to these actions by declaring a severe state of 
emergency to ban gatherings of more than five people. Police dispersed the 
unarmed protesters with water cannons and protest leaders were arrested and 
 
41 Prime Ministers of Thailand: Sarit (1959-1963) and Thanom (1963-1973). Praphas 




charged for defaming the monarchy. Some of them were arrested with harsh 
penalties for showing an act of violence towards the queen, who was in a car that 
unexpectedly drove past a demonstration (Paddock and Linder, 2020). Other 
responses can be found as assertions of soft power. This resulted from a sharp rise 
of interest in modern Thai history. Young people now turn to textbooks about Thai 
history that are different to those used in schools. The political crisis has caused 
more and more young people to study themes, such as that of the geobody, the 
1932 revolution or Thammasat massacre of 1976. A Thai translation of Thongchai’s 
Siam Mapped, for example, has become a best-seller and quickly sold out, along 
with his other books. Consequently, the police raided a publishing house, Same Sky 
Books42, and seized copies of three best-seller titles from Monarchy Studies. 
Besides, the government censored media outlet Prachatai Voice TV, The Reporters, 
The Standard, and Free Youth for broadcasting content that ‘could cause panic’ and 
‘could threaten national security’ (Thanthong-Knight, 2020; ABC, 2020).  
Here we have an overview of how these sensitive topics are dealt with in 
Thailand. Though there are attempts to challenge these restrictions, the Thai 
authorities would exercise their power to halt resistance. It may be possible to see 
the criticism of the state or the monarchy online or on the streets, though sadly it is 
deemed impossible to see it on TV. Due to this strict climate, this thesis aims to 
analyse Thai television dramas to see how nation-building and national identities are 
constructed, and how it is believed that these structures and formulas of Thai 
television under these kinds of restrictions, have played important roles in shaping 
drama content. Television drama is never solely for entertainment. It is a state 
apparatus to deliver key messages to audiences as well as to sustain the status quo 
to long afterwards. 
2.7 Research questions and methodology  
2.7.1 Research aims and questions  
This thesis aims to investigate how Thai TV dramas with a northern Thai 
focus demonstrate and are used to construct the Thai nation and national identities? 
How is the North as one of different regions of Thailand represented in historical TV 
dramas?  
Thai television programmes, as well as all mass media in the country, are, to 
a large extent, produced in the capital city Bangkok, which is regarded as the ‘centre’ 
 
42 A publishing house that handles books by Thai and foreign scholars with sometimes 




where most forms of dominant power are located such as government, education, 
military, and cultural institutions. Therefore, this research is interested in how 
hegemonic narratives are used and depicted in selected television dramas and how 
the dominant power creates and distorts the pictures of subaltern/less powerful 
regional cultures. The major argument is based on the hypothesis that the Thai 
nation is not only constructed from ‘Thainess’ but rather from combinations of many 
ethnicities, cultures, and identities of many groups of people.  
Many scholars in the field of Thai studies have shown that the Thai nation has 
an ambiguous relationship with the West that many Western elements are hybridised 
with Thai identities (which I have mentioned in chapter 1). However, this thesis will 
investigate further on this topic by focusing on northern Thai culture as an example 
of subordinate culture and identity that are not hybridised but combined with Thai 
nation-building. The key term ‘combi-nation’, in this thesis, means the unequal and 
selective way that constructions of the Thai nation often adopt some specific cultures 
and identities to form the idea of a ‘modern nation.’ The thesis will show that this 
hybridisation and combi-nation are selective assimilations, dependent on their 
hierarchical relationships with Thai nation. While Thais choose to hybridise with the 
West by selecting what is good for their nation, that hybridisation is barred from 
northern identities as Thais regard the North as inferior and subordinate.  
2.7.2 Why the north?  
Northern Thailand is one of the most popular geo-cultural focal points of the 
Thai television drama industry. The north is frequently used in Thai television dramas 
for the following reasons.  
First, the north has long been a competitive kingdom and target of Siamese 
power. The northern provinces as we know them today were previously collectively 
known as the Lanna kingdom, and since the thirteenth century. Lanna had a 
relatively competitive relationship with its southern neighbours – the kingdoms of 
Sukhothai and Ayutthaya. War between Lanna and Ayutthaya lasted more than 25 
years, and took place between 1451-1475 (Sarassawadee, 2005:105-106). During 
the eighteenth century, Lanna had fallen under Burmese power for more than 200 
years. In 1786, Siamese troops defeated the Burmese army and helped Lanna fight 
back. Siam took this opportunity to claim its higher status as overlord (Terwiel, 
2011:91-92). Since then, Lanna became a vassal state which Siam tried to 
strengthen as their northern line of defence. According to the historical background, 
the north had been an area that Siam wished to conquer and then took up an inferior 




overlords were unsuccessful such as Keng Tung and which is often depicted in Thai 
TV dramas. 
Second, the north has a relationship tied to Siam as an internal colony. It 
represents an intimate, yet also subordinate culture in a hierarchical relationship with 
central Thailand. After Lanna had become a tributary state, Chiang Mai (capital city 
of the north) had two obligations as a tributary state – the sending of tribute and the 
defence of the country against invasion from the Burmese (Sarassawadee, 
2005:152). During Chulalongkorn’s reign, Lanna and Siam developed into having an 
intimate relationship through Lanna Princess Dara Rasami becoming one of 
Chulalongkorn’s concubines. After the country reform, commissioners from Bangkok 
were sent to rule Lanna as provincial administrative units. In 1878, these 
commissioners were changed to be governors, which brought the north under direct 
Siamese control (Terwiel, 2011:191-92). Thus, from having been a competitive 
power, Lanna was converted into being a submissive, subordinate region under 
Siamese control.   
Third, the north has features that offer great potential for romanticisation in TV 
dramas. This romanticisation of the north has been largely achieved through 
depictions of culture and nature - beautiful scenery and good climate. The north has 
a culture that is distinctive from central Thailand, yet differences could be blended. 
Compared to the cultural and religious differences in the south, where the majority of 
people are Muslim, the north has more cultural proximity. While the northeast has 
been presented as a dry and hot region, the north has an easier climate. It was a 
target of unification as the government promoted tourism in the north during the 
1940s by making it ‘a beautiful region’, a region of rich culture, fertile land, and 
friendly people – expressed through beauty of nature, culture and women (Darunee, 
2006). These features of beautification have effeminised the north and they are 
reproduced in literature. 
 Accordingly, TV dramas with a northern Thai focus were regularly produced 
almost every year. This also resulted from the government campaigns and media 
liberalisation after the end of the Cold War. The Thai government felt relaxed and did 
not see local cultural identities as posing a threat to Thai national identity. This was 
supported by the Thai governments ‘Year to Campaign for Thai Culture’ in 1994, 
1997 constitution, and Tourism Authority of Thailand’s campaign ‘Amazing Thailand’ 
(1998-99) (Jory, 1999a: 337-341; Jory, 1999b:471). I will investigate the 






2.7.3 Research gap  
This research aims to contribute to the understanding of the Thai nation 
building by investigating via new perspectives and new material. In terms of 
perspective, this research aims to study nation building from non-Western and non-
centric perspectives. It uses Thailand and its regional culture as a case study to 
demonstrate that nation building in Thailand is different from Western concepts of 
nation. Chapter 1 has shown that existing research in Thai Studies focuses on 
central Thai perspectives. I want to develop from existing knowledge that Thailand is 
hybridised with the West by demonstrating that it is also combined with regional 
identities. This non-centric perspective will prove that the making of the Thai nation is 
complicated and multi-layered. This results from the ambiguous status of Thailand as 
both semi-colonial and internal coloniser, and it shows a kind of nation building that 
is different from Western scholarly understanding of nation.  
This research also draws on new material to study TV drama. This research 
follows a more recent trend of TV Studies, termed by Toby Miller as TV Studies 3.0, 
which is a hybrid concept composed of political economy and cultural studies. This 
shift indicates that television studies can contribute to wider understanding not only 
in terms of media function, but social, cultural and historical contexts that surround a 
production (as previously discussed). This research, however, uses that approach 
from a non-Western perspective as it investigates TV dramas in Thailand. Thai TV 
offers good material to study how cultural and historical contexts affect content 
because it is much controlled by the state and laden with specific nationalism 
inspired by the RNH. 
TV Studies in Thailand do not gain much attention academically. Some 
international scholars have criticised Thai TV content for being flooded with 
entertainment programmes, lacking focus on controversial issues, which in turn limits 
research on TV content to being ‘simple, value-laden opposition between serious 
news and light entertainment’ (Farmer, 2015:75-76). Nevertheless, Farmer illustrates 
how TV dramas can indeed be read critically regarding controversial issues. He has 
exemplified how TV dramas challenge the elite’s hegemonic rules, which mean they 
have political significance conveying political discursivity in the public sphere 
(Farmer, 2015:85). Similarly, Townsend illustrates how the common violence in Thai 
TV dramas reflect Thai society. The presentation of rape scenes are a reflection and 
construction of sexual authority and gendered forms of behaviour (Townsend, 





Even though these works suggest that TV drama could contribute to social 
construction, it is unlikely to find a discussion on nation building or national identity in 
TV dramas. TV Studies in Thailand focus on wide ranges of topics but mostly 
relating to social and cultural issues. First research on television in Thailand was in 
1977 and it was about the influences of television. Currently, television studies are 
more open to cultural studies approaches. Some studies have been developed from 
textual analysis and the analysis of audience behaviour through to ethnographic 
approaches (Somsuk, 2015:7-11,148). Besides, most research about TV dramas in 
Thailand is at master’s degree level and is concerned with the effect of television on 
audience’s attitudes and behaviours (Somsuk, 2015:152-153). Research by Thai 
well-known scholars in the field included Kanjana Kaewthap (1994), for example, 
investigates different cultures in Thai TV dramas and films. Her research particularly 
elaborates cultural ideologies and social norms regarding Thai women. Somsuk 
Hinwiman (2015) also takes cultural and ethnographical approaches to analyse 
cultural politics in TV. This includes studying behaviours, content, social and cultural 
context. His research problematises topics such as gender, class, social ideologies.  
Examples of PhD theses about Thai TV Studies are also about social and 
cultural identity. Thitinan Boonpap (2007) explores the construction of contemporary 
Thai cultural identity in television. Her work includes all forms of TV programmes 
such as game shows and dramas, putting emphasis on roles of globalisation in 
constructing cultural identity. Nitikul Chamaraman (2007) studies the cultivation 
effects on the representation of social attributes, marriage, family and occupational 
roles in Thai TV dramas. Isaya Sinpongsporn (2018) looks at Thai cultural identity 
through the remaking of Korean dramas and focuses on transnational and hybrid 
culture. Her research indicates that these Korean dramas were revised and localised 
based on Thai cultural and national identities. Though there are topics relating to 
ideologies, cultural or social identities, they do not discuss topics relating to the 
nation building.  
On the contrary, a number of theses and research about the Thai nation are 
often in the political field and based on historical texts or literature. For example, 
Copeland (1993) studied political newspapers as source text. Chanokporn 
Chutikamoltham (2015) investigates the construction of national identity in Thai 
school textbooks. Janit Feangfu explores the construction of modern Thai identities 
by looking at Thai literature during the Cold War era. Hamilton (2002) discusses 
cultural identity in Thai media yet she includes all kinds of entertainment media, not 




Other research relating to nation or national identities can be found in film 
studies but they take a central Thai perspective and less focus on the representation 
of regional identity. Kultida Boonyakul Dunagin (1993) studies Thai cultural identity in 
Thai movies. Patsorn Sungsri (2004) explores how Thai national identities, 
particularly the three pillars (nation, religion, and monarchy) are constructed from the 
creation of Otherness, or threat to the nation in different periods. Other scholars 
have been focusing on Thai cinema in connection with the theme of nationalism. 
Harrison (2005,2010) elaborates how Thai films are full of popular animosity towards 
the West, anxieties over Thai authentic identity in a globalising world, promoting 
national pride as the only nation ‘never-been-colonised’, and the yearning for the 
imagined Siamese past. Lewis (2003) argues that Thai films are used to echo Thai 
nationalism, either elite or popular, which is proud of its independent non-colonial 
past. Amporn Jirattikorn (2003) further adds that these historical films are the 
attempts to reaffirm Thainess and national identity in both local and global contexts. 
Chajabhol Choopen (2007) studies nationalism in contemporary Thai society by 
looking at Thai films. He notes five nationalistic themes which are closely connected 
to Thai historiography, such as historical wars, Western threats, cultural invasion, 
feminism and teenagers’ nationalistic consciousness.  
Based on the existing research, Thai TV Studies do not discuss the topic of 
Thai nation-building while research that examines the Thai nation in other texts does 
not particularly focus on regional identity. Accordingly, this thesis anticipates 
investigating Thai TV dramas, particularly historical dramas, with historical and 
political context surrounding them, and the representation of the North as one 
regional identity. It anticipates illustrating how the construction of the Thai nation and 
national identity in TV dramas are in connection with specific Thai nationalism and 
RNH, which cannot be found in existing research. Though Thai historical dramas do 
not show as strong nationalistic themes as Thai films, they constantly remind 
audiences of Thai nationalism as resulting from the RNH. Moreover, the content and 
representation in TV dramas are more static than films. In addition, the depictions of 
regional identity are recurrent and repeatedly reproduced in TV dramas, and they are 
more obvious than found in films. My major contribution of the concept of ‘Combi-
nation’ will therefore broaden knowledge on the idea of nation.   
2.7.4 Methodology    
 This research uses qualitative analysis which includes a close reading of 
visual presentation, montage, sound, light, camera angle, clothing and makeup, body 
language, dialogue and language use. Instead of examining these TV dramas 




selected dramas. The major analyses of TV dramas in this thesis will be divided into 
two main chapters, which are made up of five smaller sub-chapters. The first chapter 
is ‘history and nation’ in which I aim to show how the Royalist Nationalist 
Historiography (RNH) dominates the presentation in these dramas, how the state 
exploits history to construct the Thai nation, and how history creates different 
combinations, that is combi-nations, to form the Thai nation. This will be done by 
examining three main points which are combination with the West, combination with 
other ethnicities, and combination with the Others within. The second chapter is 
concerned with ‘body and nation’, in which I aim to investigate how Thai national 
identities are created by different combinations by looking specially at combination 
with genders and though combination with concepts of beauty.  
In this research, four TV dramas were chosen as case studies because they 
correspond explicitly to the five main concepts of discussion. 
List of four selected dramas 
1. Ploeng Chimphalee (2014) 
2. Raknakkara (2017) 
3. Buangbanjathorn (2017) 
4. Klinkasalong (2019)  
Each of these four dramas are distinguished in different ways. I do not 
separate them in each chapter but use them as texts for discussion where 
appropriate. I do not wish to analyse every episode/scene but do close reading of 
some key scenes. Moreover, the analysis will be done alongside contextual analysis 
regarding the historical and social background of Thailand from the late nineteenth 
century to the present.  
These four dramas set their stories from the nineteenth century to the 1950s. 
The first tale, Raknakkara, is a historical drama that takes place in the late 
nineteenth century. This drama is the only drama with a northern Thai focus that 
uses historical events situated during Western imperialism and Siamese 
centralisation as a context. Moreover, the presentation of northern Thai culture 
(language, costume, props) has gained a lot of public interest. This raised public 
awareness and concerns about Thai history as well as inspired many seminars, both 
academic and non-academic. Klinkasalong set its story during the 1920s. It is a 
romance with a background of a northern province, after the Siamese administrative 
reform. It is one of a few dramas that illustrates the civilisation and modernisation of 
the north. While many other dramas about the North occur at unknown times and 




and places referred to. The story also features the roles of missionaries, supported 
by Siam, in advancing the civilisation in the North, which we cannot see in other 
dramas. Next is Buangbanjathorn, which is a historical drama set in the 1940s during 
the second World War when the irredentists gained parts of the northern states from 
British Burma. This drama is worth studying because it has the representation of 
ethnicity coming from beyond the Thai border. Though Keng Tung and its culture are 
commonly found in Thai TV dramas with a Northern Thai focus, this is the only 
drama that shows Thai government’s invasion of Keng Tung. The last selected case 
study is Ploeng Chimphalee, set in the 1950s. Ploeng Chimphalee is one of many 
dramas that reproduces gender stereotypes between northern women and Bangkok 
men. However, it is the only drama with a northern Thai focus that also has a third 
gender43 character.  
This thesis also includes interviews with people involved in the production and 
TV business i.e., screenwriters, director, and costume designers. The interviewees 
are professionals in the TV business and selected specifically by their work and 
positions. I selected these small samples only to provide background of these 
dramas and formulate research questions in this thesis. Their answers are not used 
for analysis though some parts may be used as supportive evidence in the 
discussion of certain TV dramas. These participants were approached either by 
personal connections or via social networks such as Facebook. I had their contact 
numbers and emails from my friends and family who work in the Thai entertainment 
industry. In Thailand, connections are significant to reach these groups of 
participants. For each participant, I had contacted them individually in advance to 
ask for permission before doing the interview and made initial appointments.  
Interviews took place in Thailand, in June 2018, mostly in Bangkok and in 
Chiang Mai provinces because the participants work and live there. In-depth 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner and informal atmosphere. 
These took place in cafés, participant’s workplaces or shops. I visited each 
participant one time, and the interview lasted one hour approximately. In some 
cases, I contacted them later to ask for more information by using chat applications 
like Line or Messenger. All participants were Thai and interviews were conducted in 
Thai by the researcher who is a native Thai speaker. Interview data is recorded 
through digital audio recordings and in written notes. All the data is stored in a 
personal laptop, the University M drive and OneDrive. Parts of the interview answers 
are included in the thesis, and I translated all of them into English. 
 
43 Apart from the normative genders between men and women, Thailand has accustomed to 




Participants and the dramas they were involved with include: 
1. Piyaphorn Sakkasem (Author of Raknakkara) 
2. Yingyot Panya (Screenwriter for Raknakkara)  
3. Wasin Aunchanum (Costume Designer for Raknakkara and Klinkasalong) 
4. Sutthiphan Hera (Costume Designer for Raknakkara) 
5. Phensiri Sawetwiharee (Screenwriter for Ploengchimpalee) 
6. Atthaphorn Theemakorn (Director of Buangbanjathorn)    
2.8 Empirical data from fieldwork: How TV dramas are made  
 The main idea of this section is to show a process of drama production and 
find out who dominates and has more power. Thai TV drama production process is 
varied in different production companies, but it can be roughly categorised into five 
processes which are; planning, pre-production, production, post-production, and 
evaluation (Sirinthip, 2002: 2-4). From fieldwork in Thailand I have collected 
information on the pre-production and production process, based on interviews with 
an author, directors, screenwriters and costume designers. This thesis will not cover 
post-production and evaluation such as editing, colouring, or audience reception.  
2.8.1 Pre-production 
 Based on the interviews, people who had the highest influence in the pre-
production process was the TV station owner or committee. According to Arunee 
(1993), the production of a TV drama in Thailand involves three sectors, which are 
the TV station, production house, and sponsor. TV dramas that I have studied were 
either produced, funded, or owned by the TV stations.   
The first step of production is to find a suitable novel for adaptation. The TV 
station committee make this choice. For Raknakkara, the novel’s copyright belongs 
to Channel 3 and it has power to grant permission to an appropriate production 
house. Piyaphorn, the author, stated that the copyright of her novel was bought a 
few years before the production started. At that time, she had no idea who would be 
the director or which production house would make it (Piyaphorn, 2018, interview). 
Yingyot Panya, the screenwriter, said that Act Art Generation, the production house, 
had always wanted to make it into TV drama. So, they approached the station and 
luckily their request was approved (Yingyot, 2018, interview). In some cases, a 
production house could propose a project to the station. Phensiri Sawetwiharee 
found the novel Ploengchimpalee interesting, so she proposed it to the station, and it 




 In these two cases, production houses were interested in the novels and 
asked for permission from the stations. For Buangbanjathorn, it was the other way 
around. It was the station that wanted to make this drama and the production house 
had to do the job. According to Atthaphorn Theemakorn, the director from one 
production house was assigned to run the project and he was hired as an 
outsourced director. So, he had very little involvement in the screenplay or the 
casting of actors. His duty covered mainly the filming and art direction. Though he 
did some historical research, it was for the setting of scenes, not the content 
(Atthaphorn, 2018, interview). From this information, it can be assumed that TV 
stations play an important role in controlling, deciding and selecting a drama to 
broadcast on their channels. These drama makers were either assigned or approved 
by a TV station before production. Figure 10 shows an example of the workflow of a 
Thai TV drama based on the interviews I conducted. This workflow is in fact a 
common process, found in most TV dramas in the country.  
 
 
Figure 10 Processes of Thai TV drama production, showing two main different 
workflows  
Next in the process is preparation for production. As the selected dramas are 




about the north. Of the interview participants, three researched from textbooks and 
held interviews with experts. One person did not research but relied on his memory 
and lasting impressions. Among the six interviewees, only two had a background 
from the north of Thailand and had a direct educational background related to 
northern Thai culture. Wasin Aunchanum and Sutthiphan Hera were costume 
designers for Raknakkara and Klinkasalong. Both gained some knowledge about Tai 
textiles before they entered the entertainment industry. They graduated with a 
degree in Thai Arts from Chiang Mai University. They also had experiences from 
working, full-time and part-time, with northern textiles and related business, so their 
knowledge came from education and direct experience. When they designed 
costumes for the drama, they applied their background knowledge with some more 
research on textbooks and interviews (Wasin, 2018; Sutthiphan, 2018, interview).  
 Four out of six interviewees are not from the north of Thailand. Piyaphorn 
gained her knowledge about the north from textbooks. She had spent two years on 
research in libraries, reading Thai textbooks and theses about the topic, especially in 
the field of history. Atthaphorn and Phensiri interviewed some experts apart from 
reading. Atthaphorn was interested in art direction, so he went to the north to 
interview northern artisans and lecturers about northern furniture and objects used in 
ceremonies, as well as the ethnic groups he wanted to present in the drama. 
Phensiri travelled to the north to find shooting locations and interviewed people who 
worked in a timber business, which is the main setting of the drama. She went to see 
traditional performances and invited professional dancers to train the actress 
(Phensiri, 2018, interview).  
 Yingyot is the only one who did not research from books or interview but used 
his memories from 30 years prior. What he produced in his screenplay was his 
perception and impression, which was created and represented through media or 
tourism. For example;  
My 'Chiang Mai at first sight' was in 1983-84 when I visited Chiang Mai for 
the first time. Back then, everything was so unique and beautiful. …These 
things impressed me, and I cannot forget it. I told the director that this is 
Chiang Mai in my mind. I wrote it from a pure, romantic feeling that I have 
for Chiang Mai (Yingyot, 2018, interview).     
 Based on the fieldwork, these drama makers gained knowledge about the 
north from research (reading textbooks and interviewing experts), personal 
experience and formal educational backgrounds. These people’s interests in 
Northern Thailand were in the area of tradition, culture and history. Their perception 
was shaped by the stereotype of the North reproduced in media, tourism, textbook, 




2.8.2 Production: Roles and power in drama production  
 During the production process, typically, the person who holds significant 
power in decision making is the director. However, the relationship between a 
director and a screenwriter may differ case by case and that affects their roles and 
influences in the production. If a screenwriter is a freelancer, and hired by a 
production house, he or she would normally play important roles over the making of 
plot. Most of the time, this happens with a famous screenwriter who has written a 
screenplay for many well-known dramas. Then he or she could add or change the 
story where appropriate. Raknakkara, for example, was written by Yingyot, who is 
one of the most well-known screenwriters in the country. Therefore, he could make 
some changes from the original text in the TV version and the director had to strictly 
follow his screenplay.   
 He elaborates the idea of feminism and gender equality in Raknakkara by 
presenting the concept of monogamy, which is anachronistic to the story. Yingyot 
added a new character to challenge polygamy in the nineteenth century. He was 
aware that monogamy was a Western idea that had not yet been practiced widely in 
Asian society, where polygamy was more accepted. Yet, he insisted on adding the 
topic to the drama, as it would strengthen the modernisation and appeal of the 
characters.  
Moreover, he modernised female characters by having them speaking 
English44, and interested in modern and Western knowledge, which are not 
mentioned in the novel. For example, one supporting character learns to swim, which 
was uncommon for Northern women in the nineteenth century; or a character learns 
to use a fountain pen and clothes iron. The role of women and idea of egalitarianism 
were elaborated to convey a central idea of the drama that talks about how people 
should adapt to changes and how the North should ‘change’ to be a part of Siam. In 
this situation, we can conclude that a person who has dominant power in shaping the 
story is the screenwriter, which has equal power to the director.  
The situation is different if a screenwriter works as an employee in a 
production house. In this case, his or her power is reduced. Phensiri is an example 
as she works as a staff for a production house. Though she has played a role in 
choosing a novel, she needs to propose the project to the production house’s owner 
and then the TV station committee. She might add more characters, change some 
 
44 In the original text, Manmuang cannot read English books, let alone speaking or writing. 
She received a book from her cousin, and the novel clearly stated that it is ‘a thin book with 




parts of the story from the novel for the TV version, but the person who has more 
power is the director. In Phensiri’s case, the director is also the production house 
owner, so she had to change her screenplay upon his request and to help the 
shooting run smoothly. Comparing these two cases, the power of screenwriters 
depends on their reputation and status with the director. 
 It is not always the case that a director would have more power. For 
Raknakkara and Ploenchimphalee, the directors and production house owners were 
the same person and thus they are the most powerful people. For Buangbanjathorn 
and Klinkasalong, the directors were hired by production houses. Atthaphorn, the 
director of Buangbanjathorn, had very little involvement in the adaptation from novel 
to TV drama. The screenplay was written and approved by the production house and 
he was not supposed to make any changes unless necessary. He referred to the 
screenplay as a ‘bible’ that he should follow.  
 According to the interview, the director and screenwriters do not have full 
power in the production process. It depends on their status and relation with the 
production house, which has higher power in decision making and shapes the story.  
2.8.3 How the Royalist Nationalist Historiography shapes their thought 
From the interview, it is noticeable that RNH has dominated their thoughts. 
Piyaphorn wrote her novel based on the Siam-was-never-colonised discourse and 
her novel supports the internal colonisation. In interview, she emphasised the idea of 
‘unavoidable changes’ which are important for a state to survive from Western 
imperialism and the idea of change in her novel means the Siamese administrative 
reformation. Therefore, Piyaphorn created a main male character to stand for a new 
world:   
 I created this character to be educated as a representative of the new 
world. He stands for someone who has been abroad and knows other 
countries. So, he wants his own country to change and wants to be a part 
of Siam…He sees the world and realises that if his state wants to survive, 
it has to be united with Siam (Piyaphorn, 2018, interview). 
 Apart from the Siam-was-never-colonised premise, Piyaphorn makes use of 
hero/heroine who sacrifice their lives for the nation. Her inspirations are the 
princesses Suphankanlaya45 and Dara Rasami46. The life of Dara Rasami became 
the main inspiration because it took place during the Siamese administrative reform. 
 
45 A 16th-century Siamese princess and older sister of King Naresuan, who was Queen 
Consort of King Bayinnaung of Burma. 
46 A princess of Chiang Mai and the Princess Consort of King Chulalongkorn, King Rama V 




She claims that she wanted to tell stories of women who sacrificed their lives for the 
nation more than an intention to talk about the internal colonisation in the North.   
In many Thai historical dramas, Burma has been depicted as the traditional 
enemy. This resulted from the chronicles of wars between Burma and Siam in Prince 
Damrong’s47 book Thai Rop Phama that has influenced many other Thai textbooks 
and historical writing (I elaborate on this with the RNH in Chapter 3.1). Sunait 
Chutintaranond, a Thai scholar, expert in Thai and Burmese history, stated that the 
Ayutthaya chronicles did not seriously consider wars against the Burmese as being 
more important than other historical events. It was not until the sacking of Ayutthaya 
in 1767 that Siamese leaders realised the hazard of the Burmese and they rewrote 
the past to depict the Burmese as the nation’s enemy. Later, chronicles of the 
Bangkok era expressed their antagonism towards the Burmese (Sunait, 1992:92). 
According to Sunait, this national history gave birth to modern Thai historical writing. 
In this framework, the Burmese are characterised as an important enemy and 
Damrong’s book had expressed hostility towards the Burmese since then (Sunait, 
1992:95-95). Accordingly, interviews have shown that the animosity or negative 
views towards the Burmese is evident in these film makers’ perception.  
For these drama makers, Siamese internal colonisation was better than 
Burmese power. In Raknakkara, the king and queen of one fictional state could not 
manage to protect the country from Western colonisation. The king, in the drama, 
enjoys courtly life with young girls while the queen exercises her power in the court. 
This was the cause of its fall into British colonisation. Piyaphorn admitted that she 
‘imitated a situation that happened in Burma…I just wanted to write that it was a 
collapsed nation.’ For Piyaphorn, Burma is a model of a nation that did not survive 
Western imperialism. This corresponds to the RNH narrative that Siam was the only 
one country that was never colonised. Yingyot has a similar view. He added that 
Piyaphorn's novel is about Chulalongkorn's diplomatic strategy in contrast to 
Burmese strategy. He said that ‘Muangman48 is inflexible with the British, that is why 
it was destroyed. They treated them like an enemy while Siam treated them like a 
friend.’ For these producers, the Siamese king was more knowledgeable and 
capable of diplomatic tactics to deal with the West. 
 The negative view towards Burma is also expressed in Buangbanjathorn 
which illustrates political unrest in Burma during the second world war. The director, 
Atthaphorn, stated that the drama ‘was based on Burmese political situations during 
the time of Aung San Suu Kyi’s father. There was a drastic change in that country, 
 
47 a half-brother of King Chulalongkorn  




with massacre and execution of royal family members.’ I was interested in their 
language use when these people talk about Burma. The words such as ‘collapsed 
nation,' ‘inflexible,' ‘destroyed,' ‘massacre’ 49 signify their negative view towards the 
situation in Burma. To these producers, Burma is associated with political problems 
while Siam/Thailand is depicted as peaceable.  
 Moreover, these drama makers also express the idea of irredentism in these 
dramas. For example, the ethnic Tai people in Keng Tung (a state in Burma) are 
considered as ‘Thai.’ Sutthiphan states that she used Keng Tung costume in the 
drama because it used to be held under Siamese power and had historical relations 
with Siam. This point suggests that these drama makers formulate their knowledge 
of the North from the concept of greater Thai nation which believes that other ethnic 
Tai are also Thais. According to this information, RNH heavily influenced them in 
their narratives of history and relation to other countries especially Burma.  
2.8.4 How these drama makers view the North 
 Due to the rise of regional culture in TV, these drama makers aimed to create 
dramas with high quality production and accurate presentation of culture and history. 
One of the obvious developments is the presentation of Northern Thai dialect, 
meaning to be more natural and realistic than prior dramas.  
For Raknakkara, the director and screenwriter agreed that actors need to 
speak in Northern dialect to make the dramas appear ‘realistic.' The drama set a 
new trend for TV dramas with a Northern Thai focus, and in that actors spoke in the 
Northern dialect (with standard Thai subtitles shown). This influenced other dramas, 
such as Klinkasalong, to follow this standard. Yingyot shared that he really liked the 
Northern dialect and the production team had put much effort to train actors. 
Once we decided to make a drama about Lanna, they must speak Lanna 
dialect…I believe that Lanna dialect is beautiful. This beauty of language 
must be presented, and everything must be correct (Yingyot, 2018, 
interview). 
Though Raknakkara uses Northern Thai dialect, Ploengchimpalee and 
Buangbanjathorn use standard Thai. Phensiri stated that she wanted the drama to 
be understandable for people in general. The use of subtitles is not suitable for Thai 
TV audiences, and it was not possible to train the actors in a limited time. For her, 
presenting Northern culture was more important than speaking the dialect.  
If actors cannot speak it correctly, I think it is offensive and disrespectful to 
Northern Thai culture. So, we would better show the northern culture 
 




through something else such as belief, culture, tradition (Phensiri, 2018, 
interview).   
Another aspect of cultural presentation is costume. Wasin and Sutthiphan 
viewed their roles as important because they had created a good standard for 
traditional costumes in TV drama. These replaced the stereotypical Northern Thai 
costumes of earlier TV dramas, which they considered inaccurate and ridiculous. 
The popularity of these dramas had also promoted tourism in the northern provinces 
as well as their textile business. After this drama aired, Wasin got an opportunity to 
work for Klinkasalong and other dramas with Northern Thai themes. So, it has 
become a new standard for TV dramas to pay more attention to costume design and 
cultural accuracy, and it shows that regional culture is more accepted.   
Next, these drama makers often mention Northern women, and they are 
presented in typical stereotypes. The first stereotype of Northern Thai women is 
physical beauty. Ploengchimpalee explicitly portrayed this stereotype. Phensiri 
stated that Northern women are often symbolised as a ‘wild orchid’ which represents 
natural beauty and Northern identity. For Phensiri, Northern Thailand is represented 
by its beautiful dance, and beautiful women who are kind and gentle (Phensiri, 2018, 
interview).   
Phensiri viewed this as a classic and static characteristic, and to the extent 
that she cannot make them appear as something else. For example, in the original 
text, the main female character is not as submissive as female characters in the 
past. However, when adapted to TV drama, she had to stick on a concept of beauty 
of Northern women. ‘I could not make Northern women strong and aggressive like 
women from the South. They have their kind of gentleness.’ It is a stereotype and 
essentialisation of women according to the region. Northern women are usually 
presented as gentle while women, or people in general, from the south are depicted 
as tougher. This is resulting from a political relationship between Siam and these 
regions. The North is a non-threatening Other that Siam could fully unite with 
whereas the South has been more aggressive as seen in the insurgency in three 
Southern border provinces.  
This stereotype is also found in Yingyot’s interview. Before Raknakkara, he 
wrote a screenplay for another drama with a Northern Thai focus and helped the 
director choose the main female actor that corresponded to the Northern female 
stereotype. He stated that, she fit very well into this role and perfectly represented 
Northern Thai women because ‘she is beautiful and so sweet. Her manner, her 
opinion, and her behaviour are just right’ (Yingyot, 2018). This fixed stereotype of 




culture. For example, in the original text of Ploengchimpalee, the main female 
character works as a teacher. However, Phensiri decided to change this part 
because she saw it beyond being a nang-ek and she wanted her to be with arts and 
cultures (Phensiri, 2018). At this point, we can see that these drama makers 
associated Northern Thai women with fixed stereotypes which are physical beauty 
and local culture.  
 Apart from attention to Northern women, the landscape is also in fixed 
stereotype. The beautiful landscape of the North has been a setting and background 
for many novels and dramas. According to Phensiri, Thai TV drama loves the North 
because of its beautiful locations:  
It has beautiful scenery. When a drama was on air, the audience felt like 
they were traveling to the North. The North and Northeast have different 
geography, but the North is more completed with flowers, mountains, 
waterfall, temples, arts, and culture (Phensiri, 2018, interview).  
According to Yingyot, Thai TV production prefers the North not only because it 
has charming, romantic places but also the cost of production is cheaper compared 
to the South. The North for these drama makers is a place with beautiful scenery, 
fixed and frozen in time. When a new drama is made, they would search for unseen 
places, unfamiliar views, or uncommon tourist sites to present the exoticness and 
uniqueness of the North. These people were looking for a place that was untouched 
by urban lifestyles because they perceived the North as a fantasy, remaining static 
and unchanged through time.  
The last stereotype of the North is its culture. Phensiri stated that the North is 
best represented through performances because they are unique and 
distinguishable to the eyes of people from other regions. Likewise, Atthaphorn 
wanted to present Keng Tung (Shan) culture and its traditional dance in 
Buangbanjathorn. He told in the interview that he hardly saw Keng Tung culture on 
screen, so he put the traditional dance in a scene even though it was not mentioned 
in the story because they looked strange to him. Therefore, these drama makers 
tend to view the North with stereotypes such as language, women, landscape and 
culture. These representations were aimed to create a fascinating visual 
presentation that would be attractive to general audiences. The North, according to 
these drama makers is an exotic, tempting, unique culture distinguishable from 
central Thai yet harmoniously coexists with Thai national identities. While the 
production and presentation of Northern Thai culture in TV dramas has improved, 
they consistently restate the concept and framework of the Thai RNH. This attributes 
the North with a non-threatening Otherness, which can then be combined as part of 




Chapter 3  
History and Nation 
3.1 Combination with the West 
 The relationship between Thailand and the West is ambiguous and 
complicated. That the modern Thai nation is comprised of many Western elements 
which are the products of Western imperialism has been investigated by many 
scholars in the Thai studies field (see chapter 1). However, these ongoing debates 
sit in contrast to the master narrative of the country, which regards the West as an 
enemy of the nation. This powerful narrative is rooted in a specific kind of history 
which lies at the foundation of the Thai nation as mentioned in chapter 1, and leads 
to other aspects of combination that this thesis goes on to propose in the following 
chapters. Though scholars have studied the complicated relationship between 
Thailand and the West, the depiction of the West in relation to regional identity in TV 
dramas as an element of nation-building has been overlooked. This chapter thus 
aims to investigate the construction of the Thai nation as combination with the West 
and by investigating to historical representations of Siam and the North. In order to 
understand the depiction of the West in Thai TV drama, first we must look back to 
the foundation of a specific Thai historiography, known as Royalist Nationalist 
Historiography. 
3.1.1 Royalist Nationalist Historiography  
3.1.1.1 definition and problems 
Thai Royalist Nationalist Historiography (RNH) is a master narrative for most 
stories concerning Thai nation. It revolves around a narrative of Western imperialism 
and the country’s independence, and how this combination is active in developing a 
paradigm of Thai nationalism. This section will explain why RNH is so important in 
Thai historiography, and how it affects depictions of Thai nation.  
  RNH is a specific narrative focusing on the roles of the monarch. Some 
academics term it differently. For example, Nidhi argues that the writing of Thai 
history has relied on Prince Damrong Rajanubhab’s school. As a half-brother of King 
Chulalongkorn, Damrong (1862-1943) contributed many works on Thai history, his 
most influential being ‘Thai Rop Phama’50 (ไทยรบพมา่ Thai Fought Burma), which 
 
50 A book written in 1917 which systematically depicted the Burmese as an enemy of the 
Thai nation. The book deals principally with the wars between the two rival kingdoms 




chronicles the wars between Thailand and the Burmese. It focused on kings as 
heroes and the progenitors of the modern nation-state. Nidhi argued that the writing 
of Thai history that followed this book initiated a style he called Prince Damrong’s 
school of history which ‘dominated the approach to Thai history, focused on events 
as the outcome of the actions of great figures and paid no attention to society, 
economy, or culture. They saw no value in history but a tool for inducing nationalism. 
These historians used nationalism, which was a recent idea, to explain the 
motivation of people in the past’ (cited in Baker, 2005:362-363). With this 
historiography, no space is left for different angles on Thailand’s past.   
Thongchai Winichakul (1994) contends that this most powerful theme of Thai 
history emerged from the early twentieth century onwards, becoming one of the most 
significant instruments in the identification of Thai nationhood (Thongchai, 
1994:163). He calls this specific kind of history ‘Royal-nationalism’, which refers to 
the politics, concepts, and beliefs of Siamese elites after the 1893 Paknam Crisis or 
Franco-Siamese Conflict. This historiography has adapted over time and in response 
to various challenges, so as to stay firmly at the core of Thai history. It is grounded 
within two discourses which are, the ‘lost territories’ and country reform, during the 
reign of Chulalongkorn (Thongchai, 2016b: (13)-(17)). Therefore, it is ‘a nationalism 
defined by the loyalty to the monarchy and being Thai is equated with being royalist’ 
and thus reinforcing the power of the monarch and elites. Whereas in many 
countries, nationalism and anti-colonial struggle weakened the power of elites, in 
Siam the power of the ruling elite was strengthened (Thongchai, 2008:584). 
Similarly, Jack Fong refers to a ‘sacred nationalism’, which reinforces the power of 
the king and his institution. This mode of narrative attends to primordial themes and 
sacralises nation as rooted in a glorious past, showing the monarch as a 
transcendental figure above and beyond politics (Fong, 2009:674).  
RNH is the foundation of a specific nationalism in Thailand, which is different 
from the concept of nationalism as understood in many western countries. The 
movement towards nationalism in Thailand was promulgated by those in power (the 
monarchy or the military government). Therefore, it is regarded as an ‘official 
nationalism.’ According to Anderson, ‘official nationalisms is a process developed by 
dynastic power after and in reaction to the popular national movements widely 
practiced in Europe since the 1820s’ (Anderson, 2016:86). In Thailand, nationalism 
was fuelled by the monarch. Chulalongkorn used diplomatic strategies to shield his 
country from Western imperialism with his prime interest being to centralise royal 
government, eliminate semi-autonomous tributary states and promote economic 
development along colonial lines (Anderson, 2016:99-100). Similarly, Chai-anan 




and based on ‘the ideological enthronement of the nation-state in Thailand as being 
between the King and the bureaucratic elite.’ So, the nation-state was only ‘a 
technical and administrative instrument of the regime’ and there was no need to build 
a national identity because the identity of state was inseparable from the monarchy 
(Chai-anan, 2002:50). 
RNH problematises Thai historical writing because it dominates how people 
think and understand the history of their nation. It controls how people imagine the 
past as well as understand contemporary situations. This strong narrative is sacred 
to the Thai nation and thus criticism or reinterpretation of it is very rare in Thai 
society. In order to gain a more profound understanding of it, it is important to 
illuminate the origins of where this historiography is generated.  
3.1.1.2 Boundary and Mandala 
The paradigm of the RNH uses nationalism as a modern concept to explain 
situations in the past. The Thai nation’s independence is at the apex of Thai national 
pride as the country is believed to have never been colonised. This is what 
Thongchai terms as the ‘Siam-was-never-colonised’ narrative. This kind of history 
usually relies on national crises to build nationalistic sentiment among Thai citizens. 
The most influential is the 1893 Paknam Crisis, also known as the Franco-Siamese 
Conflict, which gave birth to this narrative. However, before we understand the 
Paknam Crisis, first we need to know the concept of boundary in pre-modern 
societies.  
Geographical boundary is a modern concept initiated by Western imperialism. 
Prior, independent states and kingdoms in the region lived under the rules of 
protection and overlordship. Thongchai’s research on the making of Siam’s Geo-
body explicitly discusses how the pre-modern concept of boundary in Siam meant a 
limit without a clear-cut edge or sense of division. Pre-modern boundary was not 
determined or sanctioned by the central authority. Rather, it was determined by the 
extent of area it could protect so there were political-territorial patches with a lot of 
blank space in between. A kingdom extended to area over which their power could 
be exercised. The political sphere could be mapped only by power relationships, not 
by territorial integrity (Thongchai, 1994:75,79). Therefore, what was important for 
pre-modern society was power relationship between states which leant an idea of 
sovereignty, which was different from the one known in relation to modern concepts 
of nation.  
The relationship among several major kingdoms and their tributary kingdoms 




but operated by common recognition of a hierarchical world order. A tributary 
kingdom had to submit itself and show allegiance to the supreme overlord. 
Nevertheless, the overlord’s power could expire if it was defied by its tributaries or 
challenged by another contending overlord (Thongchai, 1994:82). This scheme of 
power relations is known as mandala which O.W.Wolters describes as a;  
…unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area 
without fixed boundaries and where smaller centres tended to look in all 
directions for security. Mandalas would expand and contract in concertina-
like fashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some of whom 
would repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to 
build up their own networks of vassals (O.W. Wolters, cited in Thongchai, 
1994:82). 
Siam had followed this system of power relationships both with the superior 
and inferior kingdoms. Siam fell under Pax Sinica, a system established by China 
regarding unequal relationships between kingdoms. Through the power relationship 
between Siam and China, Siam had to send a mission of tribute payment to China 
until the ritual stopped after the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 1855 (Charnvit, 
2016:2-3). Also, Siam, as well as many other kingdoms in Southeast Asia during the 
late eighteenth century such as the Inwa of Burma (14th -19th centuries) and the 
Hue of Vietnam (17th - 19th centuries), acted as powerful kingdoms in the region. 
These three kingdoms had gained high power over smaller such as like Laos, 
Chiang Mai (one of the Lanna states in North Thailand), and Hanthawaddy (Charnvit, 
2016:15-16).  
The Lanna kingdom, the area known today as North Thailand, included eight 
provinces; Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Chiang Rai, Phayao, Phrae, Nan, and 
Mae Hong Son. The kingdom was seized by Burma in 1560 and held for the 
following 200 years. In the late eighteenth century, Lanna’s leader, Chao Kawila 
asked for assistance from Siam to oust the Burmese overlords. After a victory, King 
Taksin of Siam appointed Chao Kawila and his six brothers as rulers of the Lanna 
kingdom (Woodhouse, 2009:34). Accordingly, Lanna turned to be a tributary state of 
Siam. However, this did not mean that it was under Siam’s power. It was a mutual 
relationship in which Chiang Mai (the capital of Lanna) sent an annual tribute and 
military support to Siam in time of war, while Siam also depended on Lanna to 
guarantee the security of northern frontiers (Woodhouse, 2009:36). It was a political 
relationship loosely tied by hierarchical power, allegiance and protection. Moreover, 
a tributary relationship did not mean one kingdom fell under one overlord at a time. It 
could be shifting, fluid, and flexible between more than one overlord.  Some small 
states were in share sovereignty between two or three kingdoms to balance power 




 The idea of Western boundary was imported to the country via Western 
imperialism after the British won the first war against Burma in 1825 and the frontier 
between Siam and the southern part of Burma became a problem (Thongchai, 
1994:63). This problem of boundary became more intense in the nineteenth century 
as Siam began to settle over the areas with overlapping powers, and that led to the 
Paknam Crisis conflict with the French over the boundary at the east of the Mekong 
River. The French proposed that the area on the east side of the river should be part 
of the French colony. In July 1893, the French pressured Siam by sending two 
gunboats to blockade the Chao Phraya River and the two armies opened fire. The 
French gave the ultimatum that Siam must withdraw from the east of Mekong area 
and pay two million francs to the French. Siam then needed to sign a new treaty with 
France in October 1893 (Terwiel, 2011:209-213).   
3.1.2 The West as external threat 
 The Paknam Incident created the perception that the West was an external 
threat that destroyed national pride. Siam viewed this incident as ‘the loss of 
territories’ because it had to surrender and give the French some part of their vassal 
states. This belief became a great misery for Siamese rulers (Terwiel, 2011:213). 
This incident was dramatised again by the national humiliation discourse during 
military nationalism in the 1940s. This viewed the Paknam Crisis as symptomatic of 
Siam’s inequality with the West and tried to place blame. Thus, France was viewed 
as a barbaric country and greedy coloniser, who took away Siamese land. The 
British were their ‘two-faced’ friend who abandoned Siam and refused to help in the 
Franco-Siamese Crisis (Strate, 2015:11,100).  
Nevertheless, Siam’s feeling towards the West before or during the Western 
imperialist period was different from the views found in narratives of RNH today. The 
Siamese elite admired and was fond of Western technology and knowledge and was 
aware of European power over China, which was the greatest power in the region at 
that time. Even the kings (Mongkut and Chulalongkorn) had shown their enthusiasm 
for western knowledge, civilisation and technological advance (Thongchai, 2011:25). 
In Thongchai’s words, during the colonisation period, Siam was not threatened the 
way its neighbours were, and its independence was not in serious jeopardy. The 
negative view towards the West was constructed many years later or by the post-
1893 experience (Thongchai, 2011:39).  
While Thongchai sees the Paknam Crisis as the starting point, Shane Strate 
points out that the distaste towards the West was strengthened many decades later. 
According to Strate, the Paknam found full expression after the overthrow of the 




campaign that led to war with French Indo-China in 1941, so as to restore the ‘lost 
territories’ from France and regain national pride (Strate, 2015:6). I explore this topic 
in detail in Chapter 3.2.  
After the Paknam Crisis, a new narrative was required to help Siamese 
people recover face after defeat and humiliation. According to many Thais, Siam’s 
independence during Western imperialism, and the fact that Siam had become a 
modern nation, was Chulalongkorn’s personal achievement (Stengs, 2009:19). RNH 
was used as a frame to redeem Chulalongkorn’s legacy as a hero and wise 
monarch, who saved the country from European imperialism by defending the nation 
by sacrificing some territories in preserving overall independence of the nation. The 
King was praised for having ‘sacrificed a finger in order to save the hand’ (Strate, 
2015:10-11). This became a master plot in Thai history; the country was invaded by 
an external force, but Siam survived because of their skilful monarch.  
For Nidhi, the external threat discourse in Thailand was formed by three major 
events, defined by ‘identity crisis’ experienced by the Thai ruling elites. The first was 
the Thonburi - early Rattanakosin (Bangkok) period, following the fall of Ayutthaya to 
the Burmese in 1767. The second period was the Paknam crisis in 1893. The third 
was the American era in 1957, or capitalist economic development, which saw the 
outbreak of communist insurgency and the government’s alignment with the United 
States (cited in Jory, 2003). In these three events, Siam/Thailand was threatened by 
external forces, yet it was the monarch who was perceived to save the country’s 
independence. The same narrative was used to explain the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 when the nation was threatened by Western globalisation and capitalism. This 
plot of the nation fighting with an external enemy has been repeatedly reproduced. 
Even in 2020, the Thai government’s campaign to cope with the pandemic of Covid-
19 still denotes the fighting of external enemy. The mobile application and website 
were launched after the partial cancellation of lockdown period for customers to 
check in and out of venues by scanning a QR code. Both platforms were named 
‘Thai Chana’ or Thai Victory, which implies Thai victory over the foreign disease. 
Thailand is trapped in the RNH narrative with every crisis thus viewed as a threat to 
the nation.  
3.1.3 Marriage of a nation – a country reform and annexation of Lanna 
 Many Thais regarded reform as a way to fight against the West and praised 
the monarch who safeguarded the country from being colonised. The reform 
included the modernisation of the country, centralisation of the monarch’s absolute 




The annexation of the Lanna kingdom was a part of the reform. Siam claimed 
that it protected Lanna or northern states from being colonised by the British. The 
reform started with an Anglo-Siamese treaty in 1874. Siam felt that British timber 
companies in Chiang Mai (city in the north) were a colonial intrusion. When the 
Chiang Mai ruler became entangled in court cases and debts, Chulalongkorn saw it 
as Siam’s opportunity to interfere in the business and the administration of Lanna.  
Siamese commissioners were sent to oversee the tributary state’s government. This 
became a ‘centralised pyramid of bureaucratic administration’, replacing local lords 
with Siamese officers. Baker and Pasuk compare this structure with the colonial 
government in British India, as the local rulers were ‘figureheads’ while the true 
power was with Siam (Baker and Pasuk, 2017:53). In 1892, Siam introduced a 
provincial administration called the thesaphiban system. The highest position was 
the thesaphiban or royal resident commissioner. Officials from Bangkok were sent to 
rule over the region. It was governed under this system until 1933, when it then 
became the provinces under the Ministry of Interior (Penth, 1994:35-36). 
Another strategy which Siam used as part of the reform was the marriage 
between two kingdoms. Prior to the reform of 1882, Chulalongkorn’s half-brother 
asked Dara Rasami, the daughter of the Chiang Mai ruler (Inthawichayanon) to be a 
consort of Chulalongkorn (Woodhouse, 2009:75). In 1886, Princess Dara Rasami 
was sent to Bangkok and she was later promoted to the position of Phraratchachaya 
(the Princess Consort) (Sarassawadee, 2005:187). According to Woodhouse, her 
status was a symbol of allegiances to ensure that Lanna would be loyal to Siam. 
While in most cases, consorts were a ‘gift’ provided to the king by the noble families, 
such an offer by the king himself was an unusual case and partly arose from 
rumours of an offer of adoption from Queen Victoria to Dara Rasami. The marriage 
offer demonstrated the increasing pressures on northern territories being felt by 
Chulalongkorn in the 1880s (Woodhouse, 2009: 73-77). 
Siam acted like an imperialist, colonising Lanna the vassal state, and by 
masking its colonial intention, presenting as a protector of these states from the 
British. Siam assumed that its vassals had been integral parts of the territorial state 
of Siam, while at the time Siam was not a unified country with integrated territorial 
sovereignty. So, it is an anachronistic narrative that is used to defend Siam of its 
internal colonisation or, in Thongchai’s term, ‘a euphemism for Siam’s imperial 
conquests’ and it is ‘a narrative that would not only help them come to terms with the 
defeat and severe humiliation, but also justify their actions’ (Thongchai, 2011:29-31).  





3.1.4 Analysis of TV dramas  
 Among many historical dramas, Raknakkara (2017) has an outstanding plot 
because it is the only drama with a Northern Thai focus that set its story around the 
theme of Western imperialism and Siam’s internal colonisation. It is based on the 
politics between northern states and Siam. The main conflict featured in this drama 
is western colonisation and the formation of Thailand as a nation-state. It is a 
historical drama that sets its story in three fictional northern states – Chiang 
Phrakham, Chiang Ngern, and Muang Man. The story takes place around the late 
nineteenth century when western imperialism had expanded its power in the region. 
Chiang Phrakham willingly unites with Siam as they will be protected from foreign 
colonisation. Chiang Ngern, on the contrary, wants to be an independent state yet 
they are on the brink of crisis. As a traditional tributary state, it is under pressure 
from both Siam and Muang Man (representing Burma) who want to annex Chiang 
Ngern as a part of their territories. The ruler of Chiang Ngern uses political tactics to 
balance power between these two overlords by sending one daughter to marry 
Muang Man’s ruler (as a consort) and another daughter to marry Chiang Phrakham's 
prince (which is under Siam). Apart from a historical and political theme, Raknakkara 
also revolves around romances and tragedy. In the end, Chiang Ngern’s mission for 
independence fails. Muang Man is defeated by the British. Chiang Phrakham and 
Siam assume that Chiang Ngern has always been a part of Siam. Chiang Ngern’s 
ruler and his son want to take revenge on Chiang Phrakham for dismantling the plan. 
Unfortunately, the daughter who marries Chiang Phrakham’s prince sacrifices her life 
to save her husband’s and for the sake of the nation. Her death ends the conflict. 
Chiang Ngern and Chiang Phrakham are then fully integrated within Siam’s 
boundary.  
 In the following section, I analyse scenes from two episodes of Raknakkara by 
using its visual presentation and dialogue as a text for analysis. The first aspect of 
combination that I will demonstrate in this chapter is a combination of Thai and 
western elements in nation-building.  
3.1.4.1 The West as destroyer of a modern Thai nation   
 These three continuing scenes from the first episode show the coming of 
western imperialism and how people in these states cope with the corresponding 
threats. According to the drama, there are two options to fight against the west. The 
first is to be at war to protect their kingdom. The second is to use diplomatic strategy 
by uniting with Siam, which will protect them from being colonised, and also lead to 




 In the first episode, the drama introduces the main male character. His name 
is Sukkawong. He is a son of the former king and nephew of the present king of 
Chiang Phrakham. Sukkawong has graduated from a university in Singapore and 
spent some years working in Bangkok. On the day of his return, he visits his father’s 
cemetery with his servant, Inthorn, and talks about a mission that he plans to 
complete.  
 
Scene 1: at Chiang Phrakham 
  
 
Figure 11 Sukkawong and Inthorn in a monastery area that stores the 
late king’s relics (Raknakkara, ep 1)   
 
Sukkawong is sitting in a monastery in front of a pagoda which stores his 
father’s relics. The area is surrounded by big shady trees and moss, giving 
a calm and peaceful ambience. Joyful traditional music from the previous 
scene slows down and changes to a soft, slow instrumental song. A camera 
shows a medium shot of Sukkawaong and Inthorn, with a servant behind 
them prostrated on the ground. Then a camera uses close-up shots when 
they speak.  
Inthorn: It's unfortunate that your father passed away. Otherwise, he would 
be very proud to see you return to Chiang Phrakam. 
Sukkawong: Not yet Inthorn. I can make my Dad proud of me once I 
complete the mission he told me to do. First, make a peaceful kingdom. 
Second, people in the kingdom should live happily and peacefully. Third, I 
must not let farang (foreigners) seize our land. And fourth, all my relatives, 
which means every state, must be united. None of them will be split off or 







Scene 2: at Chiang Ngern 
 The king, Saen-inta, and his brother, Singkham, are discussing the situation, 




Figure 12 King Saen-inta and his brother, Singkham, talk about the West 
in a palace hall (Raknakkara, ep 1) 
 
From the previous scene, the music suddenly changes to a faster beat of 
instrumental music. An establishing shot shows a landscape of a city, with a 
bridge across the moat to the entrance gate and a brick wall. A camera 
cranes down, showing the rooves of many houses behind a wall in a thick 
forest. It then cranes forward and we hear a voice of Singkham. Then a 
camera shows a medium shot of Saen-inta sitting on a bench facing 
towards a camera and Singkham sitting on another bench on the right, 
facing towards him. A few officers and servants are sitting on the floor. 
While they talk, there are intercuts showing a young prince (Normuang) 
practicing a sword fight with a few servants. He is half-naked with tattoos, 
fighting arrogantly and conceitedly. Other intercut shots show female 
characters who are princesses and queen of the state. 
Singkham: Let’s see how Muang Phraek and Chiang Nan have freed 
themselves. They live happily, peacefully, and independently. If we live 
without independence, it is like a body without a soul. 
Saen-inta: But Siamese reform will unite all the northern states, and we will 
be safe from the West. 
Singkham: What is the difference between being under Siamese power and 
being colonised by ‘kulakhao’ (white foreigners)? 
An officer: Kulakhao colonise because they want our natural resources such 
as forest and precious stones that are abundant in our land. But is that all 
they want? 
Saen-inta: That’s right, Singkham. We are afraid of the British, and also the 




Singkham: Neither Muang Man nor Siam. Chiang Ngern needs no one!  
Singkham suddenly gets sick and faints. Saen-inta and the servants quickly 
run to him. (He dies in the following scene). 
 
Scene 3: at Chiang Phrakham 
 A camera cuts to the next scene. Sukkawong comes inside a palace to greet 
his grandmother. Then, they talk about the British man who has come with him. 
His grandmother does not like him because she regards westerners as alien 
and inferior.  
 
 
Figure 13 Sukkawong and his grandmother in the palace (Raknakkara, 
ep 1) 
 
The scene begins with a slow, soft tune of traditional music played by string 
instrument. Sukkawong sits on the floor while his grandmother sits on a 
bench. He greets his grandmother with a gesture of high respect by giving a 
‘krab ’51 on her lap. They are sitting at a terrace with a servant sitting 
nearby. Then they walk along the terrace, continuing their conversation. 
Grandmother: God bless you. I have waited for a long time. I’m afraid you 
would not return home forever.  
Sukkawong: Chiang Phrakham is the place where I born, and I shall die 
here. Why wouldn’t I return?  
Grandmother: I wonder why you brought that farang with you. You act like 
his friend and treat him as if he has the same status as us. 
 
51 Similar to ‘wai’ (ไหว)้ but suggesting more polite and respectful action. Krab means to 
conjoin hands together in a prayer position and prostrate. It is used to pay respect to the 




Sukkawong: I have to work with him. Nowadays, we cannot avoid being in 
contact with these people. I need to make sure that people in this state are 
aware and well-prepared so that there will be the least difficulty among us.  
Sukkawong and his grandmother walk along a corridor, a servant is 
following behind. Camera cranes down to show an extreme long shot of 
three characters.  
Sukkawong: The world has changed, Grandma. We can no longer hide from 
their sights. We must confront them and admit that we are disadvantaged.  
Grandmother: You mean we need to surrender?  
Sukkawong: I know that our relationship with them is not on a smooth path, 
but we must take a risk. I promise that I will be careful. Our relatives, family, 
and our lands are the things that I must protect, take care, and preserve. 
You can trust me. 
According to these three scenes, the West is presented as a threat to the 
nation. The negative perception towards the West is expressed through language. 
There are many different terms used to refer to the West, ranging from the most 
disrespectful to a neutral term, which I will list them below. The way the drama 
addresses this is the combination of Thais' perspectives towards the West, and the 
way these signify attitudes constructed via the RNH.  
The first term mentioned in the dialogue is ‘farang’ (ฝรั Eง) which means the 
West, western people, and western derived things. According to Pattana Kitiarsa, the 
word ‘farang' was borrowed from Muslim Persian and Indian traders during the 
Ayutthaya period when it was used to refer to the Portuguese, who were the first 
Europeans to visit Siam in significant numbers. Thai dictionaries now define farang 
as ‘a generic Thai word for white foreigners/Caucasians.’ People of African descent 
and come from Western countries, such as the African-Americans that came to 
Thailand during the Vietnam War, are occasionally referred to as farang dam (black 
farang). The term derives from Frank, originally referred to a Germanic-speaking 
people in the region of modern France which was widely used in early medieval 
Egypt, Greece and other Mediterranean areas to refer to western Europeans in 
general. Frank later became Frenghi used by the Indians to address the Portuguese 
(Pattana, 2010:60-61).  
Farang is also a term used to refer to Otherness. In order to define what 
Thainess is, the un-Thai is identified as belonging to another nation. The term farang 
is then an adjective and noun referring to Western people without any specification 
of nationality, culture, ethnicity, language, or whatever (Thongchai, 1994:5). Pattana 
observes that farang is an expression of Siamese/Thai Occidentalism. It is ‘a 
historically and culturally constructed way of knowing, dealing with, criticising, 
condemning, consuming and imagining the West as powerful and suspicious Other’ 




them as a threat, but they also exploit some western elements to modernise Thai 
identities. 
In the drama, this term connotes a negative sense of distrust, disrespect, and 
discrimination. In Scene 1, Sukkawong talks about his mission to safeguard a 
kingdom from the West. He uses the word ‘farang’ as he says, ‘I must not let farang 
seize our land.’ Farang in this dialogue means the European imperialist, especially 
the French and British empire that invaded Southeast Asia at that time. However, the 
drama uses a generic term to label them as greedy coloniser wanting to take over 
other kingdoms. Also, in Scene 3, the grandmother regards the westerner as alien 
and inferior as she says ‘I wonder why you brought that farang with you. You act like 
his friend and treat him as if he was in the same status with us.’ Accordingly, the 
West is a greedy coloniser and low class being that should be avoided. This 
narrative reflects how RNH views the West with distaste and suspicion. The term 
farang is repeated constantly to remind the audience of the colonial atmosphere and 
also hints at Siamese independence. 
In Scene 2, another term to address the West is ‘kulakhao' (กุลาขาว). ‘Kula' is a 
word that northern and north-eastern people called any foreigner in general, and 
‘khao’ literally means white. Kula is one of the Shan ethnic groups from Burma. They 
were nomadic traders who moved by caravan. Kula travelled for trading in the area 
which is now the north and northeast of Thailand. During the imperialist period, these 
people became British subjects protected by British law to travel and trade freely. 
People in the northern area often uses the generic term kula for any mobilising 
foreigners or wanderers, while adding racist terms to distinguish their physical 
characteristics. For example, they called the European ‘kulakhao’ (white kula) and 
the Indian ‘kula dam’ (black kula). However, this term connotes a negative meaning 
as it signifies racial discrimination and sets the speakers in a racially higher position 
(Ch3Thailand, 2017; Sujit, 2016; Isangate, 2017).  
In Scene 2, Saen- Inta and Singkham (Chiang Ngern’s ruler and his brother) 
are discussing whether they should unite with Siam or surrender to the West. The 
king chooses a neutral term, referring to the West as ‘moo tawantok’ (หมูต่ะวนัตก the 
Western folks) but his brother, whom the drama presents as intensely conservative 
uses ‘kulakhao’, exhibiting strong distaste. This term is then repeated by an officer 
who describes how western colonisation will absorb natural resources from the 
kingdom. Kulakhao is a northern Thai version of farang, because it also suggests 
general dislike of foreigners while situating themselves as superior. The only 
difference is that Lanna people were less familiar than Siamese people with 




these two terms are used to strengthen the perspective derived from the RNH in 
which the West is viewed as a threat.  
However, while the drama shows the West as a threat, it also hints toward a 
combination of admiration within this evident disrespect. In Scene 3, after the 
princess mother calls the West ‘farang’, Sukkawong uses another term to convince 
her that the West is useful for their future. He says, ‘I have to work with him. 
Nowadays, we cannot avoid contact with these people.’  In this sentence, he 
chooses a more neutral word ‘puak khao’ (พวกเขา) which literary means them or they, 
who are white. His use of a neutral term suggests positive attitudes. In the following 
conversation, Sukkawong talks about the coming of the cosmopolitan modern world 
insisting that the traditional world is changing. His dialogue stresses that Westerners 
are key sources of knowledge that he must learn from. From these scenes, word 
choices reflect the discourse and narrative found in the RNH. They illustrate that 
Thailand and the West are in a complex relationship. This dialogue reuses the same 
narratives that the West is a national threat, yet Siam must learn from them in order 
to survive from colonisation. The strategy claimed by many Thai historians, as wisely 
employed by the Siamese monarch.  
3.1.4.2 The West as a builder of modern Thai nation 
The idea of ‘the West as a builder of a modern Thai nation’ is presented 
through the main male character. According to the historical background of the RNH, 
Siam held a distaste for the West, but the Siamese elites were fond of Western 
knowledge and cultural materials. This perspective manifests in the characterisation 
of Sukkawong. His personality, characteristics, as well as contribution to the northern 
states in the drama represent King Chulalongkorn of Siam who is a Westernised, 
modernised king whose skilful diplomatic strategy deterred Western imperialism.  
Sukkawong’s first feature of westernisation is his educational background. As 
we learn, he graduated from a university in Singapore. His father, who was a king of 
the northern state, sent him to study in Siam where he had a chance to follow the 
king to Singapore and then studied there. After graduating, he worked in Siam before 
returning to his hometown. His background is made to be parallel with 
Chulalongkorn’s first visit abroad. The story in this drama takes place in 1884. 
Chulalongkorn’s visit to British Singapore and Dutch Java was in 1871. The original 
text mentioned that he went with a Siamese officer, who was in a group of Siamese 
elites who followed Chulalongkorn to Singapore (Piyaphorn, 2016:28). When 
Chulalongkorn was in Singapore and Java, he visited many modern institutions, like 
schools, postal and telegraph offices, hospitals and railway stations, which 




Sukkawong is returning home with the same ambition to modernise his kingdom and 
educate people so that they will not be taken advantage of by the West.  
However, his educational background is anachronistic and not possible in 
reality. According to Tanet Charoenmuang, well-known Thai scholar of Lanna culture 
and history, historical records show that there were not any royal family members of 
tributary states who had a chance to study abroad. The only prince who was sent 
abroad was the son of King Kaew Nawarat, the last king of the Lanna kingdom, and 
he studied in Burma (Tanet, 2017). This created a controversy between Tanet and 
Piyaphorn, the author of Raknakkara, who I interviewed in Thailand. Piyaphorn 
claims that she was aware of this historical fact, yet she did not want to make her 
character study in Burma, but rather wanted to make him a man ‘who had seen the 
world’ (Piyaphorn, 2018, interview). So, it can be assumed that this character is 
created to serve a particular function in the novel (and also TV drama), to appear as 
a moderniser of the kingdom despite contradicting historical facts.  
Apart from a Western educational background, Sukkawong is a ‘civilised’ 
man. In the following scenes, the audience gradually learns he is knowledgeable of 
western culture and way of life. He dresses in a western outfit (which I discuss in 
detail on the issue of hybridised costume in Chapter 4.2). He reads English books, 
has English friends, and is fond of western goods such as perfume, iron, fountain 
pens, and he knows how to eat and cook western food as he teaches one princess 
to bake a cake. These elements suggest a westernised and modernised character. 
Besides which, Sukkawong’s characteristics impress Bracken, his English friend, 
who respects and treats him equally as his only friend in the kingdom. This is similar 
to Chulalongkorn, whose similar characteristics also impressed his western hosts on 
his trip abroad. In Stengs’s words, ‘the king spoke in English, knew Western 
manners, appreciated Western art and craftsmanship, and had a keen interest in 
technological innovations’ (Stengs, 2009:69). In this drama as well, Sukkawong is 
the only person in the kingdom capable of using English language and culture. 
These are features sought for by many Thais as part of a desirable modern Thai 
identity and Sukkawong is a model inspired by the Siamese king.  
Moreover, he is represented as having diplomatic skills, a feature of 
Chulalongkorn and widely praised by many Thais. In these three scenes I have 
mentioned, Sukkawong is presented in sharp contrast to Normuang, a prince of 
Chiang Ngern. In Scene 2, when King Saen-Inta and his brother Singkham discuss 
Western colonisation, a camera uses parallel cutting to show Normuang practicing 
sword fighting with other soldiers. Normuang is shown as a brave, yet primitive 




His topless torso is tattooed, which was a cultural practice among men in the 
northern states, to show their strength and bravery (Figure 14). The depiction of 
Normuang as a warrior, together with a conversation between Saen-Inta and 
Singkham, suggests that this kingdom will make war with the West. It also implies 
their traditional way of thinking as they plan to fight with swords remaining unaware 
of western armed forces and technology. On the contrary, Sukkawong is shown as a 
man who fights with tactics and strategies of diplomacy. He does not mention 
fighting with the West but rather focusses on how to ‘work’ and ‘contact’ with the 
West. In a conversation with his grandmother, he states that ‘I need to make sure 
that people in this state are aware and well-prepared so that there will be the least 
disadvantage among us’ and ‘the world has changed, Grandma. We can no longer 
hide from their sights. We must confront them and admit that we are disadvantaged.’ 
This dialogue stresses the discourse from the RNH that Siam survived colonisation 
because of the monarch. Sukkawong is a medium to speak these words. He takes 
the role of moderniser as Chulalongkorn did for Siam.  
 
 
Figure 14 Normuang practices traditional sword fighting (Raknakkara, 
ep 1) 
Finally, his modernised and westernised features bring the kingdom to the 
future. As Sukkawong comes with the idea of change, the drama contrasts him with 
another character who refuses it. In Scene 2, Singkham is depicted as a 
conservative patriot who strongly believes in his own opinion. He refuses both 
options either to be united with Muang Man (representing Burma) or Siam. The 
death of Singkham foreshadows the end of Chiang Ngern State as they do not 
change with the world. In contrast, Sukkawong who is ready to ‘change’, can make 




northern state could remain independent because it has a modernised ruler. The 
western elements as depicted in the lead male character save the kingdom from the 
Western threat. It is Sukkawong, or, in other words, his westernised features that 
have contributed to the formation of a modern nation-state.   
3.1.4.3 Marriage, internal-colonisation and demarcation of Siam 
  From the previous sections, the West is shown as both the destroyer and 
builder of the Thai nation. This section will investigate the idea of boundary, a 
Western-derived concept used in nation-building. Siam used geographical boundary 
to construct a modern nation-state, which meant the internal colonisation of its 
tributary states. In Raknakkara, internal colonisation is achieved through the 
annexation of northern states. Alongside this is marriage between royal family 
members of these states, which were claimed to protect the north from falling to be 
British colonies. The drama legitimises the Siamese colonial mission by combining 
pre-modern Thai and western concepts of nation together alternatively as if they 
were traditional thinking. One selected scene from Raknakkara clearly demonstrates 
the formulation of a nation by emphasising the sovereignty and boundary between 
Siam, northern independent states, and the British colony. In this scene, Chiang 
Ngern as an independent state is struggling between falling under the British empire, 
united with Siam, or isolating itself as an independent state. This event imitates the 
Siamese centralisation of power. In this section, I will investigate how the Western 
concept of nation is expressed through language and mise-en-scène. I go on aims to 
show how the West is used in the making of a boundary and the construction of a 
nation. 
 The following is a scene from episode 12, the final episode. It is a 
demarcation meeting about the territory of northern states. Attendants are 
representatives from Siam (a Bangkok prince), northern states (Normuang, a prince 
of Chiang Ngern; Sukkawong and Jakkham, two princes of Chiang Phrakham), and 
the British. These people are divided into two sides. On one side are Siam and 
Chiang Prakham who think that all northern states should be united with Siam 
because they are related by blood and traditions, and they will be safe from western 
colonisation as a result. The other side is Chiang Ngern, backed by the British, who 
think that each northern state should be independent. This side argues that traditions 
and customs are not indications to prove that one state belongs to another. They are 
merely common practice in premodern society. The British supports Chiang Ngern 
(as the drama implies) because it hopes to seize the land later, once it is isolated 





This scene starts with a master shot and high angle, showing a meeting 
room and all attendants around a rectangular table. There is one man taking 
minutes on the side of the table. He sits on a chair and works on a western-
style desk. There is also another man who is a translator, who behind two 
British representatives. The meeting hall is decorated with Western style 
architecture such as arched window frames, staircasing, pillars and 
decorative cornices. Other furniture includes a bookshelf, wall lamps, flower 
stands, round table with figurine bronze lamp in Victorian style. On the table 
are teacups. When a camera pans around the room, we can see a table 
with English tea set at the back. A giant map is hung on a blackboard and 
right next to that board is a big globe. There is another map spread on the 
table. Medium and medium close-up shots are used to show each character 
speak. Most of the conversation is in English. Orchestral instrumental song 
is a music background. Music starts from a slow tune and then rises to 
higher amplitude, and faster beat (Figure 15).  
British Official A: According to the map, it seems that Siam is intruding into 
the territory of an independent state of Chiang Ngern, your highness.  
British Official B: Siam should step back and draw a clear borderline, and 
Britain will do the same on the west side. 
A Bangkok prince: No independent state has ever existed between Siam 
and Muang Man. Chiang Ngern has long been under the kingdom of Siam. 
You can verify this with the Chiang Ngern ruler. 
Normuang: Chiang Ngern is an independent state. In the name of the king 
of Chiang Ngern, I insist that we are free and independent.  
A Bangkok prince: What you have just said implies your tendency towards a 
mutiny.  
Sukkawong: Just explain this. If Chiang Ngern is independent, why Bangkok 
designates and gives credentials to the regent of Chiang Ngern and Chiang 
Mai? And why the princess of Chiang Ngern, who is also your sister, is 
residing with me in the governor’s villa? 
Normuang: My sister has to stay with you out of necessity and under 
tradition. Maenmuang has no choice. Just like my father and I, we have no 
choice but to follow tradition by giving a loyalty oath. This is a tradition of 
survival.  
Sukkawong: We are relatives, made by blood. This whole region is one 
country. 
Normuang: But I see that Chiang Mai and every kingdom in this area must 
be independent just like Chiang Ngern.  
British Official A: We are not concerned about traditions and customs here. 
We would like Chiang Ngern to confirm whether or not they wish to be 
independent. 
 
A camera cuts to a small scene break. A Bangkok prince, Sukkawong, and 
Jakkham walk into another room to discuss. They are angry with Normuang 
and think how they could defeat him. They refer to a secret plan to take over 
the power from Chiang Ngern’s ruler. Then they go back to a meeting room. 
   
A Bangkok prince: (stands up, and walks halfway around the table) I, in the 
name of the government of the kingdom of Siam, hereby confirm that lands 




government decisions must receive peer approval, be reported to the king 
of Siam, be given royal credentials and it is a must to attend a royalty oath 
ceremony.  
Normuang: (stands up) That was your own claims. Right now, I, regent 
Normuang, representing the king of Chiang Ngern, announce that Chiang 
Ngern is an independent state and not under Siam's rule anymore.  
Sukkawong: (stands up) Your claim is personal but not official in this 
meeting. You are no longer a regent of Chiang Ngern.  
A Bangkok prince: (smiles and slowly take a letter out of an envelope, 
showing to everyone) The ruler of protectorate Chiang Ngern has just 
approved the designation of Chao Phrakham as a new regent and 
Boonsong as a commissioner. 
(Conversations suddenly switch to central Thai and northern Thai.) 
Normuang: No. Impossible. I don’t believe it.  
A Bangkok prince: Why it’s impossible? Look. The evidence is here.  
Normuang: No way. This seal is a fake one.  
Sukkawong: How can it be fake when King Saen In-ta had stamped it 
himself. Look, Normuang. He appointed Chao Phrakham to be a regent and 
dismiss you from the position. You are no longer the regent of Chiang 
Ngern.  
 
An intercut showing a flashback scene, which is a secret mission planned 
by Sukkawong and Siam. A group of soldiers seize power from Chiang 
Ngern’s ruler, King Saen In-ta. He is sitting on a bench in a palace hall. His 
face shows that he is angry. All the servants prostrate on the floor. One of 
the seizers says ‘Please be calm. You are still a king of Chiang Ngern. You 
and your son forced Siam to do so. Soon, you will realise that you made the 
right decision today.’  
 
After this scene, Normuang tries to claim the independence of his state. He 
argues that it is a premodern tradition for an independent state to show 
respect to more than one overlords by claiming that two princesses from 
Chiang Ngern were sent off as a symbol of respect to two states – Chiang 
Phrakham (which is under Siam’s rule) and Muangman (representing 
Burma). Bracken, one of the British representatives is the friend of 
Sukkawong. He is aware of the marriages between these states. Though he 
joins a meeting as a British representative, he prioritises his friendship over 
the profit of his own country. Therefore, he takes side with Siam by 
pretending that he has no clues about the political marriages between these 
three states. This makes Normuang’s claim invalid, and he is caught as an 
insurgent. At the end of this scene, it seems that other two British 
representatives disagree with Siam’s rule over Chiang Ngern. A 
conversation switches back to English. 
British Official A: The British are suspicious about the story of a princess 
from Chiang Ngern. We believe she exists and will find her to prove it. If 
Chiang Ngern befriends both sides, it is common for an independent state  
A Bangkok prince: Once your evidence is substantial, we shall go on with 
border demarcation, but now Chiang Ngern still is a protected state under 





 This is a long sequential scene, and it is a highlight of this episode and the 
whole drama because the meeting brings an end to the independent northern states. 
Since Normuang's reason is made to be invalid, Siam can occupy Chiang Ngern as 
a part of its territory and accordingly form its boundary of a nation.  
 
 
Figure 15 a demarcation meeting over the dispute of boundary 
(Raknakkara, ep 12)  
3.1.4.3.1 English as a means to build the Thai nation 
The first aspect of the West that is obvious in this scene is the use of English 
as the main language in the conversation. Usually, Thai TV dramas speak central 
Thai language. This is regardless of the setting of the drama or nationality of 
characters. Even though a character is a person from other regions of the country or 
a foreigner, he or she will speak central Thai because it is understandable to most 
viewers. Many times, the drama makers let actors pronounce Thai incorrectly to 
pretend that they are westerners or Chinese. Speaking regional languages or 
English will require the adding of subtitles, which is unfamiliar to Thai TV viewers. 
Raknakkara is an unusual case as the drama makers wanted it to appear realistic. 
So, they use northern Thai language with subtitles in most scenes.  
Even though the drama puts more emphasis on other vernacular such as 
northern Thai language, the language of power is central Thai and English. It is 
interesting to note that long English conversation is only found in some key scenes. 
In other scenes, even though a character is talking to a westerner, the drama permits 
actors to speak central Thai instead. For example, Sukkawong, who is a northern 
prince and speaks northern Thai language throughout the whole drama, talks to 




scenes when they have short greetings. Other than that, central Thai is used instead 
of English. English is avoided almost throughout the whole drama despite the drama 
makers wanting it to appear realistic. The main reason is not the actors’ incapability 
of speaking English (which is clearly not the case) but because they are non-
essential scenes. The above scene, on the contrary, is the climax of the drama 
because it is about the demarcation and the creation of Siam's boundary. English is 
used as main language because the drama producers want to create a realistic 
scene that imitates an international meeting. Even the architecture and decoration of 
the meeting room is designed to appear western producing a colonial atmosphere. 
English was a coloniser's language that came with the British colonisation, and thus 
a language of superior power. Therefore, debating in English signifies that they have 
equal power with the imperialist and their arguments are convincing. Moreover, the 
drama uses English to gain the validity of the conversation. Boundary and 
demarcation are products of colonialism, so they are discussed in the colonial 
language. This dialogue is not only spoken to the British representatives in the 
drama but delivers the message to international audiences beyond. 
Apart from English, they also use central Thai in this scene to indicate that it is 
an official meeting whereas in most scenes northern dialect is spoken. In Thailand, 
while there are many regional dialects and vernaculars, central Thai is a print-
language which means it is a formal language used in the bureaucracy. According to 
the ninth State Convention, all Thai citizens, including non-Thai-speaking groups, 
must study Thai language so that they be able to read and write. Everyone must 
consider that he is born Thai, so he naturally possesses Thai blood and talks Thai 
irrespective of birthplace or pronunciation (Barmé, 1993:155). The promotion of 
central Thai as the national language involved the ban on the use of region-based 
nomenclature for Thai groupings such as northern, northeastern and southern, in 
favour of Thai. This was assumed that language and ethnic differences could be 
eradicated or reduced. It caused central Thai, especially in its written form, to be the 
preeminent component of identity for those seeking to define and promote a national 
culture (Reynolds, 2002:8).  
The creation of print-language is a product drawn from western concepts of 
nation. In Western European countries, print-language was necessary for 
constructing the modern nation-state. According to Anderson, print-languages laid 
the bases for national consciousness. People become aware that a million others 
were connected through that print-language and formed the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community. It builds an image of antiquity as well as creating language-of-
power to be a politico-cultural eminence (Anderson, 2016:44). As an official 




regional languages. In this scene, central Thai is used by the Bangkok prince who 
stands for the Thai monarch. Sukkawong and Jakkham, who are northern princes 
and speak northern Thai language throughout the drama, have to speak central Thai 
with the Bangkok prince. This implies that they conform to Siamese power through 
language.  
The use of English and central Thai, in this situation, makes their discussion 
appear official and thus the official meeting verifies this narrative of history as truth. 
The only moment they turn back to northern Thai dialect is when Normuang rejects 
the argument by saying ‘No. Impossible. I don’t believe it’ and it is followed by a 
quarrel between him and Sukkawong. Normuang’s disapproval of this ‘official 
meeting’ causes him to be expelled from the meeting room. His protest spoken in 
northern Thai dialect does not have any significance in the meeting as no one wants 
to listen. Accordingly, the drama exploits English and central Thai to form a nation. 
English, as a colonial language, and central Thai, as a print-language, are all 
products of the West and they are used to confirm the boundary of the nation.  
3.1.4.3.2 Combination of pre-modern and Western concepts of nation 
The next combination of the West is found in the concepts of nation as 
expressed in the dialogue. From the demarcation meeting in Episode 12, the drama 
presents mixed concepts of nation between pre-modern and modern, traditional Thai 
and western. The first concept that is stressed in this scene is the pre-modern based 
on collective identity, which is also known as ethnosymbolism. Anthony Smith sees 
that the essential element of a nation lies in the concept of ethnicity in what he called 
‘ethnie’ or ethnic communities. Ethnie consists of a collective proper name, a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements 
of common culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland,' and a sense of 
solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith, 1991:21).  
This pre-modern concept of nation is stressed by Sukkawong who refers to 
the idea of blood and family relationship. A nation in his point of view is defined by 
people who are from shared backgrounds and ancestry as he says, ‘we are relatives 
made by blood.’  He further uses marriage to support his argument by saying, ‘your 
sister is residing with me in the governor’s villa.’ This implies traditions and customs 
of pre-modern states in which women were used as signs of relationship and 
allegiance to unite one state with another. It is a tradition for tributary states to give 
their daughter to a king or overlord to guarantee loyalty. According to Reynolds, 
marriage and concubinage were ways of balancing power and securing the 
kingdom’s perimeters. Vassal rulers seeking the protection of Siam would offer their 




received these women to exhibit his own and the kingdom’s reproductive capacities 
(Reynolds, 2006:193-195). Another pre-modern signifier of nationhood is to give the 
loyalty oath to the monarchy and be under the power of the overlords. A dialogue by 
a Bangkok prince explicitly illustrates the belief that the northern state belongs to 
Siam because it has been under Bangkok's power;  
…lands in our custody are protected states and Chiang Ngern is one of 
them. All government decisions must receive peer approval, be reported 
to the king of Siam, be given royal credentials and it is a must to attend a 
royalty oath ceremony. 
Based on these statements, the Thai nation was formed by pre-existing 
elements such as bloodline, kinship, marriage, and loyalty to the overlords. 
In this drama, the dispute over the northern state Chiang Ngern is based on 
its multiple sovereignty between two overlords. The drama brings back pre-modern 
hierarchical relationship to claim that it must belong to Siam. However, the pre-
modern relationship is different from the modern understanding of nation-state. This 
kind of relationship did not guarantee conquering power of one overlord over one 
state nor did it confirm eternal allegiance. Power and loyalty could be shifting and 
flexible depending on power of the overlords. This multiple sovereignty was common 
for many tributary states and they were regarded as the frontier of several kingdoms, 
which means the realms of the overlords were overlapping (Thongchai, 1994:96).  
In this scene, pre-modern concepts of nation are raised to legitimise Siam’s 
internal colonisation. However, the drama uses Normuang to counter this claim by 
saying ‘my sister has to stay with you out of necessity and under tradition. 
Maenmuang has no choice. Just like my father and I, we have no choice but follow a 
tradition by giving a loyalty oath. This is a tradition of survival.’ Normuang’s 
statements remind us that pre-modern traditions are different from modern concepts 
of nation and thus should not be applied here. Therefore, he does not consider the 
marriage or kinship as proof of nationhood. The counterargument of the pre-modern 
concept is stressed again by the British representative who says that ‘if Chiang 
Ngern befriends both sides, it is common for an independent state.’ Nevertheless, 
both arguments are finally made invalid and Siam can unite the northern state.  
For modernist thinkers, a nation is not naturally formed by collective identities 
alone, but rather a result of a modern, industrialised society. Ernest Gellner states 
that nations resulted from modernity and industrialisation whereby universal literacy, 
mobility, individualism, political centralisation, and the need for educational 
infrastructure were required for the economic growth of industrial society (Gellner, 
2006:106). For Anderson, a nation is imagined after the decline of religious 




(Anderson, 2016:13-22). Nation has finite boundaries and sovereignty and it is 
imagined as a community because the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 2016:6-7). In Montserrat Guibernau’s term, a 
nation is a human group, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future 
and claiming the right to rule itself. The idea of a nation with demarcated territory 
derives from nationalism which was created by concepts of equality, freedom, 
solidarity and especially popular sovereignty (Guibernau, 1996:45-47). This means 
nationalism engenders and concretises a nation, and it is similar to what Gellner 
says that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist’ (cited in Anderson, 2016:6). 
Here we can see new concepts related to the modern nation that are 
individuality, demarcated territory, sovereignty and the right to rule itself that are not 
mentioned in pre-modern nations. These concepts are expressed in a dialogue when 
Normuang affirms the independence of his state and that ‘we are free and 
independent.’ His claim has nothing to do with ethnie or pre-modern concepts but 
rather focuses on the idea of sovereignty over a territory. The drama’s use of the 
word ‘independence’ is a western understanding of nation that is depicted on pre-
modern relationships between vassal states. Thongchai argues that during the 
nineteenth century (the time the story takes place) the word ‘independence’ did not 
have equivalent Thai translation and it was different from two Thai words ‘ekkarat’ 
(เอกราช) and ‘itsaraphap’ (อสิรภาพ) which have become Thai translations of this word 
in the present day. Ekkarat and itsaraphap meant ‘superior’, supreme power of the 
monarch, but not independence. The meaning of these two words became equal to 
‘independence’ only from the early twentieth century and it was the geo-body and the 
role of the map that takes part in generating new ideas, new values, and new culture, 
and used to represent nationhood to arouse nationalism (Thongchai, 1994:136-137). 
So, making Normuang speaks about independence here is very modern and 
anachronistic. 
The clash of concepts is not only between characters but can be found within 
the same character as well. In this drama, it is not as simple as characters clearly 
divided into opposite sides in which one represents pre-modern and the other 
represents the modern concept. Rather, they keep mixing up both concepts and 
using them alternatively. For example, Sukkawong supports Siam's right to rule over 
an independent state by claiming its ethnic tie. Shortly afterwards, he quickly turns to 
the modern, Western idea of a nation by saying ‘this whole region is one country’ 
while the concept of a country at that time meant only a space or unspecified spatial 




shared ethnic roots or history. Instead, it is a finite area as he uses the word 
‘country.' As Thongchai argues, the idea of nation or chat which denotes common 
origin, cultural commonality, soil, and royal sanctity is combined with another word 
prathet (country) which was given new spatial definition by the geo-body 
(concretised by modern geography) to become synonymous. In Thai, a combined 
word prathetchat therefore is a mixing of traditional values and modern concrete 
embodiment (Thongchai, 1994:135). Sukkawong’s use of a word ‘country’ reflects 
this combination as he mixes up both traditional and modern concepts of nation.  
It is clear that the drama uses the concept of boundary to form a modern 
nation-state. The Bangkok prince, representing Siam, states that ‘no independent 
state has ever existed between Siam and Muang Man. Chiang Ngern has long been 
under the kingdom of Siam.’ This is an anachronistic understanding of a nation 
presented in a historical drama when a concept of a boundary was not clear at that 
time. This is based on the assumption of the pre-existing boundary of Siam and a 
‘Siam-was-never-colonised’ discourse which is derived from the RNH. This narrative 
is successfully created by assuming the northern state as a part of Siam's territory 
and ignoring the internal colonisation done. Even though Normuang and the British 
representatives argue that it is a common tradition to show respect to more than one 
overlord, the drama ignores this fact and presumes Siam’s absolute power over the 
area.  
 Geographical maps and boundaries have become foundations for Thai 
historiography. A boundary is not a natural thing but rather constructed and 
determined by those who are in power. According to Thongchai, mapping was no 
longer merely a conceptual tool for spatial representation. It became a lethal 
instrument to concretise projected desire on the earth’s surface. Siam's geo-body 
was created by the modern map and geographical knowledge that ‘the role of the 
modern map did not record or represent the reality, yet it has concretised it’ 
(Thongchai, 1994:129-130). It is the geographical map that is exploited in the ‘lost 
territory' discourse and irredentism campaign by the military government during the 
1940s. With a modern map, the monarch was revered as a hero, and the military 
junta created anachronistic maps to make a new narrative to convince the populace 
of its right to rule the country (Strate, 2015: 10) (see Chapter 3.2).  
To conclude, the Raknakkara uses traditional practices of premodern vassal 
states to build the Thai nation but combines it with modern, western concept of 
boundary to verify the making of a geographical map. Characters refer to a pre-
modern concept of nation by referring to ethnicity, race, kinship, marriage, and 




western concepts which are about independence, sovereignty, and a clearly 
demarcated boundary. This kind of thinking is a product of the RNH, which 
selectively uses the West to build the modern Thai nation and exercise the power 
over the tributary states through internal colonisation.  
3.1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the West is one essential feature that is 
combined to form a modern Thai nation. The West is often perceived as threat or 
destroyer of the Thai nation. This perception is based on a master narrative and 
conventional Thai discourse that are rooted in the RNH. A selected Thai TV drama 
has exemplified that master narrative from RNH, and the West is selectively 
exploited to formulate the modern Thai nation and identities.  
In Raknakkara, the negative perception towards the West is expressed 
through the use of language. Farang is a generalised term to stereotype without 
specifying races or nationalities, and it presents the West as greedy coloniser. 
Another term, kulakhao is also a generalisation of westerners, with some attributed 
racism by adding a word that specifies skin colour. These two terms demonstrate 
that a westerner is a destroyer of the nation and reminds the audience of the 
narrative of Siamese independence in the colonial atmosphere. While the drama 
shows the West as threat, the West helps constructing the modern Thai nation. This 
is expressed in the characterisation of the main male character who is westernised in 
many aspects such as his educational background, his characteristic as a civilised 
man, his diplomatic skill, and his view towards social changes. Thus, the drama 
implies that the only way to survive from Western colonisation is by learning from the 
West, which was the strategy claimed by many Thai historians as wisely done by the 
Siamese monarch.  
The West is further exploited in Thai nation-building through the making of 
geographical boundary and the internal colonisation of its tributary states. The drama 
legitimises the Siamese colonial mission by combining pre-modern Thai and western 
concepts of nation together as if they are traditional thinking. The first aspect of the 
West is the use of language – English and central Thai – which makes the 
discussion in a selected scene appear official and thus the drama can verify the 
particular narrative of history as a truth. In other words, English, as a colonial 
language, and central Thai, as a print-language, are all products of the West and 
they are used to confirm the boundary of the nation and form a modern Thai nation.  
Lastly, the combination with the West is found in the making of a geographical 




mixing of concepts between pre-modern and modern concepts. On the one hand, 
the Thai nation is comprised with the pre-modern concept of collective identities with 
pre-existing elements such as bloodline, kinship, marriage, and loyalty to overlords. 
On the other hand, the Thai nation is constructed from modern concepts of nation 
such as individuality, demarcated territory, sovereignty and the right to rule itself. 
According to examples from this drama, the making of the modern Thai nation is not 
successfully done without the combination of Thai and western features, concepts, 







3.2 Combination of ethnicities 
Siam used imperialist thinking to form the modern nation, which was 
expressed through the internal colonisation of Lanna and the creation of a modern 
geographical map. The idea of nation-state and boundary was elaborated during the 
1940s through the irredentist campaign to regain the ‘lost-territories.’ Thailand was 
literally like an empire as it expanded to rule over other provinces in French 
Indochina and British Burma. Hypernationalism and the Thai-ification process were 
being encouraged by the military government through the annexation of territories. 
Moreover, people of different ethnic Tai groups in the area absorbed by the 
irredentists were identified as Thai citizens.   
This perception continued even though the Thai empire terminated after 
World War II. While irredentism passed, the annexation of other Thai ethnicities did 
not vanish from the Thai perspective and constant reiterations act as a reminder of 
Thai empire. People of other Tai ethnicities who live within and outside of Thailand’s 
border are still considered Thai or a part of the nation and this is reflected in 
contemporary TV dramas. These ethnic Tai groups are often evident in the 
narratives of nation-building which suggest that the Thai nation is not a homogenous 
nation but rather comprises many ethnicities. As Patrick Jory points out, Thailand 
was traditionally a multi-ethnic kingdom, which included ethnic Chinese, Lao, 
Khmers, Burmese, Mons, Malays, hill-tribe groups, and the dominant ethnic Thais. 
But Thai governments have commonly stressed the homogeneity of the people of 
Thailand. There has never been an official discourse on multiculturalism in Thailand 
and the predominant polity towards cultural diversity was assimilation, which aimed 
to integrate minority groups into a cohesive nation-state (Jory, 1999a:337). This 
chapter investigates this matter of the Thai nation as combination with other 
ethnicities. It does so by looking at products of imperialist thinking, such as presence 
of irredentism in Thai TV dramas. 
3.2.1 The making of the Greater Thai nation  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the origin of RNH was the Paknam 
Crisis, which gave birth to the modern map and boundary, and the ‘lost-territories.’ 
During the 1940s, the Thai nation expanded to become an empire, and this was 






3.2.1.1 The irredentist campaign, national humiliation, and the ‘lost territories’ 
map 
After the Paknam Crisis, Siam recovered from its loss with the narrative of the 
country’s reform led by Chulalongkorn which brought the country to modernisation 
and civilisation. However, Siamese people’s feeling towards the monarchy started to 
change in the next reign of Vajiravudh as criticism of the monarch increased due to 
the king’s expenditure. During 1919-23, Siam faced financial crisis which had cost 
the country massive amounts of revenue and foreign loans. While Vajiravudh had 
the power to change the nation’s financial policies and decree a measure that would 
have freed the Treasury, there is no evidence that the king even considered such a 
step (Terwiel, 2011:244-45). Finally, this led to the coup to topple the absolute 
monarchy, in the following reign of Prajadhipok. Prajadhipok’s reign was clouded 
with criticism and unrest, together with economic problems. This period marked the 
end of absolute monarchy and the rise of a new segment of urban elite who began to 
question the social and political system based on an absolute monarchy (Wyatt, 
1982:234-235). A group of Siamese students abroad, calling themselves ‘The 
People's Party,' were sceptical of the class-conscious authoritarians in the country. 
This group was later joined by members of high-rank military men. In June 1932, the 
coup toppled the absolute monarchy without bloodshed. Prajadhipok went abroad 
and abdicated in 1935 (Wyatt, 1982:238,245). 
The turning point of the nationalistic narrative was after the overthrow of the 
absolute monarchy in 1932. According to Strate, the ‘lost territories’ discourse was 
transformed to be the ‘National Humiliation’ discourse, which brought the Paknam 
Crisis to full expression (Strate, 2015:6). After Phibun became prime minister in 
1938, the military government needed to legitimise its right to rule the country so the 
topic of ‘lost territories’ was restored with a new narrative. Prior to this, the Paknam 
crisis was more an agony of Chulalongkorn, and Siamese elites, having less impact 
on commoners’ day to day lives because the event mainly diminished royal prestige. 
The military created a new sense of historical memory by transforming the disgrace 
of the elite into a collective trauma that would bond citizens to the new state. In other 
words, the new narrative converted ‘royal shame into national agony’ (Strate, 
2015:11-12).  
 ‘National agony’ is created by through attention on a  ‘chosen trauma.’ This 
then stands  in collective memory. The making of collective memory, for Tanabe and 
Keyes, is also called ‘social memory’;  
the processes of collective remembering and remembering together, in 
which people share memories of events, recalling them together or 




features of the past… social memory is imaginatively shared by a social 
group, such as a family or ethnic group, and provides a basis for its 
identity and an instrument for shaping ideas and emotions that affect the 
actions and practices of its members (Tanabe and Keyes, 2002:3).  
While the RNH viewed the Franco-Siamese crisis as the monarch’s legacy of 
saving the country from European imperialism, the irredentists saw it as an 
embarrassing defeat. Phibun’s regime constructed this kind of collective memory to 
convince the public to support their actions. In order to do so, Phibun’s government 
needed to concretise the memory by producing an anachronistic map, identifying 
areas ceded to French Indochina that had once been part of Thailand.   
The publishing of the ‘lost territories' map concretised the memory and urged 
strong nationalism and support from the public since the disputed spaces in the 
imagination of Thais were unclear. Even the Thai government at that time had 
difficulty identifying the territories it hoped to recover. The disputed areas were 
assumed to be part of the kingdom of Siam because nationalistic writings from the 
government made no distinction between soverignty and suzerainty (Stowe, 
1991:144). Besides, the areas of ‘lost territories’ were based on a person’s 
interpretation. This is because the ‘lost territories' are not a location, but a symbol  
commemorating the idea of National Humiliation (Strate, 2015:45).  
Nevertheless, the government had visualised the idea of loss into different 
versions of a map. One version of this map was published in a book entitled 
Prawatisat Sakon (A Universal History) written by Wichit Wathakan52, defining the 
lost territories surrendered to French Indochina. This book described Siam’s defeat 
and chronicled France’s expansion by dividing the nation’s loss of territory into five 
specific incidents, from 1867 to 1907 (Strate, 2015:45). Another map was entitled 
Phaenthi Prawat-anakhet-thai (Map of the History of Thailand’s Boundary53), which 
was launched by the government. This map depicts eight losses of territories, which 
reduced Thailand's legitimate realm, until the present boundary of Siam came about. 
Most of these losses were territories surrendered to European powers from the late 
nineteenth century, except the second which was taken by Burma. This map 
assumes that the extent of Siam’s bounded territory, before any loss, is the total 
legitimate realm of Siam. Thongchai pointed out that the ‘lost territories’ map created 
and made national agony visible – ‘It makes the National Humiliation discourse 
 
52 A distinguished and respected intellectual during Phibun’s regime. He held many positions 
but the most important one was Director General of the Fine Arts Department. Wichit 
produced a large number of influential historical plays and nationalistic songs during the 
1930s (Barmé, 1993:2).  




visible and concrete. It concretises a geo-body which had never existed in the past 
and the agony is visually codified by a map’ (Thongchai, 1994:150-152). These maps 
have important functions since they connote the idea that Siam used to be a great 
kingdom covering a vast area in the region and inspires the Siamese/Thai people to 
yearn for its by-gone prestige. The military government legitimised the irredentism by 
projecting modern conceptions of boudaries into the past.  
Under Japan’s support, Thailand invaded and eventually annexed Lao 
Sayaboury, west-bank Champassak, and the Cambodian provinces of Battambang 
and Siem Reap in 1941 (Wyatt, 2003:245). Not only were the French colonies 
targets of the Thai irredentists, but also the British colonies. Phibun desired two 
areas of Burma – the Tenasserim region in southern Burma, which had been under 
Thai control during the Ayutthaya period, and the Shan states in the north. In 1942, 
the Thai army invaded the Shan states. This was supported by Japan who wanted to 
form an alliance with Thailand, so they decided to give the portion of the Shan states 
already occupied by the Thai army, along with the four northern Malay states over 
which Bangkok had once claimed suzerainty (Reynolds, 2004:130-131). The results 
were widely celebrated in Thailand. The conflict and its outcome suited the 
nationalistic propaganda machinery that the regions inhabited by members of the 
great Thai race had been liberated from a colonial regime and become part of 
Thailand (Terwiel, 2011:270). Accordingly, this was the triumph of the nation and 
became the foundation of the Greater Thai nation and created a national prestige. It 
formulated the notion of Thai and Tai people as members of the Thai nation, a belief 
still deeply engraved and circulating in the perceptions of many Thais’ today.  
3.2.1.2 The Greater Thai nation  
 To accomplish the irredentist campaign, the government needed to create a 
good understanding among people within the country that those who lived outside 
Thailand’s border were also Thais. The government constructed the concept of 
brotherhood and homogenisation between the Thai’s and Tai people, who lived in 
the ‘lost territories.’ This became known as Pan-Thaism. The first shift towards the 
homogenisation of the Thai race was to change the country’s name. Before the 
1940s, even though Thais usually refer to their country as ‘Muang Thai’ or more 
formally ‘Prathet Thai', the name Siam was more well-known among foreigners. The 
first State Convention during Phibun’s regime in 1939 stated that the name of the 
country had been changed from ‘Prathet Sayam’ to ‘Prathet Thai,' in Thai, and from 
‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ in English (Stowe, 1991:122; Barmé, 1993:147). The change of 
the country’s name brought about controversy. Several ministers who disagreed with 




dominant ethnic Thai. Other races would feel discriminated against if the name of the 
country was changed from Siam to Thailand (Chai-anan, 2002:52). Nevertheless, 
Phibun and Wichit paid more attention to the homogenisation project. This 
repositioning reflected Phibun’s aspiration to bring ethnically related peoples in 
neighbouring territories under Bangkok’s rule and so that he could reclaim the 
nation’s ‘lost territories.’ In Reynolds’ terms, ‘Thailand raises the political claim to 
embody in one great empire all Thai and not only the Siamese’ (Reynolds, 
2004:119). 
However, rather than adopting the word ‘Tai’ (ไท) to create homogeneity 
among members of other ethnic groups, a decision was reached to use the word 
‘Thai’ (ไทย) instead. This decision was made despite the name ‘Thai’ denoting only 
the ethnic Thai group. The given reason to use ‘Thai’ instead of ‘Tai’ was irrelevant 
to the construction of brotherhood. The government claimed that ‘Thai with an H is 
like a sophisticated girl with her hair set, her lips touched with lipstick and her brow 
arched with eyebrow pencil, while Thai without H is like a girl who is naturally 
attractive but without any added beautification’ (Van Esterik, 2000:106). However, 
Thongchai contends that the use of these different terms is not because one is an 
elaborated version while the other is not. Rather, these two names connote deeper 
signification of a modern nation-state and ethnicity. Here, I would like to cite 
Thongchai’s full explanation to distinguish how the term Thai/Tai is used in both Thai 
and English;  
In contemporary Thai, the word that connotes the Tai/Thai ethnicity is 
spelled in two ways. With exactly the same pronunciation – ‘thai’ – one is 
spelled with a y at the end and the other without, respectively as ‘thaiy’ 
(ไทย) and ‘thai’ (ไท). When spelled ‘thaiy’ the word denotes the modern 
nation-state and its citizens… When spelled without the y ending, it is a 
loose term denoting the ethnic peoples whose languages belong to the 
same Tai/Thai linguistic family. This ‘Thai’ (without a y ending) includes 
the Shan of Burma, the Lao people on both sides of the Mekong, and 
people speaking various Tai/Thai dialects in Thailand today, including the 
Muang people of former Lanna (Chiang Mai), the Tai Lue, the Tai Maung, 
the Tai Khoen in the border areas between China, Burma and Laos, the 
Black and White Tai in Vietnam, and others… Thus, in recent academic 
writings, ‘Tai’ refers to the larger ethnic and linguistic groups and ‘Thai’ to 
the modern nation and its citizens (Thongchai, 2008:576).  
Barmé argues that the state convention was an attempt aimed at forging a 
‘Thai’ consciousness among the Lao and Shan peoples living within Thailand’s 
borders and those in the neighbouring areas coveted by the irredentists. The 
promoting of Thainess went so far as the government issuing the order that the word 
‘Lao’ and ‘Ngiew’ (Shan) be deleted from the popular folk songs of north and 




race affected the people in the country that would henceforth be simply known as 
Thai (Chao Thai) (Barmé, 1993:151). So, it could be assumed that the change of the 
country’s name was for the ethnic Thai group, which was the majority of people, 
whereas the other Tai groups living within the country were forcefully changed to 
becoming Thai. Accordingly, to address the country and its people as ‘Thai’, the 
government aimed to turn all these Tai ethnic groups into Thais more than to accept 
their Tai ethnicities as a part of nationhood. 
The homogenisation of other ethnic Tai groups was then expanded to outside 
Thailand’s border in the area defined by the irrendentist known as the Greater Thai 
nation. Wichit began to forge bonds between Thais and those living in the area 
divided by the 1893 crisis by encouraging Thais to view the Lao and Khmer people 
as part of their larger nation.  Consequently, the area was referred to as ‘left-bank 
Thais,' which was portrayed as the victims of the Paknam crisis (Strate, 2015:13). To 
create a stronger sense of brotherhood, these ethnic Tai groups were divided into 
‘greater Thai’ and ‘minor Thai’ groupings. Wichit’s book Siam and Suwannaphum 
classified the Shan of northern Burma as part of the first category, while the Siamese 
and Lao belonged in the second category. The homogenisation of these people was 
stressed by the government as Wichit stated that ‘the Lao had just as much Thai 
blood as the Siamese’ and emphasised that both Lao and Khmer had many 
similarities to the Thai in religion, culture, and tradition (Strate, 2015:48-49).   
In the north of Thailand, which is the focal area of this thesis, the Thai 
undertook a military campaign to conquer the Shan region around Keng Tung in 
northeastern Burma in May 1942. This acquisition of the ‘United Shan States’ 
became the ‘Original Thai States’ or ‘Satharanarat Thaidoem’ (Wyatt, 2003:248). 
Keng Tung in Shan state, which was populated by ethnically related people, was an 
area the Siamese were ambitious to conquer since the late Third and Fourth reigns. 
During 1851-53, Siam sent several troops to attack Keng Tung, as the Burmese 
became weak due to the Anglo-Burmese war. However, the attack was unsuccessful 
due to a lack of weapons, food, and morale, partly because the northern vassals 
were not motivated to give battle against the Keng Tung defenders. This had a 
sobering effect upon Siam’s leaders (Terwiel, 2011:152-53). When the irredentists 
saw the opportunity to regain national prestige in the 1940s, they did not hesitate to 
proceed. The Thai army invaded the Shan state, occupied the city of Keng Tung and 
eventually moved northward until reaching the border of Yunnan Province in China. 
This time, Thailand acted as an empire and ruled over Keng Tung by establishing 




Nevertheless, the Greater Thai nation did not last long. After the end of World 
War II, all treaties and pacts signed during wartime were invalidated. Thailand 
restored the Malay and Shan territories annexed in 1942-43 (Wyatt, 2003:250). 
However, the notion of brotherhood of the Thai empire never went away. During the 
irredentism campaign, it was promoted by the media that the people living in those 
territories were also ethnically Thai. Thus, when they had to return the four provinces 
to France, Thais believed that they were sending ‘innocent men to the gallows' 
because these people are ‘our flesh and blood’ (Strate, 2015:141).   
So, we can see that Pan-Thaism and the concept of the Greater Thai nation 
were a chauvinistic means to constructing a modern nation-state. These concepts 
stimulated nationalism among Thai people as Thailand tried to be an empire to show 
its prestige as a great nation. Though the actual empire building was over, the 
imperialist thinking became deeply engraved within Thai people’s perceptions. The 
view of other ethnic Tai as members of the nation was recurrent in many genres. 
This chapter will demonstrate that this kind of thinking is still visible in contemporary 
TV dramas. The ‘Greater Thai’ or Tai ethnic group of Keng Tung in Shan State have 
become one of the most frequent topics for content-making in Thai TV dramas with a 
northern Thai focus. In the next section, I explore how other ethnicities are depicted 
in Thai television dramas with strong themes on northern Thailand. 
3.2.2 Tai ethnicities in Thai TV dramas  
 Regional culture is one of the most frequent topics in Thai TV dramas. The 
north, northeast, and south are commonly used as materials for drama makers and 
these regional cultures rotate in Thai TV programmes every year. I have looked 
through Thai TV dramas dating from 1990 to 2020 (as of the time this thesis was 
written) which were broadcast during prime-time slots, mainly on major channels 
(Channel 3, 5, 7 and 8). I found at least 3254 TV dramas that have northern Thailand 
as the main theme. This number demonstrates that the north has been a popular 
choice for drama makers as it reappears almost every year as an essential element 
of Thai TV programming.  
 The north comprises of many ethnic groups such as Tai Lue, Tai Khoen and 
Tai Yuan which is the majority. In Chiang Mai, the capital of the Lanna kingdom, 
people of many ethnicities were relocated to populate the city after great forced 
 
54 This number excludes TV dramas where the story takes place in northern provinces but 
have little emphasis on northern culture, tradition, or history. This kind of drama mostly uses 
the northern provinces as locations for scenic presentation, but the north itself is not its main 




resettlements during the late eighteenth century. These ethnic groups were classified 
and settled in the city based on their skills and background (Sarassawadee, 
2005:136). While the Tai Yuan made up the majority of the Lanna kingdom, it is not 
the most popular ethnic group chosen to for depiction in Thai TV dramas. Commonly 
drama makers select the culture and identity of other ethnic Tai groups, and then mix 
them together. Therefore, I divided dramas with strong northern themes into three 
main groups. The first group is dramas that combine cultures and identities of many 
ethnic groups together to represent the ‘fictional states.’ The second group is dramas 
that use cultures and identities of particular ethnic groups to represent fictional 
states. The third group is dramas which use cultures and identities of specific ethnic 
groups to stand for that particular states where those cultures and identities actually 
belong.  
 Most of the dramas in the early period studied (1990-2000) and some remade 
versions in recent years regularly depict the mixing of northern identities. 
Accordingly, the north as shown in these dramas is a ‘generalisation of the north’, 
which is constructed via the mixing of features from different ethnicities according to 
the drama maker’s imagination. However, the popularity of these dramas influenced 
the fashion of northern Thai costume even though it modelled an inaccurate mix 
(Chiang Mai University, 2017). Northern Thai costumes as seen in TV dramas 
became a trend for people in the north to wear during ceremonies, parades, cultural 
performances, and so on. The combining of different ethnic costumes later became a 
controversial issue among officials in Chiang Mai as they wanted to redefine proper 
northern Thai dress. In 1994 and 1996, a meeting was held at Chiang Mai Rajabhat 
University, attended by northern culture and costume experts, to find an agreement 
on how to wear proper northern Thai costumes. The mixing of costumes was one of 
the main concerns in these meetings that the committee had pleaded the public to 
avoid (Wilak, 2004). Still, this kind of TV drama did not completely fade from the Thai 
TV industry and many have been reproduced, even in recent years.  
After the 2000s, more and more TV dramas were developed in terms of 
production quality. Drama makers paid more attention to cultural accuracy. There 
was more awareness of northern Thai culture after 1996, which was the year that 
celebrated the 700th anniversary of Chiang Mai Province. This stimulated interest 
among scholars in Chiang Mai University in Lanna history, arts and culture, including 
northern Thai costume.  This period marked the awakening of authentic Lanna 
costumes of different ethnic groups (Chiang Mai University, 2017). Following this 
movement, more and more dramas made effort to present cultural accuracy by 
imitating cultures and traditions of some specific ethnic groups. These are TV 




However, among many ethnic groups that are presented in these dramas, the 
most frequent group appearing is the Tai Khoen in Shan State, who live outside the 
present Thai border. The Tai Khoen frequently appear in TV dramas, either mixed up 
with other cultural groups or presented alone in dramas with more concern placed on 
cultural representation. Among the 32 TV dramas with strong northern Thai focus, 
only 14 of them explicitly show Tai Yuan culture and identity, despite it being the 
dominant culture in the north. There are 17 dramas that portray cultures and 
identities of other ethnic Tai groups while 3 dramas strongly show hill tribe people55. 
Six out of these 17 dramas explicitly present the ethnic Tai Khoen group, while the 
ethnic Tai Khoen culture and costume also appear as mixing elements in 11 dramas 
out of 17 (Figure 16). These numbers imply that the Tai Khoen from Keng Tung have 
become one of the iconic presentations of northern Thailand, rather than the 
dominant ethnic Tai Yuan who live within the Thailand border. 
 
 
Figure 16 Left: Ethnic cultures and identities presented in Thai TV dramas with 
a northern Thai focus between 1990-2020 (32 dramas in total) / Right: Dramas 
which show other ethnic Tai identities    
Tai Khoen culture and identity is often chosen to represent the north even 
though it is not specified in the plot or original text. For example, the drama makers 
of Raknakkara wanted three distinctive ethnic costumes to represent three states. 
While the previous version in 2000 mixed different cultures and identities to present 
three fictional states, the 2017 version aimed at a realistic presentation. The Tai 
Khoen was chosen as one of them because its ethnic costume is distinguishable 
 
55 Two dramas in the list fit in more than one category, that is, they present both the Tai 
Yuan and other ethnic groups. Three dramas in the last category are remade versions of the 




from other ethnic groups in the north (Sutthiphan, 2018, interview). Another example 
is Roymai (2011). According to its original text, the original story takes place in 
Luang Phrabang in Laos. It is a drama about a princess from Chiang Mai (north of 
Thailand) who is sent as a tribute to the Luang Phrabang ruler. In an interview, 
Yingyot, the screenwriter, states that the production house had a lot of difficulties 
asking for permission for film shooting in Laos. The production house in Laos who 
acted as an agent with the Ministry of Culture asked for 300,000 baht (approx. 
£7500) for additional operation fees which was considered a lot of money for Thai TV 
drama production56. Besides, the production cost in Luang Phrabang was estimated 
to be much higher than shooting in the north of Thailand. Therefore, the screenwriter 
and the director agreed to change the location of the story to be Chiang Mai instead. 
So, the drama makers changed from a Chiang Mai princess being sent to Laung 
Phrabang to be a Keng Tung princess being sent to Chiang Mai (Yingyot, 2018, 
interview). As an ethnic group in one of the provinces used to be in the Greater Thai 
nation, Tai Khoen has become the most common depiction of the north for these 
drama makers.  
These samples reflect a strong perception that many Thai people have 
towards the ethnic Tai groups outside Thailand’s border. Drama makers seem to 
assume that the ethnic Tai who live beyond Thailand’s present territory were 
members of the Thai nation. These kinds of dramas also often end with a unification 
between Thais and Tai people from other states. They may begin with conflict within 
these states or with Thailand. However, in the end they are peacefully united and live 
together happily. The depiction of these ethnic groups recalls the idea of the Greater 
Thai nation that assumes all other Tai races as a part of the Thai nation. The 
following section investigates the depiction of the ethnic Tai Khoen in Thai TV 
dramas and to study how that depiction demonstrates machinery for nation-building. 
3.2.3 Analysis of TV dramas 
 This chapter aims to demonstrate that the Thai nation is constructed through 
combination with other ethnicities. The analysis of TV dramas will focus on the 
presentation of the ethnic Tai Khoen, which is one of the ethnic groups used as part 
of creating the Thai empire. While the notion of a Greater Thai empire has passed, 
imperialist thinking is still evident in contemporary dramas with a northern Thai focus. 
These dramas do not only present people in northern Thai provinces but go beyond 
 
56 In contrast to films, Thai TV dramas do not usually have high budget. For example, the 
budget for making traditional costumes for every character in Raknakkara was only 300,000 




to other ethnic groups outside the Thailand’s border. This kind of thinking is based 
on the assumption of brotherhood between Thai and Tai people as promoted by the 
RNH. This section will analyse two TV dramas that clearly present the ethnic Tai 
Khoen. These dramas are Raknakkara (2017) and Buangbanjathorn (2017). I 
investigate two main aspects, which are the assimilation and generalisation of these 
ethnicities, and the creation of brotherhood. The ethnic Tai in Raknakkara, who were 
successfully united with Siam, are presented in the first aspect while the ethnic Tai in 
Buangbanjathorn, who are no longer part of the Thai nation, are presented in the 
second aspect. However, both aspects do stress the idea that these people are 
closely related and essential to the construction of the Thai nation-state. 
3.2.3.1 Cultural assimilation and generalisation of Tai ethnicities  
Raknakkara (2017) exemplifies the case of successful unification of the north 
through internal colonisation. In this drama, all ethnic Tai groups have close 
relationships and cultural proximity that can be exchangeable. The harmonious 
combination of these ethnic groups is presented via the generalisation of these 
people as one unit through their traditional style costumes. 
 This selected version is famous for its representation of northern Thai culture 
and production quality. It has been praised by media and drama fans in social 
media57 and Thailand’s most popular web forum (Pantip.com58) as an accurate 
historical adaptation, especially the representation of characters (wearing traditional 
costumes), language (speaking northern dialect), props and locations. One of the 
features that caused the drama to be widely known was its costumes and 
appearances of leading characters which are inspired by the outfits of ethnic groups 
in the northern part of Thailand. The production house claimed that they had worked 
with specialised consultants and costume designers who were textile experts. The 
production house also launched a photo book with photos of actors in specific ethnic 
and traditional Thai costumes, with interviews of actors and costume designers. Not 
many Thai TV dramas gain high interest among audiences in terms of the costumes 
and overall physical appearance of the show.  
 
57 official Instagram account, official Facebook page of Channel 3, official YouTube channel, 
and its official website (www.ch3thailand.com) 
58 Thailand’s most popular web forum, which is a big online community in Thailand covering 
many aspects of interest. The highest-viewed forum could reach more than 7 million views. 
Content in Pantip.com is influential and affects many brands' marketing. The website could 
gain around 100 million Thai Baht yearly (over 2.5 million GBP) from advertising. Among 
many categories of forums, TV drama and the entertainment business is the biggest share 




This version is different from the 2000 version which did not pay much 
attention to cultural accuracy by mixing several ethnic costumes together. The 2017 
version aims at presenting three different ethnic groups via culturally accurate 
costumes. Raknakkara sets its story around three fictional states in the north of 
Thailand. According to Piyaphorn Sukkasem, the author of the novel, one kingdom 
represents Burma and other two kingdoms stand for the northern states. One of the 
northern states is Chiang Phrakham which, according to the TV version, is situated 
in the eastern part of northern Thailand. The drama makers choose Nan province 
which is located in the east of northern Thailand as reference for costume design. 
There are diverse ethnic groups living in Nan such as Tai Yuan (Lanna), Tai Lue 
from Sipsongpanna (in China) and Laos but the drama makers chose Tai Lue as 
reference for costume because the clothing is distinct from the Tai Yuan style in 
Chiang Mai, which they believed was used so often in Thai TV dramas.  
Another northern state included is Chiang Ngern. This is a problematic choice. 
When Piyaphorn wrote her novel, she referred to Thailand's geographical map and 
chose three locations that matched the plot;  
Chiang Phrakham should be somewhere around Nan, Phrae, or 
Lampang59. For Chiang Ngern, I imagined it should be on the upper north 
with a difficult route to get there, and it must be within Thailand’s border. 
So, when I point to these locations on a map, it would fall at the border of 
Chiang Rai Province. … my intention was that Chiang Ngern must be in 
present Thailand’s territory and not too far from or too near to Chiang Mai 
(the capital of the north). People from Chiang Ngern could travel to 
Chiang Mai or to Chiang Phrakham within a similar distance. These 
locations on a map should look like a triangle (Piyaphorn, 2018, 




59 All are three provinces in the north of Thailand are located in the eastern side of the 





Figure 17 Locations of three fictional states according to the author of the 
novel and locations that are used as references for ethnic culture in the TV 
drama  
The concept of territory is important in this drama because the main conflict is 
about the demarcation of these two northern states. At the end of the story, they are 
unified as provinces of Siam. This is why Piyaphorn was concerned that they should 
be located within Thailand's boundary. However, in the 2017 version, the drama 
makers go beyond that boundary. They decided to use the ethnic Tai Khoen culture 
in Keng Tung as reference for costume despite it being a group outside Thai 
territory. Sutthiphan states in the interview that the main reasons for selection come 
from its distinguished costume and historical background of Keng Tung (or Chiang 
Tung in Thai), which had a close relationship with both Siam and Burma;   
Our team agreed that costume is essential. It is the first thing that appears 
to the eyes of the audience before a character speaks. It must be obvious 
to indicate where he or she came from and they must not look the same… 
Chiang Tung is in a perfect location, and it used to be a state with two or 
three lordships. It had a relationship with both Thailand and Burma, 
depending on which period (Sutthiphan, 2018, interview). 
Accordingly, this drama presents three states via cultures of three ethnic 
groups which are the Burmese, Tai Khoen in Keng Tung, and Tai Lue situated in the 
eastern part of northern Thailand. These costumes were exploited to signify cultural 
differences of ethnic peoples. However, as the story goes on, the drama rather 
generalises these ethnic groups as one unified unit. It is a discourse from the RNH 
which assumes the north as a part of the Thai nation and automatically considers all 
ethnicities as one group included within Siam. This is reflected through the 






3.2.3.1.1 Cultural proximity between ethnic groups 
 Cultural proximity between different ethnic groups is exploited by Siam to 
facilitate internal colonisation. Diverse ethnicities in the north were generalised as 
one group with similar cultures and identities like brothers and sisters, so that they 
could be unified with Siam later on. This selected scene from Raknakkara shows two 
ethnic cultures of the north: Tai Khoen and Tai Lue, representing the fictional state 
Chiang Ngern and Chiang Phrakham respectively. Different identities of these two 
ethnic groups are depicted by two women through their costumes. The first one is 
Maenmuang, who is a princess from Chiang Ngern. Another is Laongkham, who is a 
princess of Chiang Phrakham. The identity difference is stressed in episode 6 when 
they discuss their clothing. However, the drama eventually demolishes the difference 
by making one character transform her identity by wearing another ethnic costume.  
A close-up shot shows a wooden box with tube skirt inside. Laongkham’s 
hands carefully pick it up and gently touch it. Camera closes up to show 
detail of that cloth, which is a green silk skirt, decorated with striped cloth, 
silver threads and pins at the bottom edge. 
Laongkham: The more I look, the more beautiful it is. I think the Chiang 
Ngern skirt is more beautiful than Chiang Phrakham. 
Maenmuang: That’s not true, Laongkham. The Chiang Ngern skirt is in 
Chiang Ngern style. Chaing Phrakham skirt is in Chaing Phrakham style. 
They are both beautiful but in a different way. You just get bored because 
you wear the same skirt every day.  
Laongkham: Right, then can I borrow your skirt today? 
Two servants come in and sit on the floor. Medium shot shows their 
awkward faces when they hear Laongkham’s request.  
Maenmuang: (talk to the servants) Can you two help Laongkham dress up? 
She wants to try Chiang Ngern skirt.  
 
Figure 18 Laongkham (left) in Tai Lue costume and Manmuang (right) in 




From this scene, we can see that two women wear different styles of clothing 
(Figure 18). Their clothes may look very similar in the eyes of people who are 
outsiders. However, for ethnic people, these outfits stand for their identity and they 
can distinguish what ethnic group a person belongs to by looking at their dress. So, 
wearing outfits apart from their own is not a common practice. This transformation of 
identity is elaborated in the following scene. After Laongkham changes her outfit to 
be in Chiang Ngern style, both women go to the grandmother’s house.  
A crane shot showing external building, it is the grandmother’s residence. 
Medium shot shows the grandmother sitting on a bench and Sukkawong on 
the floor. A servant comes in to serve tea. She looks outside and tells the 
grandmother that Laongkham and Manmuang have arrived. Everybody 
looks out and seems to be surprised. A lively and exciting tune of music is 
suddenly playing. A camera reveals Maenmuang and Laongkham walking 
into the room. Camera changes a slow-motion. They slowly sit down and 
prostrate on the floor to pay respect to the grandmother. Close-up shots 
show Sukkawong and the grandmother’s happy faces. 
Grandmother: I thought it was an illusion. You dress alike and look like 
sisters. 
Laongkham: (move closer to the grandmother) Grandmother, do I look 
pretty in this dress?  
Grandmother: (gently touch Laongkham’s head to show her affection) You 
are pretty. You look pretty in whatever you wear.   
Laongkham: How about you, Sukkawong? How do I look in this dress? 
Sukkawong: Chiang Phrakham and Chiang Ngern are like brothers. I am 
delighted to see that these two states are combined to become one without 
discrimination. 
Laongkham: I’m asking Manmuang to teach me to do Chiang Ngern style 
embroidery.  
Grandmother: Is Manmuang free to teach? She has lots of work to do.  
Laongkham: Of course, she is. Right, Manmuang? Please teach me so that 
I can have my own pretty skirt in Chiang Ngern style.  
Manmuang: Sure. I will.  
Sukkawong: Are you going to wear Chiang Ngern skirt forever and not 
return to Chiang Phrakham style?  
Laongkham: Of course not, brother. I might wear Chiang Phrakham skirt for 
three days and the other four days I will wear Chiang Ngern skirt. What do 
you think, Manmuang?  






 Figure 19 Maenmuang (left) and Laongkham (right) dress in Tai Khoen 
style costume (Raknakkara, ep 6) 
 The changing of identity implies one meaning in the drama, yet it reflects 
another meaning if we read it to a deeper level. According to the story, Sukkawong is 
married to Manmuang. Laongkham wants to be a minor wife so she tries to imitate 
Manmuang’s style. Therefore, her transformation of ethnical identity as well as her 
request to wear Manmuang’s ethnical outfit four days a week (despite that the 
concept of week did not exist at that time) indirectly means her wish to be another 
wife and share a husband. However, on a deeper level, it reflects how the drama 
makers have perceived the ethnic groups in the north as interchangeable. The 
drama emphasises the similarity between these two women by making them have 
almost the same movement. They walk, move, and sit simultaneously. These two 
women look alike in their appearance. Even the colours of their clothes, hair style 
and make-up are the same. Other characters all seem to be happy to see these two 
women dress alike. Besides, the concept of brotherhood is stressed twice, first by 
the grandmother and then Sukkawong, in a conversation.  
Though these two women represent two northern states and two ethnic Tai 
groups, audiences do learn from the story that Chiang Phrakham has unified with 
Siam. Thus, Chiang Phrakham is also a representative of Siam. If we read this scene 
from this perspective, the language used is a restatement of the RNH discourse that 
revolves around the similarity and brotherhood between Thai and Tai ethnic groups. 
The RNH often refers to the idea that Thai and Tai are sharing the same blood and 
they look like each other in regards to physical appearances. For example, during 
the time that the irredentism campaign was promoted, some Thai media described 
Keng Tung people to have ‘dress, culture, and religion just like us (Thais)’ (Strate, 




that the Thai state has always used in the entertainment media, which includes 
plays.  
During the Phibun regime, there were also plays with irredentist themes, 
composed by Wichit Wathakan. These included Ratchamanu and Chaoying Saenwi. 
According to Barmé, these two plays employed themes revolving around the military, 
heroism and sacrifice in wartime, and the links between Khmer and Shan people. In 
Ratchamanu, the idea of brotherhood between Thais and Khmer was presented. 
This is explicitly expressed in a conversation in a play for example; ‘They are Thais 
like us,’ ‘We are all really Thai brothers,’ and ‘There’s no more need to fight. All of us 
on the Golden Peninsula are the same… the Siamese Thais are the elder brothers.’ 
In the printed version of this play, Wichit reaffirmed, by citing physical and cultural 
similarities between two peoples as ‘proof’ – ‘such as the shape of face and skull, the 
type of food eaten, common diseases, indigenous literature, music and song… it is 
clear that the Khmers of the present day are Thais’ (Barmé, 1993:124-126). In a play 
Chaoying Saenwi (The Princess of Saenwi), which had the purpose of advancing the 
irredentist movement against the British, Wichit emphasised the racial and cultural 
links between the Shan people (Tai Yai, greater Thai) of northern British Burma and 
the Siamese Thais (Tai Noi, minor Thai), suggesting that the two groups should 
unite. An excerpt from the play states that ‘Thai Noi, Thai Yai, though we live far 
apart, we are together Thai. We must love one another as more than friends 
because we are of the same blood and stock, brothers from old times, sharing 
sorrow and joy as Thai’ (Barmé, 1993:126).  
These kinds of statements are reproduced again in Raknakkara. Chiang 
Phrakham and Chiang Ngern do share some similarities in their race (as shown via 
physical appearance), languages (which are understandable and have no 
differences in this drama because they both speak northern Thai dialect) and culture 
(through the costume that can be exchangeable and transformed). Sukkawong 
states that ‘Chiang Phrakham and Chiang Ngern are like brothers’ and ‘these two 
states are combined to become one without discrimination.’ His statement echoes 
the discourse from the RNH. Based on Siamese perspective, the drama generalises 
these two ethnic groups as one unit. No matter what ethnic group, they are regarded 
as ‘the north’ and they must be annexed to Siam. The unifying between Chiang 
Ngern and Chiang Phrakham symbolises the Thai-ification of the ethnic groups. This 
illustrates how the notion of ‘brothers of the same blood’ is still alive in the perception 
of these drama producers so that the same kind of conversation from the 1940s is 
evident in contemporary dramas. Apart from the generalisation of these ethnic 
groups as one unit, this drama further shows the assimilation of one’s identity in the 




3.2.3.1.2 Abandoning one’s identity to become Thai 
  Cultural assimilation is depicted through Manmuang. After marriage, she 
moves to Chiang Phrakham which is her husband’s hometown and where she has to 
adapt to a new life. While Manmuang gets along well with people there, she strongly 
maintains her ethnic identity by wearing her hometown’s traditional outfits all the 
time. Manmuang and her two servants who have accompanied her are the only 
people in the city that wear Tai Khoen style dress, while others wear Tai Lue. 
However, after she lives with her husband for a while, she starts to change. From a 
radical patriotic woman who has strong singular perspectives, she learns to be more 
open-minded to new cultures and people, both Thai and Western. In other words, 
she transforms gradually to blend in with her husband’s way of life, perspective, and 
culture. In episode 7, she is transformed from her own ethnic costume to that of her 
husband’s hometown, which implies the cultural assimilation of the ethnic Tai to 
becoming Thai.  
 In this scene, Sukkawong wants to take a picture with his wife. He asks her to 
dress in Chiang Phrakham style. So, Manmuang changes from Chiang Ngern dress, 
which is represented by the ethnic Tai Khoen, to Chiang Phrakham style, which is 
represented by the ethnic Tai Lue. Audiences learn from the story that Chiang 
Phrakham is a northern state that is unified with Siam. Sukkawong himself 
represents the king of Siam (see Chapter 3.1) through his characteristics and 
personality. Accordingly, this scene could be understood as the Siamese effort to 
assimilate the ethnic Tai as a part of their nation-building. In other words, Manmuang 
is requested to abandon her identity and transform to become Thai. 
 
A long shot shows Sukkawong, Maenmuang, and two servants. He is 
holding her hand and taking her to the terrace. He walks fast and seems to 
be very excited while Maenmuang is curious and keeps asking. The other 
two female servants are following them, and their faces show anxiety as 
well. Then they walk to the terrace in front of the house where Mr. Bracken 
stands with his camera. The camera is set on a tripod with black cloth 
covering it. Opposite to the camera are a table, a chair and piece of cloth 
hanging as a backdrop for photo shooting. Five other servants are sitting on 
the floor, not far from the photo set.  
Maenmuang: Where do you take me to? 
Sukkawong: Don't worry. I don't take you anywhere far. 
Maenmuang: Then why do I have to wear Chiang Phrakham dress?  
Sukkawong smiles and does not answer. He leads her and calls Bracken. 
Bracken: (bow his head) Hi Maenmuang. Please let me take a photograph 
of you and Sukkawong. It would be my great pleasure.  
Before they take a picture, two female servants warn Maenmuang that a 




Maenmuang to sit on the chair. Mr. Bracken covers his head with a black 
cloth and then presses a shutter. This scene ends with a photograph of 
Sukkawong and Maenmuang (Figure 20). 
 
 
 Figure 20 Sukkawong is taking Manmuang to take a photo in Tai Lue 
costume (Raknakkara, ep 7) 
Taking such a picture has an implication of recording an important event or 
people. During the nineteenth century, photography was new to Thai society and 
only the elite could access this luxury. Photography was introduced in Siam under 
the reign of Mongkut (reign 1851-1868). The earliest extant daguerreotype image of 
the Siamese monarch dates to the early 1850s. Mongkut was aware that it was 
essential for foreign heads of state to have their portraits circulated for public 
relations purposes and so he allowed a photographer to take a portrait of him and his 
wife to present to Queen Victoria in 1857 (Peleggi, 2002:47). Therefore, taking one’s 
photograph was only in important occasions and reserved for particular purposes. 
Only the nobles and royal family could have portrait photos and the shooting was 
often done with a set of background, furniture and decorative items to signify the 
status of people who were photographed. Consequently, what a person wears or 
uses in the photograph really matters. Maenmuang is dressed in Tai Khoen costume 
in every other scene and her husband does not find it a problem. However, he 
demands that she changes her costume for the photograph. It suggests that he does 
not want her ethnic identity to be recorded. In this drama, this photo is also a key 
element because it is the only evidence to prove her existence after her death. The 
identity that is chosen to be recorded in the photograph is not her true identity, but 





What Raknakkara reflects is the Siamese ambiguous feeling towards other 
related ethnicities. In this drama, the ethnic Tai Khoen is regarded as the other but at 
the same time it is also unified as a part of the Thai nation. The ethnic Tai Khoen had 
had close relationships with the north but were discriminated and excluded from the 
nation-building project by Siam. During the great forced resettlements in the Lanna 
kingdom between 1781-1813, the Tai Khoen was one of many ethnic groups that 
were ‘collected’ by King Kawila of Chiang Mai to be relocated to Lanna. It was the 
gathering of people to populate the city known as ‘collecting vegetables for baskets 
and collecting people for muang’ (Sarassawadee, 2005:132-133). Thus, many ethnic 
Tai groups, including the Tai Khoen, Tai Lue, Tai Yai, Yong, and the dominant Tai 
Yuan lived together in the north. However, after the Siamese reform in the late 
nineteenth century, Siam began to differentiate between people who were Siamese 
and those who were not. The dominant Tai Yuan or Lanna people in the north were 
included as a part of Siam but the target of discrimination was the other ethnic 
groups especially the Tai Yai which Siam saw as the untamed, threatening Other. 
This was because the ethnic Tai Yai, who migrated between Lanna and Burma, had 
close relationships with Burma and the British. The discrimination even led to a Shan 
Uprising in Phrae province in which Siam sent troops to destroy the rebellion and 
used it as an excuse to take full control in the North (Sarassawadee, 2005:206). For 
other ethnicities that are less threatening, the discrimination was expressed in the 
form of ‘Thai-isation’ during the country’s reform. The reformation went along with 
the building of the Thai national identities in many aspects including education, 
religion, administration and the spread of Bangkok culture to the north. Northern 
people were made to have a consciousness of the Thai nation which meant the 
ethnic differences were forcefully faded out. It was Siam who intervened and created 
a sharp division between Lanna people in the north and other ethnic groups.  
This drama is a product of imperialist thinking, which was intensified after the 
government rebuilt the brotherhood among these ethnic groups during the irredentist 
campaign. This process is reflected in the assimilation of ethnic groups. The focal 
point of the drama is the Siamese reform in which all northern independent states 
became provinces of Siam. Even though the drama makers emphasise the cultural 
differences through costumes, these characters go through some processes to 
become Thai. The drama blurs the lines of ethnic identity by making characters swap 
clothes and transform their identities back and forth. This signifies how they perceive 
the ethnic Tai group, as one single unit which is interchangeable. At the end of the 
drama, all ethnicities are transformed and blended into becoming Thai. Tai Khoen 
and Tai Lue are generalised and assimilated as one, known as the north of Thailand, 




3.2.3.2 Thailand as a protecting brother  
The previous section gives examples from Raknakkara, which uses the ethnic 
Tai Khoen to represent the northern state as successfully united with Siam. This 
section will investigate the ethnic Tai Khoen as the representation of the northern 
state but as no longer a part of the Thai nation. Examples are taken from 
Buangbanjathorn (2017). This drama is attention worthy because it explicitly shows 
the concept of the Greater Thai nation in relation to the Tai Khoen people in Keng 
Tung, Shan State, Burma, during the expansion of the Thai empire in the 1940s.  
The story is set in 1944 and when the Thai army, under the irredentist 
campaign, invaded Keng Tung and established an administrative division called 
Satharanarat Thaidoem (Unified former Thai Territories/ Original Thai States). This 
was part of a Pan-Asianist mission in which Thailand collaborated with Japan, to 
reconquer their ‘lost territory’ in 1942. TV versions of the drama were adapted from a 
novel of the same name, written by Keerati Chana in 2000. The original novel is 
written in a hybrid style using novel and documentary. The novel heavily relies on the 
book ‘Tiew Muang Chiang Tung and Kwean Salawin’ (เทีEยวเมอืงเชยีงตุงและแควน้สาละ
วนิ). This book is documentary travel writing authored by Boonsing Boonkham, a 
Siamese education officer working in Keng Tung during the Thai invasion of Shan 
State. Every chapter of the novel begins with one page of excerpts from that book, 
describing life, culture, landscape, and people of Keng Tung. There are also 
excerpts from other books at the opening of some chapters, but those written by 
Boonsing play a key role in continuously setting the scene. Names of actual places 
as well as historical figures such as the Keng Tung royal family are referred to. 
Fiction and reality are thereby blurred. The fictional events in the novel run alongside 
ethnographical records and autobiography.   
Keng Tung and its culture forms the centre of the novel. When it was first 
adapted for TV in 2002, the drama maker made use of Keng Tung culture as well as 
its history. Characters were dressed in Tai Khoen style, and the story was said to be 
taking place in Keng Tung. However, in a 2017 version, the name Keng Tung was 
deleted from the drama. Despite improved production quality to create historical and 
cultural accuracy and a realistic presentation of Keng Tung, this version decided to 
make it a story occurring in a ‘fictional place.’ So, the name of the state ‘Keng Tung’, 
or in Thai pronunciation ‘Chiang Tung’ as used in a TV version, was changed to be 
‘Wiang Kin’ and Burma was changed to be ‘Padeng.’ As well, names of historical 
figures such as the royal family members of Keng Tung were also replaced with new 




These changes of names were done to avoid conflicts between Thailand and 
other ethnic groups. According to my fieldwork in Thailand, Atthaphorn, the Director 
of Buangbanjathorn, stated that he tried to avoid mentioning actual names (Keng 
Tung and Burma) as it might upset people in other countries;  
The name Keng Tung, as well as names of cities and royalty are real 
names. So, we decided to change these because the drama is about their 
history, international affairs, and a massacre that people in that country 
might not want to deeply remember. If this drama is successful at an 
international level, it would bring about discussion of history. The 
discussion would travel to other countries. … It is all about international 
affairs. People in Burma wanted to end all these wars. To raise such topic 
of this massacre again could cause international conflict (Atthaphorn, 
2018, interview)60. 
A similar conflict had occurred before. Ploengphranang (2017) revolves 
around the theme of love and jealousy inside the Burmese court, and characters are 
inspired by the last king and queen of Burma. Moreover, the drama is based on a 
book ‘Phama Sia Mueang’ (พมา่เสยีเมอืง), which is a chronicle of Burma before its fall 
to be the British colonialists, and written by Kukrit Pramoj, a well-known Thai writer. 
In 2017 Ploengphranang was heavily criticised by Burmese audiences, that it 
negatively represented the Burmese royal family. The great-grandson of Myanmar's 
last monarch King Thibaw accused Thailand of double standards in how it treated 
another country's royals and requested Thailand's royalty to stop the drama 
broadcasting (AFP, 2017). TV drama can indeed lead to international conflict.  
Similarly, TV dramas and actors can be manipulated into fuelling international 
conflict. For example, the famous case of actress Suwanan Khongying who became 
a target of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear dispute. 
In 2003, the ingrained sensitivity felt by Cambodians in relation to their relations with 
Thailand was triggered when Suwanan was supposed to have stated that she would 
not perform in Cambodia until that country restored Thailand’s sovereignty over the 
great Angkorian temple of Angkor Wat. Whether she made such statement or not, 
the publicity that surrounded her alleged remark led to serious anti-Thai rioting in 
Phnom Penh. Unrest erupted in Phnom Penh in the course of which the Thai 
embassy was burned to the ground and the destruction of many Thai businesses 
even though Suwanan denied ever having said anything to that effect (Wagener, 
2011:39; Osborne, 2008:4). Regardless, Thai TV dramas need to be cautious to 
avoid such sensitive topics to prevent the recurrence of conflict.  
 
60 The persons who made decision on the avoidance of these names are actually the station 
owner and committee while Atthaphorn as the director as limited role in making decision. 




Even though names are avoided, ethnic culture and identities are 
emphasised. In Buangbanjathorn, Tai Khoen culture was clearly shown through 
costume, cultural performances, rituals and ceremonies, props, and so on. With 
more advanced technology, better quality of production, and more access to 
information or research on culture and history, the 2017 version appears to present 
even more realistic pictures of the ethnic Tai Khoen than the 2002 version, when 
production technique as well as research were limited. For the 2017 version, the 
production team did a lot of research on Tai Khoen culture by interviewing experts, 
visiting museums and temples in the northern provinces, and making replicas of 
antique cultural objects by local artisans for instance. A lot of effort was used to 
create realistic presentation of Tai Khoen life (Atthaphorn, 2018). Only its name is 
censored, while other cultural identities are less concealed.    
 Buangbanjathorn is a story about a Bangkok woman named Praenuan who 
inherits a house from her father in Chiang Rai (one northern province). There, she 
finds an antique bed. When she sleeps on the bed, she wakes up in Keng Tung, in 
1944, the time when the Thai army occupied the city as a part of the Thai empire. In 
Keng Tung, she meets Laoperng who is the adopted son of Keng Tung’s ruler. 
Laoperng’s half-sister, Tongrew, is a princess from Chiang Rung (Jinghong61) who is 
forced to marry a Burmese nobleman. Tongrew runs away from her arranged 
marriage to seek help from her brother in Keng Tung. In the drama, Keng Tung is 
attacked several times by the Burmese but remains protected by the Thai army. The 
selected scenes demonstrate the relationship between Thai and Keng Tung as 
friendly brotherhood and safe under the Thai army’s protection.  
3.2.3.2.1 Friendly relationship between Thailand and Keng Tung 
 In the first episode, after Praenuan sleeps on the bed and magically awakens 
in Keng Tung, she meets Laoperng for the first time. He is surprised and wonders 
why she is in a palace in Keng Tung. He recognises immediately that Praenuan is 
Thai because she speaks Thai (though the whole drama speaks central Thai 
language anyway). They do not have a chance to talk much as he has to leave and 
Praenuan wakes up. In the second time that they meet, he saves Preanuan from a 
Burmese soldier who takes her as a hostage.  
A long shot shows four soldiers holding guns and patrolling in front of a 
palace wall. Fast instrumental music is played.  A long shot shows 
Praenuan and Laoperng walking into the garden in front of the palace. 
Music changes to a soft, slow tune. A camera gives medium and long shots 
 
61 A city in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, in the far south of China's Yunnan 




as they walk along the garden while talking. Praenuan thanks Laoperng for 
helping her. He then asks where she comes from.  
Laoperng: Where are you from? 
Praenuan: Chiang Rai. 
Laoperng: It takes a day to travel from Chiang Rai to Wiang Kin. Most Thais 
who live here are soldiers who come to seize our country. No women travel 
here alone.  
  
In the next scene, a camera slowly pans, using an extreme long shot to 
show Praenuan and Laoperng sitting in a garden. Long, medium and 
medium close-up shots are used when they speak. Laoperng keeps asking 
where she comes from.  
Praenuan: I was feeling unwell when I slept on a bed in Chiang Rai. Then I 
woke up here, in Wiang Kin. 
Laoperng: So, this is the reason why you don’t put on shoes. 
Praenuan: Who would I wear shoes on a bed?  
Laoperng: You lie to me because you don’t want to tell how you snuck into 
this palace.  
Praenuan: I told you the truth, but you don’t believe me. 
Laoperng: During this political crisis, I cannot trust anybody.  
Praenuan: You told me that the Thai army had seized over your country.  
Laoperng: The Thai Army of Monthon Payap 62 seized Wiang Kin since the 
middle of last year. By the end of last year, they set up an army to control 
the region. Phor Boonsing is a Thai provincial education officer. He taught 
me some Thai. 
Praenuan: So, you don’t like Thai people? 
Laoperng: We are like brothers and sisters 63 however, I want Wiang Kin to 
be independent, not under anybody’s control (Figure 21).  
 
 
62 The administrative reform of the Lanna Kingdom during the centralisation of Siam. 
Monthon Phayap is a subdivision governed under Thesaphiban (literally local government) 
system. Officials from Ministry of Interior in Bangkok were sent to administer the region 
(Sarassawadee,2005:185-201).  





Figure 21 Laoperng and Praenuan meet for the second time and he 
treats her very well (Buangbanjathorn, ep 1)  
 The idea of brotherhood is explicit in this conversation. The phrase ‘baan 
phee muang nong’ (บา้นพีEเมอืงน้อง), that Laoperng uses to refer to the relationship 
between Thailand and Keng Tung, literally means ‘houses of older brothers/sister 
and cities of brothers/sisters.’ It is a discourse commonly found in the RNH to build 
awareness among the Thais of the other ethnic groups living both inside and outside 
Thailand’s borders, that they are members of the same nation. It is similar to a 
statement by the main character in Raknakkara, in the previous section, that two 
ethnic Tai groups are like brothers but in Buangbanjathorn this discourse is 
emphasised in line with the irredentist campaign and concretised by the depiction of 
the Thai empire.   
The idea of brotherhood is romanticised to be a loving, friendly relationship. 
First, it is shown that the Thai army and Keng Tung people can live together 
harmoniously. The drama does not show signs of oppression or resistance. As seen 
in a conversation, when Praenuan asks if he dislikes Thai people, Laoperng does not 
say yes or no. He tries to speak nice thing about Thai people even though Thai 
soldiers seized his country. Moreover, the way he talks about Thai soldiers living in 
the palace or in his country does not show any strong sentiment. His voice is in a 
neutral tone and his face is calm without any sign of anger or sorrow. Although he 
says that he wants his country to be independent, he does not show hatred towards 
Thai people or the country. Rather, he shows his preference for Thai people as he 
refers to the Thai education officer with the respectful word ‘phor’ (พอ่), followed by 
his name Boonsing, which literally means ‘father Boonsing.’ This suggests that he 
gives some respect to the Thai man. The drama implies that he probably has 




Boonsing.’ These statements demonstrate that Thailand and Keng Tung have lived 
together harmoniously despite being under the rule of Thai empire. He can tolerate 
the existence of Thai soldiers in the palace and in the country. More importantly, he 
expresses his friendliness and hospitality to Praenuan, a suspicious Thai woman 
whom he does not know. At the end of the scene, Laoperng shows his kindness and 
offers Praenuan accommodation and treats her like his guest. Based on what we see 
from this scene, Thai people are respected and well treated by Keng Tung people, 
even though they are ruled by the Thai empire. 
Second, Thailand is not an enemy but a friend. Even though the Thai army 
takes control of their country, Laoperng still has full power in the palace. As an 
adopted son of Keng Tung’s ruler, he is owner and master and can exercise power 
over the Thai soldiers. This implies that the Thai army respects his rights to rule the 
palace and people, and they are in good relationship. On the contrary, the Burmese 
appear as a threatening enemy. In an earlier scene, a Burmese soldier intrudes into 
the palace and takes Praenunan as a hostage. Laoperng fights with him bravely and 
then orders all the soldiers to chase after the Burmese soldier. This scene infers that 
the Burmese are the enemy and harmful to Keng Tung people. The idea of a country 
in danger is also expressed in the beginning when four Keng Tung soldiers are 
patrolling the palace wall, suggesting that the country is experiencing threat of war or 
similar unstable situation. This image of the Burmese as enemy is in sharp contrast 
to that of Thai people as a good friend. Accordingly, this scene also implies that 
Thailand and Keng Tung are like brothers living peacefully together under the rule of 
Thai empire, an idea promoted by the irredentists at that time.  
3.2.3.2.2 Keng Tung under Thai protection  
 The above section illustrates the supposed brotherhood between Thai people 
and the ethnic Tai Khoen in Keng Tung. This section will show that, under the Thai 
empire, the ethnic Tai Khoen appear protected by the Thai army. Keng Tung is safe 
from their enemy, the Burmese, because it is a part of the Thai nation. In episode 9, 
Tongrew is getting married. Her family is worried that Usor, the Burmese nobleman, 
might destroy the wedding ceremony and kidnap the bride because Tongrew was 
previously supposed to have an arranged to marry him. Her brother asks the Thai 
army for help.  
 
The wedding party is set in a big garden in front of a palace. It is a Western 
style banquet. A rectangle table is set in the middle. On top of the table are 
food trays and afternoon tea stands. Five round tables are set in a half 
circle. On each table are Western-style cutlery. Food is served on the tables 




watching traditional dances. Extreme long shots are used to show overall 
setting and landscape. A medium shot gives a closer look at the table where 
the main characters sit. At that table are Tongrew (the bride), Sanpang (the 
groom), her grandmother, her uncle, Laoperng (her brother and main male 
protagonist), Praenuan (main female protagonist), Boonsing (a Thai officer), 
and Major Kit (a Thai soldier). All the characters dress in traditional Tai 
Khoen outfits, except the two Thai men that wear western suits. Medium 
and medium close-up shots are used as characters speak. Slow and soft 
instrumental music is played (Figure 22).  
Praenuan: What time will the wedding parade leave the palace?  
Laoperng: 2 o’clock. Some soldiers will dress like villagers and stand with 
the crowds watching the parade along the way to the temple and on the way 
back here.  
(Music changes to faster, exciting drumbeats.)  
Major Kit: Don’t be afraid, Praenuan. Thai soldiers and Wiang Kin soldiers 
will do their best to protect the people and the peacefulness of this city.  
Uncle: I’ve heard that a weapon storehouse in your military camp was burnt 
and destroyed by Usor.  
Major Kit: If Usor dares to cause trouble in Wiang Kin, I will arrest and 
punish him. I won’t fear anyone’s power. 
Boonsing: Usor wants to show his power and scares everybody.  
Laoperng: Power can force people but cannot create loyalty. To rule others, 
one needs to build respect, not scare them. 
Sanpang: I don’t believe oppressing people will bring him power. Nor do I 
believe that violence will bring respect.  
 
 
Figure 22 Two Thai men and one Thai woman are joining a wedding party with 
Keng Tung’s royal family members (Buangbanjathorn, ep 9) 
 This scene restates the depiction of friendly relationship as discussed above 
but it adds the idea that Thailand is a protector of other ethnic Tai groups. Thais are 




Thai woman (Praenuan) can sit at the same table with the royal family of this state. It 
suggests that Thailand receives a certain amount of respect. In contrast, the 
Burmese are represented by a character named Usor, who is a bad man as he will 
destroy the wedding. This sharp contrast builds the image of Thailand as a protector. 
According to Major Kit, the Thai army takes the role of a protecting brother who 
would bravely chase away all danger. This scene indirectly states that Keng Tung 
will be saved from Burma if it is under the protection of Thai empire. This statement 
legitimises the Thai invasion of Keng Tung to be a heroic deed of a more powerful 
nation to help a less powerful one. This legitimisation is elaborated when characters 
criticise the Burmese way of ruling through force and violence. This reminds 
audiences of the discourse frequently found in the RNH that the Thai king is a 
righteous ruler who protects his kingdom and people with benevolence. The Thai 
king is portrayed as a merciful and compassionate ruler who has both mystical 
power and might, and thus creates the essence of barami, or virtuous and moral 
power (Fong, 2009:688). The RNH assumes that the barami will make people 
respect and bring loyalty to the ruler which is opposite to the Burmese ruler in this 
drama that exercises its power violently.  
 The role of the Thai army is to elaborate the next episode. Usor and the 
Burmese soldiers kill several men in the wedding parade and take Praenuan 
hostage. They run away into the forest. Laoperng chases after them and fights 
furiously. When Laoperng is about to lose, Thai soldiers come in (Figure 23).  
 
An extreme long shot and high angle shows these people standing in a 
forest. A gun shot is heard, followed by the voice of someone speaking ‘Just 
give it up, Usor.’ Then, a long shot shows several Thai soldiers, led by 
Major Kit, running to them. All are holding guns and aiming at Usor and his 
men. Medium close-up shots are used to stress characters’ feelings when 
they speak.  
Usor: What can you do?  
Major Kit: You burnt the Thai army’s storehouse, abducted women, and 
harmed Wiang Kin people under the protection of the Thai army. With all 






Figure 23 Thai army arrests the Burmese soldiers (Buangbanjathorn, ep 9) 
Even though both Usor and Laoperng have guns in their hands, they throw 
them away and fight with traditional martial arts. In contrast, the Thai soldiers come 
in, all armed with weapons such as rifles and pistols. This is a different mode of 
fighting. It symbolises that Keng Tung and Burma’s fight is in a traditional context, 
while the role of Thai soldiers and army belongs to a modern context of a nation-
state, as expressed in Major Kit’s saying that Usor harms ‘Wiang Kin people under 
the protection of the Thai army.’ The Thai army in this scene is portrayed as civilised, 
advanced in weaponry and fighting skills, able to help a small state like Keng Tung 
from pre-modern, traditional overlordship, which relied on simplistic modes of 
violence. 
According to the dramatic narrative, Thailand and Keng Tung are brothers 
that have close relationship and Thailand acts as the older brother who willingly 
protects its younger, less powerful sibling. In this last episode, the Thai army 
interferes with internal conflicts between Burma and Keng Tung because they 
believe that it is their responsibility as a protector. There are no Keng Tung soldiers 
in this scene which hints at the disappearance of Keng Tung military power. The 
drama uses this scene to remind audiences of Thailand’s right over Keng Tung. At 
the end of the drama, Usor is dead and Keng Tung has returned to a peaceful life. 
The depiction of Keng Tung in conflict with Burma provides the opportunity for 
Thailand to step in and prove that it is reliable as a trustworthy brother. Therefore, 
the creation of brotherhood with other ethnicities in Buangbanjathorn is a way to 
build an image of Thailand as a strong Thai nation.  
The narrative drive of the drama builds an image of Thailand as a great 




memory. The drama reproduces national pride that Thailand was once a powerful 
country and these people used to be a part of the Thai nation and have always been 
their brothers. It is based on imperialist thinking that views the colonised country as 
incapable of ruling itself. One scene in episode 3 explicitly expresses national pride. 
After the Burmese soldiers intrude into the palace several times, Praenuan asks 
Laoperng why he does not negotiate with Usor (the Burmese). Laoperng’s answer is; 
 
Usor is a man who crazy for power. He never loses. He will never yield to 
a small state like us. Your country has never been colonised. You might 
not understand a country that wants power or a country that wants 
independence. 
 
 This statement reflects how the RNH circulates in the perception of these 
drama makers. While this drama presents Thailand as a great nation in the past, it 
never fails to reaffirm the discourse that the Thai nation has always been 
independent. In order to do so, the combination with other ethnicities is needed. The 
ethnic Tai Khoen in Keng Tung are exploited to make a comparison with Thais who, 
according to the RNH, have always been independent and protective. The Tai are 
essential as they are evidence of the Greater Thai nation, and proof of national pride, 
and associated power.  
3.2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter aims to demonstrate that the Thai nation is built through 
combination with other ethnicities. It does so by looking at the idea of the Greater 
Thai nation and irredentism, which were products of imperialist thinking. This kind of 
thinking resulted from the RNH and narratives revolving around the ‘lost territories.’ 
This discourse was elaborated to be a ‘National Humiliation’, and used by the military 
government to construct a hypernationalism in Thailand, claiming to restore national 
prestige as an empire. The building of the Thai empire was followed by the creation 
of an anachronistic map, the concept of brotherhood between Thais and other Tai-
speaking people beyond Thailand’s borders, the homogenisation of all ethnic groups 
living within the country, and the expansion of territory to the areas Thai leaders 
believed to be their ‘lost territories.’ It was a short period in Thai history that Thailand 
actually functioned as an empire.  
This thesis has found that the ethnic Tai Khoen from Keng Tung are the 
popular choice  used to represent the north of Thailand in Thai TV dramas despite 
them existing predominantly beyond Thailand’s borders. This implies that drama 




historically members of the Thai nation. These kinds of dramas often end with the 
unification between Thais and ethnic Tai people from other states. The depiction of 
this scenario recalls the idea of Greater Thai nation. While the empire or the Greater 
Thai nation had passed, this imperialist thinking is still evident in contemporary 
dramas with a northern Thai focus. It also reminds Thai audiences of the unification 
and hierarchical relationship between Bangkok and the north as the centre and the 
periphery.  
Raknakkara (2017) exemplifies the case of successful unification of the north 
through internal colonisation. This discourse from RNH assumes the north as a part 
of the Thai nation and automatically considers all ethnicities as one group to be 
included in Siam. This is reflected through the assimilation of characters between 
different ethnic groups. In this drama, the assimilation of ethnic Tai groups is 
expressed through cultural proximity as they are generalised as one, and via the 
abandonment or shifting of one identity to becoming another. Another drama, 
Buangbanjathorn (2017) depicts the perception of brotherhood relating to ethnic 
groups that are no longer a part of the Thai nation. In this drama, selected scenes 
demonstrate the relationship between Thailand and Keng Tung as friendly brothers 
showing Keng Tung as safe under the Thai army’s protection. The idea that Thailand 
is a more benevolent ruler compared to the Burmese who use only violence is also 
perpetuated. It legitimises the Thai invasion of Keng Tung as a heroic deed of a 
more powerful nation to help one less powerful.  
Pan-Thaism and the Greater Thai nation were chauvinistic ways of 
constructing a modern nation-state. These concepts were used by the military 
government to build appearances of a strong Thai nation and to stimulate 
nationalism among Thai people. The key message of these dramas is that Thailand 
has always been a powerful nation and to extoll national prestige as an empire in the 
past. So, it is needed for this drama to instil a social memory of Thailand as a once 
great nation. Evidence from these dramas have shown that other ethnic Tai groups 
are combined to build the Thai nation, yet they are not hybridised. It is a ‘Combi-
nation’ process where Siam/Thailand has positioned itself on a superior level in all 
aspects. Even though the ethnic Tai groups are not treated equally as the dominant 








3.3 Combination of the uncivilised Others 
 The depiction of the north in Thai TV dramas is often framed in similar 
patterns.  Stories are set in the past, or take place in rural areas. These dramas, 
capturing the north in days-gone-by, differentiates them from audiences who by 
relation occupy the ‘future’ domain. The north is represented as Other, both of time 
and space. The dominant power in Bangkok has exercised power over them.   
A key element in the construction of Thai national identities are the signifiers 
pertaining to being a ‘civilised nation.’ However, at the same time, the combination 
with peripheral uncivilised Others is essential to nation-building because it confirms a 
superior status. This chapter will examine the presentation of the north as Otherness 
in Thai TV dramas. The making of Otherness is constructed from the Siamese siwilai 
discourse, which follows imperialist thinking. The first section provides historical 
background on how dominant power exploits and adapts the meaning of ‘civilise’ and 
turns it to being the ‘siwilai’ concept. The second section analyses scenes from 
selected TV dramas in relations to this topic.   
3.3.1 Siwilai: a power relation between Siam and the local  
 Siam/Thailand has followed imperialist thinking in its nation-building and then 
through the concept of ‘siwilai’, which reflects products of imperialism. Western 
imperialist colonisers viewed indigenous people and their lands as objects of study, 
open for investigation and occupation and because the Imperialists regarded 
themselves as being more civilised. As Mary Louise Pratt’s concept ‘Imperial Eyes’ 
contends, the West legitimised their occupation of land by using ‘travel writing’ to 
explain that appropriation without subjugation and violence. For example, it narrated 
those lands as ‘uninhabitated, unpossessed, unoccupied landscape’ with indigenous 
people portrayed as ‘ghostly presence’ or ‘cultureless beings’ thus acting to leverage 
a narrative that legitimised the appropriation of resources and administrative control 
(Pratt, 1992:38-39,51-53). In this chapter we see how a dominant Bangkok based 
power acts as the imperialist, looking to a ‘less civilised’ Northern Other as 
something to be controlled, investigated, evaluated or enjoyed for holiday pleasure.  
Siwilai or ‘civilise’ was coined as a term in Thailand around the nineteenth 
century. The word ‘civilise’ and ‘civilisation’ came to Siam during the reign of King 
Mongkut (Rama IV, r.1851-1868) after the coming of Western trade and imperial 
power. The Thai King was aware that Siam’s sovereignty would depend on a 
relationship with the West and to certain Western notions and standards of 




class could sustain their power as well as distinguish themselves from less civilised 
Others. 
3.3.1.1 Empowering Siam and the concept of ‘siwilai’  
A significant amount of Thai historical narrative explains that Siam’s 
modernisation, or the quest for siwilai, was done to avoid being colonised by external 
forces saving the country’s independence by satisfying the Europeans (Thongchai, 
2000b:532). The country’s reform and King Chulalongkorn’s first journey to Europe in 
1897 was highly praised as a tactic to save the country’s independence from 
Western imperialism. For example, David K. Wyatt states how the king felt 
Westernisation was needed for the country after a trip to Europe;  
… he (the king) knew what the Europeans were demanding and the 
theory that lay behind their often contemptuous judgements of his 
kingdom. He knew how, according to European definitions of modernity, 
his country should develop, and he often despaired at the compromise 
that had to be made, the work left undone, and the imperfections in the 
system that was being developed… (Wyatt, 2003:196-197).  
This is part of the ‘Siam-was-never-colonised’ discourse, which implies that 
the king was obliged to reform the country and Siam was forced to follow Western 
ways. Nonetheless, some scholars have noted that the motivation to become 
civilised among the Siamese elite was for their own benefit. Thongchai points out 
that ‘the quest for siwilai’ was not simply a reaction to the colonial threat. Rather, it 
obscured another motivation and an attempt originated by the elites to attain and 
confirm the superiority of Siam (Thongchai, 2000b:529). The Siamese monarch and 
elites exploited the westernisation process to gain advantage in many aspects. 
First, the concept of siwilai conceals Siam’s internal colonisation over the 
smaller states. Siwilai legitimised extensions of power over tributary states in Lanna, 
Lanchang and Pattani (Harrison, 2010a:17). The reformation of the country was 
believed to be part of an anti-colonisation movement because it was linked to the 
Paknam incident, a territorial conflict whereby when the French pressured Siam by 
sending two gunboats to blockade the Chao Phraya River. The centralisation of 
administrative systems was the only way to survive. However, in Thongchai ‘s words, 
the administrative reform was an ‘apologetic discourse for Siam’s aggression’ and 
‘merely a euphemism for Siam’s imperial conquest’ (Thongchai, 2011:29-30). The 
centralisation of the administrative system enabled Chulalongkorn to achieve 
‘absolute’ power and Siam to enjoy the centralisation of tax collection and absolute 
spending power, too (Peleggi, 2002:41) So, the siwilai discourse disguised Siam’s 
internal colonisation to act as if it was an obligation or ‘burden’ to make a modern, 




Second, the concept of siwilai prevented Siam elites from being uncivilised. 
The reformation was done by the Siam elites since they could not tolerate being 
seen as uncivilised. This group were not hostile to Westerners either. Conversely, 
the Thai elite were fond of the West and their craving for things Western was well 
known (Thongchai, 2000b:532). They did not have a distaste of colonial economic or 
Western technology because they were the beneficiaries. They were eager to 
modernise the Thai state, bureaucracy, and society in more ways than the colonial 
power dictated (Thongchai, 2011:28). Peleggi’s book (2002) illustrates in detail how 
the monarchy and Siamese elite enjoyed Westernised objects, fashions, and 
lifestyles. Thus, their thirst to be civilised also drove the siwilai project.  
Third, siwilai enhanced the image of the monarch as a moderniser. 
Westernisation in the country was claimed to be achieved by the monarch and the 
king’s trip to Europe in 1897 was highly praised as a strategy to save the country. 
However, there is little evidence to prove this claim. More reliable evidence to 
confirm Siam’s independence is the Franco-British Declaration of 1896, which 
secured Siam as a buffer zone and was signed a year prior to the King’s first trip. 
Thongchai and Harrison argue that the most significant meaning of this trip was to 
claim a status on par with European monarchs and to regain the nation’s glory after 
losing the supreme royal power in the Paknam Incident in 1893. Instead, what the 
King achieved was the standing of a significant political player on the world stage, in 
the eyes of most Thais, whilst acquiring symbols of Westernisation as attributes of 
status and markers of prestige (Thongchai, 2000b:539; 2011:27; Harrison, 
2010a:18). Accordingly, Thais worship Chulalongkorn as a king who brought 
modernisation to the country and glorify this idea. Irene Stengs’s research elaborates 
that Chulalongkorn has become a mythical figure as the great Buddhist king who 
modernised his kingdom. Thais admire him dearly, leading to the cultivation of a cult 
of King Chulalongkorn worship and deference, founded on these narratives of him as 
a great moderniser, saviour, and caring father to the nation. These narratives 
constituted the myth of the Great Beloved king64 (Stengs, 2008:160-162). Siwilai 
discourse leveraged the monarch in to being a great hero of the nation, even though 
modernisation was only a by-product of his preference and desire for Western 
lifestyles.  
Finally, siwilai turned Siam towards being a modern nation state. Though the 
reform started during the 19th century, its products were carried on and intensified 
during the 1940s. Siwilai became more concrete in the form of cultural mandates (รฐั
 




นิยม ratthaniyom) during Phibun’s first government (1938-1944), which aimed at 
creating a ‘uniform, civilised, and progressive’ society (Barmé, 1993:138). This policy 
was proposed to remove flaws which hampered the country’s progress. These flaws 
were seen as unsightly dress and undisciplined social behaviour, which made the 
country seem ‘unprogressive’ (Barmé, 1993:144). The siwilai programme covered 
almost all aspects of life from clothing to housing, daily life, economy, language, and 
so on. For example, it included linguistic reforms where people were taught how to 
say hello (สวสัด ีsawatdee) and thank you (ขอบคณุ khop khun) properly as a civilised 
person (Peleggi, 2008:73-75). The most obvious policy called on the public to dress 
in a neat and well-groomed manner and Western-style clothing, to lead Thailand to 
becoming ‘the equal of civilised nations’ (Barmé, 1993:156-157) (read more in 
Chapter 4.2). Under the concept of siwilai, Siam had gained a new image as a 
‘civilised’ and ‘progressive’ Thai nation.  
 Therefore, the concept of siwilai empowered Siam elites so that they could 
feel equal to the West in terms of social, cultural or technological mores. Even 
though the function of ‘siwilai’ itself was not the main factor in saving the country 
from colonisation, Siam elites adopted Western ways of life to modernise their own 
identities. Siam followed imperialist thinking to exercise power over the less civilised 
commoners and local people whom they treated as subjects of internal colonisation. 
3.3.1.2 The unification of the less civilised Others   
Siam’s ‘higher civilisation’ and the ‘less-civilised’ Others were reflected in 
some ethnographic records which show that the distance between rulers and their 
subjects was not in ethnic cultures but the power relations of the ‘tamed/untamed’, 
‘civilisable/uncivilisable’ qualification of the Others (Thongchai, 2000a:44,49). 
Thongchai finds two kinds of Otherness in these writings: one is the ‘chaopa’ (ชาวป่า) 
or ‘jungle people’, which they regard as uncivilised and barbarian; another is 
‘chaobannok’ (ชาวบา้นนอก) or the rural villager, who is seen as uneducated and 
backward (Thongchai, 2000b:534-536). The Siamese elites put themselves in the 
centre and applied the geographical concept to differentiate the Others. Forest, rural 
areas, and city are differentiated spaces of civilisation. The elites situated 
themselves in a muang (เมอืง town, nation state) with the outer rings being bannok 
(บา้นนอก rural village) and pa (ป่า jungle) (Thongchai, 2000b:537). These two groups 
are also referred to as the ‘wild others’ and the ‘docile others.’ The wild others were 
objects of entertainment whereas the docile others were those who ‘begged to live 
under the shadow of protection of Siamese overlords’ (Thongchai, 2000a:46-49). 




the backward space, in the domain of simplicity, superstition, ignorance and 
uneducatedness, which is less siwilai.  
 Siam loved to display the less civilised others such as village, hill tribe, or 
savage people for their entertainment. For example, Chulalongkorn adopted a young 
boy (named Khanung) of the Semung tribe in the Malay peninsula and raised him in 
the Inner Palace as the King’s ‘own experiment in civilising a savage.’ Photographs 
of Khanung or ‘Ngo Ba65’ were displayed in fairs and festivals for urban people and 
these photographs became popular souvenirs. This is the same as photographs of 
Princess Dara Rasami66. Her photographs showed the ethnic difference through her 
looks and northern style costume which were different from the central Thai fashion. 
These two samples are colonial subjects that the king kept inside the palace, for 
political relationship and reinforced the Siamese hierarchy of ethnic categories 
(Woodhouse, 2017:145, 149-151).  
However, when it comes to nation-building, these ‘Other’ people are counted 
as ‘Thai’ when presented to foreigners. In the 19th century, Siam commissioners 
needed to emphasise the common identity of Lao and Siamese when talking to 
foreigners, but to retain some of the old Thai-Lao difference in private (Baker and 
Pasuk, 2017:64). During the Phibun Regime in the 1940s, the government wanted to 
stress the unity of a nation, and this included the building of perception among Thais. 
One of the cultural mandates states that ‘the citizens of the country would henceforth 
be simply known as Thai (Chao Thai).’ The mandate was aimed at forging a Thai 
consciousness among the Lao and Shan peoples living within Thailand’s borders 
and neighbouring areas coveted by the irredentists (Barmé, 1993:151).  
Consequently, the Others in regional area such as the north was a target of 
this unification because it has distinctive culture and tradition. The government 
promoted tourism in the north during the 1940s by making it ‘a beautiful region’ 
(Darunee, 2006). The unification was intensified after the construction of highways 
and railways which connected the north and Bangkok more effectively. This led to 
the first National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961-1966) which 
promoted the northern provinces as new tourist attractions (Sarassawadee, 
2010:595-598). Despite the unification process, the difference of hierarchical 
civilisation still exists. According to Baker and Pasuk, the unification has stratified 
people into three broad bands. The hill peoples are at the bottom, next are the 
 
65 A play, written by Chulalongkorn, describing the Semang people in detail. The play is a 
means of knowing these tribal people, who are seen as less than human in the royal court 
(Woodhouse, 2017:148-149).  




agricultural docile people. The top of this hierarchy is the princes and elites. These 
strata of peoples are both ‘united and divided’, at the same time (Baker and Pasuk, 
2017:64).  
The next section will explore Siam’s centralised view of and over local people, 
and their ‘inferior’ identities. This phenomenon is known as ‘localism’, in which local 
cultures are promoted and people are yearning for an authentic (Thai) life. While the 
craze of siwilai was a must for the elite, they felt it was essential to preserve and 
display life of the uncivilised, because this affirms the necessary status of Siam as 
internal imperialist. 
3.3.2 Localism and Thai rural community  
Localism was widely discussed in Thailand during the 1970s as a ‘grassroots 
development movement.’ In Parnwell and Seeger’s term, ‘this privileges locally 
rooted, locally controlled, and locally relevant forms of development which have the 
moral market society and traditional culture at their core’ (Parnwell and Seeger, 
2008:85). In the 1980s, there was an NGO development strategy and ideology which 
tried to avoid the state and politics after the collapse of the Communist Party of 
Thailand and related to community cultural development perspectives (CDP or 
วฒันธรรมชมุชน watthanatham chumchon) (Baker & Pasuk, 1999:121; Hewison, 
2002:148). This did not only bring attention to local culture but also shed light on the 
concept of an authentic Thai community, which is the root of Thai society.  
According to Atthachak Sattayanurak, Thai renowned scholar on Thai history 
and politics, CDP has shaped the stereotype of the rural community to be an 
agricultural society where people live harmoniously like family and relatives. Villagers 
are perceived to be politically humble and live in a vertical relationship to a 
hierarchical society. This stereotypical image was created by Phraya 
Anumanratchathon67 during 1940s, and was then combined with images of 
backward, underdeveloped communities that required development (Atthachak, 
2016:32). This turning back to village life in a way stood against Westernisation and 
modernisation. One of the key scholars in this field, Chatthip Nartsupha (1999)68, 
illustrates that the Thai village community is a peaceful community where people 
were tied into ancestor systems, Buddhism and spiritual beliefs, and lived under the 
state’s control system of corvée and tax. Chatthip suggests that the villages’ 
subsistence economy was destroyed by free trade and economic changes during the 
 
67 Thai scholar well-known for culture-related works such as the study of Thai folklore which 
set the foundations for cultural awareness among young Thai scholars.  




mid-19th century (1855 – 1932) where traditional monopoly was replaced by free 
trade. Economic systems changed from subsistence to commercial, and people were 
tied to a metropolitan capitalist system instead. For Chatthip, the Thai village 
community is unique, self-sufficient, and was in existence before the state was 
exploited and neglected by external forces. The villagers were ‘dragged into the 
market, capitalist system half-heartedly’ (Chatthip, 1999:42-50). This is what 
Atthachak calls ‘the plot of Thai village history69’ which fixes on ‘beautiful past that 
was ruined by capitalism and Western influences, and all Thai citizens must help 
preserving Thainess in the village.’ Eventually, this plot has turned to be a yearning 
for ‘the good old times’ (Atthachak, 2016:33).  
 Localism was raised to higher concern after the economic crisis in 199770 
when the country had to depend on international financial power. The popular 
opinion was that the country was threatened by modernisation, the capitalist 
movement, globalisation, Westernisation and thus needed to reject liberalisation, and 
respond by proposing a rural localism as a ‘bedrock of Thai cultural values’ and an 
alternative means to fighting back (Parnwell and Seeger, 2008:85; Hewison, 2000: 
280,285). This perspective was restated in King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s birthday 
speech in December 1997.This included a solution to national economic crisis by 
using a ‘new theory’ of self-sufficiency economy or ‘setthakit pho phiang’ (เศรษฐกจิ
พอเพยีง). The speech was televised nationwide. The King’s preaching was regarded 
as a reaction to the threat to sovereignty and ‘economic warfare’ which was 
paralleled to the previous threats to Thailand’s sovereignty in the nineteenth century 
and early twentieth centuries (Reynolds, 2001:265-266).  
 Localism also brought local identities into public view. After the end of the 
Cold War, the Thai government relaxed and did not see local cultural identities as 
posing a threat to Thai national identity. Rather, local and regional cultures such as 
languages and traditions were promoted in the mass media such as on soap operas, 
in advertisements, or government campaigns. This media liberalisation was 
supported by the 1997 constitution that increased the use of regional dialects (Jory, 
1999a: 337-340). This was in line with the Thai governments ‘Year to Campaign for 
Thai Culture’ in 1994 and Tourism Authority of Thailand’s campaign ‘Amazing 
Thailand’ (1998-99). The result was that local identities were employed in the tourism 
 
69 โครงเรืFองในประวตัศิาสตรช์นบท 
70 Tom Yam Kung crisis or Asian financial crisis which caused many business sectors to 
terminate and put thousands of people jobless. This era is sometimes referred to as ‘Yuk Ai 




industry more heavily (Jory, 1999a;1999b). Consequently, the economic crisis gave 
birth to the rise of localism in the country as a true essence of Thai identity.   
 Even though localism was highly praised as a solution to save the country 
from crisis, there are some critics that view the concept differently. Baker and Pasuk 
(1999) argued that Chatthip’s book romanticised the rural while ignoring the benefit 
of urbanism, modernism, and progress. The village is represented only one-sidedly, 
as an idyllic place and via a backward-looking lens (Baker and Pasuk, 1999:122-
123). Thongchai also stresses that the idea of ‘Oriental despotism’, found in 
Chatthip’s work, substitutes the empirical village with his own idealised village. He 
notes that what makes Chatthip’s idea so influential within Thai society is the idea of 
community culture and the belief in the primordial essence of ‘the Thai village’ 
(Thongchai, 2008:580-581). Hewison also argues that localism in Thailand ignores 
the positive aspects of industrialisation and remains unable to develop a ‘sound 
alternative model.’ What localism does do, is provide moral arguments about 
globalisation, privileging agriculture, and ignoring other industries beyond farming 
and the agricultural sector. In essence, the localist movement in Thailand does not 
go beyond the reactionary, romantic, anti-urban, and chauvinistic (Hewison, 
2000:291-292).  
 The romanticisation of localism is also associated with the idea of 
‘phumpanya’ (ภมูปัิญญา) which translated as local knowledge, indigenous knowledge, 
native wisdom, local genius, and ingenuity. However, phumpanya, which is believed 
to be a very old model of thinking, and presented as a main source of local 
knowledge, does not originate from the local. On the contrary, it was introduced at a 
global level as a key concept in the twentieth century, because Western social 
scientists were concerned about representing subaltern actors, and many years 
before the failure of grand theories (Reynolds, 2001:264). Localism is a newly 
invented concept resulting from global processes. Parnwell and Seeger had given 
their significant criticism over localism in that it;  
misrepresents the reality of ‘traditional rural life’, for its lack of realism in 
the face of the continuing certainty of global capitalism, for its use as a 
cathartic sop for people in denial after the economic crisis, and for its lack 
of appeal to a majority of Thai people still intent on the path toward 
modern development (Parnwell and Seeger, 2008:85-86).  
However, the ideal village community contrasts to reality. Research by many 
scholars has revealed that villagers in the countryside have changed significantly 
from the constructed stereotype. They are no longer farmers who rely on primitive 
farming. They have developed towards more progressive technology usage, as well 




not farmers who were forced or ‘dragged to consumerism.’ Rather, they are not 
against consumerism but have benefited from economic changes (Naruemon and 
McCargo, 2011:1005). They may be poorer than people in urban areas, but they are 
not so close to the subsistence margin. These people seek to improve their lives, not 
maintaining their standard of living as imagined by urban people in some faux mode 
or model of sustainability (Keyes, 1983:15). Rural farmers and traditional agricultural 
society have been replaced by a new pattern of farming and new community of 
entrepreneurs (Atthachak, 2016:45).  According to these changes, farmers should be 
referred to as farm-entrepreneurs, post-peasant, taproot, middle-income peasants, 
or cosmopolitan villagers (Atthachak, 2015,2106; Naruemon and McCargo,2011). 
Janit Feangfu also challenges the binary of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ as fixed 
categories. She argues that modernisation in Thailand is complex and dynamic as it 
is a result of both ‘the desire to be modern’ and the modern environment itself. Thus, 
it is spurious to identify ‘modern/Westernised elements’ as alien to ‘Thai tradition’ in 
order to preserve what is believed to be ‘Thainess’ (Janit, 2011:235-237). Based on 
these scholars, existing images of traditional, rural society are problematic. These 
scholars’ views affirm that localism and its romanticisation in the Thai context is no 
longer applicable to reality.  
 To conclude, localism and the romanticisation of the rural past are products of 
the siwilai concept and mode of thinking. People of dominant power in Bangkok 
enjoy stories and depiction of localism with a perception that they are situated higher 
up, in a hierarchy of civilisation. While they used siwilai to respond to an external 
threat from the West, they also used siwilai to put themselves in a higher position 
than the Others within. In Western culture where actual colonisation takes place, 
siwilai functions as a tactic used by the coloniser in transforming or controlling their 
colonised Others. In Thailand, the difference is that Siamese elites take the role of 
Western coloniser over their internal subjects.  
3.3.3 Analysis of TV dramas  
 In this section, I investigate the concept of siwilai in three selected TV dramas. 
I do so to see how these dramas use the depiction of the past and northern Thailand 
to construct a nation. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section 
examines the products of the ‘siwilai project’ in the north. The second section 
focuses on the making of Otherness. The last section analyses the nostalgic 






3.3.3.1 The Siamese burden: products of the civilising process 
 Siamese civilising projects are a product of imperialist thinking and also used 
to legitimise Siamese internal colonisation. This section examines the products of 
Siamese siwilai projects in the north as depicted in two TV dramas. It shows how the 
north was developed in different aspects because of Siam, and the discourse that 
Siam used in its nation-building. 
The imperialists perceived is an obligation of civilised countries to help other 
uncivilised countries. According to Niall Ferguson, though the British Empire was 
zealous in the acquisition and exploitation of slaves, practiced forms of racial 
discrimination, and acted brutally or negligently towards the suffering of the colonies, 
it was obvious that no organisation in history has done more to promote the free 
movement of goods, capital and labour, Western norms of law, order and 
governance than the British Empire (Ferguson, 2004b:xxii). The ‘Anglobalisation’ 
from the British Empire left many imperial products to the world, including commodity 
and labour markets, culture, government, capital markets and warfare (Ferguson, 
2004a:9-10,21-22). 
This concept is explicitly shown in Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem ‘The White 
Man’s Burden’ (1899) which talks about the American colonisation of the Philippines. 
The poem states that it is a duty of the empire to help the uncivilised world and 
justifies imperial conquest as a mission-of-civilisation. It is not only the degree of 
civilisation but also racial ideology that underpins this civilising mission. U.S. 
imperialism was backed by white supremacist conviction such as Anglo-Saxonism, 
Social Darwinism, and benevolent assimilation as well. These are rationale for 
seizing other countries and extending American dominion (Love, 2007:76,83). The 
terms differ in each country. The British empire calls it a white man’s burden. It was 
the ‘civilising mission’ for the French and the American empire calls it ‘manifest 
destiny’ (Ferguson, 2004a:23). In Thailand, this mission is known as ‘the quest for 
siwilai.’  
This section explores the siwilai project in the TV dramas Raknakkara and 
Klinkasalong in which examples of civilisation and modernisation process is clearly 
presented. These two dramas have similar themes that talk about modernisation in 
the north. Raknakkara takes place in 1884 and the story is about how the northern 
states should adapt to changes, prepare for the coming of West, and be united with 
Siam to survive Western colonisation. The story in Klinkasalong is set many years 
later in 1924 after the north had been incorporated as a province of Siam. It can be 




portrays the success of that reform. I will separate the siwilai project in the north into 
two parts – Lanna identity and Lanna society. 
3.3.3.1.1 Civilising the Lanna identity  
 This section will focus on the civilising of northern identity in order to turn the 
colonised Others into civilised subjects. In Raknakkara, Sukkawong, the main male 
character, represents Siamese power and Western civilisation. Though he is a 
northern Thai prince, his education in Singapore and work experience in Siam give 
him superiority in the north. He is the only civilised man in that northern state who is 
fluent in English and knowledgeable about Western culture. Sukkawong imports 
Western knowledge, ways of thinking, and Western objects to his hometown, too. 
For example, he teaches his servants to use an iron in episode 5 and in episode 7 
he has his British friend taking his picture with a camera. These episodes show 
northern people as backward and lacking education; amazed with the iron and 
scared of a camera. These examples are not found in the original text but in the TV 
adaptation. The producers added them to stress the idea of modernisation of the 
north. Episode 4 shows that a Western way of thinking is imported to the north when 
Sukkawong teaches one servant to swim:  
 
Kamkaew, a young servant, practices swimming in a pond. Manmuang (her 
master) and other servants try to stop her, saying that a woman should not 
swim, and she should be ashamed of herself. Minutes later, Kamkaew 
starts drowning. A male servant jumps into the pond to save her. When she 
is safe, everybody tells her not to do this again. Sukkawong asks if she is 
scared of swimming and she says no, insisting that she wants to swim. 
Then a camera cuts to new scene. Kamkaew is in the pond again. This time 
she uses dried coconuts as floats.  
Sukkawong’s grandmother: You should have stopped her, but you help her 
instead. 
Sukkawong: How can we stop her? If we say no, do you think a girl like her 
will not do it again? 
 
 This scene is added to the drama though it is not essential to the core plot. Its 
makers want to present the siwilai project, that Siam has exported to the north. 
According to an interview with the screenwriter, he claims that typical northern Thai 
women in the past did not swim because it exposed their bodies. He states that he 
wanted to add a feminist idea that women should be equal to men, and this idea is 
supported by Sukkawong, a character that stands for Siam (Yingyot, 2018, 
interview). Accordingly, swimming symbolises the modernisation of northern people. 
It does not simply mean the ability to swim but it also signifies the Western idea of 




swimming and think that a good woman must avoid it, Sukkawong is the only 
character who supports Kamkaew and finds a solution for her to swim safely. Here, 
the drama displays how Siam is the important agent in civilising the north.   
In the same episode, the drama further illustrates that Sukkawong’s 
modernised and civilised lifestyle gradually changes his wife’s identity. Manmuang is 
becoming more civilised when she opens her mind to learn new things. In this scene, 
Sukkawong allows her to read his collections of English books and educate her 
about the concept of colonialism. Then, he changes her attitude towards the West 
and his British friend.  
 
Manmuang is in a living room with two servants, cleaning and unpacking 
her husband’s belongings. She is interested in some English books which 
are her husband’s collection. She flips through some pages then suddenly 
her husband comes in. 
Manmuang: I’m sorry to use your things without asking. 
Sukkawong: I told you. All my belongings are also yours. What really 
interests you? 
Manmuang: I’m wondering why the West wants our teakwood.  
Sukkawong: That’s because their countries do not have valuable and costly 
wood just like ours. Teakwood only grows in tropical areas. Even though 
their countries are much more developed, they lack many things we have 
such as ore, spices, and rice that they need during winter.  
Manmuang: They just want to trade with us, don’t they?  
Sukkawong: Nobody knows their real intention.  
(Mr. Bracken, Sukawong’s friend, enters the scene)  
Bracken: (in English) Good Morning. 
Sukkawong: (in English) Morning. (Turns to Manmuang, switch to northern 
Thai dialect) We should be friends with them and exploit this time as much 
as we can. It is the best way.  
Bracken comes in and shakes hand with Sukkawong. Both of them speak in 
English. Bracken then turns to Manmuang.  
Bracken: (in English) How are you today? 
Manmuang: (in English) I’m fine. Thank you. And you?  






Figure 24 Sukkawong introduces his wife to his British friend (Raknakkara, ep 
4) 
This scene shows how Manmuang changes her attitude towards the West. 
She looks uncomfortable at the beginning but later she seems to be more relaxed 
and answers in English. A sudden facial expression of happiness is shown on 
Bracken's face, and he smiles back to her husband. Both men look very happy to 
see that she is now ‘changed.' This scene is explicit in portraying how Manmuang, 
as a representative of the north, has gradually changed to be open-minded to new 
knowledge and experiences, which is an ideal characteristic for the subjects of the 
Siamese siwilai project. Manmuang is now civilised because she engages with 
Western culture; she has adapted to Western thinking and developed modern 
attitudes towards the West. She understands the concept of colonialism and knows 
how to deal with it, and, more importantly, she demonstrates a better understanding 
of the significance of internal colonisation and Siamese reform.  
3.3.3.1.2 Civilising the Lanna society  
This section investigates the civilising process in the north on modern facilities 
such as railways, medication, education, or economic systems. Klinkasalong 
highlights the modernisation of the north via a relationship with Western medication, 
education and other symbols of civilisation brought to the region by the West and 
Siam. While many TV dramas with a northern Thai focus usually avoid referring to 
actual places and make them ‘fictional’, Klinkasalong clearly specifies when (1924) 
and where the story takes place (Chiang Mai). So, it appears as a historical record of 
the modernisation of the north.   
The first aspect of modernisation comes in a form of transportation. There are 




episode 3 however, the drama introduces a train. The train is first referred to in a 
dialogue when a servant is asking her master, Songpeep, to go shopping at a local 
market to see new goods that have just arrived by boat, but she replies irritably; 
 
Songpeep: I’m lazy. Goods from boat are outdated. It took a couple of 
months from Bangkok to get here. Right now, everybody goes to Sanpakoi 
Market71. There, goods come with trains. They are much faster and newer.  
  
 This dialogue signifies that water transportation within is going to become a 
thing of the past. The Ping River was the major route between Bangkok and Chiang 
Mai until the railway route opened in 1921.  This caused rapid economic changes 
(Sarassawadee, 2005:245). Siam foresaw that the construction of railroads would 
bring them economic benefit in the north. Train journeys were also later promoted for 
tourism (Darunee, 2006:90,128). In Klinkasalong, substituting boats in terms of 
domestic logistics come the idea that whatever comes with the train is 
modernisation. Trains are a symbol of the Siamese siwilai project, elaborated in the 
following scene when Songpeep accompanies her father (Mang) to welcome 
Siamese commissioners at the train station.  
A long shot, high angle shows Songpeep, Mang (a village headman), and 
Moey (a servant) cross over train tracks to stand on a platform. An extreme 
wide shot shows long train tracks on the left of the screen and mountains on 
the right. We see a train coming from the far left which stops in the middle of 
the frame. The camera uses cross-cutting shots to show three characters as 
they are waiting at the platform. When the train stops, Mang tells Songpeep 
to wait as he will get on the train to welcome the Siamese officers. A high 
angle shows Songpeep sitting on a bench and waiting for her father. We 
see a Thai flag and a sign of the train station says ‘Chiang Mai.’  
Not far from them, a group of Westerners just get off the train. A camera 
gives a worm’s eye view and then tilts up to give a long shot of 6-7 men 
standing on the platform with their baggage. Sap, the main male character, 
and another Western doctor greet the newcomers. We learn from a 
conversation that they are doctors who come to help at a hospital in town. 
Several medium shots show these men talking, shaking hands, and we see 
a Thai flag as a background.  
Songpeep spots Sap and wants to say hello. A long shot gives Songpeep 
and a servant on the left side of the screen and Sap on the right side. While 
she walks towards him, one Siamese officer in a formal uniform walks in a 
frame (Figure 25). When they are about to greet each other, Mang calls 
Songpeep over to greet the Siamese officers. A long shot presents a group 
of Siamese officers and Mang in Ratchapattaen outfit which is a Siamese 
formal uniform (Figure 26). 
 
71 A local market near the Ping River (main river in Chiang Mai Province), where the 






Figure 25 Songpeep and a servant (left), Sap (right), and a Siamese officer in 
the middle (Klinkasalong, ep 3) 
 
 
Figure 26 Songpeep and her father welcome the Siamese officers 
(Klinkasalong, ep 3) 
The train is a symbol of how Siamese power penetrated the northern region. It 
does not only bring modern goods to the north but also it literally imports a concrete 
form of Siamese power. Bangkok officers can travel more easily and that enables the 
administrative system in the north to run smoothly. It is a form of modern 
transportation that looks like a civilising of the north but in fact it is to enhance the 
administrative system so that Siam can control the north more effectively. This scene 




people are only supporting elements. Passengers on that train are the Siamese 
commissioners and Westerners. The locals can only stand on a platform to welcome 
them. Though Mang can get on the train, he does not board on the train to travel but 
to welcome and show respect to the Siamese commissioners.  
Figure 25 provides several signifiers of Siam which are a Thai national flag, 
train tracks and a Siamese officer. One flag is attached to the building and there is a 
flagpole in the middle of the screen. Even though audiences see only a bottom part 
of a flagpole, most Thai viewers would recognise immediately that this kind of pole is 
used solely for a national flag to be raised and lowered twice a day. In 1939, the Thai 
government under the Phibun regime called on the public to show respect towards a 
national flag. The government prescribed that ‘whenever the National Flag was 
raised or lowered in public places individuals in the vicinity were required to stand at 
attention’ (Barmé, 1993:152) and that this happens twice a day. Though the story in 
this drama takes place in 1924, it reflects the idea of the Thai nation that is deeply 
engraved in the perceptions of these drama makers. In Figure 26 as well, a station 
sign ‘Chiang Mai’ is sandwiched between two national flags. It keeps reminding 
audience that the station as well as the province are under Siam’s control. The 
visibility of a Thai flag will link automatically to audience perceptions that this place 
belongs to the Thai state and falls under control of the Thai government. Moreover, 
in Figure 25, a Siamese officer walks into a frame and appears in-between 
characters. While he does not have any role in this scene, he is intentionally put here 
to stress Siamese ubiquitous power. Accordingly, the drama conveys the idea that 
Siam is in charge of this civilising process. In the following scenes, it leads to another 
form of civilisation which also comes with the train, brought by the Siamese officers 
and Western doctors – Western medication.  
In Klinkasalong, Western medication is represented through the main male 
character. Sap is a Chinese doctor who moves from Bangkok to Chiang Mai to work 
in a newly opened Western hospital run by American missionaries under Siam’s 
support. During the time of the story, smallpox is a pandemic disease in the region. 
In episode 3, after the arrival of Western doctors and Siamese commissioners at the 
train station, they have a meeting about the disease at the hospital.   
 
In a meeting room, one Siamese officer is a head of a meeting. He sits at 
the short end of a meeting table. Two Western doctors sit on the left side of 
the table. Sap and another Thai man sit on the right side. Western and Thai 
nurses sit around the table in a back row, taking minutes.  
Doctor A: Smallpox infection is getting worse. Yesterday three kids died 
because they came here too late. It is Haemorrhagic smallpox which is a 




Sap: According to the statistic, the pandemic of this disease has stopped for 
a long time. We have no clue why it starts to reoccur and this time the 
situation is even worse. 
Doctor A: Lots of villagers refuse to get vaccination. We don’t know if they 
are scared of a treatment, a doctor, or an injection. But when they were sent 
to the hospital, it was too late.  
Sap: Same as villagers in Bangkok, they were also scared of the 
vaccination. They did not understand how injecting of antigens could 
prevent them from the disease. I even had to inoculate myself to show them 
that it is safe.  
Bangkok commissioner: This is an urgent issue. We need to educate these 
villagers. In fact, we have been doing research on the antigens for decades 
before the Saovapha Institute72 was founded. Most of Bangkok villagers 
have been vaccinated. We need to make sure that all the people here are 
aware of this problem. Otherwise, more people will die from this disease 
and it will be harder to control the pandemic.  
 
A discussion on the issue of pandemic in TV dramas is not common but this 
drama uses it to stress the siwilai project done by Siam. A conversation tells us that 
Bangkok has more experience and research to deal with the pandemic. This also 
infers that the north cannot deal with this pandemic without the assistance from 
Bangkok and the West. 
The drama elaborates this idea in the following episodes. In episode 4, Sap 
offers free vaccinations to people in the village which is a technique he has 
successfully used in Bangkok. He is at the market centre, using a megaphone to talk 
to the villagers. There are two nurses holding signs which say, ‘free vaccination for 
smallpox.’ However, the villagers are scared of injection and run away from him 
(Figure 27). As a result, the drama shows northern people as being backward 
through lacking knowledge of Western medication. It suggests that it is Siam’s duty 
to provide modern health and medical care to these uncivilised people. Siam needs 
to educate the north about diseases and how to prevent them. This positions Siam 
as the benevolent ruler helping to modernise the north.  
 
 
72 Queen Saovabha Memorial Institute, founded by Vajiravudh (Rama VI) in 1912 and 






Figure 27 northern people run away from a doctor who wants to give free 
vaccinations (Klinkasalong, ep 4)  
The next form of the siwilai project is modern education. Klinkasalong refers 
to the first school for girls in Chiang Mai. Founded in 1879 by American 
Presbyterians, it was renamed Dara Academy in 1924 - after Dara Rasami, the 
northern princess and queen consort of King Chulalongkorn. Even though this school 
was founded by missionaries, in 1909 Chulalongkorn gave it the official name Phra 
Racha Chaya Girls School, which means school of the queen consort, and was 
authorised under the Private School Act B.E.2461 (1918). A short background of the 
school is even mentioned by one character – see below. In this moment, Sap thinks 
that Buakiang, a girl whom his aunt has adopted, needs a proper education so he 
sends her to the school. He sponsors her school uniform and takes the role of her 
parent at school. He also promises that when Buakiang graduates, he will take her to 
Bangkok to study in a medical school so that she can become a doctor. Here, the 
idea of schooling is encouraged by the main character who stands for Siam. In 
episode 7, Buakiang and Kasalong talk about the profit of education.  
At Kasalong’s house. Buakiang runs into the house happily to tell them that 
she is going to school. 
Buakiang: Mother! Kasalong! (makes a wai gesture to pay respect) 
Mother: Why do you dress so well today? You look like a schoolgirl.  
Buakiang: Yes. I will study at Dara Academy. (stands up and turns around 
to show her outfit) 
Kasalong: Really? (turns to her mother). Phra Racha Chaya School that my 
sister and I went to. Now they have changed the name to Dara Academy. 
(talks to Buakiang) I told you to go to school a long time ago, but you said 




Buakiang: It’s because of Nai Mor73. He told me if I graduate from this 
school, he will take me to medical school in Bangkok.  
Mother: Really? That’s good. If you want to be a doctor, you must study 
hard.  
(next scene) 
Buakiang and Kasalong walk to the school. Medium shot shows them walk 
from the left side of screen. On the right side is a sign which says, ‘Dara 
Academy’s announcement.’ There are two schoolgirls in front of them and 
one man in Siamese official attire walking in the opposite direction. 
Kasalong: You must study hard. People say women do not need to study 
but believe me, what you study today will make you survive in the future.  
 This scene shows the importance of education, in that it is seen to be able to 
improve one’s life. Buakiang has a promising future that she will be a doctor which is 
also emphasised by Kasalong. Besides, the drama thus also stresses that education 
in the north is controlled by Siam. Even though it is a Christian school for girls, the 
drama has one man in Siamese uniform walk into the scene in the foreground 
(Figure 28). This reminds audiences that the school is under Siam’s rule. When the 
idea of education and progress in life is juxtaposed with the presence of Siam’s 
representative, the drama signifies its core driver of a Siamese siwilai project, of 
which education in the north is also a product of civilisation, brought by Siam.  
 
 
Figure 28 Kasalong and Buakiang at school (Klinkasalong, ep 7) 
The next aspect of modernisation imposed by Siam is the trading system. The 
drama presents the picture of a subsistence economy and simple commodity market, 
where people earn a living from forest goods, agricultural and hand-crafted products. 
 




In episode 3, the drama shows a local fresh market. We see stalls selling fruits, 
vegetables, local food, and handmade items such as handwoven cloth, wooden 
containers, and other knickknacks (Figure 29). It is a picture of pre-modern society 
where the economic system is a subsistence one, rather than commercial.  
 
                       Figure 29 local fresh market (Klinkasalong, ep 3) 
 
        Figure 30 Chinese community and a paddy merchant (Klinkasalong, 
ep 3)  
However, the drama also shows that there is in fact a dynamic of economic 
systems already operating in the north. In the same episode, we see other kinds of 
markets and new business in a Chinese community, such as a Chinese medicine 
shop and paddy merchant (        Figure 30). These two pictures illustrate the 
changing of economic system in the north from subsistence to commercial. 




products traded out of the north were mainly forest goods. In 1900 when the 
administration of Chiang Mai was more completely merged with Bangkok, land tax 
was collected in cash. Farmers were forced to sell their produce and enter into the 
capitalist system. Rice began to be produced for export to Bangkok and the trend of 
commercial rice production in the north began from the 1920s onwards after the 
railway was built (Chatthip, 1999:62-63). This new mode of economics gave rise to a 
new social class of Chinese merchants. Sap’s uncle, for example, is a paddy 
merchant who buys and sells rice between villagers and rice mills. Thus, the 
existence of the Chinese community in the north as shown in this drama 
demonstrates how economic systems from the central region reached the north and 
gradually changed the society. These are depictions of social changes as a result of 
the siwilai project brought by Siam after the reform of administrative systems. 
  Examples from these two dramas are portrayed as if it was the Siamese 
burden, to modernise and civilise the north and display the products of the siwilai 
project in so many aspects. From northern identity to various forms of social change 
– health, education, transportation, and economics – the north has changed 
significantly into being a modernised and civilised region because of Siam/Thailand. 
While presenting pictures of the north as uncivilised, or people in need of assistance, 
Siam gains the role of saviour or benevolent ruler, having helped the north out of 
barbarism and backwardness. These are premises of imperialist thinking, and as 
Siam/Thailand imagined it was their obligation to behave so.  
3.3.3.2 The strange Others: depiction of uncivilised villagers and hill people 
 This section will explore the creation, or ‘casting’, of northern Thai people as 
Others in two TV dramas. It will support the main idea of this chapter that Thai 
nation-building works in combination with this Otherness. It aims to show that the 
making of Otherness is essential for nation-building because it reminds audiences 
that these people are uncivilised and require rule by the more elevated Siam. 
Siamese elites viewed themselves as superior and they rank the north as 
Others depending on the level of their ‘backwardness.’ This view equates with 
imperialist perspectives, when the European knowledge-building project created a 
new kind of Eurocentered planetary consciousness (Pratt, 1992:38). In other words, 
the ethnographers and imperialists view of indigenous people as objects of study in 
which they can take samples, record, study their behaviours, observe and analyse 
based on their own prejudice and standards. The Siamese elites also recorded, 
analysed and categorised people in the northern region as if they were objects of 




According to Thongchai’s concept of Others within, the Siamese elites have 
followed ethnographic constructions, as produced as part of the colonial project, to 
formulate and control the perceived Others, thus reaffirming their superiority, and 
justifying their rule. Siam categorised Others based on the level of their 
backwardness using chao pa (the forest, wild people) and chao bannok (the multi-
ethnic villagers under the supremacy of Bangkok) as identifiers (Thongchai, 
2000a:41). Ploengchimphalee and Klinkasalong are different in the presentation of 
Others. Klinkasalong takes place in 1924 in Chiang Mai during the time when the 
administration in the northern region was completely united with Siam. Therefore, it 
gives a picture of the north as, using Thongchai’s terms, the ‘docile others’ whose 
people and culture is assimilable, similar to Siamese only in that they are less 
civilised. People appear submissive, obedient, friendly and highly respect the 
Siamese power in the drama. Ploengchimphalee, however, sets a story many years 
later during the 1950s in a mountainous village. The Others in Ploengchimphalee are 
the ‘wild others’ or hill people. They are far less civilised by Siamese standards, and 
thus they are harder to control. The presentation of Otherness in this section reflects 
hierarchy on ethno-spatial ordering which is the imperialist thinking that Siam 
manipulated to legitimise its power, and confirms the fact that Siam needs the north 
as Otherness as one element of a combination to construct its nation.  
3.3.3.2.1 The villagers 
In Klinkasalong, northern people are shown as less civilised, different but 
assimilable. The first feature that creates Otherness is cultural difference. This is 
expressed through the eyes of Sap, the main character. Sap is ethnic Chinese but 
his characteristics represent Siam. Though he wears Chinese-style outfits and has 
features of a Chinese face (light skin and single eyelid), he speaks central Thai 
throughout the whole drama. Besides, he speaks it in a fluent way while other 
Chinese characters (such as his Chinese aunt and uncle, performed by Thai actors) 
need to speak it ‘incorrectly.’ Even his name is Thai, and we learn from the story that 
he has moved from Bangkok. So, it is assumable that he stands for Siam, not 
mainland China.    
In episode 3, one mode of cultural difference is the use of northern language. 
After his arrival, Sap goes to a local market to explore the city. There, he meets three 
sellers who misunderstand that he is a tax collector sent by the Siam government. 
These three sellers spot him as a newcomer in town and want to make fun of him. 
So, they speak bad words to him in northern Thai language, assuming that he will 
not understand their native language. Sap understands almost every single word 






Figure 31 Local people assuming that Sap does not understand their language 
(Klinkasalong, ep 3) 
 
Seller 1: Who’s that? I never seen him before. Oh! It must be a Chinese 
from Bangkok. 
Seller 2: Isn’t he a tax collector from Bangkok? 
Seller 3: Let’s talk to him. Keep smiling. He doesn’t know our language.  
(All go to talk to Sap.) 
Seller 2: What the hell are you doing here, greedy Chink? Why don’t you 
live in your country? 
Seller 3: Your face is handsome, but you are greedy. We are ripped off to 
the bones. We’re starving now.  
Seller 1: What are you looking at? You never seen our vegetables? Such a 
twonk!  
(Laughing out loud.) 
Sap: I saw these herbs in a book, but never a real one. 
(All are shocked.) 
Seller 2: Oh… you can speak Thai. You understand northern Thai 
language?  
Sap: I travelled by boat for 3 months and heard bargemen talking. I think I 
understand. 
Seller 1: Well, you don’t understand every word, do you? Some difficult 
words, you may not get it, right?  






 The first feature that differs northern people from Siamese people is 
language. Lanna had developed its own traditional knowledge in the fields of arts, 
linguistics, local culture, and Lanna Tham script74. People in the north speak another 
language which is different and incomprehensible for the central Thais. It is an 
obstacle in communication between people from the two regions. The different 
languages meant a lack of unity. Thus, Bangkok embarked on a process of 
educational reform in the north, in which students were required to study in central 
Thai language (or ‘standard’ Thai) instead of ‘kham muang’ or Thai Yuan language 
(Sarassawadee, 2005:185). By 1903, the government policy enforced that central 
Thai script must be taught in schools throughout the kingdom. The government 
believed that this educational reform would lead to the disappearance of local 
languages, given the rule that government officials had to know central Thai. The 
use of Lanna Tham script has continued to decline to the present day, together with 
knowledge of the old texts (Sarassawadee, 2005:209-210). 
 This language difference is also expressed in the way the drama was 
produced. The majority of Thai TV dramas employ standard Thai despite stories 
taking place in other regions of the country. This is because drama makers want to 
reach a wider range of audiences. For example, Pensiri, the screenwriter for 
Ploengchimphalee, suggests that to make a drama in regional language with central 
Thai subtitles would prevent Thai audiences from understanding the story. She 
states that ‘we must agree that the audiences in our country read quite slowly. They 
cannot read subtitles. Unlike films, characters talk a lot in TV dramas. If they cannot 
catch up, they would lose their interest.’ Moreover, most Thai actors speak central 
Thai as their mother tongue, so it is a struggle for them to speak regional dialect and 
Pensiri adds that the production does not have much time or budget to invest on 
language training (Pensiri, 2018, interview). However, there are rising number, 
though still small, of TV dramas that have started to use regional language with 
central Thai subtitles. Klinkasalong is one of these and northern Thai dialect is 
spoken as the main language throughout the whole drama. In this regard, the use of 
northern Thai dialect and standard Thai subtitles reminds audiences, and indexes, 
the cultural differences between the north and Siam.  
 The idea of incomprehensible language is elaborated in this scene as the 
three sellers make fun of Sap, presuming that he does not understand what they are 
saying. Here the drama presents language as a cultural barrier that obstructs Siam 
and the north from understanding one another and also differentiates them as 
 





separate groups. However, the drama quickly brings in the idea of unification by 
showing that Sap understands their language almost clearly and he also shows his 
eagerness to learn new words in the future. So, the north is firstly presented a region 
with cultural difference (in term of language) yet it is not hard for Siam to overcome 
this obstacle given Sap’s grasp of Northern Thai.  
 The next feature of Otherness is that of backwardness, resisting 
modernisation. Though northern people are similar to the Siamese in many ways, 
they are deeply engaged with traditional, superstitious beliefs. In episode 8, Sap is 
called to Kasalong’s house because she has a fever. Her mother does not allow him 
to come in because of tradition. However, her daughter’s condition is serious, so she 
has to relent though it means destroying her daughter’s reputation. The day after, 
Sap realises that entering a woman’s room does not only defame her, but it also 
indicates he has had a sexual affair with her. In order to compensate, he has to 
apologise to the house’s spirit.  
 
Mother: Thanks for coming, doctor. Just give me some medicine. I will take 
them to Kasalong. 
Sap: I can’t. I need to check first. How is she now? 
Mother: She has high fever, shivering and cough. 
Sap: Let me check.  
Mother: No. I can’t let you enter her bedroom. It’s against our tradition. 
Sap: I know that tradition, but her symptoms are really bad. If she has high 
fever, it may lead to shivering. This is a fatal situation. I beg you, please.  
Buakiang (a girl who comes with Sap): Just let him do the job, mother. I saw 
a patient shivering because of high fever and died, I saw with my own eyes. 
If it’s too late we may not be able to save her.  
 
After he comes into the room and checks her temperature with a 
thermometer.  
Mother: How is she, doctor?  
Sap: She has high fever. 105-degrees Fahrenheit. I will give an injection to 
reduce the fever.  
Mother: Injection? How?  
Sap: I will insert a needle under her skin to deliver medicine. 
Mother: Insert a needle under the skin? How can it be cured? Can we just 
drink boiled herbs as usual? 
Sap: You can, but she will recover very slowly. With injection, medicine is 
quickly absorbed by blood vessels and will reduce fever much faster. I’m 
afraid if she has this high fever she may be shivering.   
Mother: Alright, doctor. As you see fit.  




(After giving injection). 
Sap: All done. Her fever will reduce shortly. I will give you some medicine 
for her to take after this. If she does not recover, you must dab her with a 
wet cloth to cool down her body and give her this medicine. 
Mother: Thank you very much, doctor.   
 
On the next day, Sap comes back again. 
Mother: Do you come here to check up? This time I can’t let you in.  
Sap: No. I’m here to meet you. I just learnt that entering a woman’s 
bedroom doesn’t only mean a sacrilege to the house’s spirits but also it 
suggests I was molesting her. 
Mother: I’m aware of this. But last night, the situation was deadly.  
Sap: So, I want to make it right by asking her to marry me.  
Mother: I know that you sincerely love my daughter. But we have to wait for 
a proper time before you two can get married. What is urgent now is to 
apologise to the house’s spirits, otherwise these spirits will make us suffer. 
Sap: That’s alright. What should I do?   
Mother: We have to prepare an offering, but you mustn’t do it by yourself. I 
don’t want her father and her sister to know about this. You just pay for it 
and leave the rest with me. 
Sap: Thank you very much. 
 These scenes show a staunch traditionalism in northern people both in terms 
of medication and social behaviour. For health and medication, it is obvious that they 
lack Western, modern, scientific knowledge and rely on local herbs. The mother is 
worried and scared of injection because she has no idea what it is. Sap needs to 
explain in detail how injections work. This kind of conversation is not common in Thai 
TV dramas. Sap’s explanation educates the mother and it demonstrates how the 
north is less civilised. It is also clear that villagers have no idea about the modern 
concept of gender equality. In the north, people hold a strong belief in traditions that 
socialising between male and female genders is a taboo. The idea of gender equality 
that allows men and women to socialise in public have recently been imported to 
Thailand, in the 1920s. During Vajiravudh’s reign (1910-1925), the status of women 
was the symbol of the degree of civilisation of the country. There were three major 
restrictions on Thai women that the king wanted to change. One of them was the 
limited freedom to socialise with men on equal terms (Van Esterik, 2000:99). 
However, it is shown here that the concept of gender equality did not exist in the 
north.  
The northern tradition is grounded in a belief of family spirits. Northern Thai 
people ancestors’ spirits are believed to reside in each house, to protect the 
members of a family. These spirits are inherited from generation to generation via 




move to other villages can share the spirits back home. The sharing of spirits means 
preparing a bowl or tray of offerings to invite the spirits to live in their new home. The 
house spirits do not only unite family member, but also, they protect the family 
members’ wellbeing. If a member is unwell, they normally assume that it is because 
he or she might have insulted the spirits or broken social rules (Chiang Mai news, 
2018). One such important rule is about relationships between men and women as 
we see from the above scene. Sap is not allowed to enter a house because it is 
against social order to do so. In the actual conversation, the mother uses the words 
‘phid phee’ (ผดิผ)ี in which ‘phid’ literally means wrong or violate, and ‘phee’ means 
ghosts or spirits. So, ‘phid phee’ is an act that insults the ancestors’ spirits and 
violate social norms. To compensate this wrongdoing, a man must prepare bowls of 
worshipping objects, as required by the woman’s family, to apologise to the spirits 
(NITC, 2012). 
These scenes portray Siam’s views towards the different and strange features 
of northern people based on their own standard. According to Thongchai, the 
favourite stories that Siam likes to tell about ‘chao bannok’ or docile villagers are 
about ‘magic, superstition, spirits, local customs, and beliefs’ where a Siamese 
usually expresses scepticism. They take the role of non-believers as they considered 
themselves men of science, while the villagers are full of stories of superstition and 
rural life (Thongchai, 2000a:50-51). The north as shown in this drama follows the 
pattern as described in Thongchai’s article to be ‘inferior, superstitious, and 
uncivilised people.’ Klinkasalong repeats this aspect to enhance the image of the 
Siamese as a civilised nation and thus marketable to Thai audiences. Northern 
people are shown as less intelligent, unknowledgeable, having some cultural 
differences that the Siamese do not understand. However, these characteristics and 
cultural difference are not harmful to Siam. These people are still assimilable to 
Siamese culture and can be educated with modern knowledge. 
3.3.3.2.2 The wild others  
In Ploengchimphalee, northern people are presented as hill people and less 
civilised than provincial villagers according to a central Thai standard. 
Ploengchimphalee tells the story of a Bangkok man, Natrai, who is a son of a 
wealthy family in the north, who own a timber business in a mountainous village in a 
forest. He returns home after graduating from study in England. Natrai does not want 




disguises himself as a new manager and changes his name from Natrai to Nantrai75. 
As he works in the forest, he is challenged by the villagers. Natrai needs to prove to 
these people that he is deserved to be a manager of the company and also a ruler of 
the forest.  
The first aspect of Otherness of hill people is the diversity of tribes and 
ethnicities. The drama portrays different tribes living together in the forest and all of 
them need to be united, but also controlled under Siamese power. In episode 1, 
Natrai finds out there are different kinds of people in that village and not all of them 
respect him as a new leader. So, he has to show his power and control them. He 
calls over every mahout (elephant keeper) for a meeting to show everybody that he 
is a friendly overseer and, at the same time, exercises his power as a ruler by 
informing a policy that everybody must comply.  
 
 
Figure 32 Natrai (in green shirt) talks to all mahouts (Ploengchimphalee, ep1) 
 
In the background we see thick forest and mountains far behind. A 
slow and soft tune from a woodwind instrument is played. Then a camera 
gives a low angle shot of high trees and the sun shines through thick 
leaves. The camera then tilts down showing a wooden house. A group of 
men are standing and sitting in front of it. Natrai stands alone, opposite the 
men, at the house terrace, which is a little bit higher than where the other 
men stand. He walks down the steps as he talks and stops in front of 
Muenlah, the chief mahout. Medium close-up shots show Natrai and 
Muenlah smiling to each other. A long shot shows other mahouts, standing 
and sitting on the ground. 
 
75 ‘nan’ (หนาน) is a prefix in northern Thai word attached to men’s names after a man has 




Natrai: Though I am a newcomer to this company, I hope that all of us can 
work together. I know that grandpa Muenlah is the most skilful and highly 
respected mahout for everybody here. There are many tribes living together 
– Khmu, Ngiaw, Burmese and Thai. We will live together without any 
problems. We will live like brothers. I’m a newcomer here and I’m willing to 
hear your suggestions.  
Mondoi: So, you are one of us now, right? (He stands up, walks to Natri and 
puts his arm on Natrai’s shoulder).  
Natrai: Right. Anyway, I want to stress one important thing. Our company’s 
policy is that we must not do illegal logging and destroy the forest. We will 
cut trees only in the area granted by the state concession. And we will grow 
more trees than we cut because the forest is the important resource for our 
lives. Definitely, we will never destroy our nation and country’s treasure76.  
Saenkham: We all know this.  
Mondoi: Hey, he just repeats the policy. What’s wrong with that? 
In: Ugh! Any new manager always says this. Just remember from a book 
and speak it out.  
Muenlah: Stop it! Both of you. (Smiles back to Natrai.) We are pleased to 
work with you.  
Natrai: Thank you very much grandpa Muenlah.  
 
 From this scene, Natrai emphasises the idea of unification, that people of all 
tribes, ethnicities or races must live together peacefully in this community and under 
his leadership. The way he says ‘live together without any problems’ or ‘like brothers’ 
reflects the discourse in the nation-building process. People of all races and 
ethnicities are assumed to be citizens of the Thai nation as Natrai tells them to 
protect the forest which is a national treasure (more on the aspect of forest as nation 
will be discussed in the following section). The Thai state’s policy during the 1930s 
had turned tribal people to be Thai citizens as everybody should be simply known as 
Thai or chao Thai. People of different ethnicities or tribes needed to ‘shed traditional 
ethnic terms of identification for a new, officially sanctioned historical-cultural identity’ 
(Barmé,1993: 151). This is how Siam/Thailand follows imperialist thinking. They 
aspired to include these subjects in the nation-building as well as constructing their 
consciousness of a nation. 
 The idea of unification of hill people is clearly reflected in another scene which 
shows a school in the village. Though it is called ‘school’, it is actually a temporary 
pavilion made of wood to function as a classroom. In a pavilion, there is a blackboard 
which has three words written on the top reading ‘nation, religion, monarchy’ and 
Thai numbers from 0 to 10 (Figure 33). This scene reiterates the Siamese siwilai 
 




project which is the cultivation of ‘savage’ people. In the beginning of the scene, they 
are talking about Natrai giving learning supplies to village children. This reminds us 
of the schooling by central power. The Thai state has put a lot of effort into uniting 
the hill people as a part of the Thai nation via the centralisation of religion and 
education. The cultivation and civilising process of hill people has been done by the 
monarch during the 1960s. King Bhumibol’s projects with hill people included the 
process of turning them to be ‘the security of national frontiers’, or making them 
contribute to national development. This meant teachers were sent to hill villages to 
transform them into Thai-speaking loyal citizens (Baker and Pasuk, 2017:174). 
Schooling would teach these people to use central Thai language as well as Thai 
ideologies.  
Thus, it was embedded in the national mindset that the monarch and the 
central power were in charge of providing civilisation and development to the hill 
tribes. This drama therefore implies that though there are diverse groups of hill 
people living together, they live together harmoniously under Thai ideologies and all 
would become Thai citizens77. In this case, the trinity of the Thai nation – nation, 
religion, monarchy – on the blackboard is reminiscent of the core of the Thai nation. 
This is also central to the construction of ‘Thainess.’ Though the definition of 
Thainess has never been clear, it has been reaffirmed by the monarchical institution 
and Buddhism as the state religion, as opposed to things un-Thai (other nation, 
ethnicity, and a communist) (Thongchai, 1994:3-6).  
 
 
77 While the Thai state tried to integrate the hill tribe people, they do not have Thai 
citizenship. Only a few hill tribe people could be granted Thai citizenship if their parents 
register their birth and have a household registration. Hill tribe children in the third 
generation have more chance to be granted Thai citizenship. In the case that none of the 
parents have citizenship, the children’s citizenship would be refused. From 2016 onwards, 
hill tribe people have to carry Pink ID card which does not have the same rights as a Thai 





Figure 33 at village school, on the blackboard it reads ‘nation, religion, 
monarchy’ (Ploengchimphalee, ep2) 
 However, the hill people are not easily tamed or included into the Thai nation 
as the friendly, uncivilised villagers as seen in Klinkasalong. There is a tension 
between Natrai and other indigenous men who do not accept him as their new ruler 
and they express strong dislike. So, the next feature of Otherness found in these hill 
people is their coarse and resistant traditions. The drama further illustrates one 
character, Saenkham, who is dangerous to the central power in the episode two. 
Saenkham’s hatred and anger towards Natrai grows stronger as Natrai tries to 
befriend every villager, especially Nuanang, the most beautiful woman in the village 
who is Saenkham’s crush. Saenkham challenges Natrai to fight, claiming that it is 
‘their way’ of making friends.  
 
The scene starts with a long shot. There are villagers gathering and three 
women come in.  
Soifah: What’s going on? Why does the manager fight?   
Khamfai: Shut up, Soifah. It’s a manly act.  
Runjuan: He’s a manager. He’s an educated man and works with his brain, 
not using his body like a labourer. 
In: We are all labourers here. If he wants to be a ruler, he must prove this.   
Nuanang: (talk to Muenlah) It’s because Saenkham challenged Nantrai to 
fight.  
Muenlah: Don’t worry. If he wants us to respect him, he must prove he is 
good enough. Our tradition believes that only the strongest man can be our 
ruler. Even wild animals in this forest would bow their heads to that man.  
A fast, exciting drumbeat is played as background music when In plays a 
traditional drum. Natrai and Saenkham walk to the combat ground from 
each side. Saenkham is half-naked, revealing his worked body with six-pack 




of the ground, surrounded by other villagers. A camera uses close-up shots 
and cutaway to show facial expressions of the two fighters and villagers. 
These quick cross-cutting look like a gun fight scene in a Western cowboy 
movie. The drumbeat goes faster and louder. Natrai takes off his shirt, then 
throws it away. He raises his arms to make a gesture of a boxing guard 
while Saenkham raises his hands and arms like traditional martial arts of a 
Kungfu fight. They walk around making a circle for more than 10 seconds 
before starting the first punch. Villagers cheer and shout.  
The fighting goes on for 5.12 minutes with different styles of punches and 
kicks such as kickback, jump-kick, fly-kick, and many others that resemble a 
scene from action movies. These two men are fighting furiously so that their 
bodies are full of sweat, dirt, and blood. The fight ends when Natrai is about 
to lose and Muenlah tells Saenkham to stop. Natrai goes back home, 
frustrated and angry at Saenkham (Figure 35).  
 According to this scene, northern people in the mountains or hill people are 
considered as having cultures and traditions that are far less civilised than that of 
Siam/Thailand. While the north in other provinces of Thailand are obedient, friendly, 
and submissive to Siamese power, the north in the forest are aggressive, dangerous 
and lack restraint. A comparison between two fighting scenes from two dramas gives 
a clearer picture how Thai TV portrays these two groups differently. In Klinkasalong, 
there is a sword fighting scene as a part of the cultural performances in a new year 
festival. This fight is presented as a traditional and cultural ritual because one has to 
learn from a master. There are patterns of fighting postures and techniques. A 
student must give offerings to a teacher before he is accepted. There are sets of 
rules that can and cannot be done. As a part of the ritual, they even have to dance 
before they fight as to pay respect to their masters. They use swords as weapons 
which people regarded as sacred objects. They fight at a proper fighting ground with 
a full musical band. All these elements suggest culture and tradition (Figure 34). This 
drama portrays that northern people are cultural beings. Though they may be 






Figure 34 A sword fighting which is shown as a cultural performance 
(Klinkasalong, ep 6) 
 
 
Figure 35 Natrai is fighting with Saenkham in a hill village (Ploengchimphalee, 
ep2)  
Conversely, in Ploengchimphalee, the fighting scene and hill people are 
portrayed as barbaric and savage. They are half-naked, barehanded without any 
weapons or set of rules. Their fighting modes are freestyle and combined of many 
martial arts. Natrai fights with boxing skills while Saenkham uses traditional martial 
arts, and then every mode of fighting combines in the end. This implies that it is not a 
cultural or traditional way of fighting as each man does what he wants. Besides, they 
fight on soil ground, which is dry, unsmooth, and uncultivated in all aspects. This 
fight reminds audiences of the fighting of wild animals with the idea stressed by 




that man.’ This statement implies it is not only a combat to win over these savage 
men, but also it is a means to rule all the beings in the forest. While Siam can use 
civilisation such as scientific knowledge to educate and control the north in the rural 
village as shown in Klinkasalong, in Ploengchimphalee they have to use stronger 
modes such as fighting. The wild Others in TV dramas are shown as more diverse 
and dangerous that Siam must unite as Thai citizens.  
3.3.3.3 The good old days: Communitarianism and the Thai rural village 
 The previous sections investigate how the products of the Siamese siwilai 
project reflect the role of Siam as the moderniser and the creation of the uncivilised 
Others. This section will examine the making of Otherness through the depiction of 
localism. It will illustrate how the north is attached to a nostalgic presentation of the 
past and how it contributes to Siam’s process of Thai nation-building.  
 The depiction of localism in media, films and TV dramas in Thailand are, to a 
large extent, connected to a sense of the past. Localism does not only infer local, 
rural or village life but also implies a yearning for the past when life was ideally good 
in people’s memories. Or, as is otherwise known as nostalgia. Svetlana Boym 
explains that sometimes nostalgia is presented as a form of historical record, while 
sometimes it is a longing for ‘the past’ that no longer exists or has even existed. It is 
a sentiment of loss and displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own 
fantasy (Boym, 2008:xiii). There are two notable kinds of nostalgia; the restorative 
and the reflective. Restorative nostalgia proposes to rebuild the lost home and ‘patch 
up’ memory gaps. Reflective nostalgia dwells in longing and loss, the imperfect 
process of remembrance. Restorative nostalgia manifests itself in total 
reconstructions of monuments of the past, while reflective nostalgia lingers on ruins, 
the patina of time and history (Boym, 2008:41). Nostalgia in Thai media fits into both 
categories as it makes use of the past and memory. The media recall and obsess in 
historical record and the restoration of these memories is performed, rather than 
erect in forms of monuments.   
The images of the past reemphasise the root of the nation and thus they help 
constructing the nation. This section will analyse the presentation of the past in two 
dramas, Ploengchimphalee and Klinkasalong. In Ploengchimphalee, the north is 
shown with a pure, uncontaminated nature representing the ideal authentic Thai life 
in the past, while in Klinkasalong, the north is glossed with images of a tourist 
destination. Both are nostalgic presentation based on a central Thai perception in 
which they view the north from the eyes of the imperialist and treat the area as a 




3.3.3.3.1 The ideal authentic Thai past 
 In Ploengchimphalee, a story is set in the 1950s in a rural, mountainous 
village. Thai rural life in the past is symbolised by a forest which is depicted as 
innocent, pure, peaceful, fertile nature, uncontaminated by material progress or 
Western capitalism. A forest does not only function as a location of the story but also 
it is treated in this drama as a ‘national treasure’ which everybody must protect. 
Natrai, the main character, is portrayed as a hero who protects this forest. This is 
shown in a scene when he fights with timber thieves.  
An establishing shot shows a thick forest. A jeep comes in. High and low 
angle shots show that jeep passing rough, unsmooth ways in the forest. 
Then it stops in front of a big log that blocks its way. Natrai gets out. A high 
angle, medium shot shows him from the back. He walks to the front of the 
jeep and stands on its bonnet, looking to the forest. Medium close-up shot 
shows his back. He is wearing a jacket and a cowboy hat.  
(cut to parallel scenes)  
He jumps over a log and runs quickly into the forest. A close-up shot gives a 
picture of a saw cutting a log. Then, another wide shot shows a pile of logs 
on the right side of a screen and Natrai running from the left side. He quickly 
jumps on the log pile. A wide shot gives a picture of a tent, another pile of 
logs, and four thieves. Then it shows a medium shot of one thief. He says; 
Thief: Today, they will have a party to welcome the new manager. No one 
will look around here. You two, go and get all those logs.  
Natrai: Stealing logs in this forest is not as easy as you think.  
Suddenly, he jumps down and kicks one man. Then they start to open fire. 
He uses that man’s body to protect himself from bullets before runs away. 
All the thieves follow him.  
(cut to parallel scenes)  
Natrai is running and the thieves are chasing after him. He runs back to the 
car, takes another gun and fires. While all the four thieves miss every shot, 
Natrai shoots them easily. One man hides away and turns back to attack 
him. Then they start fighting.  
(cut to parallel scenes)  
They continue fighting, up and down the hill, running around, kicking and 
punching. Finally, the fight ends when Mondoi, a villager, riding a bicycle 
and bangs into the two of them. The whole sequences of these scenes, 
excluding cuts to parallel scenes, takes 3.52 minutes.   
 
 What is explicitly reflected in these scenes is the idea of a fixed, unchanged 
forest as property that needs to be preserved. This is expressed through Natrai who 
acts as a protector of the forest. His mission in these scenes is to save the forest and 
expel the bad men. On the one hand, these scenes introduce the main character to 
the audience for the first time, by making him a brave, strong man. Natrai appears on 
screen as a hero as in action movies; he uses both fighting skills and pistols. The 




Jones, and thus it gives a perception of a civilised man hunting for a treasure and 
exploring in an unknown, dangerous land. On the other hand, his role as a protector 
signifies the idea of ownership, and provided the fact that he is the owner of a timber 
business. Thus, the forest appears as his property, a treasure, in which Natrai has 
discovered and claimed ownership.  
Ploengchimphalee provides this background knowledge to its audience, that a 
forest can be owned or belong to someone. Stealing or making profits from that 
forest without permission is unacceptable. This is the idea that the Thai state has 
exploited in controlling forests and other natural resources, as well as in affecting the 
indigenous people who earn a living from forests. In pre-modern society, though 
forests or lands were governed by the rulers or nobles of each state, ordinary people 
were able to use them freely. The idea of a timber business entered the north during 
the early nineteenth century when the British Borneo Company and the Bombay 
Burmah Company of England began logging in Burma and later expanded into 
Lanna (northern Thailand). These contractors were respectful of the northern nobles 
because forests were considered the property of the rulers and the nobles, and the 
concessionaries paid a fee for every tree they cut. However, this fee was not fixed, 
and forests had not been seen as a commercially valuable resource but were used 
for local needs (Sarassawadee, 2005:169). This indicates that the ownership of 
forests was not taken seriously back then. In the 1840s, Siam showed that they did 
not want to interfere in Lanna’s internal affairs. They considered that forests were for 
the benefit of the tributary states and that trade and logging rights were for the 
prerogative of their rulers. It was in the 1870s when problems with logging increased 
which put the Lanna rulers in court cases and debts so that the central government 
of Siam decided to take control of all the forests (Sarassawadee, 2005:168,171).  
Chulalongkorn of Siam took this opportunity to bail out the debtors, and took 
charge of negotiating an Anglo-Siamese treaty in 1874 to constrain the colonial 
loggers. After the 1880s when the administrative reform began, forests in the north 
were controlled by Siamese commissioners in almost all aspects. Consequently, the 
local nobles were gradually removed from being in charge of the timber concessions 
(Baker and Pasuk, 2017:53). Since then, the forests have become the property of 
Siam and they are regarded as commercial profit providers for the Thai state. In this 
drama, the timber thief is portrayed as a villain, while the owner of the forest is a 
hero despite both of them having the same purpose, that is to gain profits from the 
forest. Natrai is legitimate to arrest these thieves, either dead or alive. The drama 




 The idea of ownership is expanded to the discourse of national treasure in the 
following scene. As shown in Figure 32 (a section on the wild Others), Natrai 
reminds all workers that the forest and all trees belong to the Thai nation and that 
they must follow the concession’s rule. This emphasises the role of the Thai state as 
the owner and ruler who determines who and how many trees one can cut. From the 
dialogue of Figure 32, Natrai tells the workers that ‘we will grow more trees than we 
cut because the forest is an important resource for our lives.’ This gives a negative 
perception of the timber business and destroying natural resources and thus will 
destroy one’s life as well. He even goes further by stating that cutting trees means 
‘destroy our nation and country’s treasure.’ While the hill people had lived in the 
forest before the timber business or any idea of concession existed, they had to 
conform to these rules because forests had become national treasures. Besides, the 
discourse of deforestation is, to a large extent, shaped by the perception of many 
Thais that hill people destroy forests because of opium and shifting cultivation.  
According to Baker and Pasuk, the monarchy resurgent in Sarit’s government 
had encouraged the expansion of the royal role. One way of doing this was rural 
development and during the 1960s, King Bhumibol went to the north to develop 
projects with hill people to stop opium growing and stabilise shifting farmers (Baker 
and Pasuk, 2017:174,177). Hill people were alleged as being ‘opium producers’ or 
the ‘health-hazardous Other’ being a risk to Thai welfare (Thongchai, 2000a:56). 
This became a Thai nationalist discourse, that hill people are the destroyers of 
forests and it is an obligation of the Thai state to control them and give protection. 
Forests, in these regards, must remain the same and untouched by the locals 
whereas the only one who is legitimised to gain benefit is the one who establishes 
the ownership over these forests. This is how Siam viewed forests or natural 
resources with imperialist thinking. They must own and control them because the 
locals are not eligible to do so. Moreover, they shaped a new definition of forests and 
nature, which later was seen as rooted of Thai rural community, or a simple life in a 
forest. 
In Ploengchimphalee, we see a small self-sufficient community that does not 
rely on market economy or material progress. Food is abundant and medicine can 
be acquired from herbs. Recreation and leisure places can be found in forests. It is a 
picture of an ideal society in the past where people are closely connected to nature. 
Localism is often associated with the concept of communitarianism in which people 
live their lives on agriculture and subsistence economy. This image of the Thai rural 
community is described in Chatthip’s book as a peaceful community where people 




The presentation of rural community in this drama is one-sided. The drama 
ignores the unequal relationship between the business owner and hill people who 
are workers. Let alone the suffering of life in the forest that is not mentioned. This is 
very much in line with many scholars such as Baker and Pasuk who argue that the 
romanticisation of the rural community often ignore the benefit of urbanism, 
modernism, and progress. The village is represented as a romantic place and by a 
backward-looking viewpoint (Baker and Pasuk, 1999:122-123). In this drama, the 
north is framed as an ideal rural community, represented by a forest that is fixed and 
unchangeable. This is the Siamese elites’ views towards the uncivilised Others that 
have become nostalgic narrative that Thailand has repeatedly used to shape the 
characteristic of Otherness. 
3.3.3.3.2 The nostalgic past and localism as tourist destination  
 This section moves to another aspect of nostalgia which is the promotion of 
localism via tourism. This will elaborate the making of Otherness that has been fixed 
in stereotypes. In Klinkasalong, many scenes and events resemble captured 
moments that were frequently used for tourism campaigns and advertisements. This 
section investigates the construction of Otherness via the romanticisation of localism, 
which portrays the north as attractive, beautiful and a passive subject of Siamese 
entertainment.  
 Klinkasalong follows the success of many preceding dramas with a northern 
Thai focus by showcasing high quality production, ethnic costumes and props, 
beautiful locations, and the use of northern Thai language. The story refers to actual 
locations in a northern province (Chiang Mai) while other dramas often make up 
fictional places. The drama’s popularity encourages tourism in that province, which is 
a predictable consequence almost every time after a drama with regional themes is 
aired. However, while the drama promotes tourism in the north, the production itself 
was reproduced from the stereotypical images used in pre-existing tourism 
campaigns.   
Tourism in the northern Thai region was a part of the government’s 
campaigns to build a strong nation. The state viewed that regional differences were 
obstacles to the building of Thai national identity, so they encouraged the Thai-
ification of people from different ethnicities. While villages in Thailand contained a 
mix of people including Khmer, Mon, Lao, Lua, Lue, Karen and many others, there 
was the generalisation of multiethnicities by assuming that all Tai-speaking region 
share the Thai culture and language (Thongchai, 2008:582). The Thai-ification of the 
north was emphasised after the end of an absolute monarchy since the government 




traditions in central Thai perspectives, was a target of this unification. Thus, a 
tourism campaign was designed to encourage people to visit the north. Images of 
the northern provinces and northern Thai women were promoted and distributed as a 
part of the government’s policy during the 1940s which Darunee Somsri argues was 
the beautification of the north – expressed through beauty of nature and women – 
having been reproduced in different genres (Darunee, 2006). 
In Klinkasalong, many scenes appear as if they were inspired from magazines 
or tourism advertisements. For example, a brochure by The State Railway of 
Thailand in 1940 to promote tourism in the north illustrated a picture of fertile nature, 
markets, mountains, together with northern women in traditional outfits doing the fon 
leb dance78. These images had become stereotypes of the north and a brochure in 
1951 still used the same set of pictures (Darunee, 2006:129). Until these days, fon 
leb has been used as symbol of the north because of its exotic feature that is 
different from the central Thai culture. It has become a traditional dance of the region 
and a trademark in many TV dramas with a northern Thai focus. Although there are 
many cultural or traditional performances of the north, the drama selects fon leb 
because it is the well-known performance frequently appearing in tourism campaigns 
and most Thai viewers recognise this dance as a symbol of the north. In 
Klinkasalong, a scene of fon leb is again reproduced.  
 
In episode 6, a fon leb parade is held during the Songkran Festival 
or Thai New Year. A dolly shot, high angle camera tilts down, we see a 
parade of dancers in traditional costumes. There are viewers on both sides 
of the road. A medium shot shows Kasalong, the main female character, 
dancing. Slow tempo music from traditional wind instruments and drum is 
played as background music for dancers. Medium shots, long shots, and 
close-up shots are used alternately to show the costume, face, and hands 
of dancers (wearing artificial nails). On the background, we see people 
splashing water which is an activity on Thai New Year’s Day. Then, Sap 
comes in. He stands among other audience members and looks at 
Kasalong. Then, Sap bumps into a Japanese man who is taking pictures.  
Sap: I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to do that.  
Saito: Daijoubu (speaking Japanese). That’s alright.  
Sap: Are you Japanese? 
Saito: Yes. I have a photo shop in town.  
Sap: Then, can you please take a picture of this woman?  
Saito: I took a lot of her pictures. She is so beautiful.  
Sap: I will take a look at these photos at your shop. What is the name of the 
shop?  
 




Saito: Saito. It’s my name.   
Sap: Nice to meet you, Saito. 
Two men bow to each other. The whole sequence takes 4.20 minutes 
(Figure 36).  
 
 Figure 36 Fon Leb parade (Klinkasalong, ep 6) 
The depiction of the north as a tourist destination or using images from 
tourism campaigns do not simply deliver nostalgic atmospheres or beauty of the 
north. Rather, doing so reflects imperialist products through the power of a gaze that 
Siam exercises over the north. According to Pratt, the imperialist or the coloniser 
takes the role of a ‘seer’ while the indigenous is ‘seen.’ This is shown in the 
descriptive writing about what the travellers discovered. Pratt calls them as the 
‘verbal painter’ whose rhetoric made use of three techniques that are estheticized 
landscape, density of meaning, and the relation of mastery between the seer and the 
seen. Thus, the scene is painted verbally based on the traveller’s viewpoint which is 
‘intended to be viewed from where he has emerged upon it’ and that scene is 
‘ordered with reference to his vantage point, and is static’ (Pratt, 1992: 198-201). 
Likewise, in Thongchai’s view, the docile others are ‘the objects of Bangkok’s gaze.’ 
The people, the landscape, and everything are described by the Siamese as normal 
villagers who had lived peacefully under the rule of Siam in ways that are familiar to 
the author and his readers (Thongchai, 2000a:48). In other words, Siam uses the 
imperialist view to hold the north as a frozen, unchanged stereotype that they want to 
see. 
In this scene, power is with the one who gazes. Siam/Thailand, as 
represented by Sap, is the seer both through his eyes and through a camera. As an 
object of gaze, Kasalong cannot move away or escape but stays in her position in 




seen and captured, both in photographs and in the reproduction of fon leb 
performance which repeatedly appears in different genres about the north. The way 
this scene is inspired by stereotypical tourism campaigns and how a character in this 
drama wants to capture the event in photos indicates a continuing, never-ending 
loop.   
This whole section demonstrates that Thai TV dramas present the north in the 
static, unchangeable past. First, the north is fixed with the idea of rural society 
closely connected to nature, represented by a forest. Second, the north is attached 
to the depiction of a beautiful region, inspired by stereotypical images from tourism. 
These are foundations in the romanticisation of the north, which have turned local 
people, their cultures and ways of life to being objects of Siamese entertainment. TV 
drama follows the imperialist path by putting the north in a romanticised past, 
situated in an ideal village and glossed with stereotype for tourism purposes. The 
depiction of good old days provides no dynamic. The north is nothing but an 
undeveloped Otherness that clings to the old world, yet it is nonthreatening to the 
Thai nation.  
3.3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter supports the key thesis concept of ‘Combi-nation’ by illustrating 
that Thai nation-building and national identities are constructed through combination 
with Otherness. Siam/Thailand has followed imperialist thinking by exploiting these 
features of Otherness under the Siamese siwilai concept. This chapter has shown 
the construction of Otherness and siwilai project in three main points. 
The first section portrays how the north developed under the Siamese siwilai 
project. Examples from these two dramas legitimise the notion of internal 
colonisation as it was Siamese burden to modernise and civilise the north. This 
displayed the products of the siwilai project in many aspects from northern identity to 
various form of social change. Siam gained the role of a saviour or benevolent ruler 
who helped by saving the north from barbarism and backwardness.  
The next section is the construction of Otherness by divisions of the ‘wild 
Others’ and the ‘docile Others.’ The first feature that creates the docile Others is 
cultural difference which is shown by northern Thai language which is different, yet it 
is understandable. The second feature of Otherness is that of being stuck to 
traditional, and superstitious belief. However, these characteristics and cultural 
difference are not harmful to Siam. These people are still assimilable to Siamese 
culture and open to being educated with modern knowledge. The wild Others are 




is the difference of tribes and ethnicities. The drama portrays the diversity of tribes 
living together harmoniously in the forest under Siamese power and ideologies. The 
next feature is their coarse and resistant traditions. The north in the forest are 
aggressive, dangerous and lack sophistication, making it Siam’s obligation to subdue 
these threatening features.  
This last section examines the making of Otherness through the depiction of 
nostalgic localism. It shows the imperialist thinking in viewing the north as a utopia 
for entertainment and yearning for the good old days. The first aspect of the 
nostalgia is the image of the Thai rural community as the ideal authentic Thai life of 
the past. A forest in this drama is fixed in the past and regarded as national treasure. 
The second aspect of nostalgic localism is images of a tourist destination. This part 
investigates the romanticisation of localism which portrays the north as attractive, 
beautiful and passive as Siamese subject of entertainment. This reflects through the 
power of gaze. The north is shown as a beautiful region with exotic culture and 
tradition, static, fixed and unchanged. Consequently, this chapter confirms the 
construction of the nation that is comprised with the combination of Others. This is 
essential to nation-building because it confirms their superior status. Siam followed 
imperialist thinking to exercise power over the less civilised commoners and local 






Chapter 4  
Body and Nation 
4.1 Combination of Genders  
Chapter 3 elucidates how nation-building and national identities are 
constructed via the many elements of ‘combi-nation’ and in relation to history. This 
chapter focuses on the aspects of body and nation. The nation-building process has 
played a key role in shaping perceptions on body and form with some specific 
characteristics in modern Thai identities. The first aspect of the body that I want to 
investigate in this chapter is gender because it is a concept that Siam/Thailand has 
drawn on from imperialists and manipulated during the making of a modern nation. 
The power relationship between Siam and northern Thailand has followed the 
gendered stereotypes of the coloniser and the colonised. However, instead of 
exploring the masculine/feminine dichotomy between Siam and the north, this 
chapter will focus particularly on the depiction of Kathoey or third gender. This 
traditional gender is frequently excluded in TV dramas focussed on northern Thai 
culture.  
It is almost compulsory that every Thai TV drama have a binary of characters 
– of male and female heroes. Besides heterosexual men and women, Thai TV 
audiences are familiar with Kathoey as another essential element. Kathoey acts as 
an intermediate gender that represents an ‘in-between’ space. While Kathoeys are 
commonly found in contemporary dramas, they are rarely seen in historical ones that 
focus on nation-building. Their appearance is even more unlikely in historical dramas 
with strong themes on regional culture. Over the course of doing this research, I 
have searched for TV dramas which have strong themes of Northern Thai culture 
and found at least 32 that are well-known. These were all broadcast between the late 
1980s to present (2020). These dramas are either romance driven, comedies, or 
horror. Among the 32, 20 are historical dramas or dramas that taking place in the 
past, and only one has a Kathoey character.  
The scarce appearance of Kathoey in Thai historical TV dramas, especially 
dramas with a Northern Thai focus, implies that it is a gender that is not important in 
the construction of a nation. In this chapter, I want to investigate depictions of 
Kathoey in Thai TV dramas by looking specifically at a historical drama focusing on 
Northern Thai culture, to see how Kathoey is presented as a part of nation-building. 
The first part deals with historical background and Kathoey as third gender in 




4.1.1 Old Kathoey and New Kathoey: Background on pre-modern and 
Western concepts of genders in Thailand 
 The first section provides historical background of Kathoey and other genders 
in Thailand. This is divided into three main parts which are the ‘Old Kathoey’ or the 
pre-modern concepts of gender in Thailand and the coming of Western concepts of 
gender after imperialism; the ‘New Kathoey’ which is a new movement of new 
gender categories and how that affects genders in Thailand; and the toleration of 
Kathoey in Thailand.  
4.1.1.1 Old Kathoey 
Thailand has an intricate pattern of sexuality and gender. Apart from the 
normative genders between men and women, it has accustomed to the 'third 
gender.’ Genders in Thailand are divided into three forms of phet, namely, masculine 
'men' (phu-chai), feminine 'women' (phu-ying) and an intermediate category called 
Kathoey (Jackson & Sullivan, 1999:4). This thesis calls the third gender in pre-
modern Thai society as ‘old Kathoey’ for they belong to traditional society. 
Literally, Kathoey means unnatural or withered, undeveloped, a seedless 
plant that cannot be reproduced (Channarong, 2014:5). According to Channarong, 
the word Kathoey was translated from Pali words pandaka (ปณฺฑก) or bando 
(บณัเฑาะก)์ which have two different meanings. The first meaning is a castrated man 
and the second meaning is a man who may or may not enact feminine roles but 
prefers to have sex with a man. Kathoey developed a new meaning also which 
denotes a person, male or female, who exhibits hermaphroditic features which is 
different from the original meaning of the word pandaka/bando as described in the 
Tipitaka (Channarong, 2014:5-6). Kathoey in pre-modern Thai society was a person 
whose social behaviour was considered inappropriate for their genders. Sometimes, 
Kathoey have been called a 'third gender/sex' in both popular and academic 
discourses. Historically, Kathoey included all forms of difference, whether in the 
domain of sex (hermaphroditism), gender (cross-dressing), or sexuality 
(homosexuality). Only after the 1970s did Kathoey develop its meaning to denote 
only a person who is born male but subsequently enacts a feminine role (male 
transvestite) or undergoes a sex change operation (a male-to-female transsexual) 
(Jackson, 2001:16). 
Even though Thailand has regarded Kathoey as one gender, they were not 
treated equally especially in terms of Buddhist beliefs. According to the Buddhist and 
traditional beliefs, Kathoey are viewed as sinful people and excluded from religious 




Buddhist monks because their sexual behaviour would cause problems or create 
negative images in the eyes of lay people towards the Buddhist monastic community 
(Channarong, 2014:6-7). Also, the Three Seals Law (กฎหมายตราสามดวง Kotmai Tra 
Sam Duang, a collection of law texts compiled in 1805) links Kathoey with the 
Buddhist belief that one was born Kathoey because he committed adultery in his 
previous life. However, Thais also believed that being Kathoey is not an eternal sin 
and can be redeemable. If one does lots of good deeds in this life, one will be born in 
a better form, as masculine man or feminine woman, in one’s next life (Terdsak, 
2003:311-312).  
In actual practice, Thais’ attitudes towards Kathoey Buddhist monks vary to 
different degrees. Sometimes, Buddhists feel that Kathoey monks may cause the 
decline of Buddhism but not always in thinking that these monks’ behaviour are 
problematic, as long as they practise religious and social work, such as traditional or 
cultural rituals. However, there are some private and clergy organisations that 
monitor this scenario. For example, there are anti-gay-monks organisations 
operating in the north of Thailand, though some lay and clergy in some communities 
do not see it as a severe problem (MGR Online, 2009; MThai, 2009). In April 2009, 
Phra Wor Wachiramethi, Thailand's well-known preacher, launched a course entitled 
'Sombat phudee sammanen’ (An etiquette course for novices) to prevent 'gay 
expression' among young monks (Palungjit, 2009).  
Kathoey monks are only accepted if they are seen to not impact the ‘harmony’ 
(status-quo) of the community. If monks violate their disciplines, especially if they 
engage in sexual intercourse, then the lay population would consider it a serious 
problem. According to Sulak Siwaraksa, a violation of these rules is known in Pali as 
‘parajika’ and entails an irrevocable ‘defeat’ and the monk must then leave the 
sangha. A man expelled from the sangha can never again seek entry into the order 
(Sulak, 1999:121-123). There are few examples of highly revered monks who were 
expelled because of sexual scandals such as Phra Nikorn and Phra Yantra, who 
were found guilty of having sexual intercourse with many women and were disrobed 
(Sulak, 1999:124-129). There have also been many cases of paedophile monks who 
have sexually abused novices. High ranking abbots can exercise their power over 
young novices, threatening them into silence. On many occasions, those paedophile 
monks escaped the law because they are protected by cleric authorities which tend 
to treat the problem as isolated crimes by individuals, rather than look at the problem 
as systemic (Sunitsuda, 2019). Such cases impact on how and why Kathoey are not 
seen as acceptable in the realm of Buddhism, and as if Kathoey’s presence in 




The concept of Kathoey in Thailand is different from Western understanding 
of sexuality, and particularly one that distinguishes between normative 
heterosexuality and homosexuality. Kathoey is more about gender appearance 
(transgender and at times transsexuality), rather than sexuality. Moreover, pre-
modern Thai culture did not oppose homosexuality. Kathoey have been recognised 
in Thailand since the pre-modern era. During the Ayutthaya period (14th -17th 
century), there was also a record of a Kathoey who worked as a eunuch in an inner 
court. According to Simon de la Loubère’s79 records, there were small numbers of 
Persian eunuchs imported from the Islamic world too (Silpa-mag, 2018). The 
Muslims played significant roles in administrative positions in both military and civil 
services as well as the Royal Court. Among many, there was a unit called Krom 
Kanti (กรมขนัท)ี or 'the Eunuchs Department' (Julispong, 2007:103).  
In the Bangkok period (starting 1782), the idea of homosexuality was found 
among women in the Inner Palace or elite men, but they were not regarded as 
Kathoey. Rather, homosexuality was considered an individual, private activity and 
Thais do not have specific terms to describe this in specific genders. Neither did Thai 
society have any severe punishment for homosexuality, as in Western or Christian 
societies. There was only one case of homosexuality in the Siamese court that led to 
the death penalty. During the third reign of Chakri dynasty (1824-1851), Prince 
Rakronnaret was charged of corruption and treasonable conduct. One of his 
transgressions was homosexual relations with young members of a theatre group. 
Craig J. Reynolds argues that the prince’s crime was that he did not stay with his 
wife, and reproduction of the family was important. This shows that homosexual 
behaviour was a threat to the political order of the time, based as it was on family 
ties (Reynolds, 2006:136). However, Terdsak Romjampa80 states that the execution 
was because Rakronnaret was found guilty of many other charges while other court 
men who were found committing homosexuality were safe from such penalty 
(Terdsak, 2003:320-321). It was the only recorded case where homosexuality had 
such severe sanction. 
For court women in the Inner Palace, homosexuality or len phuan (เลน่เพืEอน 
literally, play with a friend) was prohibited with specified punishment such as ‘beaten 
50 times and shown around the palace for public shaming’ (Phon, 2019). According 
to Loos, female homosexuality was of more concern in the court than male 
homosexuality because these women were the king’s concubines and ‘the only 
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sexual activity lawfully permitted within palace perimeters was that between the king 
and women in the Inner City’ (Loos, 2005:886). However, in actual practice, the 
punishment was much lessened and treated as a non-serious matter. Court literature 
written by one elite female writer during the early Bangkok period mocks female 
homosexual relationships between concubines in the Inner Palace in a hilarious way, 
and shows how the behaviour was tolerated (Phon, 2019). Temple mural painting in 
Ratchaburi Province, dated from the mid-Ayutthaya period depict palace women 
engaging in sexual behaviour (caressing each other’s breasts, bodies, and faces) 
and punishment (two women are seen hung in a cage). Nevertheless, women in 
these murals seem to be happy as they continue to fondle breasts despite their 
containment (Loos, 2005:887). The use of a cage may suggest unequal power 
between the monarch and court women, and BDSM relationships. Besides, it is also 
‘animalistic’ and suggests a lack of maintaining a mode of courtly comportment. 
However, the artists who painted these murals chose to depict these women as if 
they were not guilty for their behaviour. These murals, as well as court literature, 
evidence that female homoerotic relationships were recognised in pre-modern 
society, without being treated as a serious offence. 
Kathoey was regarded as one of the three-genders concept, separated from 
homosexuality, in pre-modern Thai society. During the nineteenth century, Western 
imperialism reached Siam however, and started to influence Siamese elites in many 
aspects, including concepts of gender.  
In Western culture, the paradigm of two genders founded on two biological 
sexes began to predominate in Western culture only in the early eighteenth century, 
as a product of a modern Western gender system especially in countries in north-
western Europe such as France, the Netherlands, and England. In the seventeenth 
century, there were two genders – male and female – three biological sexes – man, 
woman and hermaphrodite. People were assumed to have sex ordinarily with the 
opposite gender only, and only in marriage under Christian teaching. 
Hermaphrodites were obliged to choose one gender or the other for themselves. If 
they moved back and forth in their gender, their sexual relations could be stigmatised 
as a crime of sodomy (Trumbach, 1993:111-113).  
However, the Western concept of gender imported to Siam was a Victorian 
concept, travelled by the British Empire during the nineteenth century. Unlike the 
idea of three biological sexes in the seventeenth century, Victorian concepts of 
gender stressed gender polarity and binarism that divided sharply between 
masculinity and femininity. The division included the sphere of women and men of 




had created structures of order, and boundaries of gender were a significant part of 
that order (Mendus and Rendall, 1989:3).  
During this period there was the emergence of a sexed opposition between 
the male and female body, which regarded men's bodies as superior and female 
bodies for sexual passivity and men’s libido. There was a dichotomy of the rational 
and emotional that structured the 'sexed mind as well as sexed body’ (Tosh, 2005: 
68, 91). The division did not only cover private family life but also work life as well. 
The dualism compared gender relation with economic relation. In patriarchy, men 
benefit sexually and economically by subordinating or exploiting women. This way of 
thinking created social meaning of masculinity and femininity. Men were supposed to 
be honourable and respectable and women should have virtues of sexual purity, 
domesticity and motherhood (Rose, 1992:12,14-17). 
This gender binary of the Victorian bourgeois family also brought with it ideas 
of monogamy. This stood in contrast to the custom of polygamy that was widely 
practiced among elite men in Siam acting to contradict Western imperial standards of 
civilisation, since the reign of King Mongkut (1851-1868). In the eyes of the West, 
Siam was regarded as feminine, improperly masculine, and subordinate to the manly 
Western states primarily because of polygamy and prostitution, which the West saw 
as evidence of the 'barbarity' of the Siamese. The West was using ideas of ‘proper’ 
gender and sexual behaviour as criteria to judge the standards of civilisation (Jeffrey, 
2002:3). Though a sign of ‘backwardness’, polygamy was continuously practised 
until the reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925). The king did not do any legal action to 
revoke polygamy, though he himself did not practice this custom. Vajiravudh 
advocated monogamy for most of his reign but refused to promulgate a national 
monogamy law (Loos, 2005:901).   
There were rumours and criticism over the king’s refusal of polygamy, which 
related to the idea of homosexuality. Vajiravudh rejected marriage for many years 
and dispersed the inner palace harem. In contrast to his grandfather and father who 
had many wives, he had only four wives and one child. This brought criticism of his 
sexual preferences for men. However, Loos argues that this is an insufficient 
explanation to confirm the king’s homosexuality and the source of criticism comes 
from Vajiravudh’s rejection of marriage and the Inner Palace, rather than 
homosexuality (Loos, 2005:897-900). According to Reynolds, many Thai scholars do 
not suggest him homosexual but rather his ‘personal inclination’ from problems with 
the bureaucracy. Even one Thai scholar, Chanan Yothong, who wrote a book tribute 
to the issue of ‘men of the inner palace’ also refers to this behaviour as 




masculinities.’ These men were a ‘group of men loyal to him (the king)’ and ‘an 
affluent coterie of refined gentlemen who shared his tastes and values’ (Reynolds, 
2014:260-263). According to these scholars, it can be assumed that the practice of 
polygamy was more important for people in the Inner Palace than the king’s 
behaviour, and if it were homosexuality, which tended to be acceptable among the 
Siamese elites at that time besides.   
 Polygamy was officially outlawed in 1935, when the Three Seals Law Code of 
1805, which recognised polygamy, was replaced by the Civil and Commercial Code, 
which recognised monogamy (Reynolds, 2006: 185). Eventually, Siam followed 
Western concepts of gender and there were legal restrictions to support these 
changes. Monogamy and the western concepts of family inspired Vajiravudh to issue 
gender-related regulations which distinguished masculinity from femininity. For 
example, the king required government officials and personnel to register their 
marriages, the names of their wives and children. This regulation also forbade the 
registrar from recording certain women as wives (Loos, 2005:903). After the 
restriction on marriage registration, the surname act was issued in 1913 in which a 
woman and her children were required to use her husband’s surname, and the 
surname must be chosen by a family head which is the oldest male of a family. A 
pattern of family was taken from the West, so roles of women and men were clearly 
defined. The gendered roles were encouraged as the idea of nationalism was 
concerned, which means both men and women must do their parts to sacrifice for 
the country. In wartime, men go to war and women should serve as nurses. At home, 
a woman should do a good job in the home and provide a husband with pleasant 
and comfortable surroundings so that he can work efficiently (Vella, 1978:132,152).  
From a historical background, Kathoey was regarded as a sovereign third 
gender. It is a traditional gender in Thailand’s three gender concept (and as 
mentioned was more akin to a mode of transsexuality, rather than homosexuality). 
Kathoey was aligned with homosexuality after the coming of the Victorian binarism of 
gender and thus it started to be viewed as problem. These western, Victorian-style 
gender roles and morality that the king cultivated after his education in England, 
therefore, drew a more definite line and function between being a man and being a 
woman, and Kathoey was excluded in the gender domain as a result. 
4.1.1.2 New Kathoey after the Western trend of LGBT  
Gender binarism has long dominated how people view themselves and their 
genders. The gay and lesbian rights movement in western countries during the late 
1960s – 1970s stimulated a major shift in gender concepts and thought. The 




sexual revolution in western culture. Before this time, lesbian and gay men were 
mostly restricted in exhibiting their gender identities or sexuality, because of the 
domination of heterosexual norms. Especially in the United States where the 
Stonewall event took place, there were anti-sodomy laws in many states to aid the 
targeting of sexual non-normativity and cross-dressing, for example, with gay men 
and lesbians being considered part of the criminal class. The Stonewall incident 
paved the way for new organisations to deal with homophobia and gave rise to US 
and other LGBT movements (Hanhardt, 2013). In many European countries, a 
movement had been started many years before. In the UK, for example, 
homosexuality was decriminalised after the Sexual Offences Act 1967. Even though 
the criminalisation of homosexuality in the UK did not completely end, the Act 
marked as a starting point to reform gay law which anal sex was made a crime since 
1533 (Tatchell, 2017). 
In Europe, in the 1970s, Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality offered a 
counter-narrative to Victorian sexual repression and triggered progressive liberation. 
Foucault questioned the idea of sexuality as a natural feature. For him, sexuality was 
a ‘constructed category of experience, which was historical, social and cultural’ 
rather than purely of biological origins. Even though there were feminist and racial 
movements during the 1960s-1970s, gay and lesbian people were often still trapped 
in heteronormative roles, for example, the division between butch partner and femme 
partner between female homosexuality. Therefore, Foucault's book presented 
significant shifts with the introduction of 'queer theory' which was a new identity that 
people identified themselves apart from normative heterosexuality or gay/lesbian 
identity (Spargo, 2000).   
Queer theory questions and contests gender categories whereby people feel 
they do not fit into the expectations and remit of a particular category. It also 
investigates and examines the meanings that attach to binaries, such as 
man/woman or heterosexual/homosexual. In other words, queer theory insists that 
persons do not divide so neatly into these binary categories (Spargo, 2000; Turner, 
2000). According to Morland and Willox, queer theory challenges the hegemonic 
understandings of the relations between identity, sex, gender and sexuality, which 
patriarchals values are founded upon (Morland and Willox, 2005:4). Consequently, 
western gender concepts moved from binarism to new gender variations. There is a 
growing number of literature under the area of 'queer' and 'queer theory.’ As a result 
of this shift in gender studies and gender proliferation, queer has become a useful 
term and having replaced some existing terms such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender acting to generate better understanding and existence of a collective 




After Foucault’s queer theory, the discussion on gender issues developed 
vastly. One interesting aspect is about female sexuality. Many, especially among 
lesbian scholars, criticised queer theory for mainly focussing on male homosexuality 
and ignored lesbianism. Lesbian scholars felt frustrated when they were included in 
feminism, nevertheless, they felt that a referent identity for queer is gay, and lesbian 
becomes absent (Walters, 2005). In 1990, Judith Butler developed Foucault’s 
arguments to question the concept of 'body' as natural and looks for a way of reading 
a body as a signifying practice. In her book Gender Trouble, she quoted Simone de 
Beauvoir's notion, which stated that ‘one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes 
one.’ In Butler’s terms, there is no reason to divide up human bodies into male and 
female sexes except that such division suits the economic needs of heterosexuality 
and a lesbian is not a woman. So, ‘one is not born a female but can become neither 
female nor male, woman nor man’ (Butler, 1990:112-113). Her major contribution 
was the question of gender as 'culturally produced' and a 'perfomative effect' 
experiend by the individual as a natural identity (Spargo, 2000). With these views 
disseminating more into public consciousness after the 1990s, western societies 
started to recognise the proliferation of genders. 
 Western notions of homosexuality were also imported to Thai society after the 
1970s. This was evident by the way Thais use borrowed English terms to label 
different homosexual identities such as tom (from tomboy), dee (from lady), seua bai 
(bi-tiger for bisexual) (Jackson, 2001:16). According to Peter Jackson, even though 
Thais adopted Western-derived terms, these terms are appropriated to the Thai 
context to relabel the existing genders (Jackson, 2001:7). For example, the word 
'gay' for gay men is not a new concept of gender but used to refer to male 
homosexuality and to distinguish from Kathoey (cross-dressing, transgendered 
people). Historically, the Kathoey category had included all forms of gender/sex 
variance from normative forms of maleness/masculinity and femaleness/femininity. In 
the 1960s, gay men, lesbians, and hermaphrodites were different types of Kathoey. 
By the 1970s, Kathoey had come to mean only a person who is born male but 
subsequently enacts a feminine role (both transvestite and transsexual) (Jackson, 
2001:16).   
Rosalind Morris (1994) argues that the emergence of new, Western-modelled 
discourse of sexuality is the co-existence of the older Kathoey category with newer 
homosexual and bisexual identities, and this represents a complex of ‘two 
irreconcilable but coexists sex/gender systems’ (cited in Jackson & Sullivan, 1999:5). 
This appropriation and localisation of Western gender terms generates a 
hybridisation of Thai-Western perspective on genders and sexuality, and it is a part 




these new gendered terms reflect Thai’s highly selective usage, and they do not 
introduce a new concept of genders or mark the emergence of a new phenomenon 
but have replaced pre-existing Thai expressions (Jackson, 2001:16). Megan Sinnott, 
however, views the combination with western concepts of gender as ambiguous. It is 
regarded as a means to modernise the Thai nation as well as bringing 'strange 
gender' to the country. Thai media often associates transgendered sexuality with 
modernity and national development in contradictory ways. Traditional 
transgendered people like Kathoey are presented as a sign of the lack of 
modernisation, which resulted from Thai traditional same-sex schools and taboos on 
teenage dating. At the same time, the emergence of new genders like transgendered 
homosexuality drawn from Westernisation is perceived to be 'the strange ways of 
modern middle-class youth', which are threatening to a more conventional and 
traditional society. Sinnott views this as the vexed relationship between the positively 
valued concept of 'being modern' and the more troublesome concept of 
'westernisation’ in Thai public discourse (Sinnott, 2000:427-429).  
 Nevertheless, these Western-derived terms pertaining to gender and gender 
identities are still framed within the Western binary concepts of male and female, and 
in that order. For example, they are divided into masculine/feminine, active/passive 
roles of gay men and lesbians. Even though Sinnott argues that tom masculinity is in 
contrast to normative conceptions of masculinity for Thai men, because it is a 
selective appropriation of Thai expectations of both normative masculine and 
feminine genders (Sinnot, 1999:98-99), the sharp division between masculine and 
feminine roles explicitly demonstrates how binarism has controlled gender in Thai 
society. Accordingly, the emergence of LGBTQ discourse and greater acceptance of 
gender proliferation may appear like Thais are welcoming new gender, but in fact, 
they are framed within the Victorian duality of the heterosexual norm.  
 While English-borrowed terms are adopted, it is interesting to note that the 
Kathoey category is unaffected by western-imported terms. The linguistic 
persistence of Kathoey means that popular English terms for transsexuality and 
transgenderism, such as ‘drag queen’ or ‘tranny’, have not been borrowed and are 
largely unknown in Thailand (Jackson, 2001:17). Even the word 'queer' which could 
fit with the Kathoey category is not widely used. For people in general, the most 
common term is tud (ตุ๊ด), which was taken from a 1982 American film Tootsie which 
was not about being transgender but depicted a cross-dressing man. A Kathoey who 
is a transvestite or transsexual is often called saopraphetsong (สาวประเภทสอง 
second-type woman) or phuying kham phet (ผูห้ญงิขา้มเพศ transsexual woman) 
(Käng, 2012:477). In contrast, there are many other terms that are loosely used as 




beginning of the twenty-first century which have started to become more widely 
used.   
More contemporary terms for homosexual men are geng (เกง้) and gwang 
(กวาง) (literary mean different types of deer) which are slang terms for 'gay' to avoid 
using the term directly. There are also new terms for homosexual men which are 'ke’ 
(passive role), 'me' (active role) and 'se' (both). These three terms were inspired by 
Japanese Y-comic (Yaoi or Boy’s love comic), and they are commonly used among 
female readers to refer to male homoerotics or homosexuality (Anucha and Sopee, 
2017:179). This new homoeroticism, as originated from romance literature, stresses 
romantic scenes between two men rather than sexuality, even though their sexual 
roles are clearly identified. According to Kam Louie, this is the trend of 'beautiful 
men' resulting from American metrosexual and CJK popular culture (China, Japan, 
Korea) which shows a 'hybrid masculinity' widely seen in media and replacing older, 
traditional images of masculinity (Louie, 2012:932, 936). In Thailand, beautiful men 
are commodified for female audiences. The target group of this new homoerotic 
relationship is not people who are homosexual but straight female readers who 
prefer reading this kind of story. Still, the presentation of these new emerging 
genders in media is much controlled by the pre-existing binarism. Anucha and 
Sophee’s research on Boy’s love novels demonstrates that these characters 
represent 'a frozen queer character' which they argue is based on the stereotype of a 
heterosexual relationship (Anucha and Sopee, 2017). 
According to these varieties, Thai genders show a combination of different 
concepts by mixing perspectives on traditional gender with western concepts, or 
even Japanese, and then customise them to fit with their own preferences. In 
contemporary Thai society, these terms have been developing and building different 
perceptions. Modern-day Thai people and academics try to invent new words to 
prevent sexual discrimination, such as using 'alternative gender' instead of 'third 
gender', which signifies the ranking of sex from men as a first gender to female 
(second) and other genders (third). They even promote the use of the Thai term 
'rakphetdiewkan’ (รกัเพศเดยีวกนั love a person who has the same biological sex) 
instead of 'rakruamphet’ (รกัรว่มเพศ) as a Thai translation of homosexuality because 
the latter can also be literally translated as 'love and have sexual intercourse’ and 
thus connotes an idea that homosexuality is about sexual intercourse only. These 
are attempts to redefine different gender variations, apart from the normative of 
heterosexual men and women (VoiceTV, 2015). There is no finite answer what terms 
should be used and whether the terms are appropriate, or they carry with them the 




 It can be said that new gender movements after the 1970s have provided new 
categories of Kathoey, which were generalised in the past. Different categories of 
third genders and their sexuality are being recognised more and relabelled with 
Western-derived terms. This is the way that the old Thai Kathoey has become a 
globalised third gender, and hence, new Kathoey. However, these new genders are 
still dominated by Western binarism. Consequently, Thai modern concepts of gender 
are a combination of traditional three forms of gender – men, women, and Kathoey – 
and two different notions of gender from the West.   
4.1.2 How much Kathoeys are tolerated in contemporary Thai society  
Even though Western concepts of gender have participated in creating a new 
notion of Kathoey, the discussion of a new gender outside normative heterosexuality 
was not widely accepted in Thailand. During the 1980s, Kathoey and homosexuality 
were targeted as problematic issues after the spread of HIV/AIDS, which was 
regarded in Thailand as a largely homosexual disease. The epidemic brought 
homosexuality to being pathologised as a sexual perversion in accordance with 
contemporary western psycho-medical theories. It was not until the 1990s that mass 
media like television programmes started to show Kathoey on-screen widely, and 
they were shown through a 'commodified, exaggerated femininity' (Peleggi, 
2007:88). Outside the world of entertainment media, being homosexual or Kathoey 
in real life was not fully accepted, and general discourse in Thai society struggled 
with ways to prevent this 'deviation' (Jackson and Sullivan, 1999:10). 
On a superficial level, it appears as if Kathoey in Thailand enjoy a certain 
degree of acceptance and toleration. They can cross-dress and go to work, 
especially in the entertainment industry. Same-sex marriage is sometimes socially, 
though not legally, accepted. Nevertheless, there are many laws and restrictions that 
limit rights of Kathoey in their lives. For example, a transsexual woman cannot 
change her gender designation on identity papers from Mr. to Miss or Mrs. Male 
designation affects their lives in many aspects. They cannot travel to other countries 
freely without being physically examined because the designation does not match 
with their gender appearance. The fact that they cannot legally marry affects how 
they manage their properties or can adopt a child (Voice TV, 2019).  
Most of all, Kathoey are still considered as men, so they need to undergo the 
annual military draft enrolment. Before 2014, transgendered and transsexual women 
were labelled in a conscription certificate as 'disabled, psychotic or having mental 
disorder.’ If they could not provide a medical certificate upon military enrolment, they 
would have to go through a physical check, which in some cases meant being half-




Many were abused and bullied because of their gender. After 2014, the Thai Sexual 
Diversity Network successfully lobbied to change the detail in the conscription 
certificate from 'permanent mental disorder' to being 'gender identity disorder' or a 
person whose gender is opposite to his birth sex (Intharachai, 2016; Allen, 2019).  
This evidence suggests that Thai laws are gender discriminatory. Thailand 
has recently had its first transgender MP from the 2019 election. Tanwarin 
Sukkhapisit, a renowned film director who is famous for films that criticise gender 
issues in the country, came from a new party that puts equality at the forefront of its 
agenda and aims to change the discriminatory laws and push for a change in 
marriage laws and sex education in schools. Despite an effort to raises the issue of 
gender equality, she still receives lots of criticism and online bullying (Ellis-Petersen, 
2019; Thanyaphorn, 2019). However, in 2020 she was dismissed from parliament for 
being a stockholder of a media company, several months after her party was 
dissolved.   
It is also difficult for Kathoey to get a job in the academic world, especially at a 
higher education level. Apparent evidence of the homophobic environment in Thai 
academic institutes came in 1996 when Rajaphat University, the country’s teacher’s 
college, which has branches all over the country, announced a ban on 'sexually 
deviant' or 'homosexual' students. Rajaphat’s actions significantly show how Thai 
society discriminates against homosexuality. According to Sinnott, Rajaphat 
University associated with national development because it produces teachers to 
educate Thai people into being Thai nationals. Teachers are the primary bearers of 
the state and to have a homosexual teacher is considered unacceptable role models 
for students (Sinnott, 2000:429-430). Rajaphat University is not the only case 
whereby Kathoeys are excluded from the academic sphere. In 2018, a transgender 
instructor sued Thammasat University for discriminating against her gender by 
refusing her employment (Mathichon, 2018).  
Within this atmosphere of discrimination and tension in some cases, there are 
not likely to be any significant liberation movements, as in the West. Rather, gay and 
Kathoey people in Thailand have shown their resistance to social norms by simply 
ignoring them. As mentioned in Storer, ‘we would not expect to see a gay community 
as in the West with its tradition of liberation, simply because without oppression, 
there can be no liberation’ (Storer, 1999:154). Regarding the legal restriction and 
discrimination on homosexuality, Thailand is considered as tolerant towards 
homosexuality. Jackson argues that much of the opposition to homosexuality in 
Thailand operates at the level of discourse rather than institutional practices affecting 




appropriate and inappropriate masculine or feminine behaviour. So, ‘long as a Thai 
homosexual man or woman maintain a public face of conforming to normative 
patterns of masculinity or femininity, he or she will escape sanctions’ (Jackson & 
Sullivan, 1999:4, 11). Kathoey in Thailand enjoy certain freedom in everyday life or in 
the entertainment industry, but other normative spaces and occupations do not 
welcome Kathoey, and they still have to struggle to be accepted.  
 Both concepts and corresponding discourses of old and new Kathoey indicate 
power struggles to gain acceptance. The only difference is that they are struggling 
with different agendas. Old Kathoey was regarded as a sovereign third gender 
subject of traditional society yet they lacked a sexuality. New Kathoey is a 
global/western third gender subject which comes with more recognition, or at times 
objectification, of sexuality but still they are discriminated and dominated by the 
binarism of genders in the expression of their sexuality. Therefore, Kathoey in 
Thailand is complex, laden with different layers of perception on gender that are both 
traditional, Western influenced, and reflect imperialist thinking.  
4.1.3 Analysis of TV dramas 
This chapter will now investigate the depiction of genders in Thai TV drama as 
a combination of Western and Thai concepts to see how it contributes to the nation-
building project and national identities. The first part of the analysis is the 
modernisation of the Thai nation through gender which explores how imperialist 
binarism shapes genders and identities in TV dramas. The second part will 
investigate how the depiction of Kathoey represents one aspect of combination. The 
third part is how Kathoey is used as an element of nation-building. The TV drama 
that is used as a case study is Ploengchimphalee (2014). 
Ploengchimphalee is the only drama with a Northern Thai focus that has a 
Kathoey character. The role of the Kathoey does not exist in the original novel, but it 
was added to make the drama ‘more enjoyable.’ According to the screenwriter, the 
role of the Kathoey was used to entertain and to make the drama more comical as 
'colours in this drama' and that the Kathoey role helped in ‘supporting the main 
characters’ (Pensiri, 2018, interview). This single sample demonstrates how dramas 
with a Northern Thai focus normatively do not include a Kathoey character, unless 
used for entertainment purposes. The first section will demonstrate gender binary 







4.1.3.1 Modernisation through gender: Imperialist ideas of genders 
  When gender is considered in the construction of a nation, it is often the 
division that separate men and women into a dichotomy of private/public and 
nature/civilisation. The identification of women is with ‘nature’ while men tend to be 
identified with ‘culture’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997:6). Gender binary is a modernisation 
which associating imperialist gender stereotypes to unequal power relations, 
between the coloniser and the colonised.  
The imperialist concept of gender is explicitly seen in a power relationship 
between Siam and the north in TV romances. Siam entered the process of 
modernisation by situating itself on the masculine side and thus putting their 
colonised subjects, including the north, on the feminine side. The most popular plot 
is a love story between a Central Thai man and a Northern woman which is based 
on a ‘Madame Butterfly’ model. Madame Butterfly, the opera written by Giacomo 
Puccini, is a love story between a Japanese girl, Jojosan, and American man, 
Lieutenant Pinkerton, set in Nagasaki, Japan. In 1907, Prince Worawannakon81 who 
is a half-brother of King Chulalongkorn adapted this play into a Thai version entitled 
Sao Krue Fah. The Thai version is then a love tragedy between a Northern Thai girl 
and Bangkok man, with setting changed from Japan to Chiang Mai (a province in 
Northern Thailand). Since then, romances and dramas in the later period follow this 
story pattern; a focus is on hetero-romance between a masculine man and a 
feminine woman who are the main characters.   
This is the product of imperialist thinking as Siam situates itself in the role of 
the Western imperialist and the north as the oriental subject. The imperialist’s view 
on gender is based on what Edward Said calls Orientalism.  
Orientalism is not only a positive doctrine about the Orient that exists in 
the West; it is also an influential academic tradition, as well as an area of 
concern defined by travellers, commercial enterprises, governments, 
military expeditions, readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventure, 
natural historians, and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of 
knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilisations (Said, 
1979:203). 
Within the framework of Orientalism, Western imperialists associate the Orient 
with its backwardness, silent indifference, feminine penetrability, supine malleability 
(Said, 1979:206). This was based on biological bases of racial inequality and leads 
to the division of races into advanced and backward races, cultures and societies.  
Said calls it ‘an exclusively male province which viewed itself and its subject matter 
 




with sexist blinders.’ Orientals were linked to delinquents, the insane, women, the 
poor (Said, 1979:207). This pattern is used in the gendering of the nation which is 
explicitly shown in Ploengchimphalee. In this drama, an imperialist view on genders 
is represented by the sexualisation of the main characters who are a Bangkok man 
and a Chiang Mai woman.   
In the opening scenes in episode 1, Nuenang, Saenkham, and Natrai are 
introduced as representatives of northern woman, northern man, and Bangkok man 
respectively.   
A close-up shot shows several orchids. The camera moves upward and we 
see a long shot of Nuenang, the main female character, riding on a baby 
elephant in a shallow river. There is an elephant keeper standing on the 
side. Soft and slow instrumental music is played. Medium close-up shot 
shows her face and upper part of her body. She is wearing a strapless top 
and trousers, and her hair bun is decorated with orchids. Then, she starts 
reading The Jungle Book out loud. Suddenly, she drops the book and it 
flows along the river. She looks around and cries out for help. 
Saenkham, a northern man, comes in. A low angle shows a 
silhouette of his topless, muscular body. Music changes to faster, livelier 
instrumental song. 
Nuenang: Saenkham! My book!  
He quickly slides into the river to grasp the book. When he walks 
towards her, an elephant splashes water at him. Nuenang giggles. They 
smile to each other. She gets off her elephant and hugs him. 
 Nuenang: You are the dearest person in this village, brother.  
 Saenkham: Keep on reading. 
 Nuenang: No, you always say you don’t understand.  
 Saenkham: I don’t understand English, but your voice is so sweet. 
Keep reading. I want to hear it for the rest of my life. 
Then he carries her on his arms and turns around. Both are smiling and 
laughing. In the following scenes, the drama introduces Natrai, the main 
male character, in a gun fight scene (I describe this scene in detail in 
chapter 3.3). Natrai is introduced for the first time by driving a jeep, wearing 
a jacket and cowboy hat, and uses pistols to fight with timber thieves 







Figure 37 Characters representing a northern Thai woman and man 
(Ploengchimphalee, ep1) 
 
Figure 38 A character who represents a Bangkok man 
(Ploengchimphalee, ep1) 
First, the drama makes a sharp division between characters. We learn from 
the story that Natrai has graduated from England and returned home to run his 
family’s timber business. He represents Bangkok and central Thai identity through 
the language he speaks, clothes he wears, and his background as a foreign-
educated man. Though he is not from Bangkok, he comes from the ‘city’ while other 
characters live in the forest. Nuenang and Saenkham, on the contrary, dress in 
ethnic costumes and speak words of northern Thai language. Though every 
character in this drama mainly speaks central Thai, they use some words which hint 




northern Thai language to be comprehensible to audiences nationwide. For example, 
Nuenang calls Saenkham ‘ai’ (อา้ย) which means a brother in northern Thai language. 
Natrai, however, always uses central or standard Thai. So, he is an outsider of the 
community which bears with him central Thai identities. It is the same plot and 
structure as many other dramas which are about a man who is an outsider, 
newcomer, falling in love with a local woman. 
This gendering of characters is dominated by Orientalism. Oriental females 
were the creatures of male power-fantasy, expressing unlimited sensuality, more or 
less stupid, and above all they are willing, while the Oriental male is viewed with 
something resembling contempt and fear (Said, 1979:207). Hasan adds that non-
western women are often portrayed as ‘ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, 
domestic, family-oriented, victimised, etc.,’ and western women as ‘educated, 
modern … having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to 
make their own decisions’ (Hasan, 2005:29). Similar definition adds that Europe is 
seen as being essentially rational, developed, humane, superior, virtuous, normal 
and masculine, while the Orient is seen as being irrational, backward, despotic, 
inferior, depraved, aberrant and feminine sexually (Shabanirad and Marandi, 
2015:23). These stereotypical images can be seen in these scenes as the drama 
effeminises the North, while Bangkok is associated with masculinity. 
The drama also associates the north with nature. In the opening scenes, 
Nuenang and Saenkham are at the river in a forest with the baby elephant. The 
location implies nature and uncivilisation and the baby elephant suggests they are 
innocent and childish. Even the book she reads (The Jungle Book) symbolises 
nature and primitive life. Orchids, a wild, regional flower, are a symbolisation of 
northern Thai women in Thai literature and widely known among many Thais. This 
flower is juxtaposed with a northern woman to indicate that she is also one of the 
wildflowers. Then, Nuenang’s beauty is intensified with close-up shots to show her 
body, face, skin, or cleavage. Her beauty is in harmony with a pure, beautiful, serene 
natural surrounding. Also, she is seen as weak and fragile when she calls for help.  
Northern man on the contrary is shown as a strong yet primitive being. 
Saenkham is topless, showing his muscles and tanned skin. His physical strength is 
shown when he carries Nuenang in his arms. At the same time, he is an uncivilised 
man, English illiterate. So, the drama portrays northern woman as beautiful, 
submissive, weak, naïve and northern man as physically strong but lacking 
intelligence. On the contrary, a Bangkok representative is associated with modern 
objects and civilisation that aim to contrast with the north. Natrai drives a car while 




Saenkham wears only loose trousers and wraps his head with cloth. Natrai has 
graduated from England but Saenkham is illiterate both in central Thai and English 
(this information we learn later in the following scenes). It is a product of imperialist 
thinking that relies on the gender binary and separation between Orientalist and 
Orientals into male/female, civilised/uncivilised, educated/uneducated, 
refined/savage. To highlight this idea, the drama also creates a model of a colony to 
emphasise this power relationship.  
In the next scene, villagers are having a welcome party for Natrai, who is the 
new manager. 
A wide shot shows the party venue. We hear fast tempo music from drums 
and cymbals. Medium close-up and long shots show Saenkham performing 
a traditional dance using different postures of martial arts. Long and wide 
shots show Natrai sitting on a chair in the middle and other villagers sit on 
the ground on both sides. One man throws Saenkahm a torch. He grabs it 
and swings it around his body. Camera uses cross-cutting to show other 
characters as they watch the show. Some are standing and some are sitting 
on the ground, eating food on wooden trays. When the show finishes, 
everybody claps their hands. Suddenly the music changes to slow tempo 
from string instrument and cymbals. An elder villager tells Natrai that the 
next show is ‘fon ngaen82.’ Nuenang comes in. Camera uses close-up shots 
to show her feet and then tilts up. Long and medium shots show her body in 
a traditional costume (strapless top and tube skirt). She slowly walks to the 
show space in the middle. When Natrai turns to see her, he is stunned. 
Music suddenly changes to a love song, the theme song of the drama, and 
she dances until the song ends. Close-up and medium shots are used to 
show her performance and Natrai, who seems to be fascinated by her 
beauty. When the show ends, he gives her some flowers. The whole scene 
takes 8.32 minutes.  
 The unequal relationship between coloniser and colonised is simply 
expressed through the way people sit in this scene. Natrai is the only person on a 
chair, which does not only signify power but also civilisation, while other villagers sit 
and eat on the ground. Cultural performances of the indigenous people are 
presented for the coloniser’s entertainment (Figure 39). Both performances show two 
main features of the local people, or Orientals. On the one hand the male Orient is 
strong and primitive as represented by martial arts and torch dance. On the other 
hand, the female Orient is beautiful and seductive. Said states that it is the male 
conception of the world which tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The 
Orientalists or Western imperialists carry with them this stereotype. The possibility of 
development, transformation, human movement is denied the Orient and the Oriental 
(Said, 1979:208).  
 
82 A traditional dance when dancers bend their bodies backward to touch the ground with 






Figure 39 A welcome party with traditional performances 
(Ploengchimphalee, ep1) 
In this drama, the north is effeminised or frozen in the gendered stereotypical 
images that follow the imperialist premise. Siam adopted this gender binary from the 
west during the modernisation process and has used it to construct a power relation 
with its subject. In the drama, thus, a relationship between a Bangkok man and a 
Northern woman stands for a political relationship between Northern states and 
Bangkok. To place emphasis on this romantic relationship and gendered stereotype 
is a way a nation maintains its masculine core and power. Kathoey are not 
necessary for this binary structure since it is a power relation between male/female 
and Bangkok/Northern Thai. In these scenes, a Kathoey character is visible, but has 
an unimportant role. What does Kathoey do and how important are they for nation-
building is investigated in the next section.   
4.1.3.2 ‘Old Kathoey’ and Westerns concepts of gender 
The previous section illustrates that Ploengchimphalee is dominated by 
Western concepts of gender that emphasises binary. This drama sharply divides 
characters into two sides of being men and women, and each of them is in 
stereotypical functions. However, there is a Kathoey character who is presented as 
living harmoniously with other genders. This suggests the idea of three genders in 
Thai pre-modern society. At the same time, the old Kathoey clashes with the 
Western concepts of gender. This next section will show how much Kathoey are 
tolerated in this drama, modelling a society dominated by the new Western concepts 
of gender, and how the depiction of Kathoey therefore sustains the heteronormative 




Kathoey in Thai TV dramas are frequently seen as extraordinary and 
uncommon. This makes them a special gender, standing out from heteronormative 
men and women. In this drama, a Kathoey is presented as a transgression of gender 
and social norms. They are indeed often represented as clowns or funny, ugly 
beings. 
The presentation of Kathoey in TV dramas is different from films. There are an 
increasing number of Thai films which show dynamic representations of Kathoey 
characters. The appearance of Kathoey and gay men in mainstream Thai films 
started during the 1970s, starting with Games (1976) and Plengsudthai (the last 
song, 1985, 1987) (Thitiwat, 2010:4). During earlier periods, Kathoey and gay men 
were presented as negative stereotypes, similar to clowns, marginalised, or as 
alienated social outcasts (Thitiwat, 2010). The most frequent characteristic of 
homosexual men found in Thai films is that of a comedian however (Chaisiri, 2010).  
 Satree Lek (Iron Ladies, 2000) shows a significant change in direction 
because Kathoey and gay men are the main characters. Based on a true story of 
gay volleyball players, this film was highly successful as it made gross income of 99 
million baht (approx. 2.5 million GBP) and won 10 Awards (from 12 nominations) 
(Film Archive, 2019). Its popularity caused its second episode to be released in 
2003. One year after, another film based on a true story, Beautiful Boxer (2004) was 
released, and it was the most famous of all films about Kathoey at that time. This 
biographical film about the life of Kathoey Thai boxer was highly received both in 
Thailand and at international levels, with several awards, including the Torino 
International Gay & Lesbian Film Festival, and Milan International Lesbian and Gay 
Film Festival. It was the time when Thai film really began critically engaging with 
social problems on gender. Films in more recent years have dealt with problematic 
existing issues of Kathoey and gay men such as, The Love of Siam (2007), Insects 
in the Backyard (2010), It Gets Better (2012), Malila (The Farewell Flower, 2018) and 
Dew (2019). All these films show Kathoey and gay men in dramatic, problematic 
contexts with more understanding of variations of gender and sexual orientation.   
Kathoey on TV shows, on the contrary, remain in a more static fixed 
stereotype as a clown. This is based on the four basic elements of Thai traditional 
performances which are phra (male hero), nang (female hero), kong (villain), and 
talok (clown/comedian). Kathoey often falls into the ‘talok’, clown category. The Thai 
talok is also similar to a trickster in Western literature, a comical character that 
entertains audiences and offers strategies for writers to challenge social structure 




 In Sanskrit drama, a clown appears to prevent the audience from being too 
bored or too sad. A clown is a person who relieves tension, assist, give advice, and 
provide warnings (Kultida, 1993:92). A clown also functions as the voice of the 
audience. They speak what the audience may think, and dare not say, or they share 
a secret that other characters are not aware of, for example. According to Nidhi, a 
clown in Thai movies violates the rules of Western movies that aim to present a 
realistic setting completely separated from the real world. A clown in Thai movies 
keeps reminding audiences of the imagined setting by communicating directly with 
them, criticising or making fun of the actions of other characters (Nidhi, 2014:74-75). 
Patsorn Sungsri argues that a clown also stands for ordinary people or someone of 
inferior status, such as servants or friends who have a role for serving the main 
characters (Patsorn, 2004:48). With these functions, a clown is essential for a drama 
in entertaining audiences, supporting main characters, and or acts as the voice of 
the audience, although their roles may affect plots and storylines very little, or not at 
all. 
According to these three scholars, a clown can relieve tension and sadness, 
remind audiences of the pretended reality of the drama at hand, and criticise other 
characters, while also standing for ordinary people. Here I also want to add that a 
clown represented by Kathoey is a transgression of social norms. While other 
characters are fixed in a binary – either male or female, good or bad – Kathoey is 
more fluid and can move back and forth between opposite sides. Roles of Kathoey in 
Thai TV dramas can thus be better understood through Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of 
carnival and carnivalesque. According to Bakhtin, in a carnival, social rules and 
hierarchy are reversed and transgressed. While medieval society in the West was 
hierarchical and strict, in a carnival, all rules were abandoned and suspended. In 
other words, it was the time of free and familiar contact among people when 
hierarchical structure and all forms of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette were 
dispatched (Bahktin, 1998:251). In Thai TV dramas, Kathoey act as a mouthpiece, 
medium, chaos, or anti-system agent to perform actions that are against accepted 
social norms.  
4.1.3.2.1 Kathoey as exotic beast 
 The first aspect of transgression is shown via the strangeness of the Kathoey 
in the fixity of a heteronormative and imperialist gaze. In many Thai TV dramas, 
Kathoey and third genders are classified as extra, unusual elements. In 
Ploengchimphalee, a double layer of strangeness is presented as a Kathoey in the 
north here is alienated both by gender and ethnicity. In this drama, a Kathoey 




entertainment portrayed through bizarre costumes and heteronormative expectations 
of a Kathoey’s physical appearance. 
This bears relationship to Bakhtin's concept of a carnival whereby ‘the 
utilisation of things in reverse such as putting clothes inside out, trousers on their 
heads. It was the violation of the usual and the generally accepted’ (Bahktin, 1998: 
253). A Kathoey usually ends up wearing strange clothes in these dramas, elaborate 
headdresses, bold make-up and fancy hairstyles. Their appearance does not belong 
to common, everyday-life practice. In Ploengchimphalee, Kampoong, the Kathoey 
character, usually appears with her two female friends. These three characters are 
strange and different from others because they wear bold make-up and vivid, 
colourful clothes. Kampoong is the strangest as her outfit is complicated, more 
elaborate than her friends’ making her look like a clown in the community. Her outfit 
usually comes in many layers, vibrant colours, with elaborate headdress and lots of 
accessories that are uncommon for everyday uses. The drama stresses this idea by 
showing her in eccentric ethnic costumes. In this case, Kampoong is more exoticised 
than other characters however, because she is not only foreign to Thainess in terms 
of ethnicity but also her gender is alien and external to Thai society.  
 Figure 40 gives a comparison of the Kathoey’s outfit with other female 
characters. Two women on the right, according to this drama, are good girls. They 
dress in plain outfits – black and blue shirts with dark-colour tube skirts – with little 
hair accessories and wear light make-up. Three women on the left, as the drama 
tells us, are the antagonists. They wear brighter colour dresses – red, shocking pink, 
and violet shirts and colourful, fancy skirts. Their accessories are big, and they have 
heavy make-up. Among these five women, Kampoong’s dress is the most elaborate. 
She is the only one in this scene who has a headdress, and she wears several long 
and short necklaces. Even her shirt and skirt have more details compared to the 
other women because they both have patterns while the other women either have a 
patterned shirt or skirt.  
 Also, Figure 41 shows a scene from episode 1 when villagers attend the 
welcome party. While other villagers’ costumes are more special than everyday 
outfits, Kampoong is still in the strangest outfit. She has three pieces of cloth in three 
different colours wrapped around her head as a crown. There are also two bunches 
of small colourful pom-poms hanging on two sides of her head. On her neck are the 
golden rings of the long-neck Karen people. Her bizarre costume, inspired from 
Karen hill tribe with extraordinary details, doubles up on her Otherness, both as an 
Oriental, and as ‘backwards’ because she appears as outrageous and as a member 




how a Kathoey is always the strangest character. In everyday life, her costume is 
fancier than other characters. When other characters dress for special events, the 
Kathoey will be made even more strange with bizarre costumes.  
 
 
Figure 40 comparison of costumes between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ women 
(Ploengchimphalee, ep2) 
 In this situation, the Kathoey is presented as an alienated, strange individual 
that does not belong to normal, standardised social practices. Her fancy outfits 
remind audiences of the unreal setting and that she is fictional. A Kathoey could be 
compared with a character in a carnival meant to challenge dominant power. 
According to Bakhtin, a carnival offers a 'half-real and half-play-acted form' which is 
a new mode of the interrelationship between individuals to free them from the 
authority of hierarchical positions. It is a space of Eccentricity that permits the latent 
sides of human nature (Bakhtin, 1998:251). The strangeness of Kathoey in Thai TV 
drama is to distinguish them from normative gender constructs. This can also 






Figure 41 Kathoey’s costume for special occasion (Ploengchimphalee, 
ep1) 
 Since they are presented as strange beings, most Kathoey in Thai TV dramas 
are not associated with beauty. It is highly contradictory to the depiction of beautiful 
Kathoey in many transsexual beauty contests. Whether beautiful Kathoey outside TV 
dramas, or Kathoey’s ugliness in TV dramas, reflects how the idea of being Kathoey 
is dominated by heteronormative ideas of feminine beauty. This is expressed in 
transsexual beauty contests where Kathoey are evaluated not on their ability to 
express hybridity between masculinity and femininity, but on their mimicry and ability 
to transgress the gender boundary. These contests become subjugating sites that 
subject Kathoey to imitate mainstream (dominant/Western) notions of beauty and 
femininity which means these Kathoey need to be as beautiful as real woman 
(Wuen, 2005:10-12). Example of well-known beautiful Kathoey in Thai entertainment 
industry is Treechada Petcharat (Poy), who won Miss Tiffany and Miss International 
Queen in 2004. Poy has become a well-known actress in Thai entertainment 
industry. She featured in many Thai advertisements and films, and later appeared in 






 Figure 42 Treechada Petcharat (Poy), Miss Tiffany and Miss International 
Queen 2004 (Kapook, 2020) 
Accordingly, feminine beauty has dominated how people treat Kathoey and 
how they view themselves. In Käng’s terms, Kathoey in cabarets are promoted and 
commodified by Thai government and private agencies for foreign tourists to 
demonstrate the ‘amazing’ character of Thainess, an exotic place with an 
institutionalised third gender. Moreover, modern and younger Kathoey are in search 
for ideal feminine beauty as they often have utilisation of modern medical technology 
such as hormones, Botox and surgery (Käng, 2012:479-480). This evidence 
suggests that Katheoy in Thailand are controlled by the domain of beauty in which 
they need to be beautiful to be accepted. There is social expectation and feminine 
beauty that Kathoey have to conform to and many of them have proved to 
successfully achieve it. However, this mode of beauty surrounding Kathoey life, is 
not visible when it comes to TV dramas. 
A majority of Kathoey in Thai TV dramas are not beautiful by Thai beauty 
standards. When there is a beautiful Kathoey in a TV drama, it is never performed by 
a transgendered or transsexual woman. For example, Baimaithiplidpliw (2019) 
superficially indicates an improvement of Kathoey’s beauty in TV by having a 
beautiful Kathoey as the main character. However, the drama makers cast a female 
actor in the Kathoey role rather than having a transsexual/transgendered woman to 
perform. It is also interesting to note that other supporting characters are typically 
unbeautiful Kathoey, and played by transgendered and transsexual actors. The 
situation is similar in films in which typical Kathoey characters are shown as ‘weird 
and ugly.’  
In Ploengchimphalee, Kathoey is associated with ugliness as expressed 




popular Thai beauty standard, so she is humiliated and treated unequally. Her figure 
is not an ideal type of Thai women, as shown in TV dramas and films that promote 
light skin, small, and slim bodies. She is tall and plump. She has a big, rounded face, 
and she does not look like an ideal type of woman. Her name is the Northern Thai 
word for a spider, and throughout the story, she is often called 'a giant spider' (แมงมมุ
ยกัษ์ maeng mum yak) to mock her big body. The concept of female beauty and 
Kathoey’s beauty is elaborated in episode 6 (Figure 43).  
 
 
Figure 43 Kampoong in a yellow dress joining a beauty contest 
(Ploengchimphalee ep 6) 
There is a beauty contest in a village. Kampoong is one of the contestants. 
A master of ceremonies introduces every contestant one-by-one, and each 
of them walks on stage. When it is Kampoong’s turn, an MC announces.  
MC: The next contestant is a woman who should not have been born. Her 
beauty makes everybody want to kick her. Number three. Miss Kampoong, 
or a giant spider.   
She walks in, prostrates on the floor and performs a Thai way of greeting by 
making ‘krab’ (putting two palms together on the floor to show high respect). 
Then she stands up, raises one hand and slowly waves to a cheering 
crowd. That hand-waving is mimicking an action done by most Thai beauty 
contestants. Daoden, a girl from Bangkok and also one of the audiences, 
laugh at her and talk to a friend. 
Daoden: That dress belongs to my sister. She is huge. How can she 
squeeze her body into that dress?   
The crowd cheers and gives applause. Some people laugh. She blows 
kisses to the crowd, smiles, walks and poses on stage. Runjuan, her friend 
and also a contestant, then says;  
Runjuan: You think you are beautiful in this dress? You look fake!   
Kampoong:  Say what you want. Look! Don’t you see that everybody is 
stunned by my beauty? 




 As seen from dialogue in this scene, a Kathoey cannot be considered as 
beautiful because of her physical appearance. Instead of admiring Kathoey's beauty, 
the crowd, contestants and MC make fun of her. These voices stand for the 
audience and social norm that judge her beauty according to a social standard she 
cannot attain. Regardless of the dynamic of Kathoey’s beauty outside TV, Kathoey in 
TV dramas remains static and dominated by the standard of feminine beauty. 
Ploengchimphalee, like many other Thai TV dramas, reproduces this stereotype by 
having conventionally ‘unattractive’ Kathoeys as an object of humiliation. 
Consequently, this part has demonstrated that, under the dominant Western concept 
of beauty, Kathoey in Thailand is shown as a strange, unbeautiful being which 
transgresses the norms of a society. They are presented as a gender that can 
harmoniously live in a community without problem, yet they are also exoticised and 
alienated as the excess of a society based on binarism. This is how Thai TV drama 
reproduces imperialist ideas of gender and depicts them through the bodies of third 
gender people. 
4.1.3.2.2 Kathoey as a gender without sexuality  
 The next aspect of transgression is that Kathoey can go beyond restrictions 
on gender norms. Victorian etiquettes have influenced concepts and roles of gender 
in Thailand like how each gender should behave. However, Kathoey are a gender in 
the ambiguity that transgresses norms, and at the same time are also excluded from 
those norms. In other words, Kathoey can do what good men and women cannot do. 
And they have that freedom to do so not because they are a privileged gender but 
because they are presented as a gender without sexuality.  
Thai TV is very much controlled by law and thus affects the depiction of 
Kathoey. During the 1990s, gay men were associated with the issue of the 
HIV/AIDS. As a result, their representation on screen was prohibited and controlled. 
For example, in 1994, the Ministry of Culture prohibited any actors, producers, or TV 
hosts who were homosexual from appearing on TV to prevent behavioural imitation. 
It was not until the late 1990s, due to the lesbian and gay movements in Western 
countries and Thailand, that gay characters reappeared in Thai TV dramas 
(Phatthanaphon & Mayuri, 2016:103-106).  
After the digitalisation of Thai TV in 2014 and the birth of new privately-run 
channels, there have been increasing numbers of production houses who are willing 
to invest money in TV dramas which have gay male leading roles. However, dramas 
with gay male themes are not broadcast on major TV channels but via new digital TV 
channels (such as GMM25 or ONE channel) and internet-based platforms such as 




applications (Line TV, AIS Movie Store, ONE HD). For Line TV alone, ‘Boy’s Love’ 
dramas have attracted high number of female audiences and reached more than 600 
million views in 2017, which was only a few years after the digitisation of Thai TV 
(Positioning, 2017).  
Despite this change, the country’s two main channels (Channel 3 and 
Channel 7) which have broadcast TV dramas since the beginning of the TV business 
in Thailand, continue to show conservative dramas that hinder expression of male 
homosexuality. Moreover, the presentation of homosexuality in Thai TV drama never 
includes sexuality. The presentation of sexual/erotic scenes are strongly restricted by 
law even between heterosexual men and women, let alone a love scene for Kathoey 
or homosexual people, which is even more scarce. According to the 2013 Royal 
Gazette (B.E.2556) on the guidelines on content and classification, television 
programmes for general audiences and children above 13 (TV drama is in this 
classification) should avoid content that shows inappropriate sexual values and 
scenes that indicate sexual intercourse. Consequently, if male homosexuality is 
shown in TV dramas, it is indirect. The only permitted sexual expression on TV is 
kissing on lips or cheek. This is different from Thai films where obvious sexual 
scenes or tongue kiss are more common. Romance or love scenes between two 
male actors, remain taboo. For example, male homosexuality is hinted but not 
verbally stated. In Mongkutdoksom (1996), there is only one scene which implies 
male homosexuality by showing two men sleeping on the same bed. 
In Ploengchimphalee, Kathoey can transgress gender norms yet there is no 
sign of sexuality. Kathoey however is the only gender that can publicly express 
sexual attraction and desire, while it is strictly refrained for heteronormative men and 
women. Kathoey in contemporary Thai society usually means a person who is born 
male but enacts a feminine role. Most Kathoeys in Thai TV dramas are normally 
portrayed as being sexually attracted to masculine men. In Ploengchimphalee, 
though it is not clear about the sexuality of Kampoong, she is the only character who 
can verbally express sexual desire to men. In episode 1, after villagers talk about the 
new manager and predict what kind of person he will be, Kampoong states that she 
wishes him to be:   
handsome with a muscular body, having a big chest, fit and firm butt, and 
he must be single so that he can be mine.  
According to Bakhtin, law, prohibitions, and restrictions that determine the 
structure and order of ordinary life are suspended during carnival as well as 
hierarchical structure and all forms of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette 




can be compared to the carnival, therefore breaking social rules and articulating ‘low 
culture’ that is regarded as unacceptable if done by other genders. The way 
Kampoong describes and sexualises a man's physical body above in detail is not 
acceptable if spoken by a heteronormative woman, especially in traditional Thai 
society. Even though a main male character is sexually attractive to many women, 
they do not talk in the same way as Kampoong does. Likewise, if a man describes a 
woman like this, it would also be unacceptable. On the contrary, it is acceptable 
when a Kathoey speaks these kinds of sentences and people do not take it seriously 
for she is already a clown, let loose in the community.  
The Kathoey’s transgression of social rules and order are tolerated because 
she reminds others constantly of the rules of behaviour. As Bakhtin puts it, in 
festivities and holidays, people express their carnivalistic characters because people 
in the Middle Ages had two lives:  
one was the official life, monolithically serious and gloomy, subjugated to 
a strict hierarchical order, full of terror, dogmatism, reverence, and piety; 
the other was the life of the carnival square, free and unrestricted, full of 
ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the profanation of everything sacred, full 
of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and 
everything (Bakhtin, 1998: 256) 
So, the Kathoeys role is to remind these people of their ‘official life’ that they 
need to conform to rules, while the Kathoey also reflects their potential ‘carnival life’ 
which is free from restrictions. She openly expresses her sexual desire in the 
following scene when everybody introduces themselves to the new manager. While 
other villagers offer to serve the manager by doing housework, Kampoong offers to 
take him for a bath. When she speaks, she also sniffs (a strong referent to a kind of 
‘kissing’ in the Thai context) and looks at his body, which shows strong sexual 
attraction (Figure 44). A Kathoey is added here to hint to the audience that this 
action is unacceptable in real life, but it is acceptable in the drama because it is done 
by a Kathoey who does not belong to official life but regarded as other.  





Figure 44 Kampoong shows her sexual attraction to the main male 
character (Ploengchimphalee ep 1) 
While Kathoey may thus have the freedom to express their sexual 
preferences at times, it is infrequent in Thai TV dramas that they be cast in a 
relationship or be seen to have a sexual affair. Audiences will not see or know their 
sexual practices. Though they exhibit a sexual desire for masculine men, there is no 
way we can decide whether this person is straight, homosexual, or bisexual. Kathoey 
is in the domain of gender, not sexuality, and their existence is to direct audiences 
towards heteronormativity. The presentation of Kathoeys is different from the 
presentation of gay men and lesbians in new dramas which foster Western ideas of 
sexuality. These dramas tend to focus on sexuality rather than gender expression. 
For example, gay men in Sotus: the Series (2016) or a lesbian in 
Phloengphrangthian (2019) (Figure 45 and Figure 46) do not show gender 
differences. Their gender identities are masculine male and feminine female. Neither 
do they act nor dress differently from heteronormative men and women. This 
representation of gender and sexuality is influenced by Western concepts of LGBTQ 







Figure 45 Male homosexuality in Sotus: The Series (2016) 
 
Figure 46 Lesbian in Phloengphrangthian (2019) 
 The Kathoey in Ploengchimphalee bears the traditional image of old Kathoey, 
which is the sovereign third gender subject. Focus here lies on gender differences 
between heteronormative men and women. Old Kathoey is divested of sexuality and 
when it is combined with Western binarism, shows a transgression of gender and 
social norms. Though the Kathoey can openly express sexual desire, it does not 
affect the gendered norm or heteronormative structure and conforms to the rules of 
imperialist binary therefore. Kathoey’s sexual preferences do not cause trouble to the 
harmony of the society as long as they show no sexuality. So, the existence of 
Kathoey in Thai TV drama reemphasises the premise of imperialism that it is a 
gender outside the heteronormative structure.  
4.1.3.2.3 Kathoey as unifier of gender and social norms   
The previous section has shown that the ‘old Kathoey’ is presented as a 
transgressor of social norms under the dominant Western binary of gender. This 




of gender and social norms. This function of Kathoey also helps in sustaining the 
core of gendered roles in society.  
Ploengchimphalee demonstrates a clear social function of gender through 
male and female stereotypes, but Kathoeys do not have a specific gendered role in 
that society. Men are associated with masculinity, physical strength, and some 
specific jobs such as a manager, mahout (elephant rider/trainer), or doctor. In 
contrast, women do stereotypical feminine roles and domestic jobs. For example; 
Natrai, the hero, is a manager. Nuenang, the heroine, does not have a specific job, 
but her duties include dancing, cooking, and doing housework. Moreover, she wants 
to be a schoolteacher, which is a job done mainly by women in Thailand. While 
everybody has their gendered roles, Kampoong, who is a Kathoey, does not have 
any specific job. She is always accompanied by two female friends. One of them, we 
learn from episode 1, is a cook and another is often seen as helping with kitchen 
tasks. However, we do not know what Kampoong does exactly. She is often seen 
wandering or hanging around with her friends, touching this and that but does not 
really work. This is shown in a scene from episode 1 (Figure 47). 
 
 
Figure 47 villagers are doing their gendered roles (Ploengchimphalee, 
ep 1) 
A high angle, long shot shows villagers are preparing for a new manager’s 
welcome party. A group of male musicians and female dancers are 
rehearsing for a performance. Other men do outdoor, laborious work such 
as taking care of elephants, while those who work indoors and make flower 
garlands are mostly women. Kampoong (sitting on bottom left), the only 
Kathoey, is joining with female workers, but it is not clear what she is doing. 
It looks like she only sits there as a part of the community. 
Then a manager arrives. All the villagers introduce themselves one by one 




housemaid, and so on. Then, Kampoong steps in front of everybody to 
introduce herself. 
Kampoong: My name is Kampoong. People also call me ‘giant spider.’ I can 
do everything. If you want to take a bath or change your clothes, I can help 
you with that.  
 
According to this scene, stereotypical gendered roles are clearly depicted. 
Men, as breadwinner or head of a family, are associated with jobs and occupations 
outside a house. Women are reserved to be within domestic space, doing 
housework, rearing and teaching children. This is the binary concept of gender roles 
showing itself, as influenced by the West. For example, during nineteenth-century 
England, people believed in biological roles and oppositions that anatomical 
differences signalled social categories and capabilities between men and women. 
Women have physiological capability to bear and nurse children, while men have 
capability in culture (Rose, 1992:14). Kathoey in this drama neither fits in the social 
function of male nor female. However, instead of showing it as a transgression, the 
drama uses a Kathoey as a unifier that can cross between the functions of two 
genders. The way she says ‘I can do everything’ is meant to be funny in the drama 
as other characters laugh and smile. However, it also implies the Kathoey’s 
multifunction. This idea is elaborated in episode 7. 
Kathoey, in the most popular Thai understanding of this word, is a person who 
is born male but enacts feminine roles. So, even though Kathoeys dress and behave 
like women, they do have male physical strength. In episode 7, Natrai’s mother 
wants her son to marry a rich woman, so she is not very happy to know that her son 
has fallen in love with Nuenang, who is a worker in the village. Therefore, she tries to 
get rid of Nuenang from her son’s life. She orders Kampoong and Runjuan to kidnap 






Figure 48 Kampoong and Runjuan are making a fake rape scene 
(Ploengchimphalee ep 7) 
  
A long shot shows Nuenang at a waterfall as she does some washing. 
Runjuan and Kampoong approach quietly from her back and wrap her head 
with a black cloth. Then they put her onto the ground. Kampoong punches 
Nuenang’s stomach until she faints away, and then both of them help to tear 
her clothes to create a crime scene as if she was raped.  
 
 Violent scenes are common in Thai TV dramas. Face-slapping is a female 
driven act of violence, while rape or kidnap are often perpetrated by male characters 
upon women. Townsend argues that in many Thai TV dramas, rape operates as a 
form of punishment for female behaviour deemed inappropriate by the male 
characters and Thai society (Townsend, 2016:581, 581). Thai TV dramas often 
romanticise rape and violence as parts of a normal relationship. Violence such as 
‘slap-kiss’ is a cliché scene in Thai dramas in which the nang-ek would slap the phra-
ek who forcefully kisses her. Moreover, rape is used in Thai dramas because of the 
perception of ‘a good woman’ that a female protagonist cannot initiate sexual contact 
(Nanthayapirom, 2017). (More detail on this topic in chapter 2). According to this 
pattern, a female protagonist can be raped only by a male protagonist. Other than 
that, she must be safe or able to escape from rape as it is not acceptable in Thai TV 
dramas for a nang-ek to lose her virginity to a man other than to which is married 
and committed.  
Therefore, in Ploengchimphalee, rape is not real but ‘set-up’ to cause 
misunderstanding. Instead of having a male character perform this action therefore, 
the drama uses a Kathoey to do this. The way Kampoong punches Nuenang in her 




villain who hurts a female character, yet she does not rape because she is a 
Kathoey. Right after this scene, Kampoong and her friends perform another role of 
female villains which is spreading rumours and gossip. They act as a mouthpiece in 
the community by telling other villagers that Nuenang was raped. In Thai TV dramas, 
rumour and gossip are more associated with female activities. So, as a Kathoey and 
a villain, Kampoong is multifunctional and switches between male and female 
stereotypical behaviours. On the one hand, Kampoong shows that she does not 
serve a particular social function in the community as she does neither a typical man 
nor woman’s job. On the other hand, she can cross over social functions to act both 
as a man and a woman. Her male physical body can function as a male villain to 
make a mock rape, while she engages in gossip culture, which is seen as more 
related to women. In other words, she embodies both male and female villainy. 
Accordingly, these scenes demonstrate nation-building through the 
combination of gender, and that combination is dominated by imperialist thinking. 
Ploengchimphalee is a drama which reproduces the imperialist power relation of 
gender and the binary of the Orientalist/the Oriental, male/female, 
civilised/uncivilised. This dichotomy is a basis for Thai nation-building which is 
constructed via the relationship between masculine Bangkok and effeminised 
northern Thailand. It is a double annunciation of nationalist patriarchy through a 
difference of male imperial subject from a woman and from a Kathoey. Kathoey is 
presented as a transgression of social norms and genders. They are excluded from 
heteronormative binary and sexuality. At the same time, they are the unifier that can 
conjoin social functions of genders. To be Kathoey means that one can be both, or 
neither man nor woman. However, Kathoey are tolerated in a community because 
they sustain the heteronormative discourse. A perceived abnormality is used in 
reifying to the audience what normality is, or should be. 
4.1.3.3 Kathoey as an element of nation-building  
Kathoeys may function in a dramatic role as an excess of the Western binary 
of gender. Yet, they are also tolerated as one of the three traditional genders, as 
long they service and help sustain the heteronormative structure conveyed. This 
section further investigates how the existence of Kathoey in TV drama contributes to 
the image of nation-building.  
In this scene we learn Nuenang wants to be a teacher, so she sets up a 
school in the village. Before class starts, all the villagers stand in rows in front of a 






Figure 49 Villagers sing national anthem and pay respect to Thai flag 
(Ploengchimphalee, ep 2) 
The first thing that appears on screen is a Thai flag. A few men are helping 
to set up a flagpole on the ground. A camera zooms in to close-up on the 
flag. An extreme long shot shows that the pole is up, with flag now raised to 
the top. Next to the flagpole is a wooden pavilion that acts as a classroom. 
Natrai runs downhill to the classroom. His face looks angry. Khamfai, a 
village girl, quickly approaches him and explains that they are making a 
classroom for village children and Nuenang wants to be a teacher.  
Then, a group of three villains enter the scene – two female and one 
Kathoey. The oldest woman, who is leader of the gang, starts to pick a fight 
with Nuenang and her friends.  
Ranjuan: What are you doing? Did the owner tell you to build this school? 
Natrai: Yes. He wants to have a small school so that these kids can study 
and Nuenang can be a teacher.   
All the three villains turn back and gossip. Their faces look like they do not 
believe what he has just said. Then, a camera switches to long shot again 
to show all students, teachers, and the rest of the villagers standing in front 
of the flagpole. They stand on sloping ground. The leading and supporting 
characters are standing at the back row, which is the highest level of the 
ground. Other villagers are on the lower level, and the children are in the 
front row, which is the lowest position. They are singing the Thai national 
anthem, without background music. When the song ends, everybody bows 
and then walks out. The children run to the classroom. Nuenang and two of 
her friends then follow and start to teach them to sing a song.   
 A practice of singing the national anthem, shown in this scene, is known in 
Thailand as ‘khao thaew’ (เขา้แถว literally meaning ‘stand in a row’), which is a daily 
ritual performed in every Thai school in the morning before class starts. Students 
and teachers must stand in rows, usually outdoors, in front of the Thai flag. This 
ritual includes singing the national anthem, Buddhist prayer, and singing the royal 
anthem too, as the final step of the process. It is a must that the national anthem is 




practice was initially designed to show respect to the national flag, a potent symbol 
of Thai nation.  
 The current Thai national flag was decreed in 1917. In 1939, the Thai 
government under the Phibun regime prescribed that ‘whenever the National Flag 
was raised or lowered in public places individuals in the vicinity were required to 
stand at attention’ and they were required to stand to attention when the national 
anthem or the royal anthem was played (Barmé, 1993:152). This ritual has been 
followed in schools, and it has continued until today. According to the original 
intention of ‘khao thaew’, this activity is a tool to restate the three national pillars, or 
core of the Thai nation – nation, religion and monarchy. Every Thai citizen, no matter 
what race, religion, or gender, needs to take into account these three pillars. Even 
though it is common for Thai TV audiences to watch music videos of the national 
anthem twice a day (at 8 am and 6 pm), having characters singing the full national 
anthem in a drama is unexpected. 
 This scene is significant for nation-building because it reaffirms the unity of 
Thai people. There are tensions between villagers, and they are about to fight but 
the fight is interrupted by the ‘khao thaew’ ritual. After this ritual, they pick a quarrel 
again. So, the ritual is a structure of power that keeps things together. The power is 
invisible and sacred which is only visible through the tradition of singing the anthem. 
This scene reminds Thai audiences that no matter what conflicts they have, they are 
still Thai citizens that should live harmoniously within the country. This power is 
symbolised by the language of nation as expressed through the anthem. According 
to Anderson, nationalism works from language of kinship and home. National 
anthems are one example that creates contemporaneous community and experience 
of simultaneity; 
At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter 
the same verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance. (Singing 
national anthem) provides occasions for unisonality, for the echoed 
physical realisation of the imagined community…If we are aware that 
others are singing these songs precisely when and as we are, we have no 
idea who they may be, or even where, out of earshot, they are singing 
(Anderson, 2016:145). 
 Accordingly, this scene reproduces the model of the nation as imagined 
through the singing of the national anthem. The way characters stand also parodies 
a music video of the Thai national anthem that is broadcast in Thailand every day. 
This drama imitates a scene from that video by showing people of all ages, ranks, 
and genders. Standing on different levels they signify hierarchy in Thai society. 
Children are on the lowest level, then the hill people, and on the highest level are the 




scene does not only emphasise the Thai-isation of hill people but also it reaffirms the 
traditional structure of Thai gender identities that men, women and Kathoey are all 
members of the same nation and should live together happily. However, if we 
compare this scene to the official music video of the anthem, we recognise there is 
no Kathoey. (Figure 50 and Figure 51).  
This Thai national anthem music video was produced by The National Identity 
Office83. Figure 51 shows the version produced in 2011, which was broadcast during 
the time the drama was aired (2014). In this video, different kinds of people are 
selected to represent Thai citizens. The music video starts with a picture of many 
people standing in rows on different levels. Then a camera zooms out to show that 
there are representatives of many kinds of people of all sexes and ages. It even 
includes people of all religions (Buddhism, Brahman, Christian and Muslim), 
coloured people, people of the ethnic groups, people of many occupations (doctors, 
nurses, teachers, soldiers, police, white-collar/blue-collar workers, bike-taxi riders). 
They are standing in rows and ‘lip-syncing’ to the song. Even the latest version in 
2019 (after the coronation of King Vajiralongkorn) was produced in similar style with 
different kinds of people such as farmers, soldiers, government officers, students, 
and so on. However, there is still no Kathoey. While most types of people are 
included, regardless of their religion, skin colour, ethnicity, occupation, and so on, 
Kathoeys, through their absence, appear not to be accepted, or recognised, as 
ordinary Thai citizens.   
 
Figure 50 A long shot shows different kinds of people are singing 
national anthem (Ploengchimphalee, ep 2) 
 





Figure 51 Image captured from 2011’s music video of Thai national 
anthem  
 
Therefore, the presence of Kathoey in this scene of Ploengchimphalee both 
affirms and challenges these dominant structures of nation. Ploengchimphalee 
makes a model of a nation that reflects traditional concept of genders, which are 
comprised of men-women-Kathoey. However, it also challenges the dominant 
structure of the nation which is based on the Western imperialist concepts of 
binarism. In this drama, Kathoey are presented as strange, ugly creatures who, have 
the ambiguity of being both transgressor and unifier. A Kathoey is included in this 
scene to prove that they have long existed within the Thai nation. They are always 
there, yet have been blended into the combination of new gender concepts, so that 
they are posing no threats to the heteronormative community and its structure.  
 
4.1.4 Conclusion  
Representation of Kathoeys in Thailand reflect the dynamic of gender 
concepts in the country, which have resulted from the combination of three different 
concepts and having been dominated by imperialist thinking and behaviour. In pre-
modern society, Kathoey is a traditional gender in Thailand’s three gender concept, 
and it was differentiated from homosexuality. Thai society tolerated Kathoeys as long 
as they did not show inappropriate sexual behaviours and conformed to normative 
patterns of masculinity or femininity. This is what this thesis has called the ‘old 
Kathoey’ for they belong to traditional society. However, after the arrival of Western 




started to be viewed as a problem. This was indicative that Western ideas of 
heteronormativity and monogamy had come to dominate perceptions of gender in 
Thailand, to being those of duality and binary. 
Thailand has since been influenced by newer ideas of gender from the West, 
and emergent ideas of ‘new Kathoey’ as third gender resulting from globalisation. 
However, these ‘new Kathoey’ are not totally new genders. Rather a relabelling of 
old existing genders took place. Moreover, these new genders are still dominated by 
the idea of binarism. Consequently, Thai modern concepts of gender are a 
combination of three concepts which are the pre-modern Thai (old Kathoey), 
imperialist Western concept of binary, and new Kathoey from globalised trends of 
gender variation. This combination has shaped how Kathoey are tolerated in 
Thailand and presented in Thai TV dramas.  
While old Kathoey is a traditional gender and new Kathoey is part of a new 
globalised social movement, Kathoeys more generally almost disappear, when it 
comes to discussion of nation. Most Thai TV dramas with nationalistic themes ignore 
including Kathoeys. For TV dramas with a northern Thai focus, the main focal point 
of this thesis, Kathoeys are even more uncommon. Such drama focuses on the 
power relationships between Siam and Lanna. Thus, Kathoey are not deemed to 
have a necessary dramatic function. However, Kathoey can exist in this drama as 
long as their roles and functions sustain the heteronormative ideologies. The 
depiction of Kathoey in the North is a double suppression both in terms of ethnicity 
and gender. Therefore, it demonstrates how the Thai nation is combined with this 
subordinate culture and gender and uses them to sustain its power.  
Kathoeys in Thai TV dramas can be both a transgressor and unifier of gender 
and social norms. Kathoeys transgress social norms as they are presented as an 
abnormality, in appearance and behaviour, as to affirm the normality of being male 
and female. They are often shown as a clown, funny, or ugly beings. Kathoey can go 
beyond the restrictions of gender norms and also do what good men and women 
cannot do. At the same time, they also act as a unifier of gender and social norms. 
Even though Kathoey can cross between two gendered social functions, they cause 
no harm or threat to the harmony of the community.  
To conclude, the existence of Kathoeys also contributes to ideas of nation-
building. In this drama, Kathoey is shown as one element of the nation to confirm the 
three gender identities in Thailand. The inclusion of Kathoey in a national anthem 
scene challenges the dominant concepts of gender binary and structure of a nation 
too. Kathoey have long been an element of Thai nation, or in other words, the Thai 




representation of Kathoey today has been shaped by the combination of gender 




4.2 Combination of beauty 
The discussion in this chapter will then focus on the combination of pre-
modern Thai, and Western imperialist modern concepts of beauty. Thailand is a 
country where physical appearance plays an important role in categorising or 
distinguishing people into different hierarchies. The idea of beauty relates to 
traditional beliefs, Buddhism as the major religion, social class, and the products of 
imperialist thinking. These elements have shaped Thai people’s attitudes and 
experiences and then aided in formulating the modern Thai nation, including some 
specific national identities. The hybridised identity produced was intended to be 
viewed as civilised both in the eyes of the West and domestic audiences. This 
chapter investigates the combination of these concepts of beauty, which are 
depicted and used to create power relations between Siam/Thailand and the north, 
and how TV dramas exploit to the idea of beauty in constructing the idea of nation. 
The chapter begins by outlining general concepts of beauty, then moves to a 
historical background of Thai pre-modern beauty to show how concepts of beauty 
are hybridised through a relation with Western ideas. The last section provides an 
analysis of these aspects through exploration of scenes taken from two TV dramas; 
Raknakkara (2017) and Buangbanjathorn (2017).   
This chapter supports the main idea of the thesis that Thai nation-building and 
national identities are not only constructed through a hybridisation with the West, but 
also from combination with other elements from the north, which are included to 
show the relative functions of Siamese superior power. Siam acquired a hybridised 
sense of beauty and identity, and gained power over regional people who became 
internal colonies. Moreover, ethnic or regional identities have been exploited to 
legitimise this Siamese hybridisation. The overstated, repetitive reminding of 
Thainess, Thai essence and identity are represented by the portrayal of northern 
Thai identity in contrast to a modern, hybridised identity. This is an aspect of Thai 
nation-building whereby on the one hand Siam/Thailand used and uses the West to 
enhance their identity; and on the other hand, never fails to fossilise and sustain 
traditional northern Thai identity so as to reinforce the craze for Thainess and 
maintain modes of Siamese power.   
4.2.1 Beauty and hybridity  
 Beauty is not an easy term to define. Even Charles Darwin’s ‘natural 
selection’ cannot explain beauty of some animals as more elaborate elements are 
not essential for their survival. Rather, Darwin uses 'sexual selection' to understand 




based on their innate preferences. Mate choice resulted in the evolution of 
ornamental features that are thus so called beautiful, and pleasing to the senses. 
However, many scholars find this explanation insufficient because sexual 
preferences are malleable and always changing. It is impossible for animals to 
create complex evolution (Prum, 2017). According to Netflix short documentary 
Beauty explained, beauty is what a human brain finds 'pleasure' in. It is a biological 
expression formed in the cortex and dopamine motivates us to approach things we 
find attractive. Nonetheless, it is more difficult in case of the human brain because 
we do not all agree or share the same perception. Humans are creatures influenced 
by social environments. We take variations in that environment and we cooperate 
amongst ourselves. While our brains do not change, our preferences change 
according to time. It is the structure of the society that influences what one regards 
as attractive (Beauty explained, 2019). Regarding this, I would like to draw on 
Umberto Eco's explanation of beauty to show how beauty is diverse and flexible.  
In the beginning, humans associated well-proportioned objects with beauty. 
So, everything that was in symmetry and correct proportion would be regarded as 
beautiful (Eco, 2004:61, 73-74). In the Middle Ages, beauty was related to light and 
colours. People associated God with light, such as the light of the sun, stars, and 
fire. They also used colours as signifiers of wealth and social status. Only the nobles 
and rich people could afford gold, jewels, and colourful clothing, while the poor wore 
only fabrics in drab and modest colours (Eco, 2004:100-102,105-106). Female 
beauty was rarely mentioned since the Middle Ages focused heavily on religion. It 
was not until the Renaissance that female bodies became objects of artists interest 
(Eco, 2004:196). After the seventeenth century, the image of women underwent a 
progressive change as beauty was allied to useful and practical functions. This 
change meant the concept of beauty stepped away from Grand Theory and paved 
the way for subjectivist and particularist concepts of beauty (Eco, 2004:206, 214-
216). 
A new art movement called Mannerism dissolved all the strict rules of 
Classical beauty and art in the Renaissance. It valued ‘public opinion’ and artists’ 
appeal to the imagination more than the intellect or criteria of measure, order and 
proportion (Eco, 2004:221). Follwing this, the Baroque period searched for new 
expressions of beauty. This model allowed beauty to be expressed through ugliness, 
truth through falsehood, and life through death. The ethical nature of beauty does not 
lie in rigid canons of the religious and political authorities, but having dramatic, 
melancholy, dream-like features, express full dignity of beauty and facial expression. 
Then, art moved to a more straightforward style of neoclassicalism, which 




time people started to believe that beauty was not inherent in things, but formed in 
the mind of the critic or the subjectivity of 'bodily taste.’ In other words, the same 
object can appear beautiful to one person and ugly to another (Eco, 2004:246). Or in 
short ‘beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.’ 
In the nineteenth century, the impressionists believed that real things do not 
exist but artists created them. One does not paint a landscape, but an impression of 
a landscape (Eco, 2004:354-356). After the coming of the Art Nouveau movement, 
beauty changed to a beauty of lines, decorative fields, design, and fancy goods (Eco, 
2004: 368-369). Then Deco style inherited its characteristics of abstraction, distortion 
and formal simplification, while moving toward functionalism enhanced by elements 
from Cubism, Futurism and Constructivism (Eco, 2004:371-372). In the twentieth 
century, beauty was no longer for aesthetics alone, and art paid attention to 
everyday objects for commercialisation. Artists like Marcel Duchamp and Andy 
Warhol turned everyday objects into art, reminding us that even the world of industry 
can convey an aesthetic emotion and reveal an unsuspected beauty (Eco, 
2004:409). If we look at media nowadays, we will see that mass media are offering 
different models of beauty. With the coming of pop art, media are full of provocative 
experimental works based on images from the worlds of commerce and industry. So, 
the mass media no longer present any unified model, any single ideal of beauty 
(Eco, 2004:425-426).  
According to Eco, concepts of beauty constantly change and are subjective. 
Beauty is a cultural idea shaped by a dominant culture within a society. To further 
understand the dynamic of beauty, I will use the concept of hybridity. Hybridity is a 
topic discussed in postcolonial studies, whereby two different cultures have contact. 
According to Patrick Hogan (2000), colonised and coloniser would typically form a 
'contact culture.’ That contact leads to widespread modification or even loss of basic 
culture. However, it also leads to a reification of contact culture. There are many 
degrees of contact culture depending on the intensity of contact, degree of 
severance, and degree of internalisation (Hogan, 2000:1-17). According to Stuart 
Hall, hybridity as a postmodern subject is conceived not as having ‘a fixed, essential 
or permanent identity’ but rather as assuming ‘different identities at different times.’ 
The multiple and overlapping forms of identification do not necessarily coexist in an 
easy alignment but set up ‘a series of different positionalities’ which are ‘often 
dislocating in relation to one another’ (cited in Kureishi and Frears, 1999:207,216).  
Hybridity is used to describe intermixing and in different ways. Jaina C. Sanga 
compared hybridity to the notion of leaking or Chutnification. That is ‘in the process 




individual flavours, but rather makes new flavours … this metaphor can also be 
applied to the notion of hybridity because identity is affected by a host of ingredients; 
different people, places, and experiences are chutnified and produce a wholly 
different identity’ (Sanga, 2001:89). Other scholastic ideas on hybridity include 
Edward Said's notion of overlapping, which views immigrants as existing between 
the old empire and new state. Robert Young also questions the fixity of identity by 
discussing issues of colonial desire that are rooted in hybridity. Young differentiates 
between two forms of hybridity. First, hybridity is the combination of two distinct 
things that come together, making one, thereby ‘making a difference into sameness.’ 
Second, hybridity also implies the 'severing' or 'splitting' of one object into two, 
thereby turning ‘sameness into difference.’ Difference and sameness occur in an 
almost uncanny simultaneity; and there is ‘breaking and joining at the same time, in 
the same place’ (cited in Sanga, 2001:79-84).  
 Nevertheless, the key thinker proposing the concept of hybridity is Homi 
Bhabha. According to Bhabha, colonial power did not only dominate, command 
authorities of the colonialist or repress the colonised, but it also produced 
'hybridisation' – a new space which is neither the colonised or the coloniser, rather, 
something 'in-between.’ Bhabha's hybridity is in relation to two words – ambivalence 
and mimicry. Mimicry is a strategy used by a colonial power to transform the colonial 
subject into a 'partial presence' (Bhabha, 1994:86). To dominate one culture, the 
coloniser wants to transform a colonial subject to be something similar to 
themselves. However, this similarity must not be identical since it is 'the desire for a 
reformed, recognisable Other, as a subject of differences that is almost the same, 
but not quite' (Bhabha, 1994:86). The ambivalence is needed to maintain the 
distinction between the coloniser and the colonised. This was done by remaining 
slippage, excess and difference (Huddart, 2006:59). Accordingly, hybridity occurs in 
the process of mimicry. The colonised and coloniser had produced something 'in-
between' or a space that initiated new signs of identity where a social articulation of 
difference is complex in an ongoing negotiation (Bhabha, 1994:1-2) (Chapter 1 has 
also dealt withBhabha's theories of hybridity). 
These concepts of hybridity, mainly Bhabha's, can be used to explain the 
concept of beauty in Thailand. Before the coming of the West, Thais preferences for 
beauty  stemmed from cultural and religious beliefs. After the coming of Western 
imperialism, they adopted specific features of Western beauty that were then 
localised to enhance identities. It was not a mere imitation, but rather a creation of a 
new hybridised identity that was appealing to Thais domestically, while also showing 




illustrates the changing of Thai traditional concepts of beauty to that of the 
hybridised, which now formulate modern Thai identities. 
4.2.2 Concepts of Beauty in Thailand  
4.2.2.1 Thai pre-modern concept of beauty 
 Thailand values physical appearance as a signifier of one’s social status. A 
person’s physical appearance plays a significant role in determining one’s position in 
the prevailing hierarchy. The first important factor that contributes to the concept of 
beauty comes from Buddhism, which is the dominant religion in Thailand, and 
regionally. Thai notions of beauty are related to Buddhist belief that physical 
attributes are markers of one's accumulated merit. Body is a reflection of morality 
that good people must be good-looking. According to Susanne Mrozik, body and 
morality are closely connected, which is not only for buddhas but for all living beings. 
In Buddhist literature, living beings who literally stink with sin, are disfigured by vices 
and, conversely, are perfumed or adorned with merit and virtues. Mrozik calls the 
discourse on bodies as ‘physiomoral discourse’, which means bodies are cast as the 
effects of morality. Through the workings of karma, the body a person has in any 
given lifetime is the effect of his or her past deeds. Two extraordinary beings include 
a buddha, and a world-conquering king (cakravartin), who are adorned with the 
thirty-two auspicious marks of a great man as the karmic effect of their past deeds; 
for example, golden skin that is smooth without dust and dirt, a straight and tall body, 
white teeth, blue eyes and eyelashes like a cow's. The lists of these marks may vary 
yet they signify the Buddhist fascination with a physical body (Mrozik, 2007:62-65). 
Based on the Buddhist belief, complexion, grace, and serenity were reflections of 
moral goodness and ugliness conveyed the opposite. In other words, it is widely 
believed in the country that those who have a dark complexion have had extreme 
misfortune in life and this is due to their lack of merit from previous lives (Weisman, 
2001:234).  
Apart from the signification of merit in life, beauty and skin colour also classify 
people into different classes. It has been a strong perception in the country that 
people with light skin tones are believed to come from higher social status, while 
people with dark skin are on the contrary. This perception is not only found in 
Thailand but evident across all countries in Southeast Asia. Thailand's favouring fair 
skin colours is rooted in the Indian caste system and myths, which the ideal of 
whiteness played a role before European colonisation. Having a fair skin tone in 
most Asian countries implies a woman's chance of fortunate marriage with a partner 




complexions were believed to be guaranteed a better future, and it was an obligation 
for any women with a dark complexion to change their skin tone if they wanted a 
better life. In Jan Weisman’s words, migration of rural labour to the city can 
sometimes be read as a way to upgrade physical appearance or to get fair skin 
(Weisman, 2001:234). This idea implies that dark skin and rural areas are closely 
associated. The discrimination of skin colour resulted from the fact that Thailand is 
an agricultural society in a tropical zone where most people are exposed to sunlight. 
According to Penny Van Esterik, light and bright skin was proof of class because a 
person was exempted from work in the sun (Van Esterik, 2000:154). Besides, 
complexion sometimes also connotes a stereotypical woman's behaviour. Dark-
skinned Thai women are thus commonly stereotyped as being low class and course, 
whereas fair-skinned women are stereotyped as being upper or middle class and 
sexually subtle (Napat, 2013:30). Therefore, the beauty concept in Thailand goes 
beyond skin colour working as criteria for judgement, especially of women. 
While light skin is seen as preferential, having black teeth was a signifier of 
beauty in Thai pre-modern society. During the Ayutthaya period (1351-1767), people 
coated their teeth with black powder from burnt coconut shell for beauty (Kriangkrai, 
2016:237-238). The trend of black teeth continued for decades. It was also another 
way to show one's social status. Apart from coating their teeth, many people claimed 
that the black teeth were a result of betel chewing (Petchrung, 2017:79). Betel 
chewing was a habit that was widely practised throughout the country, and wealthy 
people had to carry with them accessories that were used in consuming it. Those 
accessories were indications of one's wealth as well as status, and they were given 
as valuable presents (Kham, 2017). Black teeth had been a mark of beauty until King 
Chulalongkorn took his first tour to Europe and perceived they needed to be white 
(Thongchai, 2000b:538). Only then, the trend of black teeth dropped, firstly among 
the elites, and then expanding to common society. 
 Obsession with beauty and appearance, especially whiteness, was firmly held 
in Thai society and Thais still use it as a classification in the social stratification 
system to distinguish people of different groups. When influences of other cultures 
reached the country, Thais adopted new trends of beauty that matched their social 
values and turned them towards a hybridised concept of modern beauty. 
4.2.2.2 Thai beauty reform: hybridity with the West    
  The hybridity of Thai identity has been mixed between Thai and many races 
such as jek (mainland and overseas Chinese), khaek (Persian, Indo-Malay, South 
Asian and middle-Eastern and most Asian Muslims) and Lao. However, the mix of 




modernism and has become the aesthetic face of Thailand (Pattana, 2010:58-59; 
Harrison, 2010a:33).  
 The hybridisation of beauty started when Siam had contact with Western 
imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Western influences affected many aspects 
of life, firstly among the elites, and one of them was the sartorial reform. It was 
strongly believed that the fashion reform of the Siamese elites was a part of 
diplomatic strategies done in order to gain a civilised image in the Western eye. The 
reform started among the court men as they were encouraged to wear long hair and 
moustaches. As well, women's beauty was restyled to having long hair and 
Victorian-style dress84 (Peleggi, 2002:48,59). The bodily reform was emphasised on 
women’s bodies more than men’s, as they were objects of the Western gaze, 
through which the West judged and assumed Siam’s lack of civilisation. In King 
Vajiravudh’s reign (1910-1925), the female appearance was observed and judged by 
the West as backward, i.e., having black teeth and a short-brush-cut hairstyle that 
made them look like men. Besides, the chongkrabaen85 worn by both men and 
women made them indistinguishable by the West. According to the Western 
perspective, they were strategies that Siam used to keep woman unattractive and 
implied limited freedom and equality of women. Therefore, King Vajiravudh needed 
to raise the status of Thai women and encouraged them to wear their hair long and 
use skirts (Van Esterik, 2000:99).  
Western facial beauty and cosmetics have become popular among elite 
women during the time of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), as Western cosmetics 
were imported to Thailand. Accordingly, beauty was interpreted less as a natural 
attribute than something that can be purchased and enhanced so that it was the 
responsibility of women to develop their own beauty rather than assume 
responsibility for meritorious acts. As beauty trends changed, Thai's habit of betel 
chewing and their black teeth became less popular and was banned. During King 
Prajadhipok's reign (1925-1935), the trend of white teeth rather than black teeth 
became part of the new criteria of beauty (Van Esterik, 2000:154). After 1940, the 
Phibun government sought to standardise bodily practice and to discipline Thai 
citizens, so the chewing of betel was declared illegal (Peleggi, 2008:73). From this 
period, Thais started to have white teeth according to Western beauty standards. 
The idea of promoting Western beauty was more concrete under the Phibun 
regime, the period when nationalist culture heavily stressed national stability and 
 
84 High-necked blouse trimmed with lace, old sabai (a piece of long cloth) worn over it, and a 
silk chongkrabaen, European stockings, and high-heeled shoes (Peleggi, 2002:60).  




progress. This time, the emphasis was on costume and fashion, which were effective 
strategies to deliver civilised images, just as in other countries. For example, after 
the declaration of independence, America used fashion as a means to appear as a 
new independent nation in the eyes of the world. American people devoted to 
pleasure, dress and extravagance and they believed to dress up ‘for the good of my 
country’ (Haulman, 2011:181-84). Likewise, in Thailand, twelve sets of cultural 
mandates were released to discipline the citizens and modernise the image of the 
country. One of the cultural mandates regulated a dress code which called on the 
public to dress in a neat and well-groomed manner so that Thailand would become 
‘the equal of civilised nations.’ Specified 'Western clothing' was regulated in detail, 
such as men wearing hats, shoes and socks, jacket and long trousers, with women 
wearing hats, skirts, blouses covering the shoulder, gloves, and high-heeled shoes. 
Socks and stockings were also encouraged but not compulsory (Barmé, 1993:156-
157).  
This policy urged all Thais to believe that they were not 'barbaric.’ The Thai 
government believed that ‘proper dress and correct manner are no different from 
other civilised countries’ (Peleggi, 2007:151; Van Esterik, 2000:103). Accordingly, 
fashion reform and bodily practice turned out to be a physical burden for Thai women 
in that they must take responsibility for the nation in both concrete and personal 
ways. Kanjana Hubik Thepboriruk argues that this cultural mandate was patriotism 
via motherhood. The mandate required Thai women, whom they called ‘Thai sisters’, 
to achieve self-improvement through health, behaviour, and dress, and obliged them 
to take good care of children as well as make sacrifice and volunteer for the nation 
(Kanjana, 2019:245-248). Such bodily practice was a responsibility that one must do 
for the nation.  
Furthermore, a woman's body became a symbolic space for national progress 
as Phibun further promoted beauty and clothing contests. The Miss Siam contest in 
1934 was regarded as an official policy of the Thai government to promote nation-
building. As Peleggi stated, the launching of the Miss Siam contest on the same day 
of the celebration of Constitution Day, 10 December 1934, proclaimed the 
relationship of the physical body of citizens, mainly female, with the abstract body 
politic (Peleggi, 2008:72). In Van Esterik’s terms, the beauty contest was a strategy 
that Phibun used to display new Western fashion for Thai women (Van Esterik, 
2000:140). Before the Phibun regime, contestants wore both Western and traditional 
Thai attire. After Phibun was in power (first period 1938-1944), the contestants were 
told to wear only Western-style clothing – dresses, high-heeled shoes, hats and 
gloves (Barmé, 2002:235). Beauty contests in Thailand was thus closely connected 




women to represent the new civilised country. Kanchana calls this action as creating 
‘the fashionably patriotic Thai women’ (Kanjana, 2019:249) and Van Esterik terms it 
as the turning of Thai women into the ‘public embodiment of Thai culture' and ‘flower 
of the nation' (Van Esterik, 2000:103, 105).  
Beauty contests were later exported to a global level and thus required a 
higher degree of Western standards of beauty. It aimed to promote Thailand to being 
better known abroad, with contestants joining the Miss Universe competition. Then, 
Western standards of beauty for face, figure and posture played a significant role as 
judgment and evaluation of beauty. During this period, more and more beauty 
queens possessed a Western look, and several of them were luk-khreung or mixed-
raced children, who were born and raised in western countries and moved back to 
Thailand to join the contest. A good example is the Miss Thailand winner of 1988 
Porntip (Pui) who is a Thai-born, California-raised woman and in 1992 several 
runner-up contestants were Thai-Caucasian mixed-race children (Van Esterik, 
2000:149-150). However, this trend brought the question of authenticity and 
Thainess as a representative of Thai women. The 1992 Miss Thailand contest was 
criticised because three out of five finalists had mixed looks (two out of three were 
born to Thai and American parents) and failed to express themselves in Thai. 
Nevertheless, it was undeniable that their 'mixed-looks' and facility in English are 
sought out in the international level contests as Pui Phornthip won the Miss 
Universes title because of her cultural hybridity, while Miss Orn-anong, who 
exemplified typical traditional Thai beauty and was crowned Miss Thailand of 1992, 
could not strengthen Thailand’s chances in the international competition (Van 
Esterik, 2000:149-150). Accordingly, beauty standards in Thailand moved from the 
traditional Thai to being hybridised with Western beauty standards, which are 
commonly embodied in in the ‘luk-khreung.’  
4.2.3 Luk-khreung: a new hybridised Thai identity  
 Luk-khreung means 'half child', or mixed-race offspring. This word can cover 
any mixture of races, but in most of Thais’ perceptions, it generally connotes mixed-
race children of a Thai and a Western parent. The craze over luk-khreung is part of a 
significant Thais fetish for farang. Farang is a term used in Thailand to refer to a 
Westerner or Western-derived things. Pattana explains that the word was borrowed 
from Muslim Persians, and Indians, used to refer to the Portuguese who visited their 
shores. Farang is also a generic term referring to any Westerner or Western-derived 
things without any specification of nationality, culture, ethnicity, language, and so on. 
(Pattana, 2010:61). In the second half of the twentieth century, farang moved from 




Accordingly, the luk-khreung phenomenon is seen as the Thai craze for things 
farang or the farang-isation of the Thai, at both individual and national levels 
(Pattana, 2010:71-72). 
Luk-khreung in Thailand, to a large extent, were a consequence of the post-
Vietnam War era, after the 1960s, when American GIs stationed at the US military 
bases in upcountry Thailand fathered children with Thai women (Pattana, 2010:72). 
Most of the luk-khreung at that time were the children of American GIs and non-elite 
Thai women, even though some of them were born from elite or high-ranking 
couples. During the 1960s-1970s, interracial marriage with European people was not 
widely accepted, and mixed-race children were stigmatised as 'wild rice' seedlings 
(ขา้วนอกนา khao nok na). Reynolds stated that it carries a sign of illegitimacy, 
analogous to seedlings that have fallen ‘outside the dyked boundaries of the rice 
field’ (Reynolds, 1999:269). Luk-khreung children in the later generation are also a 
result of sex tourism86 and the expansion of the economy resulting in more contact 
with the West.  
It was only after the boom of Amerasian/Eurasian luk-khreung popularity in 
the 1980s that Thailand’s entertainment industry discovered luk-khreung as 
representatives of a modern form of Thainess ‘constructed as being cosmopolitan 
and self-confident, successful and beautiful, prepared to take its place alongside 
other ‘modernities’ on the global stage.’ (Pattana, 2010:72). In Weisman’s terms, 
after 1990s, luk-khreung have become a ‘positive – even desirable – status, viewed 
as linking not only the individual but the nation with positive, desired, Western worlds 
beyond Thailand's borders.’ Images of luk-khreung are constructed and commodified 
to project a modern, developed, cosmopolitan picture of the country to an 
international audience. Their fluency in English, physical attractiveness, and well-
developed talents are essential in international competitions, such as beauty 
contests, or even at the Olympic games (Weisman, 2001:233).   
However, not all mixed-race children are favoured in Thai society. Luk-
khreung of Thai and Chinese parentage was not highly positioned. During the reign 
of King Vajiravudh, the Chinese as well as their descendants were discriminated 
against as the king developed an extreme ideology of nationalism, patriotism and 
ethnicity at the expense of the Chinese, whom he regarded as the Jews of the East 
(Sulak, 2002:36). During the 1940s, the government policy aimed to limit the 
 
86 During the Vietnam war, the United States Air Force established a military base at U-
Tapao Airport in Pattaya city, Rayong Province. Pattaya is renowned as Thailand's tourist 
destination for the American soldiers. After the war ended, Pattaya expanded and developed 




Chinese from many rights. Any names or surnames which denoted Chinese origin 
had to be changed, people of Chinese extraction were not allowed to join the 
military, and Thais were told to hate the Chinese (Sulak, 2002:40). For Thai politics, 
the Chinese bourgeoisie were restricted from political participation because of the 
criterion of citizenship. Moreover, the underground, marginalised Chinese, were 
identified as communists, and thus labelled as alien or ‘un-Thai’ (Chai-anan, 
2002:56-58). As their racial identities were not accepted, Thai-Chinese children, who 
were and are large in number, needed to merge with Thai identity and become 
localised as konthai chue sai jeen, (คนไทยเชื.อสายจนี) or 'Thai with Chinese race', and 
via the building of intense Thai patriotism (Sitthithep, 2015:116-119). Only luk-
khreung who are part-White are highly positioned while the public embodiment of 
luk-khreung of other ancestry, especially of those who are part-Black is problematic 
(Weisman, 2001:234). According to Pattana, luk-khreung whose fathers were of 
African-American87 descent endured discrimination and ostracism (Pattana, 
2010:72). A good example which shows social discrimination against part-Black luk-
khreung is a Thai novel Khao Nork Na (1976) by Thai author Sifa Mahawan. This 
novel depicts the life of a half-Black girl who has to struggle with hardship while her 
half-sister, who is half-White, has a better fortune and is adopted by a wealthy family. 
This trend of luk-khreung beauty set such a standard that other types of 
beauty faded out. In modern-day Thailand, races that are in the bottom ranks of 
social hierarchy according to Thai beauty standards include traditional Thai and 
other ethnicities. For example, the facial features of people in the northeast are 
known as ‘Na Lao’88 (หน้าลาว), which means Lao face. A lot of Thai upcountry girls, 
both in the northeast and other regions, evaluate their beauty based on central Thai 
beauty conveyed in TV. Here, beauty means having an international look, which is 
characterised by fairer skin, an oval face, a more angular and narrow nose, wide 
eyes and being tall (Hesse-Swain, 2006:266).  Specific facial features of north-
eastern (Isan) Thais, such as ‘Na Lao’, are undesirable among the people in the 
northeast, and they want to transform their physical appearances as a result. Many 
Isan people even squeeze the nose of infants to prevent it from being flat and broad, 
and whitening skincare products are ubiquitous (Hesse-Swain, 2006:266-268). 
However, there is also an ‘extreme localisation of ethnic identity in the discourse of 
globalisation.’ They describe their Na Lao features as ugly, but they are aware that 
their faces could be viewed as beautiful outside the country. For example, they say 
 
87 Luk-khreung in the 1960s are offspring of American GIs, so any half-Black children were 
assumed to be descent from African-American fathers. 
88 Facial feature of people in the northeastern Thailand which is also called Lao face or Isan 




that their exotic looks elicited more positive responses in the US (Hesse-Swain, 
2006:269).  
Unlike the northeast, people in the north, especially women, were generally 
regarded as beautiful according to central Thai beauty standards. According to 
Darunee, the north is often described in tourism media as having beauty in three 
main aspects, which are beauty of nature, culture and tradition, and women. Her 
thesis studied the representation of Chiang Mai beauty as the capital of the north 
and it found that Chiang Mai women were described as having fair, white skin tones, 
sweet faces, and a gentle manner (Darunee, 2006:2-4). Though the beauty of 
northern women was well regarded compared to the northeast, facial features of 
typical northern people do not correspond with the Western beauty standards 
exhibited by luk-khreung and favored in the capital Bangkok. For example, a 
research in 2014 found that the most popular surgery for women in Chiang Mai was 
rhinoplasty, nose jobs, followed by cheek and jaw surgery (Kanoknat, 2014).  
More and more people whose faces do not comply with Western beauty 
standards are having surgery to transform their beauty. Thai women often modify 
their faces such as having nose jobs and eye lifts. In 2012, the plastic surgery 
industry was worth more than 20,000 million baht (500 million GBP approx.), which 
sharply increased from 2011 at 15,000 million baht (375 million GBP approx.). This 
sufficiently demonstrates that plastic surgery is a fast-growing business in Thailand 
(Kanoknat, 2014:2). According to the International Society of Aesthetic Plastic 
Surgery (ISAPS), in 2017 Thailand was ranked 21st in the world for plastic surgery 
cases, with the top three most popular surgeries being eyelid, breasts, and nose 
enhancements (Nantchanok, 2017). A modelling agency in Thailand stated that more 
and more young people usually have a nose job and double eyelid fix, as they 
believe they would look more suitable for TV, with an angular, pointed nose looking 
apparently more appealing on camera than ‘flat’ noses. It has become commonly 
understood among young people that plastic surgery is a pathway to the 
entertainment industry (Yuphaphorn, 2013:8-9).   
Although luk-khreung beauty is favoured by the majority in Thailand, there is 
also a concern about the deterioration of Thainess. This concern is intensified 
especially in the globalising world. The question of 'Thai tae’ (ไทยแท ้authentic Thai) 
and ‘Thai thiam’ (ไทยเทยีม synthetic Thai) is widely discussed (Reynolds, 1999:264). 
There are efforts to bring back and recall authentic Thai identities. Kasian Tejapira 
calls this anxiety around being Thai ‘cultural schizophrenia’, and by presenting ‘split 
in personality’ or fragmented subjectivity. Thais try to show that the interiorised Thai 




or activity. This reflects the ‘irrepressible, ardent, resilient, recurrent and ever-
reincarnating desire to be Thai.’ These people need a purifying of Thainess, which 
means presenting Thainess in a form that has to be old, venerable, immutable and 
fossilised in present-day circumstances such as traditional dress, and classical 
dance. All these are attempts to ‘spiritualise, purge, subjectivise, and project 
Thainess back into a solid image or sign of their desire’ (Kasian, 2002:210-15).  
However, many scholars argue that it is impossible to extract Thai or Western 
elements out of modern Thai identities. Reynolds notes that the distinguishing factor 
between the two sides are more and more difficult to judge because luk-khreung 
offspring gained more acceptance in Thailand and engender the ‘postcolonialist Thai 
self’ (Reynolds, 1999:270). Similarly, Harrison (2010a), Thongchai (2010), and 
Pattana (2010) argue that Thai and Western features became a hybridity that is 
inseparable. Harrison argues that the farang-isation of Thai aesthetics, culture and 
identities is intense, and it is impossible to separate out the strands. The hybrid 
identity that Thais have with the West cannot be examined in isolation from the 
powerful cultural influences of the outside world (Harrison, 2010a:34). Thongchai 
further adds that nothing is pure culture since the West in Thailand is a 'Thai-ised 
west’, and many Thai identities are colonial products (Thongchai, 2010:149). 
Moreover, Pattana notes that the Thai craze for Western things now goes deeper in 
mental and physical terms. From his point of view, luk-khreung is a form of hybrid 
identity caused by the cultural intimacy between Thais and the West, and that it is 
impossible to deny or squeeze out Western features from Thai identity (Pattana, 
2010:72.74). According to these scholars, luk-khreung, as well as their innate link to 
Western beauty, have become a hybridised, modern Thai identity. This hybridisation 
of beauty is used in nation-building and it is explicit in Thai TV dramas.  
4.2.4 Analysis of TV dramas  
In this section, I will analyse hybridised beauty appearing in Thai TV dramas 
in relation to three topics. The first topic will show how the hybridised beauty of 
actors is used to modernise the past. The second illustrates how hybridised beauty 
implies power and social hierarchy. The final topic shows Thai's concern regarding 
Westernisation and the revival of Thainess, expressed through the fetishizing of a 
nostalgic Thai past and spiritual comfort set against Western material progress.  
4.2.4.1 Westernised beauty modernises the past  
Many Thai historical dramas today have placed tremendous effort on 
production quality to create almost perfect imitation of the past. However, while many 




historical dramas sit in contrast to the overall production. In this section, I want to 
demonstrate that Thai historical TV dramas have exploited luk-khreung actors and 
hybridised beauty to modernise the past.                                                        
Raknakkara (2017) is an excellent example to show contradictions between 
historical settings and actors. This selected version shows strong representation of 
northern Thai culture and it has been praised by media and drama fans as an 
accurate historical adaptation, especially concerning the representation of characters 
(wearing traditional costumes), language (speaking northern dialect), props and 
locations. The production house claimed that they worked with specialised 
consultants and costume designers, who were textile experts.  
 Raknakkara gained interest with not only the media and general public, but 
also academic interest too. Film critics, historians and scholars widely discussed the 
drama on topics relating to its cultural and historical representations. For example, 
Manop Manasam, a lecturer from the Faculty of Fine Arts, Chiang Mai University 
praised this drama for creating a ‘neo-Lanna’89 phenomenon where many people, 
including those in nearby countries, became interested in northern Thai culture. 
Several seminars were also held in both academic and non-academic arenas. For 
example, an interview with the author and costume designer of the show, about 
inspiration drawn from the novel and textile history (Figure 52). In contrast, some 
scholars saw that the historical representation of the drama was problematic. Tanet 
Charoenmuang, one of the leading Thai scholars in historical and cultural studies, 
argues that ‘there is no neo-Lanna in this situation, but only a commercialised 
Lanna.’ For Tanet, Raknakkara brings only a discussion on appearances, costumes 
and acting, while little discussion focuses on its content. He points out that the drama 
reflected the failure of historical studies in Thailand since historical facts were 
ignored, and a reproduction of history into imagination never leads to arguments or 
debates and it has dramatised the individual’s tragedy over historical facts (Tanet, 
2017).  
These public and academic receptions demonstrate how the message of the 
drama and its representation of culture, history, and appearances are interpreted in 
diverse aspects. Raknakkara has been observed in relation to both cultural and 




89 He published this post on his personal Facebook account on 17 September 2017. After 





Figure 52 Posters for seminars and talks on topics regarding Raknakkara, in 
academic and non-academic arenas. (Event organisers from top to bottom: 
Top: Chiang Mai University; Bottom left: Museum Siam; Bottom right: 
Paruskavan Palace)  
Despite the effort to produce a convincing historical drama, the beauty of the 
actors is modernised and westernised. Among four leading actors, who play northern 
Thai people, one of them is Thai-Belgian (Chaiyapol Julien Poupart) and the other 
three (Nathaphon Temirak, Nittha Jirayungyurn and Prin Suparat) are Thai. 
However, they all have features of Eurasian beauty which are white skin, bigger and 
pointed noses, big rounded eyes with double eyelids90, oval or V-shaped face. Such 
Eurasian faces are ubiquitous on Thai TV, although they do not represent the 
characters. This is because Thai TV drama is a genre that primarily targets Thai 
audiences. Though the internet has provided more opportunities to reach 
international audiences worldwide, television drama is not 'officially' exported, neither 
by the Thai government nor TV stations. Some dramas are available on online-video 
platforms such as YouTube, but they do not have English subtitles. Even in some 
 
90 Some Thai people are born with Asian eyes that appear to slant because of epicanthic 
folds. Big rounded eyes with ‘double eyelids’ or clear lines on upper eyelid are more 
favourable among many Thais. Many people have had double eyelid surgery which is a 




nearby countries such as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, where Thai TV dramas are 
favoured because of cultural proximity, the distribution of Thai TV dramas to those 
countries is done privately and illegally (Amporn, 2008;2016). 
Thai films, on the other hand, target both Thai and international audiences. 
According to May Adadol Ingawanij, there are two types of Thai films, which are the 
‘bourgeois heritage film’ and ‘un-Thai teen cinema.’ The first type forms within a 
category of period films that lay claim to international quality by referencing national 
biography and are regarded as emblematic of the bourgeois narcissistic sensibility. 
Some of them may lie outside the realm of national biography, but they usually come 
with an 'aesthetic turn toward historicist spectacle and pastiche' (May Adadol, 
2006:75-77). These heritage films were aimed to be exported at in international level, 
while the un-Thai teen cinema targets Thai youth with a style of music-video movies, 
generic cityscape, pop-cultural artefacts and a large cast of young, new, actors (May 
Adadol, 2006:135, 144-145).   
Many ‘heritage films’ were produced after the 1997 economic crisis. These 
films were made in the anti-West atmosphere as Thais felt they were threatened by 
Western financial forces again. For Harrison, post-1997 films mostly deal with a 
nationalistic sense, a yearning for Thainess and a Thai rural past. Sometimes they 
respond to the Tourist Authority of Thailand's promotion of an 'Amazing Thailand' by 
presenting ‘exotic landscape, verdant nature, vibrant colours, serene spirituality, 
explosive cuisine, balletic martial arts, bucolic peacefulness, total relaxation and 
sensual pleasure’ that incorporate a set of fantasies and appeal to international 
audiences (Harrison, 2005:326). Amporn Jirattikorn (2003) also points out that Thai 
films in the 1990s followed the 'go-inter' trend and they were moving up to the 
international market (Amporn, 2003:299). Based on these film categories and 
definitions, Thai films that target international market feature Thai actors who best 
represent images of Thailand in the past while luk-khreung actors are commonly 
found in teen movies. Characters in heritage or historical films possess the pre-
modern 'authentic’ Thai beauty, which are dark skin, flat noses, a round or square 






Figure 53. Examples of period/historical films with ‘authentic Thai’ actors (from 
left to right Bangrajan (2000), Nang Nak (1999), Suriyothai (2001), Naresuan 
(2007), Ong Bak (2003), Fa Talai Jone (2001)).  
However, there are exceptions in some historical films where hybridised 
beauty can be found. For example, Thawiphop’s91 main actor contradicts the film’s 
nationalistic agenda because it is meant to ‘reiterate the message for Thais to 
accommodate, assimilate and move with the times.’ In other words, a luk-khreung 
actor stresses the film’s key message that Thais are flexible in learning and adopting 
from the West (Harrison, 2010b:116), which was a theme of that film and a feature 
that is seen to have saved Thailand from colonisation. Other historical/period films 
which show hybridised beauty tend to be romances or melodramatic films. They do 
not aim to sell the 'authentic Thai' look to international audiences or provoke 
nationalistic sensibility amongst Thais (Figure 54).  
 
 
91 A 2004 film, directed by Surapong Pinijkhar, about a contemporary young woman who 
travelled back to Siam during the 19th century and witnessed the country's struggles against 





Figure 54. Examples of Thai period/historical romances that feature 
‘hybridised beauty.’  
The same rule applies to historical TV dramas which target Thai viewers. 
According to Gerhard Jaiser, Westernised features of Thai actors are so prominent 
that ‘Thai sought for Westernised beauty makes these actors even more farang than 
farangs themselves’ (Jaiser, 2017:156). As Reynolds states, these facial features are 
‘highly prized’ in the Thai entertainment industry. This phenomenon is ‘the 
engendering of a postcolonialist Thai self, which has been part and parcel of the 
commercialisation and commodification of beauty in Thai popular culture for some 
time’ (Reynolds,1999: 269-270). Thai TV has manipulated the marketable new Thai 
self and beauty and thus can guarantee profits for the business. 
Besides Eurasian facial features, Raknakkara also avoids pre-modern bodily 
practices such as the exposure of the upper part of a body. As mentioned in Chapter 
3.2, three ethnic groups were selected to represent three fictional kingdoms in 
Raknakkara because their ethnic costumes are distinguishable. However, these 
costumes also help the drama makers to create more civilised images of northern 
kingdoms. During the nineteenth century, women in the north did not cover their 
upper body. Commoners usually had a piece of cloth to wrap loosely around their 




occasions such as religious ceremonies. Even the upper class and nobles rarely 
wore shirts. It was not until the late nineteenth century that shirts had become 
common in everyday use (Manop, 2008:125, 129). Stitched vestimentary or western-
style blouses were regarded as the mark of civilisation among court women and the 
Bangkok elites (Peleggi 2008: 67-68). The fashion reform was carried to the north by 
Dara Rasami, Lanna princess and queen consort of Chulalongkorn, after the Lanna 
kingdom became a province under Siam’s administrative system. Dara Rasami 
mixed Siamese Westernised fashion with northern Thai (Lanna) style. She adopted 
the use of upper garments, such as lacy Victorian blouses draped with a silken sash 
to accompany Lanna tube skirt (Woodhouse, 2009:170). Dara Rasami entered the 
Siamese court in 1886 and did not return home until 1908 and permanently leaving 
the Bangkok palace in 1914, which was after the timeline featured in Raknakkara. 
This information implies that if the drama makers wanted to depict accurate 
presentations of Lanna people (the majority of whom are ethnic Tai Yuan), they had 
to show uncivilised, unreformed dress, or topless actors. Instead, the selection of 
costumes from Tai Lue, Tai Khoen, and Burmese groups helped them to avoid the 
issue of uncivilised dress or topless appearance. Women in these ethnic groups 
were commonly seen wearing suea pat92 or htaingmathein93, while northern Thai 
women in the Lanna kingdom wore simpler shirts, or not at all due to the hot climate. 
Other pre-modern signifiers of beauty are eliminated, such as black teeth. So, it is 
not merely for fashion or beauty purposes that this was done, but to create a refined, 
reworked, version of the past. 
 
 
92 A long-sleeved shirt with no buttons. It is worn by wrapping the right side of the front panel 
of the shirt over the left side of the front panel, and the two panels are then tied together via 
strings. 





Figure 55. Northern Thai women in 1902 (Sarassawadee, 2005:220)   
A reason behind the contradiction lies in a specific pattern of entertainment 
media in the country. Raknakkara, as well as many other Thai historical TV dramas, 
conform to this pattern. Only admirable aspects of Thai history and refined depictions 
of the past are permitted on screen. Stories of most Thai historical dramas revolve 
around similar themes about heroic deeds of heroes or showing yearning for a 
nostalgic past (this issue is discussed in detail in chapter 2). In order to reproduce 
good images of the country, many Thai historical dramas select only positive aspects 
from captured moments in textbooks and entertainment media. For example, 
Bupphesanniwat, Thailand's most famous historical TV drama in 2019, is full of 
scenes taken or inspired from textbooks and Thai tourism advertisements. According 
to Patrick Jory, Bupphesanniwat creates the romanticised setting of a noble 
household, to show Thai family in the past living in a decorated traditional Thai-style 
house. Though there are masters and slaves and a strict code of bodily practices, 
the drama naturalises social distinctions and inequality as inherently good. All this 
fantasy comes with a soundtrack of Thai classical music. He states: ‘it is a textbook 
example of official constructions of Thai culture that could have been produced by 
the Ministry of Culture’ (Jory, 2018:443).   
Similarly, Irene Stengs argues that Thai dramas and films have repeatedly 
dramatised moments of historical records, and vice versa, which she terms these 
moments the ‘moving monuments.’ King Naresuan’s victory, Queen Suriyothai’s 
sacrifice and the villagers of Bang Rajan’s bravery, all these have been reproduced 
in numerous media and their monuments have been erected in many places both to 
imitate and inspire scenes in films. In Bupphesanniwat, a scene is a duplicate of an 
image which was drawn from an important event in Thai history. This image, 




shown in a flashback scene when Ketsurang (the main character) saw it in her 
history class. The imitation of that image, which illustrates the French ambassador 
handing over a letter from Louis XIV to King Narai, and a story behind the event, are 
filmed and blurred as a real event in Bupphesanniwat (Figure 56). As a consequence 
of this, Ketsurang, a contemporary woman who has time-slipped back into the 
Ayutthaya period in the seventeenth century, now being able to confirm what she 
learned in class is correct, exclaims to herself that ‘history is not wrong’ and ‘it is the 
truth.’ Thus, this scene offers an opportunity to demonstrate the accuracy of the 
twenty-first-century Thai history curriculum (Stengs, 2020:265).  
According to Stengs, these film directors need the reality of the monuments to 
create the ultimate sense of reality and make convincing movies. As she states, ‘for 
Thai public, monuments determine to a significant degree what history looked like.’ 
Moreover, all these captured moments from historical TV drama are recreated by 
costume-playing fairs for the public to have direct experience of a nostalgic past. 
King Vajiralongkorn’s ‘Love and Warmth at Winter’s End’ fairs was held in 2018-2019 
at the Dusit Palace and Sanam Suea Pa to promote the wearing of traditional Thai 
costumes. The events were in parallel with the Government’s programme to 
encourage Thai citizens to wear traditional costumes after the hype of 
Bupphesanniwat. The way these dramas/films popularised tourist destinations and 
costume wearing implies that ‘Thai people need continuous (re)education in Thai 
history, culture and values, to guarantee that the country will remain independent 
and unified.’ In other words, it is the re-enactment of absolute monarchy veiled in the 
new attire of entertainment (Stengs, 2020:278-279).  
 





Based on Stengs and Jory's views, I would like to suggest that historical 
events are visualised and idealised not only to confirm 'historical truth' but also to 
revise and edit them into a better version. Likewise, in Raknakkara, hybridised 
beauty in the historical setting is the romanticisation of the past as an ideal paradise 
lost. Photographs of actors in ethnic costumes are compared with old photos. These 
photos were uploaded by costume designers and the production house in their 
Instagram accounts. They posted these pictures from the dramas in comparison with 
old photos to prove that they used research for costume design. At the same time, 
the comparison of these photos credited the whole team of drama makers, in being 
able to duplicate the look almost perfectly, and gain public acceptance of presenting 
historical and cultural accuracy (Figure 57). These photos were reposted on social 
media like Twitter and Thailand’s famous web board Pantip.com by drama fans. 
These photos may appear like a perfect imitation of the past, however, they are not 
simply a reproduction of the past but an upgrade to be more elaborate version with a 
hybridised beauty that attracts contemporary audiences. 
 
 
Figure 57 Characters as replicas of old pictures and paintings (images from 




In Figure 57, pre-modern beauty in the old picture can be contrasted with the 
hybridised beauty of the shown contemporary Thai actors. People in the old 
picture/painting have darker skin tones (partly because of photo quality), thick lips 
and smaller eyes. Women in the old picture/painting (upper and lower right) have 
round-shape faces, which is an outstanding feature of people in the north of 
Thailand, while the actors have oval or V-shaped faces. In the lower right picture, 
women use long pieces of cloth to wrap around loosely, which was a common bodily 
practice of people in pre-modern Lanna. Nevertheless, the female actor in the lower 
left photo wraps her torso tightly and properly as nudity or exposing female upper 
body is unacceptable in modern Thai society, especially on TV. In addition, the male 
actor has a fine brushed-up hairstyle which is different from a traditional cut in the 
mural painting, where men have shaved the sides and back of their heads and left 
the top hair in the shape that looks like the horns of the buffalo. The actor’s hairstyle 
is modern and commonly found among contemporary Thai men. Hairstyle is one of 
the most common anachronistic features in Thai historical dramas. Hybridised faces 
with modern hairstyles make these actors look more beautiful, contemporaneously, 
than the people in the past that they are supposed to represent. For example, female 
actors in the drama Plaijawak, set in the nineteenth century, long hair substitutes 
short, with brush-cut hairstyles during the 19th century to offer modern beauty for 
these characters (Figure 58). 
 
 
Figure 58. Female hairstyles of elite women in King Chulalongkorn’s reign. 
Top: the Bunnag family (Sirinya, 2015), Bottom: female characters from a 




Not only their faces but also their posture and costume are refined and 
elaborated. The couple in the old picture (upper right) are prince and princess of the 
northern kingdoms, and in their wedding dress. In the top left picture, actors are set 
in the same posture. However, the female actor sits with straight back and shoulder 
while the actual princess in the old picture has bent back and shoulders. It suggests 
that the character in the drama is more confident than the woman in the picture. 
Besides which, the outfit of the male actor is more extravagant than the man in the 
old picture. His headdress, decorative collar on his shirt, and sleeves, are more 
prominent and adorned with gold. While the outfits of these two actors are in bright, 
vivid colours, in the old picture, they are dull and discoloured because of the 
greyscale film. This picture is elaborated into a scene where two leading characters, 
Sukkawong and Maenmuang, get married. The drama adds more detail to present a 
traditional wedding with servants, soldiers, king and prince attending the ceremony.  
This scene starts with extreme close-up shots. We see the back of 
Maenmuang’s wedding dress. Then she walks far from the camera, to the 
wedding pavilion, with 4-5 servants preceding and following her. The 
background of the set is a group of northern-style buildings and a 
monastery. All these come with slow and soft background music from string 
instruments. Maenmuang sits on a chair. A camera gives close up of her 
face. Then, Sukkawong enters from an arch doorway at the side of the 
ceremonial area and walks to the pavilion.  
Two servants talk to each other: Don’t you see? He is beautiful as being 
moulded from an angel. 
When he approaches close to a camera, louder, faster tempo music from 
keyboard and string instruments is played. Then, Sukkawong sits on 
another chair. A wide shot shows overall setting. We see Sukkawong and 
Maenmuang sitting on separate chairs. On both sides are two servants 
sitting on the floor. This scene takes 1.28 min. (Figure 59)  
 
 




The drama makes use of this wedding picture and develops it to a realistic 
presentation. Wedding dresses are replicated with more elegant details – costumes, 
setting, props and music. Servants and a parade of wedding guests are added in the 
following scenes to make a grand scene. From the greyscale picture, now audiences 
can see the whole event in colours and moving pictures. Facial beauty is intensified 
with close-up shots, at the same time as the camera showing details of traditional 
costume. The character's beauty is echoed to the audience in a conversation 
between two servants that he is as beautiful as a divine94. The drama producers do 
not only remake the past but also improve it via the body of these actors. Hybridity of 
Eurasian physical features and historical elements makes a space where the past 
can be reinterpreted and offers admirable perspectives. This drama illustrates how 
the past looked and at the same time shapes the perceptions of Thai audiences in 
how they should view and love their national history. 
 In Pattana’s terms, the luk-khreung phenomenon is the farangisation of Thai 
at both the individual and national levels, and it creates the modern form of Thainess 
(Pattana, 2010:72). It appears that hybridised beauty in TV is more like a Thai 
preference to view themselves as westernised and modernised, rather than to 
display this image to an international level. These good-looking actors fulfil Thais’ 
ambition to achieve a modernised self that is believed to be on parity with others 
globally, and highly held as a desirable aspect of national identity. With improved film 
techniques and higher production budgets, the depiction of the past will be even 
more realistic. At the same time, the portrayal of characters is always modernised, 
expressed through modern concepts of beauty. This reiterates to Thai viewers that 
Thailand in the past is an ideal society they should long for.   
4.2.4.2 Beauty as power  
In Thai TV dramas, beauty is often associated with leading characters. Their 
beauty can be identified by physical appearances such as white skin, bigger and 
pointed nose, big rounded eyes with double eyelids, oval or V-shape face, tall, slim 
body for women and muscular body for men. In contrast, supporting characters who 
play the roles of servants, friends, or clowns have 'Thai appearances', which are 
physical appearances commonly found among non-hybridised Thais and it is based 
on the typical appearance of pre-modern Thais before the nineteenth century. Pre-
modern Thai appearances are identified by a small and short body figure, dark 
complexion, rounded face, small eyes, and flat nose, for example. These physical 
 
94 Ngam muan tewada lor bao งามเหมอืนเตวะดาหล่อเบา้ in northern Thai dialect, literally means as 




appearances, together with body language, and clothing, will be used as criteria to 
study concepts of beauty as a representation of power. In this section, I want to 
illustrate this notion of power through the physical appearances of leading and 
supporting characters in a selected TV drama to show that beauty in Thai society is 
distributed unequally, and that is a part of Thai national identity. 
4.2.4.2.1 Power of being hybridised   
The selected scene is from episode 1. It is the opening scene of the drama as 
well as the opening of the episode. This scene introduces the main male protagonist, 
Sukkawong. He is a son of the former king and nephew of the present King of 
Chiang Phrakham. Sukkawong, we learn, was sent to Singapore when he was 
young for education. After graduation, he has worked in Siam for several years 
before returning to his hometown. Accompanying him are Bracken, his British friend, 
and Inthorn, his servant. This scene is an opening scene which introduces the main 
character and his westernised characteristics that would later change the traditional 
society.  
The scene begins with a camera zooming in from a top view exposing a 
geographical map of many states. There is a voice-over reading a poem in 
northern Thai dialect with subtitles in central Thai. The poem tells that 
foreign countries and Siam threaten small states. The poem ends saying 
the same sentence twice that every state in the north 'must not be a colony.’ 
Then the image of the map changes to an extreme wide shot of a city and a 
camera zooms out to show three men standing on a hill overlooking that 
city, down below them, as a distant view. The camera then shows a medium 
close-up shot of three men standing and freezes for 10 seconds. 
Sukkawong takes off his hat and holds it in his hand. They then have a 
short dialogue. (For most of the story, characters speak in the northern 
dialect. Only when Sukkawong speaks with Bracken, they switch to central 
Thai.)  
Bracken: Is this your town? 
Sukkawong: Yes, it is. Chiang Phrakham, my hometown. (camera zooms in 
for close-up shot) 
Camera zooms out again to show a medium shot of three men for five more 
seconds. Bracken takes off his hat. The camera changes to a wide shot of a 
city but we can hear Bracken's voice saying, 'like heaven.’ 
 This opening scene introduces the main character to the audience. He is 
shown in Western apparel to signify that he has a relationship with foreign culture 
and that he socialises with Westerners. This 10-second shot emphasises the 
importance of his appearance. It depicts how civilised and Westernised he looks as 
he views the town down below and signifies his superiority. This episode continues 
to show how he is different from other people through his physical appearance, and 
the contrast is more vivid in the following scene when he meets some villagers 






Figure 60 Raknakkara, ep 1   
 This scene portrays the appearances of three characters in different ways. 
Although this drama has several leading roles, Sukkawong (in the middle) is the only 
Thai character that appears in Western-style attire. Other leading characters are 
portrayed in traditional costumes. The role of Sukkawong is played by an actor who 
has elements of Western Caucasian appearance. He is tall, with a light complexion, 
big rounded eyes, and a pointed nose. In contrast, the man on the right is Inthorn (a 
servant) who has a Thai appearance. He is short, has a flat nose, small eyes, and a 
rounded face. He dresses in an old-fashioned outfit – traditional shirt, and a yam95 
which has connotations of religion, and simplicity, that is, unelaborate. On the left is 
Bracken, who is a British man played by a luk-khreung actor (half-Thai, half-
Australian). Even though he is mixed-race, he plays someone who is fully British. 
This actor signifies hybridity in Thai perceptions of beauty and appearance that it is 
acceptable for a luk-khreung actor to play a role of a foreigner as well as a Thai actor 
with Western Caucasian signifiers of beauty to play in a role as a northern Thai man.   
The hybridisation between pre-modern Thai and Western appearance is 
portrayed through the way these characters stand. These three men are ranked from 
the most Western-looking to the least; a British man played by Thai luk-khreung 
actor, a Thai man played by a Western-looking Thai actor, and a Thai man played by 
a conventionally Thai-looking actor. By looking at this scene, Sukkawong occupies 
the in-between position. This character implies a process of becoming whereby he 
transforms from a local man to a Western man. At the same time, he is between two 
 





worlds – Western and Thai. His position can be explained by Bhabha's concept of 
liminal space which situates in-between the designations of identity and link between 
two fixed identities (Bhabha, 1994:4). Bhabha argues that ‘social articulation of 
difference is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorise cultural 
hybridities’ (Bhabha, 1994:2). Sukkawong’s characteristics and appearance have 
been reformed and transformed from traditional Thai to Westernised Thai. His 
hybridised characteristic is in line with Bhabha’s concept of mimicry which was 
mentioned earlier in the section on ‘Beauty and Hybridity.’ In Bhabha’s terms, 
mimicry is a colonialist’s tool to turn a colonial subject into being something similar to 
the coloniser, as to serve their purposes and benefits. To be successful, this use of 
mimicry needs to have an ambivalence that must not be identical to the coloniser or 
as Bhabha states ‘the same but not quite' (Bhabha, 1994:86). This causes the 
hybridisation that a person repeats manners and ideas with differences and creates 
a new sign of identity (Bhabha, 1994:1-2). 
 While Bhabha discusses this concept in Western culture, the drama illustrates 
a mimicry within the Thai context and its self-colonisation. Sukkawong stands in the 
middle of traditional Thai society, which is his hometown and a globalised, Western, 
modern world where he has grown up. According to his background, he was raised 
in Siam and educated in Singapore. Sukkawong has been hybridised between local 
(northern Thai), Siamese identity, and the West (through a British colony, 
Singapore). The role of Sukkawong infers that hybridisation does not only come from 
a two-way relation between colonised and coloniser in Bhabha's discussion. It is also 
created by multiple hybridisations that, in Sukkawong’s case, from British to 
Singapore as a colony, from British to Siam as semi-colony, and from Siam to a 
northern tributary state as an internal colony. Sukkawong cannot fully represent the 
colonised or the coloniser. He is not fully a Siamese man, nor is he a purely local, 
northern man.   
 Although Sukkawong’s outer appearance implies the Western concept of 
beauty and he looks like the ‘British man’ on the left, one difference between these 
two men is their facial hair. While Bracken has facial hair, Sukkawong has a clean-
shaven face. In Western culture, facial hair like moustaches and beards are signs of 
masculinity and maturity. Masculinity rating increases as facial hair increases, and it 
also affects judgements of male socio-sexual attributes. Beardedness is considered 
attractive, and full-bearded men are perceived to be a better protective father 
(Dixson and Brooks, 2013). Facial hair is linked to masculine power and 
distinguishes a man from a boy. Sukkawong is presented here as a young man with 
fewer experiences whereas Bracken, a British man, is shown as mature, more 




 However, masculinity and facial hair are read differently in contemporary Thai 
media. Although the imported trend of North American hipster culture has changed 
the way, contemporaneously, Thai men treat moustache wearing, facial hair is rarely 
seen among male TV and film stars. In most Thai television dramas and films, the 
main male character has a clean-shaven face. Some of them appear with light 
stubble or pencil-thin moustaches but not heavy stubble or a full beard. Their 
masculinity is not shown by their facial hair, but muscular body and character, such 
as having obtained combat skills. It is a Thai value that the main character in a TV 
drama needs to look beautiful, as a king, queen, or god’s re-incarnation96 (Kultida, 
1993:85, 100). Male protagonists in classical literature are described as beautiful as 
well as women. Male beauty is implicated in the power to rule and possession of 
beauty is evidence of legitimate power so that great kings in literature were often 
described as good-looking and handsome (Van Esterik, 2000:155-156). Moreover, 
male protagonists in much classical Thai literature, though they are great warriors, 
were not described as masculine but usually possessed physical bodies that are slim 
and delicate (Wichitwathakhan, 2017). Figure 61 shows an example of how men's 
facial hair is treated in TV dramas. In a TV drama Bangrajan (2015), only supporting 
characters could have moustaches (lower right photo), while leading characters are 
presented as god-like figures (upper right photo), with clean-shaven faces.  
 Apart from being a sign of masculinity, some kinds of facial hair also imply 
civilisation and modernisation. King Chulalongkorn adapted moustache wearing after 
a Western fashion as he did not want to appear 'barbarian' (Peleggi, 2002:48). The 
first person who was recorded as having a moustache in Thailand was King Phra 
Pinklao97 (1851-1866) (Damrong, 2017). However, King Chulalongkorn was the most 
iconic person who is well-known as 'a man with a moustache.’ Thai men started to 
wear long hair and moustaches widely under Chulalongkorn's reign and after his trip 
to Singapore and India in 1896. Moustaches then became a fashion in the Siamese 
court and spread to the elites and people in general (Kimleng, 2016). In pre-modern 
Thai society, a moustache was not commonly found among Thai men. Those who 
were recorded as having full moustache and beard are Ruesi98 (ฤๅษ)ี and Brahmin 
 
96 In Buddhist cosmology and Hindu myths, there are gods on many levels and many of 
them are reborn in a mortal world in human form. A soul reincarnates again and again on 
earth until it becomes perfect and reunites with its source (Hinduwebsite, 2017).  
97 A viceroy of Siam and younger brother of King Mongkut (Chakri dynasty 4th reign), King 
Phra Pinklao was also entitled the second King of Siam. He had a strong interest in Western 
knowledge and culture and spoke fluent English (Terwiel, 2011:147-148). 
98 Ruesi in Thailand refers to those Brahmin priests who converted to Buddhism, and then 
did many good deeds for the religion such as making monasteries, erecting sacred statues 




priests, as depicted in mural paintings or literature. Facial hair usually worn by these 
men was a long, full and heavy beard in non-groomed style, to signify their isolated 
life from a secular world. This is in contrast to the shaped moustache introduced to 
Thai society by King Chulalongkorn. The King's moustache was well-groomed and 
kept in a Chevron style.  
 
Figure 61 On the left is a poster of a film ‘Bangrajan’ (2000). On the right are 
two posters of a TV drama 'Bangrajan’ (2015).   
 At the same time, different kinds of facial hair in films and dramas were 
created to demonstrate civilisation. For example, in Bangrajan (2000) (Figure 61, on 
the left) a man in the middle with unkempt, full, heavy beard to signify his 
characteristic as savage and wild, whereas the other two men have nicely groomed 
moustaches and haircuts. Their half nakedness was common for male warriors in the 
time of the story (18th century), so the only thing to distinguish a civilised man from a 
savage man was a haircut and moustache shape. In a TV drama of Bangrajan 
(2015) (Figure 61), facial hair was presented in a civilised and sophisticated manner. 
As I indicated above, characters in TV dramas, especially the main characters, are 
meant to be good-looking and fit Thai felt norms of beauty. When the same 
characters from the film appear in the TV version, they are shown with well-groomed 
moustaches. These three characters in the film belong to the group in the lower right 
for the TV version. In that photo, these men are shown with nicely kept moustaches. 
Furthermore, most characters in the TV series were created to look more civilised by 
wearing Western style shirts. Though these are based on the same story, a TV 
version tends to appear more sophisticated, while a film emphasises realistic 




characters refined for TV dramas target domestic audiences (see the topic on 
‘Westernised beauty modernises the past’ in this chapter).  
 Regarding Bhabha’s theory of hybridisation, ‘authority is articulated with a 
range of differential knowledge and positionalities that both estrange its identity and 
produce new forms of knowledge, new modes of differentiation, new sites of power’ 
(Bhabha, 1994:120). In other words, when a coloniser’s culture is introduced to the 
colonised, it will produce and be reinterpreted into new things (Childs and Williams, 
1997:136). When facial hair and moustaches were appropriated into Thai society, 
they were adapted to suit Thai standards of beauty, connoting different meanings 
from the West. Even though a moustache expresses a sign of masculinity or 
civilisation, it is not regarded as attractive, especially for leading actors. Sukkawong’s 
appearance exemplifies that a Western notion of beauty for men in Thai society may 
adopt some physical features of the Western Caucasian but facial hair is not always 
regarded as desirable.  
4.2.4.2.2 Power of being civilised   
 
Figure 62 Sukkawong on horseback, followed by Bracken and Inthorn. 
Sukkawong is shown as a leader and appears in god-like status wearing white 
clothes (Raknakkara, ep 1)   
In the next scene, Western notions of beauty, as depicted by the main 
character, are emphasised to show different levels of civilisation and power relations.   
Continuing from the first scene, the music changes to the faster beat of a 
traditional instrumental song. The camera shows a medium shot of 
Sukkawong entering, riding a horse, followed by Bracken and Inthorn on 
horseback as well. A group of villagers are sitting on steps waiting to see 
him. A close-up shot shows Sukkawong’s face. He smiles at the villagers. 
Then the camera changes to a wide shot to show Sukkawong, Bracken, and 
Inthorn on horses, villagers sitting on steps, and three servants running to 




 In this scene, Sukkawong's Western-style beauty and power are depicted to 
be in contrast with the villagers. Firstly, power is expressed through the position of 
characters. Villagers sit on the floor and steps to show they are in a lower status. 
Thai society is hierarchical and people are ranked on a vertical axis; for example, 
royalty is superordinate to commoners, religious specialists have superiority over 
laity, urban dwellers are more advanced than rural folk, seniors over junior and male 
over female (Jackson and Cook, 1999:9). Thus, it is a common practice for villagers 
to sit on the floor to welcome members from noble families, monks or royalty. Not 
only their position that indicates inferiority, but their physical appearances also imply 
their lower status, or deference. The physical appearances of villagers are diverse as 
they represent different groups of people – men and women, young and old, thin and 
fat, white and dark complexions. However, they have facial elements that represent 
pre-modern Thai looks such as a rounded face, flat or snub nose, small eyes, and 
dark complexion (Figure 63).   
 As mentioned, there is a belief in Thai society that those who are beautiful 
have higher moral attributes than those who are not. This belief supports the idea 
that powerful people must possess some kind of beauty because it relates to their 
moral life. In Van Estarik’s terms, ‘the attribute of gentleness, subservience, silence 
and virtue are intertwined with the attributes of grace, composure and beauty’ (Van 
Esterik, 2000:129). In Buddhist literature, living beings who literally stink with sin are 
disfigured by vices, which is opposite to those who are adorned with merit and 
virtues. Body is cast as the effect of morality through the work of karma or one’s past 
deeds (Mrozik, 2007:62-64). Moreover, in Thai classical drama and literature, almost 
all heroes and heroines are kings, queens, or godly reincarnation. They are symbols 
of ultimate virtue (Kultida, 1993:100-101). Nidhi also refers to the physical body of 
heroes and heroines as ‘the ultimate truth’99. Characters can always look elegant 
and pretty no matter what the situation is. In this way, audiences are aware of the 
character’s divine spirituality, that their bodies should reflect their morality, and this 
does not need to match with reality (Nidhi, 2014:76). With this perception of beauty, 
merit and power combined together, the King or ruling class’s physical beauty is a 
sign of proper moral comportment. 
The villagers are thus portrayed as less civilised by the way they dress. Their 
clothing is simple and not elaborate. Men are half-naked; topless with pants and a 
cloth wrap around their head. Women wear tube skirts and cloth wrapped around the 
upper part of their body. Some women wear traditional style shirts. This is based on 
what is believed to be historically accurate, about what people wore in the northern 
 




part of Thailand during the nineteenth century. Thai sumptuary rules regulated 
behaviour and consumption of objects, such as textiles which were meant to 
preserve and display hierarchy. This rule displays hierarchy and continues to 
influence rural and urban rituals (Van Esterik, 2000:129-130). As mentioned in 
Raknakkara’s photobook about the costume design, colourful tube skirts or shirts 
decorated with silver or gold threads, were reserved for the ruling class only 
(Eknaree, 2017:11-12, 25). Colour of cloth, pants, and tube skirts that the villagers 
wear is dull in colour without elaborate patterns or decoration. This suggests that 
they are of lower status. Their hair is simply put in a bun without accessories or 
decoration. They do not apply makeup on their faces, and none of them wears any 
ornaments. Compared to the main character, he is presented as more civilised in a 
full Western formal outfit – shirt, waistcoat, scarf, suit, pants, leather boots, and a 
hat. Considering the colour of clothes, Sukkawong is shown here in a god-like 
image. His white suit implies an image of a god or deity. White in Indian culture 
signifies purity, and that is related to the quality of a king who cannot be 
contaminated by flaws. Thai culture is affected by many Indian influences, for 
example, they use the white tiered umbrella of kingship, which is a shared culture in 
southeast Asia, to imply the purity and virginity of a Brahmin (Hindu priest) (Pitchaya, 
2017). In contrast, the villagers’ dress is either black or dark blue to signify their 
inferior power.  
  
  
Figure 63. Villagers are shown here as less civilised in traditional outfits and 
appearances (Raknakkara, ep 1)   
Another symbol of civilisation which is exploited to illustrate power is hat 
wearing. Hats are a Western object imported to Thai society in the late nineteenth 




introduced to Siam since the reign of Chulalongkorn, together with Western-style 
outfits, in which the King and princes were the first groups to have sartorial reform. It 
was not until the 1940s that Western clothes and hats were spread to the general 
public. Before that, hats and Western-style outfits were only reserved for the royal 
family and elites because the condition for appropriating Western-style clothes was 
wealth (Peleggi, 2002:61). In the 1940s, dress reform was one of twelve cultural 
mandates issued by Phibun's government100. It required the public to dress in a neat 
and well-groomed manner. This included wearing hats and other Western-style 
clothing (Barmé, 1993:156-157). A hat was used as an index of civilisation with a 
slogan ‘Wear a hat for your country’, ‘Hats will lead Thailand to greatness’ (Peleggi, 
2008:73-75). People were not allowed to get on buses or enter government offices if 
they did not wear hats. This was done in the interest of progress and civilisation that 
the government aimed at bringing Thailand to be a modern nation (Wyatt, 1982:255). 
According to this information, Chulalongkorn and Phibun brought the first wave of 
modernisation to the country. This TV series then restates the model of civilisation 
and presents a new wave of modernisation for the 21st century by making a 
westernised, modernised character. However, the modernisation of a character is a 
reproduction of the past that lies in contrast to reality. 
 Regarding historical contexts, Sukkawong might wear a hat and Western 
outfit because he is a royal family member, though of a small tributary state, and 
after a Western education in Singapore. However, the way the drama creates this 
character shows an anachronistic idea. The story of Raknakkara takes place in 
1884, whereas King Chulalongkorn's first trip to Europe was in 1897. The drama is 
set at a time when the idea of Western fashion reform had not even been brought 
into the country. Besides, Sukkawong’s education in Singapore was not possible. 
Historical records show that there were not any royal family members of tributary 
states who had a chance to study abroad. The only prince who was sent abroad was 
the son of King Kaew Nawarat, the last king of the Lanna kingdom, and he went to 
study in Burma (Tanet, 2017). Therefore, the presence of hats in this scene does not 
only imply different levels of power of the characters. It rewrites the past making the 
main character a modern, Westernised nobleman, which, historically, is not accurate. 
Accordingly, hat-wearing by a Thai prince is a TV drama's reconstruction of 
the past. It is exploited in the opening scene to exemplify the idea of civilisation and 
power relation. When they arrive in the town, Sukkawong suddenly takes off his hat. 
Bracken does not take off his until Sukkawong introduces that this is his hometown. 
 
100 Phibun’s first government (1938-1944) emphasised nation-building policy that aimed to 




Then he slowly takes it off. Since a hat is a sign of Western civilisation, Inthorn does 
not wear one. He is in his traditional outfit to represent traditional society. However, 
when Sukkawong arrives, he shows respect by taking off his hat. This implies that he 
blends Western civilisation with traditional society. Bracken, on the other hand, does 
not take off his hat because he symbolises the Western world and lacks cultural 
understanding. He is only an outsider and does not belong to that town. He keeps 
his hat on, as a sign of power as well as to show superiority and also performing 
disrespect to society. He finally removes it at the end of the scene, because 
Sukkawong emphasises that ‘it is my hometown’ and Bracken needs to show some 
respect. In this scene, hats are signs of civilisation that indicate power relations 
between characters. Even though Sukkawong takes his hat off to pay respect to a 
city, once he enters the town he wears it again (Figure 62) to show a higher level of 
civilisation than the villagers. Together with Western-style outfit and Western beauty 
norms, a hat is used to represent power relations between characters.      
 According to this scene, hybridised beauty in Thailand is not merely a 
dynamic of aesthetic concepts, but it is used as an indicator of unequal power 
relations. It is a combination of values between pre-modern and modern concepts of 
beauty that has been carefully adapted to boost modern Thai identity. Thais have 
learned how to achieve and maintain their power through beauty and bodily 
practices. With hybridised beauty, Thais build up their national pride as a developed 
nation. They use this new identity to comfort themselves that they are advanced and 
civilised while also differentiating them from the non-hybridised others.  
4.2.4.3 Hybridised Thai identity – Western on the outside, Thai at heart  
 While hybridised characters are portrayed as being powerful and civilised, 
there is a tension that hybridity is in jeopardy to Thainess; the question of how much 
Thais can be Westernised, without losing ‘Thai identity.’ This is a popular discourse 
in Thailand that, according to Prince Damrong101, ‘Tai know how to pick and choose’ 
from the West (cited in Harrison, 2010a:15). In other words, it has been an 
obsession among Thais that they should be like the West, both in terms of 
civilisation, intellect, interest, as well as bodily practices, but never fall under the 
Western power and ‘kiss the asses of the farang’ (Thongchai, 2010:135). In this 
section, I want to show how this tension between the hybridised identity and a craze 
for Thainess has built a dichotomy in TV drama, and how Thais form their national 
identities from this conflict.    
 





4.2.4.3.1 The schizophrenia of being Thai   
A conflict between Thainess and the West in Thai TV dramas is often 
depicted via a binary of characters. Though all leading actors have hybridised 
beauty, they are different in the way they react to the West. Characters who favour 
the Western way of life are the villains, while the heroes are 'Thai at heart.’ In this 
section, I show a contrast between two kinds of hybridisation, and I take examples 
from Buangbanjathorn to support this argument.  
 Buangbanjathorn presents the contrast of hybridity in two female characters. 
The main character, Praenuan, is a Bangkok woman who moves to Chiang Rai 
Province in the north. Despite being a modern woman who has graduated from 
America, she loves the peaceful life in Chiang Rai and Wiang Kin (fictional name of 
Keng Tung). Then the drama introduces another female antagonist, Ruangrayap, 
who is a northern princess and fiancé of Laoperng, a Keng Tung prince.  
At a foyer in a palace, Ruangrayap and Laoperng are quarrelling. She is 
angry that Laoperng lets Praenuan stay in his bedroom and jealous that he 
is attracted to Praenuan. Suddenly, a servant tells them that Praenuan 
comes (after she takes a bath and changes to new clothes to have 
breakfast). Everybody stops talking and looks at her. A high angle shows 
Praenuan standing on a stairway. She appears in an ethnic costume and 
with traditional hair style.  When she slowly walks down the stairway, we 
hear slow and gentle background music. Cross-cutting shots show other 
characters' facial expressions. They are stunned by her beauty. Praenuan 
stops at the landing. A camera gives a long shot of her body and then 
zooms in, takes a close-up shot of her face and freezes. Music stops and 
changes to vocal music, giving a smooth, relaxed, and romantic feeling. 
When she walks down on the floor, one character says, ‘you are so 
gorgeous.’ From the moment she appears and walks down to the hall, it 
takes 1.14 mins.   
In a dining room. A servant is serving Western-style breakfast. We hear 
fast, upbeat music. Medium shots move between Ruangrayap and 
Praenuan, and wide-angle shot shows everybody at a dining table. 
Laoperng sits at the short end of the table. On the right side are Tongrew 
(his sister), Sanpaeng (Tongrew’s lover), and Praenuan. On the left side is 
Ruangrayap sitting alone (Figure 64). She looks at Praenuan, who seems to 
be excited and says; 
Ruangrayap: Thai people eat rice as their main food. You are probably not 
familiar with the Western way of living. 
Praenuan: I have adapted to it since I studied in America.  
Laoperng: What did you study in America? 
Praenuan: (in English) International Law. 
Ruangrayap: A person like you studied International Law?  
Sanpaeng: It is so strange that a woman can study International Law.  
Praenuan: In the future, women can do everything. 
Tongrew: You talk like you see the future. 





In a following scene, at a furniture factory. Close-up and medium shots 
show a worker using an electric woodcutter and other male workers doing 
their jobs. Laoperng and Sanpaeng walk into the frame, discussing their 
business. Praenuan is seen standing behind. A medium close-up shot 
shows her smiling and looking around. A faster musical beat suddenly 
plays, and Ruangrayap walks from her back to stop in front of her.  
Ruangrayap: You seem to be interested in everything about Wiang Kin. 
Praenuan: I’m a foreigner. I’ve hardly ever seen a simple life as in Wiang 
Kin. 
Ruangrayap: You studied in America, but why do you wear Tai-Khoen102 
dress? 
Praenuan: I’m interested in the progress of education, not material 
progress. 
Ruangrayap: I studied and lived in England for many years. English people 
think America is a rootless country and does not have its own culture. 
Praenuan: Every country has good and bad sides. It all depends on how we 
choose them for our benefit. 
Ruangrayap: The good part of the Americans is respecting others. 
Committing adultery or having an affair with other’s loved one is regarded 
as a shame.  
  
 
Figure 64 Buangbanjathorn, ep 2  
These scenes illustrate two types of hybridisation that have been discussed 
widely in Thailand regarding how much Thais should be westernised without losing 
national identity. A conflict is depicted through two types of woman; both are luk-
khreung and having hybridised beauty. Ruangrayap represents undesirable 
hybridisation because she favours Western culture as shown through her outfits and 
 




attitudes. She is the only character in this drama who wears full Western-style outfits 
– dress, gloves, stockings, high-heel shoes, and a hat. Her preference is for Western 
dress and ways of living. She is confident and comfortable in this Westernised 
space. The dining table is set to be in Western style with table runner, placemats, 
candle stands, tea set, with milk and orange juice served in wine glasses. She holds 
her knife and fork well and looks down on Praenuan for her lack of familiarity with 
Western cutlery and food.  
Food can represent civilisation and it frequently does so in films. In different 
versions of the films Anna and the King, the state banquet was used to display 
Siamese civilisation. According to Van Esterik, the state banquet for British diplomats 
and merchants featured as a way for King Mongkut to prove that he was not a 
barbarian, and deserved a place among the civilised nations of the world. The 1946, 
1956, and two 1999 films all use the trivial cliché that the proper use of a knife and 
fork, and use of European table manners during the state banquet, would 
demonstrate the king’s ‘civilised’ status (Van Esterik, 2006:299). Table manners and 
Western etiquette are signifiers of one’s cultivation and sophisticated cultural 
background. Therefore, these films depicting the king as incapacity were criticised by 
many Thais and one of the main reasons why Thailand officially banned the 1998 
film, was because of the scene showing King Mongkut eating with chopsticks, 
instead of a fork following the state banquet (Van Esterik, 2006:302). In 
Buangbanjathorn, the drama makers made use of Western-style food and table 
manners to represent a character who is extremely westernised and has a civilised 
identity. However, her westernised identity is not highly praised by other characters 
as no one cares to talk about it. This character reminds audiences of an excessive 
imitation of Western culture, which has been a cultural anxiety since the time of King 
Vajiravudh. The King wrote a book 'The Cult of Imitation' to ridicule and criticise 
middle-class Thais who were aping the 'farang way' of life (Peleggi, 2008:70). It 
connoted that, apart from the Siamese elites, Westernisation found in other classes 
was harmful to the nation.  
On the contrary, the drama has Praenuan who stands for the preferable 
hybridity. She represents the ideal westernised Thai identity that maintains the 
essence of Thainess. Her response to Ruangrayap’s insult at the dining table has 
two meanings. One, it confirms that she is as civilised as Ruangrayap. Second, she 
is better than Ruangrayap who simply imitates Western ways of life, whereas she 
‘adapts103’ it to her life. So, Praenuan expresses a perfect hybridisation that 






identity, seen through the way she deals with Western food. This is similar to King 
Chulalongkorn during his long journey in Europe, as he mixed his spaghetti with Thai 
chili powder and lime juice. This showed how the Siamese were adept at integrating 
aspects of Western culture that they felt would be beneficial to the kingdom with 
aspects of Siamese culture they wished to preserve (Sud, 2009:455). 
On the one hand, Praenuan is a Westernised character who imports modern 
identities to Thai society. She has an international education as she can speak 
English and uses it spontaneously. When being asked about her education, she 
chooses to reply in English to show her language competency as. For a country 
where the majority of people are English illiterate, speaking English connotes high 
education, social background and class status. People who are fluent in English are 
highly praised for their language competency and it is on the contrary for those who 
are not. For example, a video aired on the government’s channel DLTV104 for Grade 
6 students to learn during the Covid-19 lockdown aroused public criticism and 
debate about English language education in the country. Clearly, the video teaches 
incorrect English grammar and problematic pronunciation. To learn English language 
is a scar cast by the Thai education system, so much so that anyone who can 
fluently, properly use it, is highly regarded in Thai society. However, using English to 
brag about oneself could put that person into trouble as well. In 2007, a Thai female 
TV host, who is foreign educated, said in an interview that she had a quarrel with two 
actors, and she called for help in English because she assumed that her disputants 
did not understand. This interview caused Thai fans to rage as they were upset 
about how she looked down on Thai people. She had to apologize shortly afterwards 
(Kapook, 2007).  
According to these two examples, Thailand is a country that admires English 
competency as long as a person uses it in a humble way. Praenuan’s use of English 
in this scene indicates that she is capable of using it, yet she does not brag about it 
directly. Anyway, her only English sentence suggests her high education, and it 
creates an image of a modern woman. Other characters admire her answer and 
praise her for that. Regarding her language competency and educational 
background, Praenuan is designed to be more advanced than other characters. She 
is anachronistic to the story, which is set in 1944, but she is a contemporary woman 
who time-slips to the past. Therefore, her field of study is uncommon to people at 
that time and far more progressive than that of most women in the society. From this 
 




conversation, the drama shows the desirable qualities of a modern Thai woman, with 
hybridised beauty, westernised education and progressive world view.  
On the other hand, she represents Thai people who long for a romantic, 
simple life in the past. The way she appreciates the old-fashioned furniture factory 
suggests an urban middle-class perspective, which appreciates the rural world 
beyond the capital Bangkok. Her love of Thainess is reflected through her outfit, 
made to be in contrast to Ruangrayap. She appears in traditional costume almost 
throughout the whole drama. Even before she goes to bed, she dresses up in an 
ethnic outfit, so that when she wakes up in Wiang Kin (as a magical bed brings her 
back to the past), she will dress like other people there. When she stays at home in 
Chiang Rai Province, she also avoids contemporary clothes choosing local attire 
instead. Only in some minor scenes in Bangkok we see her in contemporary clothes. 
This drama promotes Thainess through the fashion of the main character and 
reminds Thai audiences of their cultural roots by associating ethnic dress with the 
past (a rural area in Chaing Rai and Burma in 1944) while contemporary dress is 
aligned with progressive urban life in Bangkok.  
The Thai-isation of Praenuan can be read as a counter to extreme 
Westernisation, akin to the revival of traditional Thai dress during the 1960s to 
counter American cultural domination. The Thai royal revival, initiated by the military 
government of the Sarit Regime105, brought back the wearing of traditional Thai 
attire. While Thai king Bhumibol and queen Sirikit wore western clothes during their 
tour in Europe and gained a modern and cosmopolitan image, domestically, the 
queen chose to wear traditional Thai dress, which was modified from the pre-
modern, uncivilised style of the 1870s. The modified Thai costume became 
popularised among upper and middle-class women, later becoming a signifier of 
Thainess (Peleggi, 2008:77-78).    
The Thai fetish for traditional attire is further emphasised through Praenuan. 
Several scenes depict her transformation from a contemporary Bangkok woman to a 
northern woman. In episode 2, a scene lingeringly shows Praenuan taking a bath 
and to changing clothes. The moment she appears in a new outfit and walks down 
the stairs she appears like a beauty contestant walking on stage (Figure 65). Her 
transformation and beauty surprise every character. One character even praises her 
as looking like a princess, which means she blends in well with the group. The way 
 
105 Before this, the military government of Field Marshal Phibun had limited the public 
visibility of the royals. Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Thai prime minister 1959-1963) rehabilitated 
the monarchical institution in order to overcome his lack of legitimacy after the overthrow of 




people admire her indicates that a western appearance can claim to have a national 
identity if it conforms to the characteristics of Thainess.   
 
 
Figure 65 Praenuan, slowly walking down the stairway like a beauty pageant 
contestant (Buangbanjathorn, ep 2) 
Praenuan’s transformation can be compared to the case of Pui Pornthip (Miss 
Thailand and Miss Universe in 1988). Pui embodied an opposition, between her Thai 
race and her background as part of the Thai diaspora (California-born), bringing 
many Thais to conclude ‘she is an American in a Thai body’ (Reynolds, 1999:271). 
Pui's lack of Thainess, i.e. inability to speak Thai fluently or ignorance of Thai 
culture, brought conflict and criticism of her cultural impurities. In order to gain 
acceptance among Thai people in general, Pui had to undergo a ‘process of cultural 
reintegration back to modes of Thai femininity untainted by western mores.’ This 
included studying Thai language, learning Thai manners, history, and culture 
(Harrison, 2010a:28). Whereas Pui’s Westernised features (beauty and competency 
in English) brought national success at an international level and made her a 
national hero, she was still not fully accepted because she was not 'Thai enough' to 
be a symbol of the nation (Harrison, 2010a:31; Reynolds, 1999:270-271). In 
Buangbanjathorn, Praenuan abandons her modern self in Bangkok and embraces a 
new self to be localised with traditional culture and pre-modern society. This process 
restates the same old value that a person would not be fully accepted unless he or 
she conforms to a particular Thai identity. According to these characteristics, 
Praenuan stands for desirable hybridity that builds up a new form of Thainess.  
It is acceptable for Thais to have Westernised beauty and features as long as 




historical film (Tawiphop) is acceptable because she represents a character that is 
‘essentially Thai at heart, despite an outward surface appearance of farangised 
Thainess.’ It is less the ‘farang-isation of Thainess’ but the ‘Thai-isation of the farang’ 
(Harrison, 2010b:116-117). Kasian’s words best describe this phenomenon. He 
argues that the need to represent Thainess was is a symptom of ‘cultural 
schizophrenia.’ It was a Thai’s endeavour to prove to themselves that they are truly 
Thai even though their outer appearances look westernised. Their hearts are purely 
Thai and the Thai self is more authentic than the projected un-Thai self in the form of 
dress, behaviour, or activity (Kasian, 2002:210-212). Buangbanjathorn underlines 
the idea that hybridised beauty and Westernised personalities are only the outer 
package that conceals the truly Thai heart inside. An ideal Thai person should be 
modernised, Westernised, and hybridised, on the outside, yet he or she has to 
remain closely tied to their interior Thai identity, and be able to express it.    
4.2.4.3.2 The West is materially advanced but spiritually backward 
A dialogue from the above scene provides a comparison between the West 
and Thailand, as well as the perceived good, and bad sides, of the West. Following 
the existing discourse in Thailand, the conversation reflects ambiguous Thai views 
towards the West as being both desirable and dangerous. According to Thongchai, 
Siam's enthusiasm for Western knowledge and materials was known as the 
distrust/desire, hate/love attitude (Thongchai, 2011:25). The dialogue above implies 
that Thais should take only good things from the West, such as education, while 
avoiding Western material progress such as clothes.  
Thongchai explains this ambivalence as the concept of bifurcation, which is a 
binary between spiritual and worldly aspects. This is a dichotomy that Thais use to 
deal with superior Western power and legitimise their imitation of the West. It is a 
way forward without feeling a loss of power or, in Thongchai's words, ‘how to be like 
the West yet also to remain different; how not to love the West despite its attractions; 
and how not to hate it despite is obnoxious dominance’ (Thongchai, 2010:136). 
Bifurcation is a product of nineteenth-century Western imperial discourse, deployed 
as an epistemological framework for selecting western knowledge and influence. 
Thais use it to negotiate between the power of a modern West and local culture, by 
claiming that the Western world was advanced in material development but 
spiritually backward, while the traditional Thai is better in spiritual terms because of 
Buddhism (Thongchai, 2010:136-139).  
In Buangbanjathorn, America is presented as the undesirable West. America 
stands for a new world with advanced material progress, but it is often depicted as a 




glamourous ambience. As Harrison puts it, the cinematic portrayals of Europe and 
the United States relate to dominant perceptions in the popular Thai imagination. 
Western Europe has been associated with the elite, while North America has an 
appeal that erodes the differences of social class and incorporates travellers from 
Thailand in search of employment and adventure as much as further education and 
the confirmation of social status (Harrison, 2010b:102). Thus, America is not the 
West that most Thais adore as having progressed in civilisation or cultural roots, but 
rather a place for the newly rich to upgrade their financial and social status.   
In Thongchai's article, a lecture to Thai monks in the U.S. warned them not 
think of the United States as a model because Thais are in a better situation 
spiritually, and thanks to Buddhism which brings harmony with nature and fellow 
humans (Thongchai, 2010:136). Not only America, but also other Western countries 
that Thais considered as ‘new countries’ are often looked down upon as lacking 
cultural roots. This is in contrast to Thailand that is a country rich in culture, tradition, 
and history. For example, an official school textbook, published by the Office of the 
Basic Education Commission, for Grade 6 students in Thailand has a short reading 
text about a luk-khreung boy whose father came from ‘an island country.’ In that text, 
the boy criticises his father’s hometown and its history; 
 
White people wanted to find a new land to expand the boundary of their 
nation. They migrated on a ship, sailing overseas. When they found a new 
land, they seized it and banished the natives who lived in that vast area to 
stay in reservations. It is common that weapons like spears, axes, bows 
and arrows cannot fight with rifles and cannons. Finally, these white 
people established their country, which its history lasts less than 200 
years.  
When I look back to my mother’s home country. I am so proud. As you all 
know, Thailand has a long history. It gradually formed kingdoms into a 
country. This was led by the monarchs who were highly revered as a 
center of Thai people’s hearts. If we started from the Sukhothai kingdom, 
now Thailand has aged more than 800 years (OBEC, 2012:248-249).  
 
An excerpt from a school textbook and a lecture given to the monks are all 
based on the RNH that aims to forge the nation’s pride from its historical and cultural 
roots and assume pre-modern kingdoms to be part of the modern nation-state. 
Consequently, the drama makers use of this discourse to look down on America as a 
rootless, unadmirable country. According to the story, Praenuan comes from an 
upper-middle-class family. Her family is well-off enough to sponsor her education in 




northern kingdom and studied in England, Praenuan’s background is not highly 
prized. The above conversation reiterates this perception by pointing out that 
‘America is a rootless country and does not have its own culture.’ This implies 
Thailand as a country is richer in cultural heritage. Besides, Praenuan’s reply that 
she has no interest in ‘material progress’ strengthens the discourse that America, or 
the West in general, is not a role model for Thais in spiritual aspects.  
 
 
Figure 66. This scene shows a sharp contrast between two characters who are 
both hybridised but represent different identities (I combine two shots 
together to show two characters in one picture) (Buangbanjathorn, ep 2) 
Thai TV dramas often depict ambiguous feeling towards the West. One of the 
obvious examples is the role of Constantin Phaulcon in a drama Bupphesanniwat. 
Phaulcon is a Greek adventurer who joined King Narai’s106 court during the 
Ayutthaya period in 1678. He played important roles in the Siamese court, and also 
influenced the king to send envoys to the court of Louis XIV (Terwiel, 2011:33). In 
Bupphesanniwat, he is depicted as one of the king’s favourite men and one who can 
influence him. In one scene, Phetracha107 is having a quarrel with Narai because the 
king allows Phaulcon to disrobe Buddhist monks to be used as labourers for the 
construction of a fortress. The event shows that the king trusted and granted certain 
 
106 The 27th monarch of the Ayutthaya Kingdom 





power to Phaulcon more than many other Siamese officials. His action therefore 
frustrates Phetracha and his son Sorasak108 who is Phaulcon’s opponent, and one of 
the main causes leading to the coup d'état in which Phaulcon was executed. The 
role of Phaulcon in this drama reflects Siamese ambiguous feelings towards the 
West. While he is presented as a highly respected, powerful Westerner in the 
Ayutthaya court, he carries an image of a tricky, sly man, whom Siamese officials 
view with doubt and animosity.  
Moreover, it is common for most Thai TV dramas to criticise the West, rather 
than Westerners themselves. According to Jaiser, when Thai TV dramas want to 
show a conflict between Thainess and farangness, they do not show farang 
themselves in a negative light but rather cast suspicion on Thais following the farang 
way (Jaiser, 2017:54). A common presentation of undesirable Western ways, such 
as a bad girl behaves as if she were a real farang, which is clearly the wrong way for 
a Thai, is more frequent in Thai TV (Jaiser, 2017:152). Likewise, in 
Buangbanjathorn, a character who represents extreme Westernisation symbolises 
spiritual backwardness. Ruangrayap is similar to Praenuan in several aspects, only 
that she has a bad farang way about her. Praenuan, who is fond of the Thai way of 
life and culture, is shown as a sweet, gentle, polite, and smart person. She is loved 
by other characters. On the contrary, Ruangrayap, who is fully Westernised – both in 
her outer appearance and personality – is shown as hot-tempered, jealous, self-
centred, impolite and sometimes rude. She is not favoured by other characters. In a 
scene at a dining table, Ruangrayap sits alone on one side, opposite to everybody 
else, while Praenuan is accompanied by other two characters. The seating position 
suggests that she is opposed to everybody and showing how her personality and 
manner are unattractive (Figure 64).  
This anti-West idea is in contrast to the fact that Thai TV dramas often depict 
Western material progress as desirable. In this drama, the anti-American material 
progress is contradictory to the existence of many Western objects such as the 
furniture factory, machines, and a car. Other signifiers of Western progress such as 
education, English language, and English breakfast are also acceptable as signs of 
civilisation. Sud Chonchirdsin argues in regard to the ambivalent attitudes of the 
Siamese elites towards the West and that the monarch and the elites were fond of 
Western arts, performance, and education, yet the king was not in favour of 
miscegenation, liberal ideas or the greater public freedoms in Europe so that he 
repeatedly reminded those students abroad to retain a sense of Thainess (Sud, 
2009:451-54). Therefore, ‘as long as Western ideas did not challenge Siamese 
 




views on the structure of political power, the Siamese elite seems to have accepted 
them without difficulty. On the other hand, whenever these ideas presented danger, 
they were rejected’ (Sud, 2009:455). In Buangbanjathorn, the only aspect of being 
American, that is corresponding to Thai value and acceptable, is monogamy. It fits 
perfectly well with the Thai moral practice; therefore, this idea is agreed and 
respected by both characters.  
The drama indicates that, on the one hand, having Westernised features such 
as beauty, personality, and attitudes are admirable. On the other hand, extreme 
Westernised features would make a person unwanted and repellent. It is a Thai style 
hybridised identity that sprung up in the in-betweenness of being both Thai and 
Western, and neither Thai nor Western at the same time. While Bhabha’s mimicry 
means to maintain slippage in the colonised and to transform the colonial subject 
into a ‘partial presence' (Bhabha, 1994:86), hybridity in Thailand demonstrates that 
Thailand as an indirect colony has tried to maintain that slippage by themselves. 
Praenuan’s outer appearance, as well as characteristics, reflects the hybridisation 
between the West, and Thai identity. She is an ideal example in the Thai discourse, 
such as one quoted by Chatthip Natsupha that ‘Thais should be flexible in learning 
and adopting from the West but do not jeopardise the essence of Thainess’ (quoted 
in Thongchai, 2010:140). They want to prove that they are different, or even better 
than the West, by becoming the better version of West. This character is created to 
show a perfect combination. From these samples, Thai TV dramas have ‘ripped off’ 
farangness to build their modern identity and use it to criticise the excessive farang 
way at the same time.  
4.2.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have shown the combination of pre-modern and modern 
concepts of beauty operating in Thailand. This has resulted in hybridity and built 
some specific modern Thai identities. Primarily, hybridity is exploited to construct 
modernised images of the past that are appealing to modern-day audiences. The 
depiction of the ideal past is essential in the nation-building process as it encourages 
national pride and the love of national history. Eventually, the depiction of an 
idealised Thainess is the only imaginable picture of Thai history that can be 
employed in these TV dramas.  
Not only important for constructing a positive perception of a nation, beauty is 
also an indicator of power. My findings suggest that the representation of power, 
seen through these Western notions of beauty, are distributed unequally. Characters 
with more power are represented with physical appearances derived from Caucasian 




are depicted with pre-modern Thai appearance. The selected drama exemplifies 
Bhabha's concept of liminal space and mimicry, and infers that hybridisation does 
not only come from a two-way relation between colonised and coloniser as in 
Bhabha's discussion, but by multiple hybridisations as a subject of direct colony, 
semi-colony and internal colony. 
However, there is a tension between the craze for modernised, Westernised 
identity and the yearning for Thainess. Hybridised identity is essential to improve a 
person towards being civilised, yet this value is less important than the value of Thai 
spirituality. Thus, the drama highlights the principal Thai discourse that Westernised 
characteristics are only superficial personality traits that Thais express to the world. 
What is more essential is the Thai heart. The conflict for the modern Thai identity is 
the ambiguity that is described as 'bifurcation.’ Thais make use of hybridised 
features to prove themselves as having achieved the milestone of being equal to 
other civilised nations, globally. At the same time, this hybridised identity has been 
carefully selected and adapted to fit with Thai values so as to maintain a perceived 
authentic Thai core. 
Hybridised beauty is depicted in contrast to the subordinate northern 
identities. The main characters in these dramas possess hybridised beauty, yet they 
are presented with a repetitive reminding of Thainess, Thai essence and identity by 
the portrayal of northern identities. These characters are shown as idealistic, 
powerful, admirable according to Thai standards and they build the modern Thai 
identities. While Siam/Thailand needs to be modernised and hybridised in order to 
gain the images of the modern Thai nation, northern identities are essential as they 
help sustain the narratives of the nation as dominated by the RNH. According to 
these narratives, Siamese hybridisation and beauty reform are necessary for a 
modern nation to survive and be in parity with other nations in a globalised world. 
However, they need to recall their Thai essence as well as demanding a subordinate 
counterpart to showcase the modern identities relatively. Therefore, the North is 






Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
What is occurring in Thailand, in October 2020 (this thesis was completed on 
26th December 2020), suggests that the construction of the nation that this thesis has 
illustrated so far is being challenged and questioned. Massive protests in Bangkok, 
as well as in other provinces across Thailand, demanded the disbanding of the junta 
government, new drafting of constitutions, and most importantly target monarchical 
reform. This last demand is regarded as an unprecedented move in the country. 
While there have been a number of political protests throughout Thai history, the 
2020 protests aim directly at the monarchy, a topic considered in Thailand so 
sensitive that public criticism has been almost impossible. This phenomenon 
connects deeply with a modern Thai history that relates to the RNH. An increasing 
number of young people are looking at historiographical issues that are different from 
what they learn in schools, particularly Thongchai’s idea of geobody, which 
questions and dismantles the predominant understanding of the Thai nation. Once 
seriously forbidden topics are now also normalised in public, such as the 1932 
revolution and the Thammasat student massacre in 1976.  
While the majority of pro-democracy protesters are from the younger 
generation, mostly high-school and university students, the majority of the counter 
protest are royalists who are middle-aged and above. These two sides not only 
represent a clash of generations, but also different perceptions that each group has 
towards the idea of the nation. The predominant definitions of a nation that are 
based on the RNH and heavily rely on the monarchy, military, national security or 
stability, or even nationalistic, archaic history do not seem to appeal to young people 
any longer. Because of these demands, many conservatives and royalists accuse 
the protesters of being ‘chung chat’ (haters of the nation) and ‘lom chao’ (wanting to 
overthrow the monarchy). Compared to the political unrest in Thailand since 2006, 
between Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts, all these movements were based on the 
unequal distribution of power and the desire for democratisation of the country. 
Political divides in 2006 also rose from inequality, an urban-rural split, a 
regional division between the poorer North and Northeast and centrally located 
Bangkok, where money and power is located (Schmidt, 2011:323-324). The unequal 
development caused dissatisfaction and in 2014, there was an allegation that the 
Red Shirts wanted to form a people’s democratic republic in the north and separate 
into being another country (Bangkokpost, 2014). The idea of autonomy, or self-




According to McCargo, the conflict between Yellow and Red Shirts ‘reflects the 
unravelling of Siam’s nineteenth-century form of rule – the domination of royal 
Bangkok over the untamed hinterlands, and the substitution of internal colonialism 
for European empire’ (McCargo, 2010:5). These political divisions have rooted in the 
inequal distribution of power that resulted from Thai nation-building. 
These phenomena have proved to be the problems of Thai nation-building. 
The Thai state puts much effort into constructing ideas of nation, but it has never 
been fully successful. This is because the Thai nation is not a perfectly unified unit 
but rather combined from many elements. These elements - such as the rural, 
regional, minority people - are suppressed, exploited and treated unequally. 
Therefore, there are reoccurring negotiations and resistance from the ‘combined 
elements’ from time to time. This thesis shows one aspect of the Thai state’s 
attempts in constructing a unified nation. It brings forth the construction of the Thai 
nation and national identities in Thai historical TV dramas. TV drama is a good 
example for showing how Thai nationalism and ideology are distributed to the public 
because of the repetitive similar content and plot that are based on the RNH (as 
discussed in Chapter 2). Though the Thai nation is perceived to be united or strongly 
following the RNH, it is being challenged beyond TV. This thesis illustrates that TV 
content in Thailand, especially historical TV drama, remains untouched in its use of 
static, conventional narratives and that is the state’s effort to keep everything in its 
place. This thesis takes the Northern people and its culture to illustrate this 
combination process. The North has been combined to build images of a 
harmonious unified nation. However, it is a combination that stands on an unequal 
distribution of power. It is only a subordinate identity to enhance the images of 
Siam/Thailand as a modernised nation. As shown in this thesis, the Thai nation was 
built by exploiting regional identity like the North and manipulating narratives from 
the RNH, the concept this thesis calls ‘combi-nation.’   
What this research wanted to find out 
 This thesis has investigated the following questions. What is the role of 
historical TV dramas in constructing contemporary Thai nation? How are different 
regions of Thailand represented in historical television drama (for example North 
Thailand)? And how can the investigation through Thai TV dramas contribute to an 
understanding on debates of nation-building?  
Thai TV is a space where narratives of the nation are reproduced for 
communication to local audiences. While TV dramas gain less attention in academic 
fields, especially in terms of nation-building, this thesis aims to show that this 




historiographical perspectives. These can be recognised and analysed through a 
close reading of visual presentation, montage, sound, light, camera angle, clothing 
and makeup, body language, dialogue and language use. This thesis has shown 
how Thai TV is controlled and manipulated by the Thai state, both directly by law, 
indirectly by self-censorship, social values and norms, and via sensitivity resulting 
from the applications of the RNH. Thus, Thai TV dramas are laden with state-based 
ideologies. 
This research particularly used the lens of historical drama in confirming that 
narratives from the RNH strongly shape Thai TV dramas and the imagination of the 
Thai nation. In order to understand the complexity of Thai nation-building, this 
research has taken a non-centric perspective, through the representation of Northern 
Thai identity as a subordinate identity. The North is ‘combined’ in the constructing of 
the Thai nation by enhancing Siam/Thailand’s image as a civilised, modernised, 
peaceful, and independent country. On the one hand, Siam follows the modernist 
theory of a nation by hybridising with the West to become a modernised nation, 
expressed through modern elements such as administrative systems, the military, 
national education systems, and sartorial reform. On the other hand, the nation-
building project necessarily concerns premodern elements such as ethnic 
communities, ethnic ties, myths, and historical memories. Still, the ethnic 
communities need to be suppressed for the centralised application of the Thai nation 
to be successful. This thesis has shown the combinations of Northern identities 
through five aspects. The first three aspects result from history, which are historical 
narrative or the RNH in particular, and the other two aspects being combinations that 
are reflected on or through the body. On the basis of my analysis I propose a 
theoretical concept of ‘combi-nation’, which means an unequal, selective way of 
exploiting or subordinating cultures and identities to boost images of a strong, unified 
nation. The subordinated culture, such as the North, is therefore an important part of 
the jigsaw that helps to make central Thailand’s narrative of the nation complete.  
Contribution to fields  
 ‘Combi-nation’ takes a step forward in understanding the complexity of nation-
building in relation to subordinate culture. Developed from hybridisation, ‘Combi-
nation’ is not a simple two-way relationship between a coloniser and a colonised. 
Rather, this ‘Combi-nation’ is rooted in the uneven distribution of power among 
elements of the superior and inferior, an internal colony within a semi-colony, a 
colonised who is also a coloniser, and subordinate people as double colonised 
object. The process of ‘Combi-nation’ in Thailand is not identical to, but consists of, 




not necessarily hybridised. In other words, this is a selective way of using 
‘combination’, between different cultures and identities that depend on where 
Siam/Thailand positions itself by relationship to others. 
This ‘Combi-nation’ concept makes a contribution to Thai Studies by taking a 
non-centric perspective on the construction of Thai nation. It is developed from 
existing knowledge provided by many scholars in the Thai Studies field who have 
demonstrated Thai culture and systems of power have been hybridised with the 
West. I discuss this in Chapter 1, and the relationship of hybridisation with internal 
colonies. This results from the ambiguous status of Thailand as both semicolonial 
and internal coloniser. However, existing research focuses on Central Thai 
perspectives. For example, Anderson questions Thai axioms as an independent 
nation and calls the nationalism movement in the country ‘official nationalism’; 
Thongchai’s argument on the foundation of the royal-nationalist ideology after the 
Paknam Crisis and the construction of the geobody; Jackson’s idea of ‘semi-
colonialism’ and Herzfled’s ‘crypto-colonialism.’ Still, none of them have looked 
closely at how these internal colonies and their identities are exploited. I developed 
my research from existing knowledge by focusing on the internal colony and its 
regional, subordinate culture. My approach allows us to question the roles of regional 
identities in the process of nation-building and it helps us to better understand the 
technique and process that Siam/Thailand uses. While these scholars have shown 
hybridity, it does not simply mean that every identity of the Thai nation is hybridised. 
On the other hand, the hybridisation and assimilation processes are selective and 
varied based on the dimension of relationships. This non-centric perspective 
provides a better understanding that the making of the Thai nation is complicated 
and multi-layered.   
This research also contributes to studies of nation and nationalism. It uses 
Thailand and its regional culture as a case study to demonstrate that nation-building 
in Thailand is different from Western scholarly ways of describing the nation. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 1 on the section of ‘Combi-nation’, the Thai nation is 
constructed from pre-modern and modern elements. Based on Smith’s four 
paradigms of nations, this thesis shows that the Thai nation has combined concepts 
found in Smith’s ethno-symbolism and the modernist scholars like Gellner and 
Anderson. Gellner’s idea about nationalism and industrialisation as well as 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities explain the nation-building that Siam/Thailand 
has hybridised with West. In this research, we can see that there are elements of 
modernism in constructing the nation such as geographical maps which concretise a 
geobody, print language, and bureaucratic systems. At the same time, there are 




the representation of Northern Thai culture in Thai TV dramas has illustrated these 
premodern elements.  
This ‘Combi-nation’ concept also contributes to Postcolonial Studies. Thailand 
often differentiates itself from other countries in Southeast Asia as the only country 
that ‘has never been colonised.’ Thus, a lot of Thai scholars deny the study of Thai 
history through a postcolonial approach. This research takes existing knowledge 
from scholars in the Thai Studies field that propose Thailand too can be regarded as 
a product of Western imperialism. This research takes a viewpoint that 
Siam/Thailand is an indirect colony of the West, and also acted as internal coloniser. 
Thailand’s semicolonial relationship to the West can be understood using Bhabha’s 
hybridisation theory. Moreover, this thesis takes Condee’s ‘two-Russias’ to explain 
the doubleness in becoming a modern nation. This doubleness resulted from Siam's 
ambiguity being both colonised and coloniser. The depiction of North Thailand, 
closely studied in the thesis, is a product of this hybridisation and doubleness, and 
accordingly it has provided another example for Postcolonial Studies. Each chapter 
illustrates how Thailand constructs nation by using imperialist premises to exercise 
power over subaltern people.  
Apart from the new perspectives provided to these fields, which are non-
Western and non-centric, also, this research takes on new material, from Thai TV 
drama, to study this topic. Regarding Media Studies, or TV Studies in particular, this 
research looks at non-Western contexts and at a specific genre. Thai TV drama, 
though different, has something in common with Western soap operas. It does have 
its own uniqueness in terms of length (much shorter than Western dramas), stories 
developing in continuing episodes, and with closed endings that do not linger from 
season to season. Shows generally have a short finite airtime yet remain powerful in 
the hearts of the audience and can be rerun time after time. As a genre that differs 
from the West, this research has provided a new perspective in the knowledge of TV 
Studies. Therefore, it contributes to a global discussion of TV drama as a genre.  
For TV Studies in Thailand, this research uses a different approach. Existing 
research has been focusing on content, production, and reception, as I demonstrate 
in Chapter 2. Research in later periods take a Cultural Studies approach combined 
with media analysis. In contrast to that, my research has used historical, cultural and 
the political background of Thai society as a context to analyse TV dramas. By using 
this approach, it allows us to evaluate and understand the imagination and creation 
of Thai nation. It enables us to use a particular lens to study Thai TV, or in other 
words, it permits us to investigate construction of the nation. This has not been done 




things that are happening on TV better. With historical, cultural and political 
background, readers can see an overall picture of why TV dramas in Thailand are 
produced in such a manner. It shows that TV dramas too can be read as historical 
and political texts.  
Suggestions for new research  
 Within a limit of time, I have investigated only one genre of mass media, 
which is historical TV drama. I deeply explore in detail only selected scenes in four 
productions. Though this research has conceptualised a unique way of 
understanding nation-building, it would be useful for future research if this concept 
were tested against other genres such as songs, variety shows, printed media, or 
content in new media like YouTube videos which are having more and more impact 
on younger generations. It would also be useful for future research to look at how 
these media interrelated in terms of nation-building. Bupphesanniwat, for example, is 
firm evidence of how an historical TV drama with nationalistic themes can be 
developed and impact other media, such as songs and printed media. Some 
researchers may find it interesting to learn that Thai nation-building can be found 
even in the country’s favourite activities such as beauty contests, singing contests, 
ceremonies or festivals. Possible contexts to study this concept also include areas 
beyond media and entertainment like national development policy, public health, 
education, the military, or state campaigns. The concept of ‘combi-nation’ can be 
applicable for observing and examining how regional, subordinate identities are 
abused. Likewise, I would also suggest using this concept to test nation-building in 
other cultural contexts such as Russia, Turkey, or even the UK, that have similar 
problems as Thailand (problems of ethnicity, discrimination and assimilation of 
cultures, and premises of internal empire) to see whether this concept can help 
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Glossary of key terms 
Ayutthaya period (1351-1767):  
The kingdom of Ayutthaya was founded by King U Thong. By the end of the 
fourteenth century, Ayutthaya was regarded as the strongest power in Southeast 
Asia. The Thai kingdom was not a single unified state, but rather a patchwork of self-
governing principalities and tributary provinces owing allegiance to the king of 
Ayutthaya. In 1765, its territory was invaded by Burmese armies and destroyed in 
1767. After Ayutthaya, a new Thonburi kingdom was established from 1767-1782 
with King Rama I founding the Rattanakosin kingdom of the Chakri Dynasty in 1782. 
 
Chakri Dynasty:   
The current dynasty of Thailand which has ruled the kingdom since the founding of 
Rattanakosin kingdom (the Bangkok era), in 1872. The current monarch of the 
Chakri Dynasty is King Maha Vajiralongkorn, or King Rama X.  
 
Farang:   
A term used in Thailand to refer to a Westerner or Western-derived things. The word 
was borrowed from Muslim Persian, and Indian traders during the Ayutthaya period. 
It was used to refer to the Portuguese who were the first Europeans to visit Siam. 
Thai dictionaries define the term as ‘a generic Thai word for white Caucasians’ and is 
used to describe Western people without any specification of nationality, culture, 
ethnicity, or language etc109.  
 
Kathoey: 
The third gender in Thai society, kathoey is an intermediate category between 
masculine men and feminine women (and not to be confused as referring to 
transsexual women). Kathoey literally means unnatural or withered in Thai language, 
a seedless plant that cannot be reproduced. In traditional Thai society, ‘kathoey’ can 
also refer to a person whose social behaviour is considered inappropriate for their 
gender. Historically, kathoey included all forms of difference, whether in the domain 
of sex (hermaphroditism), gender (cross-dressing), or sexuality (homosexuality). 
Only after the 1970s did the term kathoey develop to denote only a person who is 
 




born male but subsequently enacts a feminine role (male transvestite) or undergoes 
a sex change operation (a male-to-female transsexual).110 
 
Lakhon:   
A term referring to the performing arts, particularly dance-drama, such as lakhon nai 
(dance-drama shown within the inner court, performed by female dancers), lakhon 
nok (dance-drama shown outside the royal court, performed by male dancers), 
lakhon charti (dance-drama usually performed in the south of Thailand), lakhon rong 
(operetta/lyric drama), and lakhon phud (dialogue play), and so on. When Thai 
traditional performing arts are developed into TV drama, they are called ‘lakhon TV.'  
 
Lakhon Namnao:   
 ‘Namnao’ evokes the look and smell of stagnant water and rotting garbage, 
conjuring up images of modern Thailand’s polluted cannels and waterways.111 Its 
literally means stinking, polluted water because of its recurring theme, emotional 
plots and low-quality production that remain the unchanging, like still, putrid water.  
Lakhon nam nao usually portrays stories of unreal life, presenting characters who 
are more attractive, glamourous, and wealthy than everyday reality. The plot usually 
involves romance between a poor girl and a rich boy112.  
 
Lanna Kingdom:   
Northern Thailand as we know it today was previously the Lanna Kingdom. It 
included parts of what is known as upper Burma, Sipsong Panna (Xixuang Banna) in 
China’s Yunnan Province, Northern Thailand, and Northern Laos. In 1560, the 
Burmese took control of Lanna and for the next 200 years. In the late eighteenth 
century Lanna’s leaders, with help from Siam, ousted the Burmese overlords. Lanna 
states then placed themselves under Siam’s power and became tributary states. 
Every three years, Lanna sent token tributes and presented themselves regularly at 
the royal court in Bangkok (Siam’s capital)113. 
 
 
110 Jackson, 2001; Channarong, 2014.  
111 cited in Farmer, 2015:81 
112 Amporn, 2008:44-45  




Luk-khreung:   
A mixed-race child, of Thai and foreign parents. Luk-khreung have been known as 
such in Siam since the Ayutthaya period, resulting from interracial marriages. They 
became a widespread phenomenon after the post-Vietnam War era in the 1960s 
after intense intimacy between visiting soldiers and local Thais114. Luk-khreung 
children in the latter times have also been the result of increases in interracial 
marriage, as well as sex tourism after the expansion of the economy and more 
contact with the West115.  
 
Nang-ek:  
The female side of a fixed binary of leading male and female characters in Thai TV 
dramas, the nang-ek normally appears as a good woman who is ‘innocent, gentle, 
prim, well-behaved, forgiving, and, most of all, a virgin.’116 The nang-ek must 
represent people who would do no wrong intentionally. It is compulsory for nang-ek 
to end up in a romantic relationship with the phra-ek.   
 
Paknam incident:   
The conflict between Siam and France regarding the boundary at the east side of the 
Mekong River. In July 1893, the French pressured Siam by sending two gunboats to 
blockade the Chao Phraya River and the two armies opened fire. The French gave 
the ultimatum that Siam must withdraw from the east of the Mekong area and pay 
two million francs to the French. Siam had to sign a new treaty with France in 
October 1893.   
 
Phra-ek: 
The leading male role of the fixed binary of characters in Thai TV dramas, the phra-
ek must be ‘brave, gallant, and impartial.' The role of phra-ek (and nang-ek) may be 
comparable to Western hero and heroine types only in representing good and people 
who do no wrong intentionally. Phra-ek is highly regarded in Thai dramas as the 
word ‘phra’ is also related to Buddhism. It is the word used to refer to a Buddhist 
 
114 Pattana, 2010:71-72  
115 Weisman, 2001:233 




monk and/or Buddha image. ‘Phra’ is used for something sacred and highly 
worshipped in Thai society.  
 
Ratthaniyom:   
The government’s civilisation programme starting in 1939 translated in English as 
state conventions or cultural mandates. This includes 12 sets of pronouncements as 
the state’s attempt to create nationalism and a new political culture. Each 
announcement was aimed at changing the outlook of people in wide variety of 
subjects. For example, the changing of country’s name, lyrics in national anthem, 
daily activities, and emphasises on social values.  
 
Self-sufficiency economy or ‘Setthakit pho phiang’: 
King’s Bhumibol’s theory of self-sufficient agriculture to help people make a living 
close to subsistence. The concept includes self-sufficiency, self-reliance, the 
rejection of consumerism and industrialism, culture and community, power, rural 
primacy, and nationalism. This concept came in sweeping statements that suggested 
Thais had been misled by the West, and made slaves of financially strong countries. 
The West, IMF, and world bank were seen as threatening Thailand117.  
 
Siwilai:  
A term coined in Thailand around the nineteenth century and adapted from the word 
‘civilise’ and ‘civilisation’, after the coming of Western trade and imperial power. The 
Thai King was aware that Siam’s sovereignty would depend on its level of 
civilisation. Thus, the Siamese quest towards being civilised, or ‘siwilai’, was 
therefore adapted by ruling elites. This process was believed to prevent Siam from 
being colonised. 
 
Tom yam kung crisis:   
The 1997 Asian financial crisis. In the early 1990s, Thailand opened up its financial 
markets and foreign investment started to pour in because Thai banks offered high-
interest rates on deposits. Loaded with foreign money, the banks loaned big and 
carelessly and it became mountains of bad debt. By the end of 1997 bankrupt 
 




corporations and failed financial institutions were spread across the continent. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) lent tens of billions of US dollars with strict 
conditions. Unemployment rose to high levels across the region as factories and 
other enterprises closed down. By the end of 1996, the Thai government had closed 
64 local finance companies, leaving just 27 in operation, along with 13 local banks. 
The Thai economic boom came to an end. Construction of hundreds of big offices, 
housing and retail projects came to a halt, as did infrastructure projects. Thai 
workers left the cities to return to their home villages118. 
 
Tua talok: 
A supporting character who takes the role of a clown, tua talok functions as the 
comedic voice of the audience, entertains, criticises, and makes fun of other 
characters.119 Tua talok can also be compared with the trickster of Western dramas 
due to the comic style. While a trickster may challenge the norm in a society and the 
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